Assertives, such as statements, descriptions, assertions.
Directives, such as orders, commands, requests.
Commissives, such as promises, vows, pledges.
Expressives, such as apologies, thanks, congratulations.
Declarations, in which we make something the case by declaring it to be the case. — Banno

Directives are saying something about the state of affairs of the wants and needs of the person using sonecscribbles or sounds.

Commissives are saying something about a future state of affairs where the user of the scribbles or sounds will be helpful.

Expressives are similarcto directives in that they are scribbles that refer one's feelings of guilt, gratitude, and happiness for someone's success - all states of affairs in the world.

Directives are like assertions in asserting what is the case in the world, which can be mental or physical states.

Minds and their states are not separate from the world and can be talked about just like every other state of the world.

I'm afraid I don't see the relevance. Searle is not saying "this is how it must be", he's giving a (hopefully useful) account. A counterargument would be that it wasn't useful, not that alternative accounts are also plausible. — Isaac

Then Searle is not talking about language-use in the world. Hes talking about his own feelings about language-use.

So is this thread about language-use or Searle's feelings or views of language use? Is there any relationship between the two?

If scribble-use was not useful then the scribble-use is meaningless.

Then Searle is not talking about language-use in the world. Hes talking about his own feelings about language-use.

So is this thread about language-use or Searle's feelings or views of language use? Is there any relationship between the two? — Harry Hindu

Of course he's talking about language use in the world. I could classify my books by author, subject, publication date, or binding colour. The choice is entirely mine, but the classification remains of the actual books and in each case I can be wrong about a particular book's placement within the scheme.

Searle is modeling actual language use, but his is not the only possible model.

For the Indirect Realist, Institutional Facts must be metaphorical

From a position of Indirect Realism, in that I cannot perceive the external world as it really is and Husserl's phenomenology, where phenomena through the senses are the primary experience, I can write and think about Institutional facts - my driver's licence, the money in my account, the job I once had, the club I might have belonged to - but only metaphorically, as figures of speech that are not literally applicable.

Searle's intentionality refers to content in the mind not object in the external world

For Searle, the representational properties of a mental state are inherent in the nature of the mental state itself, whether or not it is actually related to some extra-mental object
or state of affairs. Intentionality of a mental state describes its content, not the object.

The consequence is that Speech Acts must be part of a private language

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations argued that a language understandable by only a single individual is incoherent, yet, if my only certain knowledge is with these phenomena, whilst only having a belief in any external world the other side of them, then any speech act I take part in can only be directed at the phenomenal interface between what I know for certain and what I can only believe.

Of course he's talking about language use in the world. I could classify my books by author, subject, publication date, or binding colour. The choice is entirely mine, but the classification remains of the actual books and in each case I can be wrong about a particular book's placement within the scheme. — Isaac

What would it mean for you to be wrong if there are many possible models?

Searle is modeling actual language use, but his is not the only possible model. — Isaac

Is Searle's model wrong? How would we know?

The distinctions Banno, by way of Searle, is making are useless when you understand that all language use is about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world.

They are true because of the role that each plays in a wider activity: chess; property; and Ukrainian government. — Banno

You seem to be using the idea of a truth maker. .

The problems associated with correspondence theory can't be separated from that idea.

Each makes something the case; that the couple are married, the ship named, the ownership of the watch passed on and the bet offered, if not accepted. — Banno

The words, alone, don't make something the case (except perhaps in the case of the bet). Anyone may pronounce someone husband and wife, or name a ship something, or say they bequeath something to someone, and no marriage will result, nor would a ship be named, or a watch bequeathed. The officiant at the marriage must be authorized to marry others, the person naming the ship must be authorized to do so, the bequest must be enforceable under the law.

What would it mean for you to be wrong if there are many possible models? — Harry Hindu

Between models, utility, within models, it depends on the model. Usually they have criteria for correctness within them.

Searle is modeling actual language use, but his is not the only possible model. — Isaac

Is Searle's model wrong? How would we know? — Harry Hindu

I find it useful, so no. I strongly suspect it wouldn't have made it this far is everybody thought it was useless, but in academia, stranger things have happened...

The distinctions Banno, by way of Searle, is making are useless when you understand that all language use is about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world. — Harry Hindu

It's not a matter of 'understanding that...'. You're just presenting a different model, and it's not for you to say what I, or others, find useful.

Intentionality

Intentionality is just a philosophical term for the way in which ones mind is directed towards something. So one might believe that the cat is outside; doubt that the cat is inside; hope that the dog is not with the cat...

Notice the similarity in structure to that of speech acts? There's the same propositional content. We might represent an intentional state as

S(p)

in a way closely analogous to the analysis of speech acts given above.

Further, the same notion of direction of fit can be applied to intentional states. That you believe the cat to be outside has a mind-to-world direction of fit; that you hope the cat is inside has a world-to-mind direction of fit.

Each intentional state is dependent on other intentional states. So wanting to go to the shops is dependent on believing that there are shops to go to, on desiring milk and bread, on hoping that the shop has not sold out of bread, and so on. There are myriad things taken for granted in any intentional state - that the shop has not disappeared since last time you were there, that the ground is solid enough for you to walk on, that there is money in your account. These are termed the network and the background by Searle. The distinction is not firm, but roughly the network is other intentional states and the background is how the world must be for the intentional state to make sense.

Intentional states then have some propositional content, a direction of fit, and background conditions that must be the case. Together these form the satisfaction conditions of the intentional state - roughly the conditions within which the intentional state occurs and makes sense.

Next: Consciousness

And in the same way, I propose that Declaratives by fiat create an external reality, in the world, while Suppositions by fiat create an internal reality, in the minds of the listeners. — hypericin

I'm happy for you to do so. It seems to me that such an "inward" declaration would be private, and subject to the fate of the beetle, but that might change as it plays out.

If the ontology must be put in such terms, then Searle is pretty much a direct realist. Speech acts are very much public.

You seem to be using the idea of a truth maker. . — frank

I don't think so. The comment you quoted is about the context on which the institutional fact occurs, not about what makes the fact true.

The words, alone, don't make something the case — Ciceronianus

Indeed, hence the formulation Searle uses is "X counts as Y in C" where C is the context, and includes the network and background mentioned above.

Again, these speech acts are very much public and form part of what has been called a "form of life". The purpose here is to add detail to that form of life.

Thanks for your comment.

The comment you quoted is about the context on which the institutional fact occurs — Banno

I'm not sure what it means for a fact to "occur."

The words, alone, don't make something the case (except perhaps in the case of the bet). Anyone may pronounce someone husband and wife, or name a ship something, or say they bequeath something to someone, and no marriage will result, nor would a ship be named, or a watch bequeathed. The officiant at the marriage must be authorized to marry others, the person naming the ship must be authorized to do so, the bequest must be enforceable under the law. — Ciceronianus

This is important. The institutional facts don't only care about what is said, but also about where, when and by whom it is said. For example:

All stories might be preceded by the unspoken "in the story...", and so it becomes a declaration about a fictitious story. It is false that 'in the Lord of the Rings' Aragorn takes the ring to Mordor. — Isaac

The novel is both an artifact: the book you're actually reading, and an institutional context. The production of the artifact side excludes readers, but involves authors and editors (and printers, and literary agents, and beta readers...). The reading process itself is often solitary (though there might be a public reading), but the reception side has stuff like reviews, criticisism, fan fiction, fandom conversation... It's one huge institutional context. So it's declarative for an author to write the story, but assertive after the fact to say that Aragon doesn't take the ring to Mordor. You can construe the novel - the artifact - as a speech act, because at the time and pace of the reading the artifact is all there is on the other side of the reading. But the novel is itself a product of many different speech acts (drafts, author-side edits, manuscripts, publishing-side continutiy edits, publishing-side copy edits... would type setting or printing still count as speech acts, or are they "only" reproductions? Hmm....) It'd be imprecise, if not entirely wrong, to assume a novel represents only the speech act of the author whose name is on the cover. (It's even more obvious if you're reading a translation.)

Basically, it's not only the content of the speech act that's bounded by the instituational context, but also the participant roles of the people involved in the production and reception of the speech act, and if words get written down you produce something that moves through space time indipendently from the originator and can be modified by anyone. Which is how we get, say, intellectual property laws. Institutional contexts connect to other institutional contexts. You need to be very clear what you're talking about.

A sentence like "It is false that 'in the Lord of the Rings' Aragorn takes the ring to Mordor," is most likely assertive about the novel. The words in the novel themselves are declarative; without that declarative act, no such assertion would be possible. We attribute the speech act consituted by the novel to the author (Tolkien), but that attribution is itself institionally bound, and elides, for example, the backstage roles taken by editors and printers, all of which might introduce changes along the way to the finished product. Often, for example, translators would like more public credit. (Topical, here: I've read Searls Speech Acts in a German translation, but I couldn't tell you the name of the translator without checking. I can read and understand the original English - the German translation was just easier to buy. So how would I compare the versions?)

If you're looking at institional context, you'll need to consider who says what to whom in what sort of situation, and some of the interesting questions to ask are stuff like what counts as a successful communication, and why?

Indeed, thanks for that.

Part of the reason for setting out Searle's account in some detail is the complexity of the relation between speech acts, intentionality, background and institutional facts. Searle's grand scheme is to trace institutional facts back to our biology; such an account will be nuanced.

Consciousness

Searle's approach to intentionality differs markedly from that of other philosophers who have discussed the topic. In particular, consciousness and direction of fit are central to his account.

While many if not most philosophers who discuss intentionality see desires and beliefs as central, for Searle it seems that the mental consists in conscious states, that are directed and hence intentional. The mind changes to match the world in perceptions, memories and beliefs, while the world is changed to match mind in actions, intentions and desires. It is not desires and beliefs that are central but cognition and volition.

Further, in addition to direction of fit, Searle can now add direction of causation. In, for example, perception, the mind changes to match the way the world is, but the direction of causation is from the world to the mind - the things in the world cause the seeing, touching, smelling. In raising your arm, it is the state of mind that causes the action in the world.

The use of the word "cause" here will doubtless raise some ire, generally because of the considerable philosophical baggage the terms carries around with it. While Searle does think of these causes as quite physical, and I am inclined to agree with him, this is not I think central to the target of this thread - institutional facts; I think we can move on by agreeing that in some way we are influenced by the world, and are in some way able to make our mark upon it.

In other words, I'm concerned here with institutional facts rather than Searle's notion of consciousness. But that doesn't mean we can't discuss both.

We are hopefully now in a position to discuss collective intentionality.

See also Is intentionality exhibited by all mental phenomena?

Next: Collective intentionality

We are hopefully now in a position to discuss collective intentionality. — Banno

Interested to see where this goes in terms of cooperation, our shared obligations and putative moral systems. But maybe I'm jumping the gun?

Well, that's the promise; there should be a few hints already, especially in regard to how the utterance of a set of words in a promise places one under an obligation.

The question is, will Searle's account hold together that far?

While many if not most philosophers who discuss intentionality see desires and beliefs as central, for Searle it seems that the mental consists in conscious states, that are directed and hence intentional — Banno

Being directed is being affected by what directs one’s attention. This interest in the matter, as a function of expectation on the one hand and what affects me on the other is what desire is. Intention and desire should thus be seen as co-determinative. But this is Husserl’s notion of intentionality, not Searle’s. Searle’s form
of realism doesnt allow him to properly integrate the affective and the cognitive.

The mind changes to match the world in perceptions, memories and beliefs, while the world is changed to match mind in actions, intentions and desires. — Banno

Mind and world should not be spilt apart this way. Perception, memory and belief are equal parts expectation and what appears, while actions and desires are just as much constrained by the world they modify as they are changes of that world. Intentionality is the structure subtending all these modes of experience.

But this is Husserl’s notion of intentionality, not Searle’s. — Joshs

Yep.

What, that we refer to the ratio with the sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet? That's a geometric fact? — Isaac

If we take π to mean the number, which people generally do, your quote is a assertion of a geometric fact:
"the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is 3.14159..."

If we are talking about the use of the symbol itself, that is also an assertion of convention:
"the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is denoted by π"

If we are talking about the use of the symbol itself, that is also an assertion of convention:
"the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is denoted by π" — hypericin

Exactly. Yet your claim was that such assertions refer to objects in the external world.

Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker. — hypericin

This one doesn't. Ratios in perfect circles don't exist in the external world, they're a mathematical artefact, yet here they are being christened by a declarative, not a supposition.

What would it mean for you to be wrong if there are many possible models?
— Harry Hindu

Between models, utility, within models, it depends on the model. Usually they have criteria for correctness within them.

Is Searle's model wrong? How would we know?
— Harry Hindu

I find it useful, so no. I strongly suspect it wouldn't have made it this far is everybody thought it was useless, but in academia, stranger things have happened...
— Isaac

:brow:
Hmmm. I would have thought that, being a model, it would be wrong in that it does not represent what is being modeled, therefore it becomes useless as such. In what way can Searle's model of language be used so that we may test how well the model represents the actual state-of-affairs?

Searle is modeling actual language use, but his is not the only possible model. — Isaac — Isaac

Searle is modeling language using language? Is an actual car a model of a car, or is it just a car? Seems like circular reasoning to me.

The distinctions Banno, by way of Searle, is making are useless when you understand that all language use is about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world.
— Harry Hindu

It's not a matter of 'understanding that...'. You're just presenting a different model, and it's not for you to say what I, or others, find useful. — Isaac

So you wouldn't be interested in knowing why your models are not useful to others? If they are not useful to others, then why would it be useful to you? Use is a manifestation of our goals. So if it is useful to you, but not useful to others, then you and others must have different goals, and therefore you would be talking past others.

Exactly. Yet your claim was that such assertions refer to objects in the external world. — Isaac

"External world" is not what I want. Rather, external to the speaker.

My point is that there is a clear external-to-the-speaker/internal-to-the-speaker distinction between assertiives/expressives, and directives/comissives.

So then there should be another, internal to the speaker, corresponding category to declaratives.

"External world" is not what I want. Rather, external to the speaker. — hypericin

But the idea of a ratio within a perfect circle is not external to the speaker. There are no perfect circles, the concept is entirely internal (but shared). Which seems of the same sort as "suppose there's a big green dragon..." Which evokes something in the mind of both the speaker and the listener.

More so if the speaker says something like "we'll call him George". An entirely fictitious entity is undergoing a declarative christening.

I'm pursuing thus because I think it's going to be relevant later with language rules, but I may be completely off track.

Which seems of the same sort as "suppose there's a big green dragon..." — Isaac

I don't think so. Whatever your theoretical model of what geometric truths are, that is independent of the speech act being performed. Geometry is taught at school, assertively, it is something students must absorb from without. Even if you declare that geometry is purely mental (I disagree, but I guess it is possible to argue), this theory does not intersect with the nature of the assertive speech acts which communicate it.

This same distinction has a lot bearing on our discussion of knowledge: the theoretical status of truth does not intersect with the everyday usage of the concept.

Even if you declare that geometry is purely mental (I disagree, but I guess it is possible to argue), this theory does not intersect with the nature of the assertive speech acts which communicate it. — hypericin

How so? I mean, it seems to me to intersect in the manner of christening of terms at the very least. You've not supported your assertion.

the theoretical status of truth does not intersect with the everyday usage of the concept. — hypericin

Yes, you asserted that without argument too.

I would have thought that, being a model, it would be wrong in that it does not represent what is being modeled, therefore it becomes useless as such. — Harry Hindu

Well, yeah. But you've yet to demonstrate that it doesn't represent what it models, you've only shown that it's possible to model language in other ways (as about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world.)

Searle is modeling language using language? Is an actual car a model of a car, or is it just a car? Seems like circular reasoning to me. — Harry Hindu

I don't see why. I can model a car with cars, I could build a model of a brick out of bricks...

So you wouldn't be interested in knowing why your models are not useful to others? — Harry Hindu

Well, it depends who those others are. I mean there are 7 billion people on the planet, I can't possibly give consideration to the interest of all of them. For me, personally, I restrict my interest to how useful others in my field find my models. I suspect Searle does too.

How so? I mean, it seems to me to intersect in the manner of christening of terms at the very least. You've not supported your assertion. — Isaac

Suppose we conclude the external world is illusory. Berkeley was right, esse est percepi. Would Searle then be obligated to re-write his theory of speech acts, so that all assertives are in fact emissives?