as with Greece — Banno
the people who run money run it on behalf of people who have money, not on behalf of those who do not. — unenlightened
Sri Lanka, being a Buddhist nation, should have zero or negligibly small karmic debts and, at the end of the day, that's what counts, oui? — Agent Smith
Not really... if it's only the thought that counts, for instance, there should be very many more good looking women pregnant than there are actually. It's not always what counts that counts — god must be atheist
Maybe it's China, — god must be atheist
We really shouldn't be surprised that the people who run money run it on behalf of people who have money, not on behalf of those who do not. — unenlightened
Farmers, of course, don't always go broke. Farms have been the basic of a lot of capital accumulation by small entrepreneurs--at least in the past. — Bitter Crank
Does crop insurance not take "too good competition" into consideration? — god must be atheist
In the 1970s and 1980s, examples of newly industrialized countries included Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Examples in the late 2000s included South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Economists and political scientists sometimes disagree over the classification of these countries.
Sri Lanka moved to the upper-middle-income group in 2020. Sri Lanka had been a lower-middle-income group since 1999, while India has been a lower-middle-income country since 2009. — Investopedia
Conclusion
This chapter has disproven the debt-trap diplomacy claims surrounding Hambantota Port. China
did not propose the port; the project was overwhelmingly driven by Sri Lankan actors for their own domestic purposes, with some input from a Chinese SOE acting for commercial reasons. Sri Lanka’s debt trap was thus primarily created as a result of domestic policy decisions and was facilitated by Western lending and monetary policy, and not by the policies of the Chinese government. China’s aid to Sri Lanka involved facilitating investment, not a debt-for-asset swap. The story of Hambantota Port is, in reality, a narrative of political and economic incompetence, facilitated by lax governance and inadequate risk management on both sides.
AK: My perspective all along is that international coverage has given too much importance to geopolitics with a focus on India and China, as opposed to the ground realities in Sri Lanka. It is shallow analysis on the part of the international press and think tanks, and even more so when Sri Lankan intellectuals reduce it to such a geopolitical framing. Some years ago, I highlighted that it was not so much the Chinese debt trap that we have to worry about but the sovereign debt owed to capital markets, as our external debt amounted to 10 percent and 40 percent of debt respectively to each of these sources. I argued that it was the neoliberalisation of Sri Lanka’s economy with greater integration with global finance capital that would push Sri Lanka into a deeper crisis. Few paid attention at that time, but now amidst this crisis, suddenly everyone is talking about sovereign bonds. — Ahilan Kadirgamar
I can ascribe to incompetence or that leaders have these utopian visions of grandeur that can sometimes backfire. Or simply failed regional policy of making malinvestments.Don't ascribe to conspiracy what can adequately be explained by incompetence. — Banno
Inflation is at an all-time high of 17.5%, with prices of food items such as a kilogram of rice soaring to 500 Sri Lankan rupees (A$2.10) when it would normally cost around 80 rupees (A$0.34). — The Conversation (Article quoted above)
Many believe Sri Lanka’s economic relations with China are a main driver behind the crisis. The United States has called this phenomenon “debt-trap diplomacy”.
Defaults over China’s infrastructure-related loans to Sri Lanka, especially the financing of the Hambantota port, are being cited as factors contributing to the crisis.
But these facts don’t add up. The construction of the Hambantota port was financed by the Chinese Exim Bank. The port was running losses, so Sri Lanka leased out the port for 99 years to the Chinese Merchant’s Group, which paid Sri Lanka US$1.12 billion.
So the Hambantota port fiasco did not lead to a balance of payments crisis (where more money or exports are going out than coming in), it actually bolstered Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves by US$1.12 billion.
So I'll go to my original position, that it is incompetence combined with unhelpful demands from IMF and others. — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.