My conclusion is that scientific law is where logical necessity meets physical causation. I haven't seen an argument to dissuade me of that original idea, although I keep an open mind. — Wayfarer

This despite being shown in both the Anscombe article and Del Santo's work that physical causation is not a necessary relation; and both and I pointing out that logical necessity sets out the way things might be spoken about, not the way things are.

In the rush to go all quantum, this thread is looking in the wrong places. It still looks as if your conclusion was reached because it is convenient to your spiritual views.

You and he posted arguments, which I was not persuaded by. Nothing to do with quantum physics.

...arguments, which I was not persuaded by — Wayfarer

So it seems.

I like a truly simplistic explanation: When embedded in spacetime logical necessity becomes physical causation. :nerd:

:clap: :up:

@Wayfarer Thought you might be interested

:point: If a first cause is necessary...

mine is currently the last reply in that thread.

I like a truly simplistic explanation: When embedded in spacetime logical necessity becomes physical causation. :nerd: — jgill

Hats off to you! :up:

mine is currently the last reply in that thread — Wayfarer

:smile:

My conclusion is that scientific law is where logical necessity meets physical causation. I haven't seen an argument to dissuade me of that original idea, although I keep an open mind. — Wayfarer

I agree with this, but I would go further to say that "physical causation", as conceptual, is a form of the broader category, "logical necessity". From here, if we go further in the direction of the wider category, we see that "logical necessity" can be described as a form of "necessary" in the sense of what is required, or needed for a purpose. So it is related directly to intention and free will, as means to an end. In the other direction, if we look at an assumed object which "physical causation" as a subject, is supposed to represent (in the physical world), we find something which is directly opposed to our conceptions of intention and free will.

This I would say, is why there appears to be a problem in reconciling the two. "Logical necessity" is grounded in free will, while the concept of "physical causation" produces ideas of necessity which are directly opposed to concept of free will . And, like I explained earlier, the classical way to resolve the problem, is to make the thing represented by "physical causation" the result of God's Will.

This despite being shown in both the Anscombe article and Del Santo's work that physical causation is not a necessary relation; — Banno

I would argue that this proposed resolution of the problem renders "physical causation" as a completely impotent concept, and ultimately useless. To remove the necessity, commonly thought to be implied by the cause/effect relationship, removes the required logical rigour of the rules for application of the concept. Then we do not have adequate rules for applying the term "cause". And, we end up with things like what Bartricks demonstrates in his thread on self-creation: sloppy use of "cause", such that a cause and effect might be coincidental. And that is just one example of how "cause" may be misused, when logical restrictions on definition are removed. Aristotle demonstrate six distinct uses for "cause" current in his time, the four commonly cited, along with luck and chance. Luck and chance he excluded as inappropriate use of the term.

My conclusion is that scientific law is where logical necessity meets physical causation. — Wayfarer

"Logical necessity" in this context implies that for the laws to be different would be a logical contradiction. And yet this is not so. which is why I'm having difficulty following your argument.

I like a truly simplistic explanation: When embedded in spacetime logical necessity becomes physical causation. :nerd: — jgill

Is it logically necessary that spacetime must be always the same?

"Logical necessity" in this context implies that for the laws to be different would be a logical contradiction. — Janus

what I think it means, is simply that you can make reasoned predictions and draw conclusions based on both observation and inference. Something very close to Kant's synthetic a priori.

Notice that what you describe here is not logical necessity.

If you are insisting that the laws of physics are logically necessary you must maintain that the laws of physics could not have been other than they are.

I didn't say it was. I said that scientific laws (or principles) are where 'logical necessity meets physical causation'. As was established at the beginning, these are separate but in practice the application of logical and mathematical principles to physics is fundamental in science.

SO you are not making any salient point?

Try this: language uses logic. Logic is a formalisation of grammar, setting out structures and implications in our language use. Science uses language, and hence logic.

Again, physical causation is not a necessary relation; and logical necessity sets out the way things might be spoken about, not the way things are.

Is it logically necessary that spacetime must be always the same? — Janus

That's beyond simplistic. Time and length dilation under high velocities should have no effect on applications of logic in respective settings. But I don't think space really changes, just distances between some objects. But what do I know? Virtually nothing about the subject.

Again, physical causation is not a necessary relation; and logical necessity sets out the way things might be spoken about, not the way things are. — Banno

Doesn't allow for the fact that mathematics is predictive, enabling discovery of hitherto unknown facts (e.g. 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences'.) You can't reduce philosophy to 'language games'.

Of course it does. You put four apples in the bag, then two more, you can predict that there will be at least six apples in the bag. You describe gravity in terms of general relativity, you get the precession of Mercury.

You desire to see something mysterious. It isn't there.

[del]

You desire to see something mysterious — Banno

So what was bugging Einstein when he said 'the most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible', then?

What I'm questioning is the idea that logical necessity is not related at all to physical causation. Obviously it's possible to consider logic (and math) in the abstract as if they are not connected to any actual state of affairs. But the fact that nature is to some extent predictable, i.e. that logical inference and mathematical concepts can be used to gain insights into and influence over the course of events indicates that the supposed division between them is not absolute. So I would question this sequence of propositions:

5.133 All inference takes place a priori.
5.134 From an elementary proposition no other can be inferred.
5.135 In no way can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different from it.
5.136 There is no causal nexus which justifies such an inference.
5.1361 The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present.
Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.

Supersition, then, is the belief that things happen for a reason. Is that right? Am I on the right track here?

Isn't that part of what was left in need of more work, and which brought him back for another go?

See PI §324-5. What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live.

Isn't that part of what was left in need of more work, and which brought him back for another go? — Banno

I don't know. I should do some more reading.

But what do I know? Virtually nothing about the subject. — jgill

You're not alone!

what I think it means, is simply that you can make reasoned predictions and draw conclusions based on both observation and inference. Something very close to Kant's synthetic a priori. — Wayfarer

Yes I agree, you can think inductively and abductively based on accumulated past experience. However, logical necessity is not inductive or abductive but deductive, and that is the part that is missing from empirical inference

If we look at causality from a mathematical perspective, say as a function (input $\to f \to$ output), I think we have a good place to start as regards proving the necessity of causality. I dunno, just a random thought!

So much the worse for empiricism, then. I think Hume actually ‘plays dumb’. ‘You say there’s a causal relationship? Show it to me!’ You then set fire to his tie and say ‘see! The match caused that!’ ‘This time!’ he says, looking flustered whilst anxiously dunking his tie in his glass of water (thereby causing the fire to go out.)

Just found a splendid Robert Lawrence Kuhn video on exactly this point. And hey, personal connection - I sold one of the interviewees a Macintosh Computer, once.

In fact, there cannot be an ‘empirical inference’. Inference depends on an intuition of causal relations. If you really only accepted literally what the senses told you, then you would be able to infer nothing. Which is exactly what Kant proved, in several tens of thousands of words.

There may indeed be physical necessity. For all we know it could be physically impossible that things could have been different. But logical necessity is another animal altogether.

Also there is such a thing as empirical inference; it is based on the expectation that comes from invariance of observed correlations. I agree with Hume that we don't actually witness causation, but I think he also neglected to notice that we experience ourselves, feel ourselves, as causal agents, as being able to apply forces to other things, and also as being acted upon by various forces.

But the point is, inference cannot be derived from observation alone. Inference makes sense of observation. This is what Kant notices. He says, you can’t say that the mind is simply tabula rasa, an empty slate on which events record impressions. Instead the mind constructs your experience, and in order to do that, it has to draw on rules - without which inference would be impossible. And experience does not comprise a series of events with no connection. If we really experienced that, we couldn’t even speak. We’d be like a character in one of Oliver Sach’s books, ‘The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat’. That’s what the brain does with its billions of connections. It creates a world.

So Hume’s claim that you can’t observe causal relationships, simply shows that Hume’s account of what ‘observation’ entails is insufficient. If he was consistent, he would just stop saying anything - perhaps return to the backgammon table, which is where he spent the best part of his later life.