The problem is that there is no clear and unambiguous definition of "the truth", like there is of "the circle", or 'the square". This leaves us with doubt as to whether there really is a concept, which can be considered as an object, called "the truth".

I'll take it a little further. Truth as object/concept is empty. We can agree there is no clear and unambiguous definition (apart from merely meaning that some set of propositions are severally true). But that implies that an unclear and ambiguous understanding of the concept may be possible. If there is, what may it be? And again if there is, from every unclear explanation or understanding, something clear can be derived/refined - and what would that be?

Perhaps like most plural forms of singular objects ("music", "grain", "mice," for examples), truth is simply a collective term with no further meaning. Maybe it's that simple.

21



But in no way do those statements have the property of truth
. Great! Now, what is that property?

What is what property? Truth? Truth is not a property, it is a label.

When one affixes a label to a suitcase, it can hardly be said that that label becomes a property of the suitcase.

in no way do those statements have the property of truth. — A Seagull
How do you judge that? You must know what 'the property of truth' is, to know that these statements don't have it. And if you don't know it, then you're simply expressing an opinion, but you can give no reason why anyone ought to agree that it's true — Wayfarer

The 'property of truth' does not really exist, it is superfluous to a consistent theory of truth, in the same way that the centrifugal force is superfluous to the theory of kinematics.

If you want reasons for that, just look at statements... how is it possible for them to have a 'property of truth'? They consist of strings of symbols which can be combined into 'words' whose 'meaning' can be determined (to some degree) by looking them up in a dictionary. That is all they are. Any label of 'truth' can only be applied to the statement by a person.

just look at statements... how is it possible for them to have a 'property of truth'? — A Seagull

If that is true of your statement, then why I am expected to believe it? How can you make an argument? You're just creating strings of characters, right? Why bother typing anything?

Nice joke. Or do you actually know what the words bolded just above mean? I admit I have trouble with them. Do us all a service and in a well-crafted sentence or two or three, tell us what you understand "true" and "believe" to mean. — tim wood

"True' has a range of senses: for example 'right. 'correct', 'accurate', ' in accordance with actuality', and the like.

'Believe' means most characteristically "hold something to be true'. If you believe in someone then you would think of them as being true in some way: a true friend, or true to their word, or truly good, for example.

I predict that you will now ask what 'right', 'correct', 'actuality' and so on mean. And then if I give you definitions of those in further terms you will ask what those further terms mean. If you want to say that we cannot know what any of our terms mean, then what would be the point in discussing anything? In attempting to discuss, or even think about, anything we would be attempting the impossible, and if that were so, then we would be better to remain altogether silent.

But discussion and thought are not impossible, and the fact is that we all know very well what the words 'true' and 'believe' mean. The game of asking for definitions of definitions of definitions is a childish one; it is like the aggravating game of the child who keeps asking 'but why is that?' and when answered, asks again interminably "Yes, but why is that?".

If there is no agreed upon definition of what it means to be true, how can there be a concept of "the truth"? — Metaphysician Undercover

There cannot, because truth is more primordial than any concept. In fact concepts would be meaningless without always already taking for granted the possibility of their possession or lack of aptitude; which is to say the possibility of their truth or falsity.

If there is no agreed upon definition of what it means to be true, how can there be a concept of "the truth"?

I missed this above. I think "true" is not so much a problem. I take it as given that a claim that "X is true," can be resolved. (On the basis that if we cannot, than we cannot reasonably claim that X is true.) And everyone understands that the standard of truth for a given proposition needn't be the same standard for another. Truth, if it means anything, would just seem to refer to these different "trues." That is, truth is a many posing as and often being taken as a one. In this case, however, being a many is all it is.As a one, it's a nothing.

Seagull seems to be saying that truth is just an arbitrary label - we agree! But then it seems he means that true is also just an arbitrary label. I agree here as well, if you're willing to throw out all language/meaning. But that seems excessive.

I read John as taking the opposite view, that truth is so far from being arbitrary that it is fundamental, primordial. I think he means the truth of particular propositions, that each is, or is not, true. It raises an interesting question: what come first? The true itself? Or the possibility of being true? I suppose that the true/false divide comes into being somewhere when experience and understanding merged, and that the general term "truth" had to wait a long time before it came into usage. The passage from the descriptor, "true" to the noun-substantive (without a substance) "truth."

Or if you like, address the question of the OP, as Wayfarer has. Do you agree with him? That truth is turtles all the way down, except there aren't any turtles? — tim wood

No, truth is not "turtles all the way down"; it is not anything all the way down, although it is "all the way down" insofar as it is groundless ( and yet without a ground there is no "down"). To say that truth is "accordance with actuality' is not to say that it is grounded in actuality. We might just as well say that actuality is grounded in truth. There is no determinate grounding, although I think it must simply be accepted that both actuality and truth must be grounded in the indeterminable, if there is to be any relation between being and thought. No relationship is achieved by collapsing one into the other, or dissolving the distinction altogether.

[repl

just look at statements... how is it possible for them to have a 'property of truth'? — A Seagull
If that is true of your statement, then why I am expected to believe it? How can you make an argument? You're just creating strings of characters, right? Why bother typing anything? — Wayfarer

y="Wayfarer;67651"]

You are not 'expected' to believe it. It is a communication. And presumably you can understand it because there is a commonality of meaning of the words. Part of my communication is that I am suggesting a cohesive and consistent approach to truth that does not have the inconsistencies of other theories. But whether you believe it or not is entirely up to you.

I am suggesting a cohesive and consistent approach to truth that does not have the inconsistencies of other theories. — A Seagull

This is a statement, right.? You claim that it's 'cohesive and consistent' in the service of making a point - which is trying to persuade others that your theory is true, where other theories aren't. So if you succeed, you undermine your initial claim that statements can't be labelled 'true', because your statement then has the property of being a true theory, which is what you're arguing against. And if it doesn't fit have the property of being true, then it's not a true theory, and you haven't made your case.

I am suggesting a cohesive and consistent approach to truth that does not have the inconsistencies of other theories. — A Seagull
This is a statement, right.? You claim that it's 'cohesive and consistent' in the service of making a point - which is trying to persuade others that your theory is true, where other theories aren't. So if you succeed, you undermine your initial claim that statements can't be labelled 'true', because your statement then has the property of being a true theory, which is what you're arguing against. And if it doesn't fit have the property of being true, then it's not a true theory, and you haven't made your case — Wayfarer

I said that statements can be labelled 'true', I also said that statements cannot have the property of 'truth'. I thought I had pointed out the distinction.

So there is no inconsistency. My statements can be labelled as 'true' but they would not have the property of 'truth'.






*[/quote]

My statements can be labelled as 'true' but they would not have the property of 'truth'. — A Seagull

In other words, the label would be false!

My statements can be labelled as 'true' but they would not have the property of 'truth'. — A Seagull
In other words, the label would be false! — Wayfarer

Certainly you could label it as such if you wanted to; but do you have any criteria for doing so?

Certainly you could label it as such if you wanted to; but do you have any criteria for doing so? — A Seagull

Of course! If only the label is 'true', but the statement itself doesn't have 'the property of truth', then the label is not true, because the statement it refers to is not true. It follows from your initial statement, that if no statements have the property of 'being true', then there's nothing meaningful you can say, because whatever you say must either be true, in which case it contradicts your argument, or it's false, in which case it's false.

And everyone understands that the standard of truth for a given proposition needn't be the same standard for another. Truth, if it means anything, would just seem to refer to these different "trues." That is, truth is a many posing as and often being taken as a one. In this case, however, being a many is all it is.As a one, it's a nothing. — tim wood

Well here's the problem then. If each proposition requires a different standard to be judged as true, then "true" has a different meaning in each of these instances of use. That's what I mean when I say there is no unambiguous definition of "true". From this, to say that a proposition is true, is really meaningless unless we indicate by which standard it is true. Clearly, there is no one concept of "truth" unless there is one standard by which we judge something as "true", just like there is one standard to judge something as "square", despite the many different sized squares.

I read John as taking the opposite view, that truth is so far from being arbitrary that it is fundamental, primordial. I think he means the truth of particular propositions, that each is, or is not, true. It raises an interesting question: what come first? The true itself? Or the possibility of being true? I suppose that the true/false divide comes into being somewhere when experience and understanding merged, and that the general term "truth" had to wait a long time before it came into usage. The passage from the descriptor, "true" to the noun-substantive (without a substance) "truth." — tim wood

What John says makes no sense to me. John seems to think that there is a concept of truth which is prior to the concept of truth, and that's ridiculous.

Well here's the problem then. If each proposition requires a different standard to be judged as true, then "true" has a different meaning in each of these instances of use. From this, to say that a proposition is true, is really meaningless unless we indicate by which standard it is true. Clearly, there is no one concept of "truth" unless there is one standard by which we judge something as "true", just like there is one standard to judge something as "square", despite the many different sized squares.

Meaningless, yet it cannot be, because most people use and understand "true" and "truth" as meaningful, certainly comprehensible. It leads to the suspicion that maybe "true" and "truth" really are meaningless, except as attitudes held by more or less rational beings. Nothing is true in itself; nothing is true except as we decide it is. Truth is no part of the actual.

But clearly not arbitrary, notwithstanding abuse of the terminology and its sense. Truth seems to be one of those things that mediates perception, a form of judgment. As such it seems that truth is purely propositional: the true proposition corresponds to something in such a way that we know what we mean when we say it's true. And it's notable that recognizing truth takes practice. Not a mere label, then, but the name for a quality of relationship between language and what is.

And a variety of kinds, including mathematical/logical, scientific, statistical, moral/ethical, rhetorical, psychological, emotional, and so forth.

True, then, is the particular form of truth in a given proposition - our particular attitude and judgment about it. Truth, then, is the affirmation of the possibility of there being something true about what is in question. Both these words, then, do not at all mean what is usually thought they mean. Whenever I hear the word "truth," now, I remind myself that all it means is that someone thinks there is something true about topic, but not the topic itself (else it would be merely true, a much more substantial claim than that of "truth").

Are we reconciled? Or are there still problems?

I think that maybe you've been looking in the wrong place for "truth". You've now exposed "truth" as "attitudes held by more or less rational beings", yet you claim that these attitudes are "not arbitrary". Perhaps we can identify a particular type of attitude, rather than a multitude of different attitudes, and this particular attitude might lend itself as the essence of truth.

Would you agree that there is a relationship between truth and honesty? Have you ever considered that the essence of "truth" might be found in this attitude which we call honesty? It is evident that any statement may deceive, if that is the intent of the author, and the one receiving is not on guard. So despite how truthful the proposition may appear, if it was proposed with the intent to deceive, that truthfulness will be in appearance only. But if the statement is made in honesty, it will always reflect the true thoughts of the author.

Now, what all true statements have in common, is that they were produced from that attitude of honesty. If they were not produced in honesty, they are not true, and some honest statements are still not true by reason of mistake, but all true statements are derived from the honest attitude. So if we are looking to define "truth", by determining what all true statements have in common, then we should consider this honest attitude as the defining feature.

John seems to think that there is a concept of truth which is prior to the concept of truth, and that's ridiculous. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, what's ridiculous is the amount of effort you put into reading posts before responding. I explicitly stated that I think there cannot be a concept of truth, and that truth is prior to all concepts:

There cannot, because truth is more primordial than any concept. In fact concepts would be meaningless without always already taking for granted the possibility of their possession or lack of aptitude; which is to say the possibility of their truth or falsity. — John

What do you think a concept of anything consists in? Doesn't a concept of something consist in relating it to other particulars in terms of commonalities and differences in order to establish what kind of thing it is? Is not the possibility of the truth or falsity of these purported relations that form our concepts always prior to the purported relations themselves?

Certainly you could label it as such if you wanted to; but do you have any criteria for doing so? — A Seagull
Of course! If only the label is 'true', but the statement itself doesn't have 'the property of truth', then the label is not true, because the statement it refers to is not true. It follows from your initial statement, that if no statements have the property of 'being true', then there's nothing meaningful you can say, because whatever you say must either be true, in which case it contradicts your argument, or it's false, in which case it's false. — Wayfarer

OK Fair enough. But how is it possible for a statement to have the 'property of truth'? And how is it possible to determine whether a statement has such a property? And what advantages are to ascribe a 'property of truth' to a statement rather than merely label it as 'true'?

But how is it possible for a statement to have the 'property of truth'? — A Seagull

You have to allow for at least some statement to be true, to even say anything. Otherwise you're facing the dilemma of universal scepticism - that if every statement is false, then so to is every argument that the sceptic can offer. So the examples Tim Wood provided that you were commenting on, are text-book cases of true statements, but that in itself doesn't really say much.

However, concern with truth is fundamental. I don't know if you're following politics and current affairs, but the current President of the US is notorious for mendacity. His disregard for truth is regarded by many of his critics as not only the sign of a profound character flaw but also a threat to the institutions of democracy itself, which expect at least some level of truthfulness from their elected officials, not least the highest elected official.

The difficulty in these kinds of conversations is the open-ended nature of the question 'what is truth'? As an abstract or general question, it's almost impossible to answer. You could write an essay on the Platonic or Arisotelean or neo-Platonist views on the question, but they're situated within a culture which still had a classical regard for what you could call Capital T Truth. I think as a general tendency modernity is inclined to reject that kind of attitude. We nowadays only talk in terms of falsifiability and provisional hypotheses; maybe that's the best we can hope for!

No, what's ridiculous is the amount of effort you put into reading posts before responding. I explicitly stated that I think there cannot be a concept of truth, and that truth is prior to all concepts: — John

So what would this so-called "truth" consist of, which is independent from all concepts? Is it a physical thing? If not, then how does it differ from a concept?

What do you think a concept of anything consists in? Doesn't a concept of something consist in relating it to other particulars in terms of commonalities and differences in order to establish what kind of thing it is? Is not the possibility of the truth or falsity of these purported relations that form our concepts always prior to the purported relations themselves? — John

No, I really think you have this backward. How could the truth or falsity of a relationship be prior to the relationship itself. If it is the relationship which is either true or false, then truth or falsity is an attribute of the relationship. So how is it possible that this attribute exists prior to the thing which it is the property of? Are you suggesting that there is this thing called "truth", which floats around independent from any statements, yet attaches itself to a statement making that statement true?

So what would this so-called "truth" consist of, which is independent from all concepts? Is it a physical thing? If not, then how does it differ from a concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you have decided that there are only physical things and the concepts of them? On what do you base this conclusion?

It is obvious that truth is not a physical thing. If you want to say that truth is a concept, and nothing more than that, then you should be able to give an account of it as such.

How could the truth or falsity of a relationship be prior to the relationship itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not prior to the relationship, but to our conception of the relationship; we conceive of relationships under the aegis of the possibility of the truth or falsity of our conception of them.

So, you have decided that there are only physical things and the concepts of them? On what do you base this conclusion? — John

No, I haven't decided that. Concepts are not necessarily "of" physical things. But if you want to posit the existence of a non-physical thing, which is not a concept, you'll need to back this up with some sort of explanation.

It is obvious that truth is not a physical thing. If you want to say that truth is a concept, and nothing more than that, then you should be able to give an account of it as such. — John

According to my discussion with tim wood, I was ready to concede that there is no such thing as truth. So neither is truth a non-physical concept, nor is it a physical thing. Tim went on to suggest that truth might be attitudinal, and you can read my reply to that in the post before you engaged me.

It's not prior to the relationship, but to our conception of the relationship; we conceive of relationships under the aegis of the possibility of the truth or falsity of our conception of them. — John

If this is what you are saying here as well, that truth is attitudinal? Then we are probably in agreement. Read my post, and tell me what you think, because I've offered an identification of that attitude as honesty.

Concepts are not necessarily "of" physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give me an example of a concept which is not given, even remotely, in terms of physical things or relations between physical things?

I can't see how it could be in accordance with our experience and practices to "concede that there is no such things as truth" because our understandings of everything presuppose it. As I said before, the logical meaning of truth is that it is accordance with actuality. The trouble begins when analysis beyond that is attempted. If actuality is presupposed (as it seems to me that it must be, whatever we might think the nature of it to be) then truth is the accordance of thought with actuality. (Actuality could be otherwise referred to as being or reality).

I can't see how truth can coherently, or productively, be thought to be dependent on attitude, which would be the same as to say that it is dependent on belief. The problem is that beliefs can be true or false.

Perhaps we can identify a particular type of attitude, rather than a multitude of different attitudes, and this particular attitude might lend itself as the essence of truth.

Would you agree that there is a relationship between truth and honesty? ...if the statement is made in honesty, it will always reflect the true thoughts of the author.

Now, what all true statements have in common, is that they were produced from that attitude of honesty. So if we are looking to define "truth", by determining what all true statements have in common, then we should consider this honest attitude as the defining feature.

Hmm. The speaker's intention. This (as I think you know perfectly well) is Aristotle: very roughly, if you speak your mind, you speak truly. If on the other hand your mouth and your mind differ, then you're lying, the difference being the ground of the lie. But we can't simply bring Aristotle forward, because his world just plain is not ours. (An argument I'm sure you're well able to make.)

The difficulty I'm having here is trying to figure out if truth lies in the intention, or in the speech. Answer, it seems neither. The speaker desires to speak truly, but whether he did or did not is not his judgment to make (except as he hears himself, but he doesn't get a vote). Nor is his (rhetorical) proposition true until it is judged so. In rhetoric/persuasive speech, the desire is part of what is judged, whereas in categorical propositions, the proposition is judged on content alone.

We've reached a point where I think we have to qualify the meaningful sentences, MSs, we're thinking about. Let's limit ourselves to categorical MSs. (E.g., All (some, no) S are (are not) P.) Let's set aside all MSs built around should or ought because the truth of any of these is clearly subjective and could easily be true (for you) and false (for me).

So, a candidate MS is All S is P. We judge that it's true (in any of a number of ways, depending on the exact content of the MS). To be sure, our competence of judgment is likely borrowed, and the judgment itself may be ancient - but in at least some sense it's still our judgment.

For truth to exist at all, it seems we must be able to find it just here in our candidate MS..

It would seem that truth is never "out there" inhering in the propositions; instead it seems to just be the expression of the synthesis of perception, knowledge, and judgment. Every truth is mine, in so far as I recognize it as a truth. But every truth is also prospectively a part of collective mind.

Truth, then, is the recognized accordance of a proposition with the competent judgment of mind, and as such, testimony to the activity of that mind.
.

Can you give me an example of a concept which is not given, even remotely, in terms of physical things or relations between physical things? — John

Numbers and geometrical forms, laws of grammars, and logical relationships, can all be instantiated in physical forms, but they're essentially intellectual in nature.

It would seem that truth is never "out there" inhering in the propositions; instead it seems to just be the expression of the synthesis of perception, knowledge, and judgment. Every truth is mine, in so far as I recognize it as a truth. But every truth is also prospectively a part of collective mind. — tim wood

(Y)

Numbers and geometrical forms, laws of grammars, and logical relationships, can all be instantiated in physical forms, but they're essentially intellectual in nature. — Wayfarer

Does that mean the same as to say that they are essentially conceptual in nature? Is a geometrical form, a law of grammar, or a logical relationship a concept or are they rather sets of relations?

What exactly do you mean by saying they are "essentially intellectual in nature".Could they be known apart from their physical instantiations?

What exactly do you mean by saying they are "essentially intellectual in nature"? Could they be known apart from their physical instantiations? — John

Well - what about mental arithmetic? Irrational numbers? I should say, I was terrible at school maths and boast no intellectual prowess in the subject whatever, and also that this is a very difficult question in philosophy. But I still think it's the case that what mathematicians do is essentially, or even only, intellectual. They represent their ideas with symbols, but the ideas are not themselves physical marks or signs. The signs signify ideas or relations or quantities - the sign itself is physical, but what is signified is purely intellectual. The issue is that in our own thinking, the intellectual is always inextricably combined with the sensory - we're constantly, and unconsciously, interpreting what we see as signs or indicators, but without noticing that we're doing that, as the mind works that way unconsciously (which is directly out of Kant although he didn't use the term 'unconsciously').

Can you give me an example of a concept which is not given, even remotely, in terms of physical things or relations between physical things? — John

The fact that a concept is "given" in terms of physical things does not necessitate that the concept is "of" a physical thing. Quite the opposite is actually the case. The concept is given in terms of physical things because that is how we communicate. We must communicate through the physical world, and we give each other concepts through physical representations. But the physical thing is the representation of the concept, not vise versa.

All the purely abstract concepts such as mathematical concepts are good demonstrations of such. Consider geometry, we have points, lines, right angles, circles, etc., which all have defined essences. We make a copy of the circle, for example, on a piece of paper, to demonstrate it to others, but this is just a representation of the concept, just like a point or a line on the paper acts as a representation of the concept. That it is just a representation is evident from the fact that we cannot make a perfect circle, the "true" circle remains the concept. Nor can we make a non-dimensional point on a paper, the true point is the concept. The one on the paper is a representation of the concept.

To properly apprehend the nature of concepts, it is necessary to see the physical object as the representation of the concept, not vise versa. This is what Plato described in the cave allegory.

As I said before, the logical meaning of truth is that it is accordance with actuality. — John

But that's not the meaning of "truth", that's the meaning of "true", and this distinction is the one being focused on in this thread.

The difficulty I'm having here is trying to figure out if truth lies in the intention, or in the speech. Answer, it seems neither. The speaker desires to speak truly, but whether he did or did not is not his judgment to make (except as he hears himself, but he doesn't get a vote). Nor is his (rhetorical) proposition true until it is judged so. In rhetoric/persuasive speech, the desire is part of what is judged, whereas in categorical propositions, the proposition is judged on content alone. — tim wood

Let me just say here, that you cannot reduce the question of "truth" to a question of whether it is in the intention or in the speech, because the speech, once it is spoken, must be interpreted. So really, the question of "truth", if expressed in this way, ought to be expressed as whether the truth is in the intention of the speaker, or in the intention of the interpreter. And this rapidly becomes a complex issue because there may be multiple interpreters, each with one's own intent.

I do not see any means of positioning truth within the physical existence of the speech itself, because it requires interpretation for meaning in order to be judged. Some will define a statement, or proposition, as an odd sort of conglomeration of physical symbols combined with a particular meaning, but I don't believe this is reality. If we combine a meaning with the physical symbols, such that they exist together, the meaning must be taken as something vague and ambiguous, general, to allow for the reality of many possible interpretations. This ambiguity disallows the possibility of truth, so truth cannot be attributed to the physical existence of the speech, even if we say that meaning is within the physical existence, because this meaning within the physical existence must be inherently ambiguous. So when those people say that "true" may be attributed directly to the statement or proposition, they are assuming that the statement has one unambiguous "objective" meaning. But this is actually beyond the reality of the statement, as even precisely stated mathematical equations are open to some degree of ambiguity, such as when we subject symbols like = to principles of skepticism. So it is the essential property of the physical existence of speech that it contains ambiguity. And this denies the possibility of truth.

So, a candidate MS is All S is P. We judge that it's true (in any of a number of ways, depending on the exact content of the MS). To be sure, our competence of judgment is likely borrowed, and the judgment itself may be ancient - but in at least some sense it's still our judgment.

For truth to exist at all, it seems we must be able to find it just here in our candidate MS.. — tim wood

So here, we can see where the ambiguity lies. Let's say I produce an instance of S which I claim is not P. I insist that this is an instance of S, and it is clearly not P, so I assert "All S is P" is false. You argue, no that is not an instance of S, because it is not P, and therefore it cannot be S, maintaining, "All S is P" is true.

Obviously, we cannot say that truth is in the MS, because truth relies not only on how we interpret the MS, but also on how we interpret the world. In the example, I would argue that you are just interpreting the world in such a way as to maintain the truth of your MS, when I think it is a bad way of interpreting the world, and we should dismiss your MS as false.

It would seem that truth is never "out there" inhering in the propositions; instead it seems to just be the expression of the synthesis of perception, knowledge, and judgment. Every truth is mine, in so far as I recognize it as a truth. But every truth is also prospectively a part of collective mind.

Truth, then, is the recognized accordance of a proposition with the competent judgment of mind, and as such, testimony to the activity of that mind.
. — tim wood

It is this "collective mind" part which makes truth more than just a subjective opinion of you or I, the opinion that X is true. But this is also why it is best described by an attitude which we have towards each other. That is what I called honesty. So truth is not strictly speaking, a testimony to the activity of a mind, it is as you say the testimony to the activity of a special type of mind, which you call a "competent" mind. I would prefer to narrow down "competent" to the more specific, "honest". One can be very competent in making judgements, yet not be honest, and therefore truth does not enter into that competent judgement. Honesty is what allows one to have respect for others in making such judgements.

We take one step towards removing the arbitrariness of pure subjectivity, of truth, by asserting that the judgement must be made by a competent mind. We take the next step by saying that the judgement must be made by an honest, competent, mind. This ensures that the mind making the judgement has the proper attitude toward other minds.

I would ask you now, can we give truth independent, separate existence? There are many things which competent minds working together create in the world, and these things have independent existence. We can start with physical objects, there are many buildings and things like that. But then we can move into things which have less of a physical existence, like mores, laws, and social structures. Can truth be one of those things, created by honest, competent minds working together, yet somehow existing independently of those minds? Where would we find it? We've already determined that it is not within statements or propositions. If it is within the honest mind, then how is it also independent of the honest mind?

Can truth be one of those things, created by honest, competent minds working together, yet somehow existing independently of those minds? Where would we find it? We've already determined that it is not within statements or propositions. If it is within the honest mind, then how is it also independent of the honest mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

Apart from 'honest', also 'rational'. The problem is that modernism and post-modernism have thrown standards of rationality into question. The idea that there are common standards, or that reality itself is rational, are the very kinds of ideas that have been thrown increasingly into question. That was the theme of Max Horkheimer's book, The Eclipse of Reason, which documents how over history, the initial Platonististic view that the world was 'animated by reason' has become increasingly untenable, and that the prevailing view today is that reason is subjective or an evolved capacity of the mind which is ultimately a function of evolutionary biology.

We nowadays speak of 'scientific rationalism' however scientific rationalism is different in one crucial respect from traditional rationalism, in that the evidence for it has to be available in the third person, and it has to be empirical. There must be some measurable physical effect or consequence of whatever idea or hypothesis is entertained so as to qualify for the moniker 'scientific' rationalism. Whereas traditional rationalism argued from the specific to the general, from the effects to the most general types of causes, whether that be conceived of as the Idea of the Good or the Uncaused Cause. So traditional and scientific rationalism are actually very different in that respect.

One school where respect for that older form of rationalism is preserved, is neo-thomism or neo-scholasticism, as for example in this essay called Think, McFly, Think by Ed Feser.