As far as fossil evidence is concerned, there is abundant fossil evidence to validate in broad outlines evolutionary history

For sure, and I apologize for not being clear if I implied that evolution or evolutionary history was somehow not reflective of reality.

What I meant to say is that if we require science to require all theories to be empirically testable, then philosophical naturalism is not a scientific view, and further under the same arguments for why ID should be kept out of the classroom apply to naturalism as well.

Furthermore, the claim that all life came about by unguided evolution is therefore not scientific either, as it cannot be falsified. Assertions of teleology, and similarly, lack of teleology, would fall under this umbrella.

As far as fossil evidence is concerned, there is abundant fossil evidence to validate in broad outlines evolutionary history — Wayfarer

To which ID-ers say that the evidence was designed.

What I meant to say is that if we require science to require all theories to be empirically testable, then philosophical naturalism is not a scientific view, and further under the same arguments for why ID should be kept out of the classroom apply to naturalism as well.

Furthermore, the claim that all life came about by unguided evolution is therefore not scientific either, as it cannot be falsified. Assertions of teleology, and similarly, lack of teleology, would fall under this umbrella. — Paulm12

In a rational humanity devoid of hypocrisy, in a word, yes.

There are two typical understanding of "science": One is any branch of learning. Here mathematics can be construed a science, as can technology, archeology, etc. But then so too can mythology (it’s a branch of learning). Or, else, fartology as the branch of learning how and when to properly fart. The other understanding is that it is shorthand for the empirical sciences. Here, all conclusions are inductively obtained from empirical data that can be replicated by others - lest it be illusory or else outright deception - itself derived from falsifiable hypotheses which the data either evidences/verifies (but never conclusively proves) or else falsifies (thereby conclusively proving the one or more hypotheses false). Without this system/methodology that incorporates falsifiability, anything could go: including an in-depth theory/paradigm accounting for all aspects of the universe in terms of invisible unicorns with magical powers that surround.

Where there is confusion between the two understandings of science, the empirical sciences lose their efficacy and, in turn, their validity. At the very least in the public eye.

Since this is a philosophy forum, the methodology of the empirical sciences is itself founded upon philosophical principles. Nevertheless, in so far as these amount to the methodology of the empirical sciences, the empirical sciences will themselves be utterly distinct from the branch of learning termed philosophy at large. The empirical sciences are also greatly reliant upon non-empirical-science branches of learning, in particular that of mathematics (here first and foremost in terms of statistical analysis of data).

Because the empirical sciences are limited, in part, to data that can be replicated by any other, they by default cannot be applied to things such as the reality of anything spiritual - if there might be one - which by its very nature of so being (if it in fact to any extent occurs) is not ubiquitously profane and thereby equally observable by all in principle.

Gravity and natural selection are in and of themselves theories regarding broad spectrums of data obtained or else confirmed by the empirical sciences - but are not in and of themselves applied empirical sciences. Nonetheless, as theories they are falsifiable by potential empirical data (a replicable observation of apples that move upward into the skies or, else, a replicable observation of a lifeform in the fossil record devoid of any taxonomical lineage - like the discovery of a fossilized griffin), and as theories are furthermore evidenced/verified by all empirical data.

Not that this presents a complete picture, nevertheless:

Neither philosophical naturalism nor Intelligent Design can be empirically falsified via observable data that is necessarily replicable by all others. Neither are, nor can be, integral aspects of the empirical sciences proper. But both can be deemed sciences, by those who uphold them, in the generalized sense of “branches of learning”.

So no, Intelligent Design is not a valid scientific theory (if one is addressing the empirical sciences).

What I meant to say is that if we require science to require all theories to be empirically testable, then philosophical naturalism is not a scientific view, — Paulm12

That’s a very interesting point. What ‘naturalism’ has come to mean is ‘can be accommodated within the epistemic framework of science’. And science, or at any rate modern science, operates from certain assumptions about what is real, what counts as evidence, and so on. It’s implicitly physicalist in outlook - ‘implicitly’ because physicalism may not be explicitly stated or defended as a philosophical tenet, but simply assumed.

I was going to write some more, but @javra more or less beat me to it! ;-)

I can think outside the box, and thinking consistently with logic, another box appears. Since there are people in this box, assume there are people in that box.

One of those people created the universe(probably some poorly put together illusion that'nt nearly as big as it seems).

I don't know- right- but I do believe.

Thank you, good night.

The technicality of the universe begets that something simpler came first. If we are talking about beginnings- nothings becoming something's, why does nothing auto become the universe? Isn't there more probable states? And thus, intelligent design is a mere stepping stone; one that's probably required to make sense of this junk verse.

And science, or at any rate ‘modern’ science, operates from certain assumptions about what is real, what counts as evidence, and so on. It’s implicitly physicalist in outlook - ‘implicitly’ because physicalism may not be explicitly stated or defended as a philosophical tenet, but simply assumed. — Wayfarer

This got me thinking. According the Pew Research Center, about half of all scientists are neither atheists nor agnostics. This is much lower than the proportion of spirituality in the general population. And I haven't read the entire article. But still, to me this evidences that the empirical sciences do not require an assumption of physicalism in order to be successfully engaged in.

I rather see it as the empirical sciences tend to only hold efficacy regarding physicality - this excluding notable exceptions such as that of the cognitive sciences (which research cognition in empirical manners). So for the philosophical naturalist, if the only tool at one's disposal is a hammer ...

So for the philosophical naturalist, if the only tool at one's disposal is a hammer ... — javra

Physicalism is a metaphysics. But they like to think it is not.

Physicalism is a metaphysics. But they like to think it is not. — Jackson

Yes, agreed.

It's more a matter of history and the circumstances of The Enlightenment. Some years back when I was first posting, there was a site with an excerpt from the charter of The Royal Society, the first-ever purely scientific society. One of the articles was to avoid 'metaphysikal disputation' which was seen to be the province of Religion. And religious disputes, in that culture, were often extremely violent and politically charged.

Likewise, Galileo torpedoed scholastic physics - as had to be done, because it was archaic and not even remotely informed by observation. But with that, went much else besides, including Aristotle's final and formal causes. That is where the taboo on teleological explanations goes back to. Everything was to be explicable in terms of the paradigm of the emerging new physics (which is now 'classical' or Newtonian physics.) Ideas of purpose were abandoned, and intentionality relegated to the subjective domain of the observing mind.

I think that strictly speaking that style of old-school materialism belongs to the modern period, as distinct from post-modernity. (I bracket the modern period between Newton and Einstein.) As soon as quantum mechanics was discovered the classical paradigm of separate bodies in space obeying rigidly deterministic laws started to fall into question. That's why many of the first-generation of modern physicists - Bohr, Heisenberg, and Schrodinger in particular - were philosophically deep thinkers who explored Greek and Indian philosophical ideas. They were fishing for a metaphysic (for which, see Tao of Physics.) But the influence of that form of materialism remains deeply embedded in today's culture, albeit implicit a lot of the time. It seems highly influential in the writings of the so-called 'new atheists'.

If we are talking about beginnings- nothings becoming something's, why does nothing auto become the universe? — Varde

There had to be only a simple entropically timeless 5D quantum spacetime to let it all happen. On this space, the only thing that can happen, is the emergence of two two closed real 4D mirror universes one of which is ours..

started to fall into question. That's why many of the first-generation of modern physicists — Wayfarer

Which is why Bohm posited non-local hidden variables. His talks with Krishnamurti show his involvement with Eastern philosophy which so emphasize the relation between the parts and the holes. In his book "Wholeness and Implicate Order" he gives us a glimpse in his fascinating holographic universe.

In agreement with what you wrote. Materialism is an ingrained aspect of our culture at large, with a lot of history to this.

I'm still thinking that it's, should I say "technically", distinct from the methodology and outcomes of the empirical sciences per se. In other words, I for example find that in a different possible world where the prevailing cultural view is that of idealism, the empirical sciences would still be indispensable for optimally appraising the truth of that which is universally observable by - and which universally affects - all in principle if not also in practice (hence, what we term the physical ... or what in Peircean philosophy of objective idealism is deemed effete mind).

In his book "Wholeness and Implicate Order" he gives us a glimpse in his fascinating holographic universe. — Hillary

I got that book when it came out. I also got Krishnamurti's book with the Bohm dialogues when it came out. I'm dubious about his hidden-variables theory, but let's not get into that - it's a guaranteed de-railer.

I for example find that in a different possible world where the prevailing cultural view is that of idealism, the empirical sciences would still be indispensable for optimally appraising the truth of that which is universally observable by - and which universally affects - all in principle if not also in practic — javra

:100: I often say, the distinction that has to be made is between methodological naturalism, and metaphysical naturalism. Methodological naturalism is the prudent restriction of hypotheses to include only that which can be observed or validated/falsified empirically. But it easily spills over into metaphysical naturalism when it then declares that whatever can't be observed is not real or cannot be considered.

I'm dubious about his hidden-variables theory, but let's not get into that - it's a guaranteed de-railer. — Wayfarer

The hidden variables would destroy you whole view on the consciousness related view. It sweeps the relation between consciousness and QM under the carpet. So I can see why you not want to go into that... :smile:

No, that's not it. Check this out.

Like I said. The pilot wave is a real wave, pushing the particle determined along within it's bound. The particle always has a well determined position and momentum. No consciousness involved during collapse. The wave just shrinks simultaneously over it's extent. But feel free to think what you like. I have stated my case and retire in my cave.

Neither philosophical naturalism nor Intelligent Design can be empirically falsified via observable data that is necessarily replicable by all others. — javra

"Philosophical naturalism" – a speculative principle – is not a hypothetical explanation whereas Intelligent Design purports to be a "theory", so they are not epistemically comparable and, while neither is falsifiable, the latter claims to explain facts of the matter which is does not explain – thus, is pseudo-science at most.

The most common objection to ID seems to be that it does not produce any testable hypothesis, and thus is “outside” of science (thus perhaps it would better be argued in a philosophy class). However, what bothers me about this is if science must be testable, then much of cosmology would also be considered inappropriate for a science classroom (no multiverses, no accounts for natural laws-all those would similarly be outside of science and therefore not belong in a science classroom either). — Paulm12

Good point of contention. In math, there is a point at which we cannot determine an exact answer to a problem due to the enormity of the amount for which we don't have the proper device to calculate -- at least not yet. I forget the terminology they use. But, maybe @jgill knows something.

Intelligent design could be reworked as a paradigm shift (this is a special expression for something that requires rework of assumptions, hypotheses, and conclusions of a framework) so we have something to use to explain the unexplainable, for example the WHY questions of the universe. Of course, the issue is the testability of assumptions, etc. So this would have to be handled by theorists. But there should be an attempt at least to make room for something that science cannot fully explain due to lack of testable assumptions. Sans proof, ID, just like the big bang, should be accommodated but with a paradigm shift.

What am I comparing it to?

The mind. Science can explain the brain and brain processes, but not the mind using proof. Know this.

For intelligent design to become a scientific model, there would have to be falsification criteria, the more the better.
For intelligent design to become of much use, it would have to (stabilize and) make reliable predictions.

^{By the way, I don't think it's in the cards that intelligent design can (ever) derive, say, the 10 commandments, that one should pray to the Sun for inspiration and atonement, that Muhammad was the (final) messenger of Allah, or whatever. That's the marked gap from these sorts of apologetics to the (elaborate) religions that have adherents.}

For intelligent design to become a scientific model, there would have to be falsification criteria, the more the better. — jorndoe

Not necessarily. The big bang does not have falsification qualification, but it's scientific.

By the way, I don't think it's in the cards that intelligent design can (ever) derive, say, the 10 commandments, that one should pray to the Sun for inspiration and atonement, that Muhammad was the (final) messenger of Allah, or whatever. That's the marked gap from these sorts of apologetics to the (elaborate) religions that have adherents. — jorndoe

I was typing up a follow up post to mine and meant to say that people should stop cutting corners by inserting "god" as their conclusion if they want their theory to be accepted. It doesn't mean that they have to sacrifice their belief that it is god. But they have to rework their thesis if they want to be taken as scientific. I mean, they should write it so that the only logical conclusion is god (that is, if they want other thinkers to follow this conclusion). I don't know. I'm throwing some ideas here.

The big bang does not have falsification qualification — L'éléphant

If I remember right, it does. Something to do with recombination, that's fairly specific. Or, I guess it could just be shown that the universe isn't expanding after all, or only started expanding, say, 10 billion years ago. Or, a 100 billion-year-old galaxy could be found, ...
By the way, we already know that the theory only can go so far (at the moment), since it relies on relativity for the most part. If relativity was to be falsified, then it could take big bang with it.

(↑ edited a couple times, past my bedtime, Zzz)

It is interesting, ain't it?, that like Laplace thought, if we mathematize the present, both the past and the future will reveal their secrets to us.

I'm most amazed at how powerful mathematics is and what a stroke of luck that our universe is mathematical (re Max Tegmark).

By the way, we already know that the theory only can go so far (at the moment), since it relies on relativity for the most part. If relativity was to be falsified, then it could take big bang with it. — jorndoe

But you're forgetting, relativity does not prove the big bang, it only supports some testable hypotheses. I said this in another thread, there is no proof for the big bang. Only evidence that's testable.

you're forgetting — L'éléphant

:snicker:

The whole conversation about physicalism and metaphysical naturalism is a very interesting one, and as mentioned is very much ingrained in our culture. I'd love to continue this line of thinking more, either in this topic or in another.

the distinction that has to be made is between methodological naturalism, and metaphysical naturalism

Agreed. One of the assumptions that is made by methodological naturalism is that nothing "supernatural" will happen during the time in which an experiment is conducted. However, I think even most people who believe in the supernatural would find this to be a fair assumption. The issue becomes whether this assumption can be applied to everything within the world, for all time. At the end of the day, metaphysical naturalism involves an assumption of ergodicity about the state of the world, which to me is difficult to philosophically justify. That's not to say I think metaphysical naturalism is an indefensible position, or shoudn't be held, or anything like that-instead that the claim "nothing supernatural has ever happened" is unfalsifiable and probably shouldn't be held with complete certainty.

Science spends a lot of time generating (falsifiable) models that describe the natural world. As George E. P. Box said

All models are wrong, but some are useful

. A useful model is one that not only describes the events of an experiment, but can extend to other observations about the world too. But to me, these models are always an approximation of reality to a useful degree, not a claim to describe it exactly as it is (the latter is the job of philosophy).

For intelligent design to become of much use, it would have to (stabilize and) make reliable predictions.

I think the same could be said for naturalistic accounts for abiogenesis, the multiverse, an account for the natural laws, etc. However I also think if intelligent design explains certain aspects of reality better than purely naturalistic accounts, regardless if it makes reliable predictions or not, then it should be taken seriously. Once again, I don't claim to know anything about ID theory or biology. However, from what I've heard, the modern formations of the teleological argument for the existence of God take a probabilistic approach (I believe it was Swinborne, who I admit I haven't read, along with others), that argue the existence of intelligent life is better explained through a design argument than pure naturalistic accounts.

One of the assumptions that is made by methodological naturalism is that nothing "supernatural" will happen during the time in which an experiment is conducted. — Paulm12

That is similar to the much-vaunted 'principle of causal closure', which is that every event has a physical cause. But that is where the observer effect in physics has put a cat well and truly among the pidgeons, as it attributes to the act of observation a fundamental role in the experimental outcome. That is the sense in which consciousness enters physics - not as mysterious substance, but as the act of observation, which always entails an observer. And the observer is always separate to what is being observed.

Even aside from that, however, as first Kant, and later Husserl, understood, the observing mind is not itself among the objects of naturalism. As Husserl put it, 'Consciousness is not a thing among things, it is the horizon that contains everything.' Of course all the resident materialists will freak out when you say something like that but that's because they can't understand what it means.

However I also think if intelligent design explains certain aspects of reality better than purely naturalistic accounts, regardless if it makes reliable predictions or not, then it should be taken seriously. — Paulm12

It's true that science doesn't explain metaphysical principles. For that matter, science isn't even in the business of explaining scientific laws! Most scientistic types are convinced that science is somehow responsible for scientific principles, which is like a rooster taking credit for the sunrise.

Questions such as how do scientific laws arise, what is the origin of life, is there intentionality in the Universe, are not scientifically resolvable. Popper's criterion of falsifiability was intended to delineate scientific propositions by saying that they must in principle be falsifiable by further discovery. If they can accomodate everything, then they're not empirical hypotheses, and if they're not empirical hypotheses then they're not scientific, in modern terms.

The very simple point at the back of this is that 'naturalism assumes nature'. In other words, naturalism is not a metaphysic, concerned with the first and grounding principles of being. It works from a perspective of the intelligent subject in a domain of objects, ascertaining causal relationships and trying to uncover grounding regularities and principles. But understanding why science is not metaphysics is itself an exercise in metaphysics, not a scientific one. (See The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss, Neil Ormerod.)

But that is where the observer effect in physics has put a cat well and truly among the pidgeons, as it attributes to the act of observation a fundamental role in the experimental outcome — Wayfarer

Which is only the case in the standard QM. Of course does our consciousness projects onto the dark physical world, but it has no causal power. Observing doesn't collapse a wavefunction. Just had to mention this, cause you present a questionable, and probably wrong premise.

naturalistic accounts for abiogenesis — Paulm12

Incidentally just scrolled by ...

In Test Tubes, RNA Molecules Evolve Into a Tiny Ecosystem (May 5, 2022)

That is similar to the much-vaunted 'principle of causal closure', which is that every event has a physical cause. — Wayfarer

Just to nit-pick, I think says that physical effects have physical causes.

Yes, but given that it is a principle held dear by physicalism, and that it's a closed system, then the point of it is that it allows for nothing other than the physical.

Interesting RNA story. When can they can replicate that with only the elements from the periodic table, then they'll really be on to something.