Logic itself is the paradox. — Constance

This is a topic by itself!
Can you at least describe it shortly?

It is because logic is a quantitative delimitation of anything it applies to. — Constance

Can you explain this please?

Zeno's paradox: Why do we think the arrow never should reach the target?
... The distances between the archer and the target are eternally divisible, but it is not the world that is divisible, it is the logic that imposes a principle on the world that says any given determinative distance is divisible, which is true, but in the world as an actuality, nothing is determined. Everything is indeterminate. — Constance

I can see some truth in all this, esp. concerning "divisibility". However, I think that Zeno's "paradoxes" are much easier to explain --or rather, to reject: space and time are assumed to be discontinuous and thus divisible. Which is a fallacy. Space and time are continuous and thus indivisible. Neither of them has a start, middle or end. We can only divide them arbitrarily for description purposes. Thus, we get distances in space and periods in time. These serve to measure and compare things with each other.

Every so-called "paradox" that is based on a fallacy is a "pseudo-paradox". Zeno's are among them.

I can talk also about the remaining elements --God and Einstein's space time-- but that would overburden this post!

This is catastrophically false, but none of your co-respondents noticed nor cared, even though every single one of them is fully immersed in it, so.....you got off scot-free. Almost. — Mww

I'm so glad you came to save the day. You need to put a little meat on those bones. You have read the Transcendental Dialectic? But then, the notion of pure reason is no empirical concept. What metaphysics do you have in mind?

I'm so glad you came to save the day. — Constance

Ehhhh.....the man’s life’s work was at stake. I was duty-bound, doncha know.

I agree with what you have written.

The question is why are geometry and reality very different

For me, the reason is that relations are foundational to our logic, yet relations have no ontological existence in the external world.

This explains why geometry and reality are very different, the world is alogical, language is self-referential, we live in epistemology and the world is utterly metaphysical.

If there was a more persuasive explanation why logic and reality are very different than because of the the nature of relations, then this would be of interest. — RussellA

What? That sounds like something I would say. I probably take it further than you. If language is self referential, the there are two ways to think about this. One way says the world as the world is bound up with the ways we know it; ontology and epistemology cannot be separated and my coffee cup IS a coffee cup AS a bundled phenomenon. The idea of the cup is literally the cup-thing itself. So, I point to my cat, and the pointing, the concept, the predelineation of the past informing the present occasion as well as the anticipation of what the "future cat" will be, do, all of this is constitutive of the occurrent apperception of my cat. All of a piece. Any separation of parts would be an abstraction, which is fine because this is what analysis is, as long as we don't think analytically determined entities ae entities in their own right. Another way is to understand that the knowledge that brings the palpable thing into understanding and familiarity is qualitatively distinct from the palpable thing. To me, this is a very strong and even profound claim. It is not about some noumena that is postulated but beyond sight and sound; it's about the palpable presence of the thing, and its being alien to the understanding, so their you are, confronting metaphysics directly. This is called mysticism.

Sartre may not have been a mystic, but his Nausea has very strange encounters between Roquentin and the world (the chestnut tree, etc) which are close.

Perhaps it is sufficient to know what pragmatically works. I turn the ignition key on my car and the engine starts. I don't need to know why the engine starts, all I need to know is that turning the key starts the car. Why not treat the external world as an empirical experience and not search for any sense beyond this. — RussellA

Because the world is an open concept, and where there is openness, there is inquiry. I guess philosophical inquiry has a value difficult to see. As an objective enterprise this is most true. But as a personal desire for understanding the world that is sincerely driven by need to know, this is always important.

My belief is that logic and reality are very different because of the nature of their relations, and this I can justify. However, my justified belief that logic and reality are very different because of the nature of their relations can never be knowledge, as I can never have a true understanding of a reality that is relation-free using reasoning where relations are fundamental. — RussellA

On the other hand, logic is not nothing. An idea is not nothing.

This is a topic by itself!
Can you at least describe it shortly? — Alkis Piskas

One way to look at it is to note that all knowledge is justified belief, and justification is always presented in a logical form, as is necessitated since a proposition without logical form is literally nonsense. But where is the justification for logic's validity? It has none: logic cannot explain itself because the explaining would require logic. Logic is "its own presupposition."

It is because logic is a quantitative delimitation of anything it applies to.
— Constance
Can you explain this please? — Alkis Piskas

The world "out there" that we talk about all the time has nothing of the values we give it in doing so, it can be argued. I observe a lamp, but the singularity of the one lamp is only brought about by the application of a concept, a general term, When I look casually at the lamp, I acknowledge its singularity, just that lamp and not a table or a chair, either. All of this singling out is not part of the thing over there we call a lamp. We do this when we observe it.

Knowledge is a quantifying process. When we say some or all or one, logic calls this quantifying. Just talking about a thing at all is a quantifying act. (I remember Hegel's discussion: to say something is here, or there, or beyond, and so on, is to apply a general idea: many things are here or there, so the conditions of the application of the terms are , if you will, tokens of a type, particulars of a universal, and in this occasion, applicable. The point would be that you acknowledge this to be an independent singular perception, but actually, it really is not like this at all. As you observe, you condition the observed.

I can see some truth in all this, esp. concerning "divisibility". However, I think that Zeno's "paradoxes" are much easier to explain --or rather, to reject: space and time are assumed to be discontinuous and thus divisible. Which is a fallacy. Space and time are continuous and thus indivisible. Neither of them has a start, middle or end. We can only divide them arbitrarily for description purposes. Thus, we get distances in space and periods in time. These serve to measure and compare things with each other.

Every so-called "paradox" that based on a fallacy is a "pseudo-paradox". Zeno's are among them.

I can talk also about the remaining elements --God and Einstein's space time-- but that would overburden this post! — Alkis Piskas

Right. Interesting. You might find Kierkegaard's take on concept of time enlightening:

If time is defined correctly as infinite succession, it may seem obvious that it should also be defined as present, past, and future. This distinction is, however, incorrect if considered as implicit in time itself, because the distinction arises only through the relation of time to eternity, and through eternity’s reflection in time. If a foothold could be found in the infinite succession of time, that is, a present, which was the dividing point, then the division would be quite correct. However, precisely because every instant, as well as the sum of the instants, is a process (a passing by), no instant is a present, and in time there is accordingly neither a present nor a past nor a future. Thinking that this division can be upheld is due to an instant’s being spatialized,

Kierkegaard, Soren. The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin

Note this idea of a spatializing of time. A provocative notion. He is saying that in space things appear fixed, settled, but time is not this. Real time is a process that has no parts like past, present future. It is a seamless "passing by".

Thank you for taking the time to reply in that length!
I realize now that I have asked too much! :smile: Anyway, I will comment shortly on some things in this reply of yours. I don't ask you to agree or disagree. I just present my views.

One way to look at it is to note that all knowledge is justified belief — Constance

Knowledge and belief can be indeed connected: what we believe as true --but it is not proven or established as fact-- can be proven to be true --always for us-- through reasoning (justification), experience or actual, physical proof. Then, it becomes knowledge, i.e. a fact. But only some of our knowledge is obtained in this way. We don't have to justify the fact that it is raining, that the price of tomatoes has risen, etc. So it would be better if one says "some" instead of "all "knowledge is justified belief".

justification is always presented in a logical form ... But where is the justification for logic's validity?" — Constance

There's a circularity and self-contradiction here ... It is as if we are asking what is the logic of the logic. The basic error in this question-statement is that logic cannot be justified or validated. Logic itself is a way of justifying and a proof of validity. Logic is reasoning based on principles of validity.

You might find Kierkegaard's take on concept of time enlightening — Constance

Indeed! Nice that you brought this up! :up:

If language is self referential, the there are two ways to think about this. ..................................One way says the world as the world is bound up with the ways we know it; ontology and epistemology cannot be separated and my coffee cup IS a coffee cup AS a bundled phenomenon. The idea of the cup is literally the cup-thing itself. So, I point to my cat, and the pointing, the concept, the predelineation of the past informing the present occasion as well as the anticipation of what the "future cat" will be, do, all of this is constitutive of the occurrent apperception of my cat. All of a piece. Any separation of parts would be an abstraction, which is fine because this is what analysis is, as long as we don't think analytically determined entities ae entities in their own right............................................. Another way is to understand that the knowledge that brings the palpable thing into understanding and familiarity is qualitatively distinct from the palpable thing. To me, this is a very strong and even profound claim. It is not about some noumena that is postulated but beyond sight and sound; it's about the palpable presence of the thing, and its being alien to the understanding, so their you are, confronting metaphysics directly. This is called mysticism. — Constance

I agree that there there are two distinct ways in which we understand the external world, and these may be described in various ways.

1) Metaphysics, our past history, Sartrian existence and Kantian a priori knowledge are all aspects of the same thing. This is, as you say, about "confronting metaphysics directly".
2) Physics, our present situation, Sartrian essence and Kantian a posteriori knowledge are also all aspects of the same thing. This is, as you say, "apperception".
Each is distinct, as hardware is distinct from software, yet both are mutually dependent, and both are required for the proper functioning of the whole human organism.

The colour red is experienced both physically and metaphysically

Consider our experience of the colour red. From physics, I know that the wavelength of red light is 700nm. But I also have a private subjective experience of the colour red, an experience that can never be described to another person. At the moment of having the subjective experience of the colour red, it is not the case that I am observing the colour red, rather, it is the case that I am the experience of the colour red. An experience transcending any physical knowledge into an immediate and visceral metaphysical knowledge.

IE, our knowledge of, for example, the colour red, is both physical and metaphysical

Evolution explains Kant's a priori

We are observers of the external world, yet we are also part of the world. We have an existence upon which we build an essence. This existence did not arise yesterday, or the day we were born, but has been underway for billions of years. We have evolved in synergy with the world. Humans are born with certain innate abilities, in that the brain is not a blank slate, as described by both post-Darwinian "evolutionary aesthetics" and "evolutionary ethics". In the 3.7 billion years of life on earth, complex life forms have evolved to have certain innate intuitions necessary for continued survival. It is not the case that we have certain intuitions and they happen to correspond with the world, rather, our intuitions were created by the world and therefore of necessity correspond with the world. Through the process of evolution the mind gradually models the world around it. If the model had not been correct, then the mind and body would not have survived. Therefore, the sensible intuitions innate within the mind have been created by the world in which the brain has survived.

IE, it is not the case that the mind has an intuition of the world that it exists within, rather, the intuitions of the mind necessarily correspond with the world it exists within, otherwise it would not have been able to successfully survive and evolve.

We understand the world both in a Kantian a priori and a posteriori way

The two distinct ways we relate to the world can be further understood within Kant's theory of the "synthetic a priori". Kant combined the ideas of the Empiricists and the Rationalists. For the Empiricists, such as Hume, only what can be observed has meaning, where a posteriori knowledge is "as mere representations and not as things in themselves"
For the Rationalists, such as Leibniz, understanding is in the mind, where a priori knowledge is "only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves".

Empiricism claims that our ideas are fashioned out of experience between an observer and an external world and the ideas thus formed if they have any bearing on external reality then elementary sensations are bound together by some principle of association. Kant argued that on this reading, science could not have developed, yet, as science is successful, the principles of association must have been provided by the observer such that "nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects save what the thinking subject derives from itself".

The observer can only understand what they observe if they have a prior ability to experience what they observe, in that we are able to see the colour red but not the infra-red because of our innate abilities. Kant wrote in his Critique of the Power of Judgement : "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves". (A239). Foundational to all our understanding of what we observe is our innate understanding of space and time: "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings". (A26, A33)

It is true that Kant (1724 to 1804) did not propose an evolutionary mechanism for a priori pure intuitions, as he was not able to benefit from Darwin's (1809 to 1882) theory of evolution, Kant's principle of "synthetic a priori judgements" remains valid.

IE, We are born with certain innate abilities that have taken billions of years to evolve, and based on these innate abilities we can observe the external world, but we can only observe in the world what our innate abilities allow us to observe. Our understanding of the world is from observed phenomenon which are given meaning by a pre-existing and innate understanding of them. The physics of the world is understood through an innate knowledge that transcends experience, ie, a metaphysics.

Our understanding of the world must always be limited

FH Bradley's regression argument illustrates the that relations have no ontological existence in the external world. The Binding Problem, that we experience a subjective whole rather than a set of disparate parts, illustrates that relations do have an ontological existence in the mind. As Kant argued that we make sense of the world by imposing our a priori knowledge onto our a posteriori observations in the external world, similarly we can also make sense of the world by imposing a reasoned relational logic onto a relation-free external world.

IE, both these show the inherent limits to our understanding of the world, in that we will only ever be able to understand those aspects of the world for which we have an a priori ability to understand. This means that there are things about the world that will forever be beyond our imagination, as a horse's understanding of the allegories in The Old Man and the Sea will forever be beyond the horse's imagination.

Language is more than self-referential

As language is, taking one example, the observed a posteriori linkage between a name "red" and a known a priori part (red), rather than being said to be self-referential in the sense of the Coherence Theory of Language, language is still able to refer to the world in the sense of the Correspondence Theory of Language.

Summary

We know the world in two distinct ways - i) metaphysically, rationally, as an evolutionary memory, as a Sartrian existence, a Kantian a priori ii) physically, empirically, as a present experience, as a Sartrian essence and a Kantian a posteriori.

Kant wrote in his Critique of the Power of Judgement : "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves". (A239). Foundational to all our understanding of what we observe is our innate understanding of space and time: "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings". (A26, A33) — RussellA

And here Kant makes a false or pretentious assumption at least. Namely that we kant cognize the Ding an Sich. People have the power to become, to empathize, to become, to magine, to live oneself in das Ding.

It is not as if I expect you to see this and it does take work to familiarize yourself. But if all you read is science, you will never grasp phenomenology — Constance

I don't read science only. Theology is a firmer base of knowledge and offers a firmer ground for understanding phenomena or their nature.

Phenomenoa lay at the base of knowledge. Our brain, by means of its virtual infinite formal capacity, structures the phenomena and the structures behind it, while it gets informed by these structures at the same time.

Your accounting, or sourced from secondary literature?

It is not the case that we have certain intuitions and they happen to correspond with the world, rather, our intuitions were created by the world and therefore of necessity correspond with the world. Through the process of evolution the mind gradually models the world around it. If the model had not been correct, then the mind and body would not have survived. — RussellA

Donald Hoffman also says this, but he draws a different conclusion from it. 'Do we see the world as it truly is? In The Case Against Reality, pioneering cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman says: No, we see what we need in order to survive. Our visual perceptions are not a window onto reality, Hoffman shows us, but instead are interfaces constructed by natural selection. The objects we see around us are not unlike the file icons on our computer desktops: while shaped like a small folder on our screens, the files themselves are made of a series of ones and zeros too complex for most of us to understand. In a similar way, Hoffman argues, evolution has shaped our perceptions into simplistic illusions to help us navigate the world around us.'

So, if indeed it is the case that our perceptions and conceptions are solely the product of evolution, then why should there be any basis for trust in the independent capacity of reason to arrive at truth? Put another way, if it's true that reason is the handmaiden of evolutionary biology, what faith could we put in it? Isn't confidence in reason justifiable because it is not solely dependent on biological evolution? 'The only form that genuine reasoning can take', says Thomas Nagel, 'consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded.'

In other words, to rationalise what we take to be true in terms of what is advantageous to survival, sells reason short - a very common tendency in modern philosophy.

both these show the inherent limits to our understanding of the world, in that we will only ever be able to understand those aspects of the world for which we have an a priori ability to understand. — RussellA

I would say, rather, that they show the inherent limits of naturalism, based on the mistaken assumption that the ability to grasp a priori truths is no more than a biological adaptation. An alternative account might be that such an ability is owed to the innate ability of the intellect to apprehend higher-order truths. But of course, that is not acceptable to naturalism.

Phenomenoa lay at the base of knowledge. — EugeneW

Theology is a firmer base of knowledge — EugeneW

So...phenomena lay at the base, but theology lays a firmer base.

How many degrees of firm are there? What’s the firmest possible base of knowledge? How is the firmness of a base determined?

Paint, meet corner.

Well, the gods lay at the foundation of all there is. Understanding them gives better knowledge of the cosmos than the phenomena in it. But if we consider the universe by itself, phenomena are all we've got to study and gain knowledge about.

What’s the firmest possible base of knowledge? — Mww

Theology, seems to me. Know the gods and you know the universe.

the gods lay at the foundation of all there is. — EugeneW

All this does is presuppose the reality of gods, for which proven empirical justification is lacking.

Why don’t we just say a better knowledge of the universe is provided by better knowledge of the phenomena in it?

Know the gods and you know the universe. — EugeneW

How would one know the gods, and even if one did, how would he know the gods would give knowledge of the universe? Why wouldn’t a god just say...hey, figure it out for yourself, you think you’re so smart, with your fancy inventions and all. I mean, c’mon, man. You’ve FUBAR’ed that beautiful planet I gave you, now you want me to give you free knowledge?

I got better intelligences to work with than you puny-assed humans.

All this does is presuppose the reality of gods, for which proven empirical justification is lacking — Mww

The very existence of the universe is good enough proof for me. Know the universe and you know the gods.

That’s fine. If you think the existence of the universe is sufficient proof of gods.....who am I to argue.

But then...if to know the universe is to know the gods, and the average run-of-the-mill human being can never know the universe as such, how will he ever know the gods?

People can read about cosmology or theology. There is a pretty good scientific general picture of the universe. All people know a local piece of it. The animals, the trees in their neighborhood, other people, etc. The natural world is a carbon copy of heaven. Sadly enough the natural world is further away than ever. Destroyed or rearranged by human activity. The gods hadnt taken the homonid gods into consideration in the prequel to creation.

People can read about cosmology or theology. — EugeneW

Sure they can. So if people know a local piece of the natural world, and the natural world is a copy of heaven, then they know a piece of heaven? If so, then heaven is as full of disturbing occurrences as the natural world, so why would I prefer one over the other? Why would there be copies anyway?

Donald Hoffman, mentioned earlier, can't say evolution happened then say it shows everything is an illusion because evolution is then an illusion. I wish he would admit his position uses evolution to disprove evolution because the interface theory of knowledge is really ugly

If so, then heaven is as full of disturbing occurrences as the natural world, so why would I prefer one over the other? Why would there be copies anyway? — Mww

The only difference is that the gods have power of creation. They have the collective intelligence to create the universe. The heaven is eternal and all life in it is an eternal edition of all life in the universe. They had good reason for creating it. All creatures in the universe act out the life of the gods. Their eternal making love and hate is observe as us and all other life playing what they used to play. They watch the universe on the heavenly heavens. Big bang after big bang. Eternally. Existential boredom got a grip on heaven. Let's hope they don't get bored watching us. Untill then, they give meaning to and a reason and an explanation of life. Science merely describes. Though some think were a product of quantum fluctuations. Which are involved though.

Know the universe and you know the gods. — EugeneW

plural :yikes:

Aint there more then?

Your accounting, or sourced from secondary literature? — Mww

I had been reading The Critique of the Power of Judgement because of my interest in aesthetics. The title stuck in my mind and I mistakenly wrote in my post Critique of the Power of Judgement rather than Critique of Reason.

Many people are far more knowledgeable about Kant than me, so I think it only wise to also refer to secondary sources, such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Don't you agree ?

gods have power of creation. — EugeneW

Perhaps they do. On the other hand, human understanding is obviously capable of conceiving an unconditioned possibility, and pure reason has the authority to establish an idea of its object. But mere a priori conceptions and transcendental ideas are very far from manifest reality, and the manufactured illusory appearances of unchecked dogmatism for the sake of those ideas, treated forthwith as phenomena, do more harm to the certainty of experience than reason should allow itself to afford.

If for any reason that affirms an idea, there is an equally valid reason that negates it.....there’s something about the idea that remains inconclusive. And any thesis or proposition for which a definitive, non-contradictory judgement regarding the reality of its object is lacking, or ill-gotten, properly belongs to imagination, which has the power to logically present or deny to itself objects of mere ideas without phenomenal representation, yet cannot at all belong to that of which such representation is absolutely necessary, as in experience.
————-

That we can think gods and their supposed powers as logically possible, does nothing to grant knowledge of them as empirically given. The fact that humans cannot think the impossible, but can think gods, thereby denying their impossibility, is surely the weakest of positive arguments, and indeed.....

“....Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever. Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy...”

So, if indeed it is the case that our perceptions and conceptions are solely the product of evolution, then why should there be any basis for trust in the independent capacity of reason to arrive at truth? — Wayfarer

At the very least we need to be able to reason in order to survive. As Hoffman argued, reason allows us to navigate the world around us and has evolved to what it is today through natural selection.

I believe that in order to survive, I should not walk off a cliff. I can justify this by noticing that others who have done this have not survived. It is true that if I walk off a cliff I will not survive. Therefore, I have knowledge that in order to survive I should not walk off a cliff, where knowledge is justified true belief. My reasoning has led me to a truth.

Reasoning to survive exists outside language, in that the Neanderthals were able to successfully survive for almost 400,000 years without language. The Neanderthal reasoned and knew without language the truth of the danger of walking off a cliff.

IE, visceral reasoning arrives at truths.

Isn't confidence in reason justifiable because it is not solely dependent on biological evolution? — Wayfarer

We know that reason may lead to truths in knowing how to survive, but where is the truth beyond that which is necessary to survive. Where is the truth in a Derain. Where is the truth in an aesthetic experience.

I agree that once the ability to reason has evolved through the biological necessity of survival, then we can use our ability to reason about other things not to do with survival, such as trying to understand why a Derain is aesthetically more successful than a Hockney.

Although reason was born out of the necessity to survive, reason can now stand on its own two feet and go out into the world and reason about a whole range of different things.

It is true that when I look at a Derain I experience an aesthetic form. But what exactly is true. It cannot be the form that is true. It cannot be my response that is true. It cannot be the interaction between the form and my mind that is true. It is the proposition "when I look at a Derain I experience an aesthetic form" that is true. Truth also exists in language.

IE, linguistic reasoning also arrives at truths

In other words, to rationalise what we take to be true in terms of what is advantageous to survival, sells reason short - a very common tendency in modern philosophy. — Wayfarer

There are two types of truth - a visceral truth known outside of language and a linguistic truth known within language. There are also two types of reasoning - a visceral reasoning outside of language and a linguistic reasoning within language.

IE, as of necessity Philosophy uses language, Philosophy is also concerned with using reason as a means of discovering truth within language.

I mistakenly wrote in my post Critique of the Power of Judgement... — RussellA

Yeah, I noticed, that and including his lifespan, made it look like some C & P but without credit for it. Not important, really....just wondering.

I think it only wise to also refer to secondary sources (...) Don't you agree ? — RussellA

Yes, for comparative understanding of a personal interest. No, when referencing him in support of an argument. There’s an unnecessary trust involved, in sayin SEP....or Guyer, or Palmquist, or Quinne.....says Kant says, as opposed to saying Kant himself says.

lifespan..............just wondering. — Mww

The dates were intended to reinforce the idea that Kant was not able to benefit from Darwin's later work on the theory of evolution, in that today we can explain Kant's "a priori" knowledge as innate knowledge, a product of billions of years of evolution.

today we can explain Kant's "a priori" knowledge as innate knowledge, — RussellA

Does the theory of evolution distinguish between innate knowledge and mere instinct?
————-

I watched a NOVA show on ”slime molds”, in which a planaria was cut in half, and one piece regenerated the missing front part, and the other piece regenerated the missing tail part. The guy called it “knowledge” possessed by the organism. But under dissociative experimental conditions, the organism generates either two heads or two tails. So, dunno if that’s really knowledge to begin with or merely compliance with natural law.

Perhaps they do — Mww

For certain they do. The universe wouldn't exist if the hadn't.

On the other hand, human understanding is obviously capable of conceiving an unconditioned possibility, and pure reason has the authority to establish an idea of its object — Mww

If so, then human understanding is capable of perceiving gods and to establish ideas of them. If we can know the gods by observing the universe and are informed about their motives for creation, it might even help in establishing a cosmology, or a cosmogenisis.
Pure reason is a fairytale.

If for any reason that affirms an idea, there is an equally valid reason that negates it..... — Mww

That's equivalent to falsificationism. I prefer confirmationism. Endlessly trying to falsify has its limits. One should one time be satisfied with a last confirmation.

And any thesis or proposition for which a definitive, non-contradictory judgement regarding the reality of its object is lacking, or ill-gotten, properly belongs to imagination — Mww

Of course. This judgement though is not lacking wrt to the existence of gods.

Until so far. I criticize the second part of your challenging comment later! Thanks for making it, but that's what a philosophy forum is for I guess. Arguments, reasoning, critique, etc.

Perhaps they do
— Mww

For certain they do (have the power to create the universe). — EugeneW

Ok, but are we just as certain they did?
————-

If so, then human understanding is capable of perceiving — EugeneW

No. Understanding conceives; the senses perceive.
————

Pure reason is a fairytale. — EugeneW

And yet pure reason is the only possible source of both affirmative and negative determinations with respect to gods, as far as humans are concerned. Whether they exist or not, reason is how we can talk about what they may or may not be. It is, after all, only reason that says reason is a fairytale.