A second reason for preferring the metaphysical definition is that the two main alternatives to it have undesirable implications. Defining “atheism” as naturalism has the awkward implication that some philosophers are both theists and atheists. This is because some philosophers (e.g., Ellis 2014) deny that God is supernatural and affirm both naturalism and theism. Defining “atheism” as the state of lacking belief in God faces similar problems. First, while this definition seems short and simple, which is virtuous, it needs to be expanded to avoid the issue of babies, cats, and rocks counting as atheists by virtue of lacking belief in God. While this problem is relatively easy to solve, another is more challenging. This additional problem arises because one can lack belief in God while at the same time having other pro-attitudes towards theism. For example, some people who lack the belief that God exists may nevertheless feel some inclination to believe that God exists. They may even believe that the truth of theism is more probable than its falsity. While such people should not be labeled theists, it is counterintuitive in the extreme to call them atheists.
A third reason to prefer the standard definition in philosophy is that it makes the definitions of “atheism” and “theism” symmetrical. One problem with defining “atheism” as a psychological state is that philosophers do not define “theism” as a psychological state, nor should they. “Theism,” like most other philosophical “-isms”, is understood in philosophy to be a proposition. This is crucial because philosophers want to say that theism is true or false and, most importantly, to construct or evaluate arguments for theism. Psychological states cannot be true or false, nor can they be the conclusions of arguments. Granted, philosophers sometimes define “theism” as “the belief that God exists” and it makes sense to argue for a belief and to say that a belief is true or false, but here “belief” means “something believed”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not to the attitude or psychological state of believing. If, however, “theism” is defined as the proposition that God exists and “theist” as someone who believes that proposition, then it makes sense to define “atheism” and “atheist” in an analogous way. This means, first, defining “atheism” as a proposition or position so that it can be true or false and can be the conclusion of an argument and, second, defining “atheist” as someone who believes that proposition. Since it is also natural to define “atheism” in terms of theism, it follows that, in the absence of good reasons to do otherwise, it is best for philosophers to understand the “a-” in “atheism” as negation instead of absence, as “not” instead of “without”—in other words, to take atheism to be the contradictory of theism.
Once upon a time, there was a wise Zen master. People traveled from far away to seek his help. In return, he would teach them and show them the way to enlightenment.
On this particular day, a scholar came to visit the master for advice. “I have come to ask you to teach me about Zen,” the scholar said.
Soon, it became obvious that the scholar was full of his own opinions and knowledge. He interrupted the master repeatedly with his own stories and failed to listen to what the master had to say. The master calmly suggested that they should have tea.
So the master poured his guest a cup. The cup was filled, yet he kept pouring until the cup overflowed onto the table, onto the floor, and finally onto the scholar’s robes. The scholar cried “Stop! The cup is full already. Can’t you see?”
“Exactly,” the Zen master replied with a smile. “You are like this cup — so full of ideas that nothing more will fit in. Come back to me with an empty cup.”
Defining “atheism” as naturalism has the awkward implication that some philosophers are both theists and atheists. This is because some philosophers (e.g., Ellis 2014) deny that God is supernatural and affirm both naturalism and theism.
Defining “atheism” as the state of lacking belief in God faces similar problems. First, while this definition seems short and simple, which is virtuous, it needs to be expanded to avoid the issue of babies, cats, and rocks counting as atheists by virtue of lacking belief in God.
This additional problem arises because one can lack belief in God while at the same time having other pro-attitudes towards theism. For example, some people who lack the belief that God exists may nevertheless feel some inclination to believe that God exists...While such people should not be labeled theists, it is counterintuitive in the extreme to call them atheists.
One problem with defining “atheism” as a psychological state is that philosophers do not define “theism” as a psychological state, nor should they.
This means, first, defining “atheism” as a proposition or position so that it can be true or false and can be the conclusion of an argument and, second, defining “atheist” as someone who believes that proposition.
A psychological state is just saying "one believes God exists" etc. There's no truth aptness because it's not a proposition. A similar non-proposition is simply yelling "ouch!". — Shwah
A "belief" in anything is taken as granted and unanalyzable (how would anyone check?). The contents of the belief can be propositional. — Shwah
I would say everything you do is a belief and that everything you assert requires knowledge — Shwah
so I would say any epistemological category is derivative of the ontological proposition (the nature or conception of God dictates the epistemological requirement one needs to know him and one's epistemological capability then is automatically categorized based on the requirement outputting belief/non-belief). — Shwah
In any case, a corollary of that is that there's no passivity on either side of a position (i.e. one needs to establish evidence criteria in order to accept evidence and those can then be questioned — Shwah
I think it's a pretty standard basis that any rejection of a major position in a field requires a standard in which it can be rejected. — Shwah
Einstein didn't just yell at the other scientists that they just don't have proof. — Shwah
Edit: also I believe that's Draper who edited that. — Shwah
In any case, if one asks for proof then the person receiving that request is allowed to ask for the standard of the proof. — Shwah
If, for example, the standard required is empirical, and the conception of God has no empirically knowable points, then the standard of evidence is allowed to be criticized. — Shwah
We use rationalism in logic, math — Shwah
linguistic propositions and metaphysics, ontology etc — Shwah
Nobody else did. — Shwah
Further, from an insider perspective of a religious monotheist, an atheist can also be someone who does believe that God exists, but who refuses to worship him. — baker
Does this get rid of the New Atheist movement? — Shwah
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