As I pointed out, how Putin and Russia is viewed has changed from time to time, from "Russia is not the enemy" and responding "Why not?" to Russia joining NATO (allegedly) , things change.

It is generally accepted that having standing armies means that those forces can be used any any way that is seen fit by that nation: there are no laws concerning that. There is the United Nations, but as we have seen, it may be better to manage things outside of conflict.

Accepting the current borders is a tacit agreement to the forcible means by which they were established.

Well well, there are laws concerning occupation, which is really surprising...It would seem to be an acceptance of war...

The legality of any particular occupation is regulated by the UN Charter and the law known as jus ad bellum. Once a situation exists which factually amounts to an occupation the law of occupation applies – whether or not the occupation is considered lawful.

Therefore, for the applicability of the law of occupation, it makes no difference whether an occupation has received Security Council approval....

The duties of the occupying power are spelled out primarily in the 1907 Hague Regulations (arts 42-56) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV, art. 27-34 and 47-78), as well as in certain provisions of Additional Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law.

The main rules o f the law applicable in case of occupation state that:

Theoccupant does not acquire sovereignty over the territory.

Occupation is only a temporary situation, and the rights of the occupant are limited to the extent of that period.

The occupying power must respect the laws in force in the occupied territory, unless they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the international law of occupation.

The occupying power must take measures to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.

(My emphasis)

https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm

That is simply false. China has greater leverage right now. — Olivier5

This is simply false.

NATO has far more nuclear weapons than China, far more and more advanced aircraft (could make a "no-fly zone" or help the Ukrainians directly if it wanted to), far more intelligence capabilities, and EU and US and co. are together far larger economies than China.

China also has leverage, but China is a totalitarian state in a "special friendship" with Russia right now and clearly backed the invasion ahead of time (frustrate the US "pivot" to Asia).

You should probably learn something about the world before discussing world affairs. Corporate truisms, as @Benkei as so aptly pointed out, are not an actual basis of understanding pretty much anything at all.

Looks like Russia is taking a breather. Simply to stack on supplies and some brigades that have endured losses have been withdrawn. — ssu

This is the pattern of the war, as Russia needs to setup forward operating bases before going to the next objective.

Russia has only committed 10% of it's standing army to Ukraine, and so can also rotate units in and out of the war as well as reinforce if it needs.

No doubt Russia has suffered losses, but so too Ukraine. We can't really evaluate relative losses and operational capacity of each side with the information we have, we can only really evaluate general strategic situation (such as Russia doesn't have a fuel problem in any fundamental sense, but Ukraine may), strategic objectives that we can be sure have no strategic or tactical reason to give-up. Obviously, Ukrainians would have prevented the encirclement of the capital if they could have.

This narrative that the Russians have "stalled" makes zero sense. Had Russia failed to siege Kiev (the biggest single strategic objective), ok, then clearly a big stall, but it didn't fail. Reporters are essentially reporting Kiev is now under siege. It may not be completely surrounded, but if it can cover the Southern gap with artillery fire then it becomes significantly harder to resupply Kiev.

It is completely expected that Russia is consolidating this strategic gain to then workout their next move and the logistics for that. Had Russia really been stalled in their encirclement of Kiev, then likely we would have seen some big move on a second priority, but insofar as Russia was making progress then strategy is a very "eye's on the prize" game, and they would prioritize completing that objective with only a defensive posture and easy gains everywhere else (to keep pressure on Ukrainian forces, pin them down and tie them up to avoid them reinforcing Kiev).

There was an attempt to cut off the North-West salient, which simply revealed a long defensive completely straight line of defense the Russians had built up to protect their encirclement.

The evaluation metric the Western media is using of how much land Russia "occupies", makes zero sense. If you want to trap the enemy forces and encircle them (common sense strategy), then the goal is not to just take and occupy a lot of land, but to take the land required for encircling.

What we see now is the start of the next phase of Russian salients forming to encircle Ukrainian forces in the East, in multiple ways and multiple levels.

Again, maybe there is some surprise counter offensive in the works that will rout the Russian forces, but it seems to me an essentially impossible military task.

Ukrainian forces also need water, food, fuel, ammo and to get at least some sleep; there is zero indication that Ukrainian supply lines are working better than the Russians.

Because Nuland is not a CBRN expert either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A. you don't need to be a CBRN expert to have such experts in your staff somewhere who have told you the state of bio-weapons.

B. if she's just talking nonsense as she's not an expert and the answer requires real expertise to answer, then she would have just said "I'm not an expert".

The question does not require being a CBRN expert to answer.

The lengths you're willing to go to try to deflect from the core thing: Q. is there bio-weapons in Ukraine A. non-no-answer, is truly remarkable.

And your long explanations of the difficulty of bio-weapons for tactical purposes, which have a lot of good info and point ... as @Isaac points out, only undermines your case, such as:

1. If there's no tactical reasons to have bio-weapons such as viruses that seem to be included in what Ukraine has/dad, then the only possible reason is for strategic purposes such as starting a pandemic for whatever reason. This would be the only rational explanation of why the CIA would be running bio-weapons labs in Ukraine or then letting Ukrainians, very potentially neo-Nazi's do so.

2. If the Russians have only non-communicable diseases like anthrax to use tactically in an invasion of Ukraine, there's not really any bio-research that helps against that. We know where to find anthrax, we know what it can do, it's more a mechanical (i.e. gas masks) than biological problem in dealing with an attack.

3. Considering the difficulties in bio-weapons development that you point out, there is zero legitimate reason for Ukraine, ranked more corrupt than Russia, to be working on any bio-weapons research of any kind. If there was some legitimate bio-weapons "defensive" research Ukraine "like super needs" it could be done in the United States at a secure lab run by people literally at the top of their field and qualified to work with insanely dangerous pathogens (and even then we worry about the risks and lab escapes do happen), and whatever reason Ukraine could legitimately have ... would also apply to the US who would therefore do that research with far more funds and skills, and just tell the Ukrainians whatever the defensive info is (... like the basics of CBN gear and usage? which, I've done, and is basically put on your gas mask and your rain suite ... and tuck your sleeves into your boots and gloves and hope not to die a terrible, terrible death ... so critical defensive information supplied? You really need bio-weapons research labs for basically the only defensive thing you can do in a tactical situation?).

Continuing my analysis of the military situation, which is obviously relevant to make decisions about it.

Again, only Ukrainian commanders can know if they have military objectives that can be feasibly attained.

Diplomacy is then informed by this military situation. If you are losing a war, you have less and less leverage as the war goes on. Hence, if one wants Ukrainians to selfless sacrifice themselves and their country to bleed Russia and create a new cold war, then you need to convince both Ukrainians and the whole world that they are winning, even if you know they are losing.

However, obviously NATO and EU also knows Ukraines chances, so Western media repeating over and over the idea Ukraine is "winning" is ... maybe true, or then maybe a lie to justify pumping more arms into Ukraine.

For, the moment the Western Media says that Ukraine has lost militarily the immediate followup question is that "isn't sending more arms into a lost situation creating more bloodshed for other purpose and also a 'low-blow' to the Russians that will be retaliated against us sooner or later" (if you think the Russians will forget ... you haven't met many Russians). And, indeed, the entire purpose of the rules of war is that fighting is done with honor and integrity and rationally based to protect civilians, to avoid cycles of retaliation. Regardless of who is morally / politically, correct, one side wins and one side loses in a war, and fighting with honour avoids drawing things out longer than it needs to be (sometimes decades) which then create cycles of retaliation and no peaceful building.

Sure, the Taliban eventually "won" ... but are Afghan civilians really better off due to all the cowardly civilian-clothed ambushes and suicide bombings the Taliban needed to win an insurgency?

Which is an exemplary case, for whatever we think of the morality of the US invasion of Afghanistan (who had nothing really to do with 911), imagine the state of Afghanistan today if the Taliban followed the rules of war and accepted defeat and there was no insurgency? Regardless of the initial war and it's reasons, imagine what 20 years of peace would have built in Afghanistan. So, Taliban are certainly morally responsible for that outcome even if the US invasion not justified to begin with ... but, of course we know ahead of time there will be an insurgency and Jihadist fighters aren't going to follow our little rule book, so US is responsible for the outcome as well on that account.

So, a useful contrast in terms of what the rules of war are even about in the first place, but also Taliban insurgency serves as a contrast to conventional warfare. The Taliban did not win a single conventional style battle against NATO, and didn't "win" in the end in any military sense, just tired NATO out essentially.

Both Afghanistan insurgency and first person shooter games, it seems to be most people online base their understanding of the Ukrainian conflict.

This basis of understanding leads to, for example, the narrative of the day that "tough guy" foreign fighters are going to arriving in Ukraine and that matters; as you just need a bunch of tough guys with riffles and shoulder launched missiles to "do tough guy shit" and win battles. The mental image seems to be that tough guys can go out with a riffle and a bottle of Jameson and "find the enemy" and shoot them.

First misconception with this mental image, is that you mostly don't see the enemy at all in conventional warfare, at least not in the sense that you can then just shoot them with a riffle.

Conventional warfare is not fought on the basis of tough guys, although they can play a role, but is mostly a positional battle between artillery and the logistics to supply that artillery. It is a "system" and not a individual first person shooters bravely fucking up the enemy.

The core thing first person shooter games lack as a basis to understand real warfare is the mortar. Of course, you could have a mortar team in a first person shooter game, but it would be insanely boring to be on said mortar team. Which is why in every single conventional battle, pretty much anywhere on the world, you will at least find assault riffles and mortars even in the poorest military engagements (at least on the winning side).

The system of mortars and rifles is already insanely more dangerous than just assault riffles, and you can't just "throw a bunch of tough guys together" and work a mortar team. It takes real training and skill on several levels.

On television we sometimes see soldiers casually dropping mortars into tubes that go off and explode somewhere, but this is not the whole "team" and, hopefully, they aren't just firing in the general direction of the enemy but actually at something. The whole process starts with an observer and his communications side-kick, who sneak around and find a target. If all goes well the observer figures out where the target is on the map, the communications side-kick then gets that information to the calculator guy, usually at the command post wherever it is but he can also be just hiding under makeshift umbrella in the rain. The "gold standard" of communication in this context is a wired line that sends (little) signals, but could also be just communicated by sneak. Anyways, the calculator guy works out the direction and the distance, takes into account wind speed and rain, and therefore the angle and additional powder / high explosives (mortars go like 20 feet with just the shotgun shell that sets them off), and whoever is in command approves the strike, and then this information is relayed to the team running the actual mortars. The actual fire team then needs to work out how to get the mortars in the right direction and angle (this is not some trivial task, and starts with setting up a guide stick as a reference direction, but sight on a mortar is not fixed in space and so moving the mortar around moves it off the guide-line which needs to be compensated for), and then the mortars are backed with powder / high-explosive required, pins removed and away they go.

Obviously, this whole process is in the context of some officer having some workable plan, we hope.

Now, the difference in accuracy between a good mortar team and a bad mortar team, and the difference in the observer (of which the whole process depends) not-getting-killed first and getting-the-enemy-killed first, and the time to setup, camouflage and setup a adequate defense of the mortar battery / escape plan, is really immense. A good mortar team can not only avoid getting killed, but can achieve the accuracy of the mortar, which on relatively short distances on a windless day can be a few meters.

Observer can also observe where rounds land and so send back corrective instructions (which are then very quick to process).

There are also other weak links in the chain such as the communications guys and calculator guys.

Point is, takes a lot of training. However, the result is that indirect vertical-ish fire can be brought down on an enemy position such as directly into their trenches. Also, mortars going off in the general vicinity (fire for effects) causes people to hide and the opportunity to maneuver or then tactically retreat.

Mortars can also fire other kinds of ordinance like anti-tank mortars, anti-other things, and giant flares that case a shadow at several kilometres. When assaulting a position at night, what feels save may not actually be safe if a artificial sun goes off overhead and you're totally visible and come under immediate mortar fire. We don't see the US using flares in an insurgency as A. they have really good night vision and so B. if would only give the opposing side an advantage. However, in conventional warfare flares are insanely useful to defend a dug in position.


The point of this long explanation is that this system takes a pretty long amount of training to use effectively and the tactical upgrade from just guys with riffles is immense.

From this basic riffle / mortar system, the purpose of bullets is mostly to pin down enemy forces to then hit them with mortar fire. Nearly all bullet firing in conventional warfare is suppressive fire for the purposes of striking the enemy position with indirect fire.

A war system then builds up from this, mostly just doing the same thing. Artillery serve the same basic purpose of mortars but against harder targets or farther away and requires the same basic info chain, and the basic purpose of air power is to both observe and substitute artillery strikes. Armor comes in precisely because the bullets and indirect fire system is so effective, sending a wave of infantry just get slaughtered like in WWI. WWII was totally different because armor can be concentrated to break through enemy defensive lines. And so, since armor is so amazing effective against the basic bullets and shells game, air power became so critical because it's armor's biggest weakness.

"Peak armor" was certainly the Nazi's invasion of France, and ever since then significant effort has been put into systems and tactics to defeat armor.

However, all these other way more expensive systems, such as planes and missiles of different kinds, is all happening at the end of the day to get tactical advantages (information and strikes of key things / critical moments) needed to make defensive lines of infantry and mortar/artillery cover (as bullets and shells are insanely cheap compared to cruise missiles and jet fighters).

The basic thing you want to accomplish in conventional warfare is surround your enemy cutting them off from reinforcements and supplies. So, in this basic strategic situation of lines of infantry supported by indirect fire, the counter is to break through the line at some point creating the problem for the enemy of either abandoning their positions and falling back to make a new defensive line (costs time and energy and gives up ground) or then risk being encircled. Hence, the counter offensive is critical to be able to deploy, but this requires armor and / or air power (who can both show up to the fight in a relatively short amount of time). You can't easily send infantry by foot to reinforce a position twenty kilometres away; the battle maybe over by the time they get there, so you need vehicles, civilian vehicles are extremely vulnerable, so you may need armor personnel carriers to even get reinforcements to the battle front requiring reinforcements.

The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that talk of "hundreds of thousands" of Ukrainians joining the fight may not be effective in any conventional military battle. Pretty much the only thing an untrained conscript or civilian can do is simply wait in a trench or some urban trench-like location for the enemy to arrive.

Hence the pumping in of ATGMs and Manpads which can be used by infantry individually with even minimum training, and does not require a coordinated team. However, these weapons can only slow the enemy as they are great to ambush armor, causing losses and caution, but they cannot really be used to assault a infantry line (insane waste of money) nor can do anything about relentless shelling of your own infantry positions, and, without good logistics, ATGM's may run out in a given location allowing the enemy to break through with armor that then no one there can do much about.

NATO has far more nuclear weapons than China — boethius

I don't know where you read that nukes gives you leverage to free civilians from a mad man, but it is not true. Nobody is going to threaten nuclear war if the civilians of Mariupol are not allowed to leave the bombed city... Just watch if you don't believe me.

Your total lack of clue would be amusing if you weren't perorating about bombed and dead people.

This is what this whole nuclear escalation situation has been about ... that Russia has nukes, and so too NATO. And it is this nuclear standoff that creates intense motivation for Russia to want Ukraine not to join NATO in the first place (if NATO did not have nuclear weapons, and Russia did, Russia may not be so concerned about NATO).

You do not understand how negotiation works.

Leverage does not mean "threaten", it could but it could equally mean what you have that the counter party wants, with only implied threats that go along with not reaching a resolution (which in most negotiations don't exist as you just go to the next supplier, bring in the next interviewee, if you fail to reach a deal with the current one).

Russia wants a commitment that Ukraine doesn't join NATO, that's the biggest chip in play, and not only could NATO give this commitment directly it can also pressure Zelensky to accept that (for instance, by informing him he isn't getting into NATO anyways nor getting a NATO no-fly-zone).

It's the biggest chip in play because NATO also has a whole bunch of nuclear weapons. That's the basic geo-political question being sorted out in the Ukraine war: how far is both Russia and NATO willing to escalate to a war, and at one point does escalation go nuclear. For example, pumping in ATGM's and Manpads is an escalation, in response to Russia's escalation of invading the entire country, but that was not sufficient to go nuclear ... but, seems everyone agrees, the next escalation by NATO of a no-fly-zone would likely be responded to first with tactical nuclear weapons, first in Ukraine and also maybe in the air to take out superior NATO planes the easy way, and then maybe even in space as a giant EMP, which then means NATO can only respond to this escalation with tactical nukes of it's own, which can easily destroy all the Russian positions in Ukraine, leaving Russia with the only "viable" (from a military perspective) way of responding to that with a strategic nuclear strike on NATO cities inviting a similar philosophy about that.

Leverage is what you have or what you can do, you don't literally have to say it in a negotiation.

Russia is a aware that NATO has nuclear weapons. One thing Russia wants is better protection from those weapons, which Ukraine joining NATO doesn't accomplish, and so this is part of NATO's leverage in the situation.

You don't really pay attention, do you?

Keep licking Vlad's balls, for all I care.

You don't really pay attention, do you? — Olivier5

NATO and EU represent more nukes, more conventional military power (both direct and indirect by supplying Ukraine), and more economic power than China. Therefore, they have more leverage than China in the situation.

China also has leverage, and I hope they too use it to deescalate and help end the conflict, but to say China has more leverage than NATO in a military situation ... is to say Russia fears China's military power more, which is untrue.

Russia needs China to deal with the military leverage (pumping in ATGM's and Manpads) and, even more so it's almost not comparable, the economic leverage of pulling Western corporations out of Russia all of a sudden, requiring substitutes for those technologies and equipment and services in the short term.

However, if China had more economic leverage to begin with ... it would have already out-competed all those Western firms using the "efficiency" of the communist approach to capitalism.

The evaluation metric the Western media is using of how much land Russia "occupies", makes zero sense. If you want to trap the enemy forces and encircle them (common sense strategy), then the goal is not to just take and occupy a lot of land, but to take the land required for encircling. — boethius

This strategy is discussed on Fox news, just saying the public is aware (or some of the public).

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/newslondon/gen-jack-keane-on-russia-ukraine-war-russian-forces-are-trying-to-encircle-kyiv/vi-AAV0top

This strategy is discussed on Fox news, just saying the public is aware (or some of the public). — FreeEmotion

Yes, when I say "Western media" I mean the dominant narrative, but there's definitely exceptions.

And, of course, even the journalists are sometimes clearly not believing anymore the assurances Ukraine is "winning in some way". I saw this video the other day of a guy explaining to these two news anchors that NATO is working on supplying Ukraine with Russia's S-400 system, and explaining how great a system that is ... and news anchors were clearly just like WTF is going on.

NATO and EU represent more nukes, more conventional military power (both direct and indirect by supplying Ukraine), and more economic power than China. Therefore, they have more leverage than China in the situation. — boethius

Are you advocating that NATO nukes Moscow to save Mariupol? I'm not against it, but it could be a bit odd, logically speaking, to kill millions of civilians here in order to save thousands of civilians there.

Russia has only committed 10% of it's standing army to Ukraine, and so can also rotate units in and out of the war as well as reinforce if it needs. — boethius

That's actually incorrect.

Armed forces and land forces are quite different.

Russian Ground Forces consist of only 280 000 troops. If you have 190 000 in Ukraine, that's basically it. Putin is not sending the personnel of the Air Force or the Navy or the Strategic Rocket forces to fight it out in urban combat in the streets of Kyiv. The only option is to start calling in reservists.

What has to be understood that Putin truly is a dictator, and just like Saddam or Ghaddafi, he is scared about the Armed Forces being a monolithical power in Russia. Hence Putin established the National Guard, the Rosgvardiya, in 2016 and with 340 000 men it is far larger than the land forces component of the Russian Army. It is headed not by a professional soldier, but by Putin's loyal judo friend Viktor Zolotov, who by education was a turner( someone who shapes wood) who then became a bodyguard of Yeltsin and befriended Putin. The National Guard is basically for crowd control and domestic security, although they naturally have also been in the fight in Ukraine. Then there is the FSB that has about 160 000 to 200 000 border guards.


About Zolotov, Navalnyi (now in jail) irked him about the Zolotov's personal wealth (corruption). His response:

"You have made me the subject of insulting, defamatory remarks," Zolotov said. "You know, it is not customary among officers simply to forgive. From time immemorial, scoundrels have had their faces smashed and been called to duels." Addressing the activist as "Mr. Navalny," Zolotov continued: "No one is stopping us from reviving at least some of these traditions, by which I mean seeking satisfaction. I challenge you to single combat — in the ring, on the judo mat, wherever, and I promise to make juicy, tenderized meat out of you."

This is totally from the dictators playbook. Have opposing factions in the security realm so you cannot be overthrown by a military coup. Of course the arrangement is detrimental for fighting a large scale war, but that's not the principle idea that dictators like Putin have in mind.

(It doesn't end there. For example Russia has separately even armed Railway troops, a force of 28 000)

Are you advocating that NATO nukes Moscow to save Mariupol? Because that would be a bit odd, ligically speaking, to kill millions of civilians here in order to save thousands of civilians there. — Olivier5

I just explained it pretty clearly. The whole basis of Russia wanting Ukraine not to join NATO and commit to neutrality, is because NATO has nukes.

Hence NATO has this leverage vis-a-vis Ukrainian neutrality because it has nuclear weapons.

I just explained that "leverage" rarely means "threaten" in a negotiation. Indeed, the only time you directly threaten someone in a negotiation is when they don't already understand what you're capable of and so not already acting in a rational way according to that.

Peace and resolutions are usually obtained through constructive dialogue focused on positive outcomes, with what people can do to each other if negotiations break down something everyone should already know because they put at least some effort into understanding the situation they are in.

Hence NATO has this leverage vis-a-vis Ukrainian neutrality because it has nuclear weapons. — boethius

I like your reasonning. Indeed, we need to make use of our strengths. Once Moscow is levelled off into a glow-at-night parking lot, Putin will be more likely to let the poor folks in Mariupol leave the city, right?

Russian Ground Forces consist of only 280 000 troops. If you have 190 000 in Ukraine, that's basically it. Putin is not sending the personnel of the Air Force or the Navy or the Strategic Rocket forces to fight it out in urban combat in the streets of Kyiv. — ssu

... I've heard a lot of Russia analysts mention this 1/10th figure.



Russia could also use it's conscripts and reserves, even if it's saying it won't right now.

There's also number of tanks and equipment etc. as part of the "force".

But, from my understanding, the personnel committed to Ukraine currently include logistics and support units. Looking at Aljazera's info graphic it seems to me 1/10th is a reasonable assessment.

Keep in mind a significant amount of Russia's military hardware will be in fixed forward positions, that it could go get and move into Ukraine if it wanted too.

Except for cruise missiles, Russia is not about to just "run out" of anything else anytime soon.

But maybe this figure is wrong, but you'll need to breakdown your analysis, as clearly 10% and 90% are pretty far apart.

Just add up the figures and you do get the nearly one million. 280 000 + 340 000 + 200 000 +....

The basic fact is that they don't have a reserves similar to fight a conventional war. And Putin surely cannot send all of his National Guard and all of the FSB border guards to Ukraine and leave Moscow and St Petersburg just being taken care of by the local police.

Then there is the issue of how well these forces are capable of conventional combat. How well do forces that basically are for crowd control and imprisoning ordinary people, are able to fight the Ukrainians armed with those NLAWs and Javelins. A bit different from rioters throwing rocks. They also don't posses so many main battle tanks and heavy artillery.

What has to be understood that Putin truly is a dictator, and just like Saddam or Ghaddafi, he is scared about the Armed Forces being a monolithical power in Russia. — ssu

Neither me nor @Isaac or @Benkei (to the extent he's criticizing NATO / EU as well) have defended Putin's decisions morally.

We are simply being realistic that we cannot convince Putin to just give up on the war and turn Russia into an participatory devolved direct democracy somewhat loose confederation of cantons as a resolution to the problem of Ukrainians dying and children dying and being traumatized for life.

And, we are simply being realistic that, regardless of what we think of Putin or his moral character, using NATO planes in the air and troops on the ground is simply not going to happen due to nuclear weapons.

Does this mean Ukrainians don't have a right to fight? None of us have said so.

However, if you're going to fight in a war for your country, you'd probably want that fighting to actually serve your country and not be one big NATO arms demonstration.

If Ukrainians have a chance of winning (which we've been debating in good faith and I'm not saying your wrong; Russia itself orchestrated the most famous and consequential counter offensive in all of history ... so, maybe it's possible with weapons and tactics we've never seen before) that obviously affects the evaluation of the purpose of continued fighting.

"A bit more fighting" might increase leverage and get a better deal in a lost situation, or it might simply solicit a far worse deal.

It's precisely because Germany fought for 4 years instead of only to Christmas, that the allies imposed the humiliating and financially impossible Armistice, as a retaliation for not giving up sooner, which then resulted in Hitler proposing to "fix that" and then the cost of fighting to the death (including children soldiers) was the partition and essentially direct administration of Germany for many decades.

It does not go without saying that further resistance and "holding out" as long as possible is better for your country in this sort of situation--maybe, or maybe not.

On top of the military situation, there is a political situation. Even if Ukraine can't actually stop Russia relentlessly achieving it's objective, there is of course political consequences to Russia for continuing the war effort, mainly the sanctions. To evaluate this we need to know how the average Russian sees things, which we have little information on so decisions based on them "rising up" any day now is, at the least, a big risk to take.

The biggest sanction we could do is shutting off the gas ... but we're not about to do that.

Neither me nor Isaac or @Benkei (to the extent he's criticizing NATO / EU as well) have defended Putin's decisions morally. — boethius

I'm not accusing you of that! I'm only making the point that it's wrong to say only 1/10 of Russian forces are deployed to Russia. There isn't the 9/10 to be deployed there.

Just add up the figures and you do get the nearly one million. 280 000 + 340 000 + 200 000 +.... — ssu

The analysis I've seen of the Russian overall military position is they are still garrisoning their usual border positions, in particular close to Georgia but also in the North-East and West.

I have seen no one add up the personnel they're committing in the way you describe.

However, one must include their reservists as part of their overall force and their stockpiles of armor and artillery etc. The proper way to do things is weight each person / equipment in terms of battle readiness and effectiveness.

I agree maybe 10% is too low ... but nearly 90% committed to Ukraine seems too high.

I'm not accusing you of that! I'm only making the point that it's wrong to say only 1/10 of Russian forces are deployed to Russia. There isn't the 9/10 to be deployed there. — ssu

I was just responding to your mention Putin as a dictator, which I initially interpreted as just moral condemnation, so wanted to make that part clear. However, if it was just to point out the units committed to protect Putin, then I agree with your point.

However, we seem to be on the same page. I'm not saying 9/10'ths could be thrown into the fight.

My point is that the troops can be rotated out of the battle space. This is a large strategic advantage.

First, front line companies, or units, or individual soldiers (depending on the situation) can be rotated back to rearguard / Russia / Crimea for just basic sleep recovery and then just sent back to the front line if needs be or then for the next company to rest. Just as even US soldiers in the Middle East do some patrol or fight a battle and then rest up in the "green zone"; they are still in a war zone but have safe space to rest and aren't literally sitting in a trench for their entire tour. It maybe counter productive to send soldiers to relax on the beach, but sleep is a basic need and difficult to do with constant explosions.

Whatever the force committed to Ukraine, it's not some absolute figure, but just "at any one time" Russia can support so many troops in the war. If companies become ineffective they can be rotated out with a fresh company with just a few train rides. For example, let's say 35% of troops of some base have been requisitioned for the war in Ukraine, as things go on, they will start to be rotated out with the fresh troops still on base; still 35% from that base committed to the war, but different people. Keep in mind many professional soldiers "want" to go to war and use their training and get experience and have stories to tell. The morale level of conscripts sent in on the first day by surprise (as mentioned, so Ukraine doesn't mobilize) is not indicative of the moral of the entire Russian military; which also can explain why Russia didn't organize it's best (as that would signal imminent invasion and preemptive mobilization).

Likewise, lightly injured soldiers can be sent back to base as part of the garrison and maybe have some productive things to do in an arm sling, and so can be replaced with a fresh soldier.

Lastly, soldier that die can be replaced by recruiting more soldiers.

The point of this fact is that a war of attrition with Russia needs to take their overall force into account.

Of course, not that Russia is willing to fight until the destruction of their whole army, but that their overall force outside the battle space makes "force repair" far easier in a purely military sense. As with the United States, likely the political tolerance for losses is reached far ahead of a purely military tolerance (mainly due to nuclear weapons, Russia doesn't actually need to fear an opportunistic invasion by a neighboring empire or upstart, unlike basically any time before nuclear weapons).

I agree maybe 10% is too low ... but nearly 90% committed to Ukraine seems too high. — boethius

Well, 90% of 280 000 is 252 000, hence even if you take into account the National Guard units fighting in Ukraine, not so much is committed to Ukraine. But it's logical that they cannot withdraw troops for example from Kaliningrad and leave other places totally void of troops.

For example, let's say 35% of troops of some base have been requisitioned for the war in Ukraine, as things go on, they will start to be rotated out with the fresh troops still on base; still 35% from that base committed to the war, but different people. — boethius

Or then start calling in the reserves.

It's likely that units made from reservists will need at least few weeks or a month to train and to get synergy. Deployments of fresh troops doesn't happen in days. So basically I think for Putin to hold talks, have some kind of cease fire might be a good option. In order to reorganize the forces to a next push. Yet the thing is that during that time the West can replenish the Ukrainian forces too.

I was just responding to your mention Putin as a dictator, which I initially interpreted as just moral condemnation, so wanted to make that part clear. — boethius

Ok. Actually it wasn't meant as a moral condemnation (even if Putin deserves all the moral condemnation there is).

No, the fact is that dictators and authoritarian regimes are basically scared of their own security apparatus and hence they divide the apparatus to various competing organizations. Saddam Hussein had his Army and then his Republican Guard. Even the Saudis have the Army and separately a National Guard made of largely tribesmen. Now a sparsely populated Saudi-Arabia with Iraq (at the time of Hussein) and Iran would logically need a powerful army. But for the monarchy a powerful army is an internal threat: there could be an Arabian version of colonel Nasser who throws out the corrupt monarchy. Hence the division of the defense forces into separate organizations. And the traditional example would be the Third Reich with the Wehrmacht and the SS.

I just explained it pretty clearly. The whole basis of Russia wanting Ukraine not to join NATO and commit to neutrality, is because NATO has nukes.

Hence NATO has this leverage vis-a-vis Ukrainian neutrality because it has nuclear weapons. — boethius

To put it bluntly, joining NATO gives a nation absolute impunity, because any military action, whether sanctioned by the UN Security council or not, with our without just cause, cannot be responded to by Russia in kind because that would mean attacking a NATO member, which is tantamount to attacking them all, including the United States.

This was Putin's point when he suggested that if Ukraine joined NATO, they could attempt to take back Crimea and he would not be able to do anything about it.

Come to think of it, a good strategy would be for everyone to join NATO and paralyze Russia's ability to use their military ever again. Whom is Russia going to have left to attack? China?

The basic thing you want to accomplish in conventional warfare is surround your enemy cutting them off from reinforcements and supplies — boethius

How does the civilian population figure in all this? Surrounding a city and asking the civilians to leave seems like a good strategy but the combatants are unlikely to let civilians leave combatants in any case may not be wearing uniform. Isn't it reasonable to expect civilians to be prevented from leaving a battle zone?

Talking of siege:

However, almost all of this overlooks an uncomfortable truth. The truth is that while high-end wars between nations have decreased, war has certainly not gone away, nor is it getting any less violent. Furthermore, when looking at the conduct of warfare since the end of the Soviet Union, one thing becomes very clear—the siege is a defining feature of modern warfare across the globe. When hearing the word siege, it is easy to let one’s mind wander to the time of kings and castles, trebuchets and battering rams, but that is to overlook the frequency of sieges in modern warfare. In fact, a brief survey of history illustrates that the siege is a defining feature of the late 20th and early 21st centuries; perhaps today is the siege’s golden era.

https://www.ausa.org/publications/reemergence-siege-assessment-trends-modern-land-warfare

Well, 90% of 280 000 is 252 000, hence even if you take into account the National Guard units fighting in Ukraine, not so much is committed to Ukraine. But it's logical that they cannot withdraw troops for example from Kaliningrad and leave other places totally void of troops. — ssu

Ok, well we'll see, but I have not seen any similar analysis that Russia is engaging a majority of it's total force.

Or then start calling in the reserves. — ssu

Yes, Putin committed to not conscript anyone for the war, but there will be plenty of reservists wanting to become full time soldiers. The Kremlin does not have a short term war financing problem so it can simply start hiring more troops, especially pre-trianed (to some degree) reservists. Especially with the sanctions causing deep recession in Russia there is certainly plenty of people looking for a job.

Of course, this doesn't instantly replenish the force, but mitigates losses and frees up existing full time soldiers to replace with new recruits.

Point is, Russia can "tap" their reserve force without technically using any reserves, as it can just convert reservists to professional full time soldiers.

No, the fact is that dictators and authoritarian regimes are basically scared of their own security apparatus and hence they divide the apparatus to various competing organizations. — ssu

Agreed, some force is necessary to protect the Kremlin from revolution.

How does the civilian population figure in all this? Surrounding a city and asking the civilians to leave seems like a good strategy but the combatants are unlikely to let civilians leave, when they make avoiding civilian deaths more difficult, and also, combatants become civilians when they drop their weapons. Isn't it reasonable to expect civilians to be prevented from leaving a battle zone? — FreeEmotion

What mattes in the rules of war is who's to blame. Russia also has video cameras and as soon as the war ends will start to justify their military decisions based on the intelligence that they had.

If Russia wanted to kill civilians it could just drive a thermobaric multiple rocket artillery launcher up to the front lines and fire everything it has into a city center, or just carpet bomb cities relentlessly.

However, it's not doing that, and so will state that it conducted the war to minimize civilian casualties, although some collateral damage cannot be avoided (same as the US says), and that it's offers of civilian corridors were good faith and maybe will publish video of Ukrainians breaking these cease fires. Russia may also simply prosecute / discipline some soldiers who "broke it's rules of engagements"and pay reparations for those "errors". From there is will get all technical legal all sorts of details needing investigation, and, therefore, drop out of the news cycle and that will be that.

To put it bluntly, joining NATO gives a nation absolute impunity, because any military action, whether sanctioned by the UN Security council or not, with our without just cause, cannot be responded to by Russia in kind because that would mean attacking a NATO member, which is tantamount to attacking them all, including the United States.

This was Putin's point when he suggested that if Ukraine joined NATO, they could attempt to take back Crimea and he would not be able to do anything about it. — FreeEmotion

That's why countries want into NATO; way easier to be defended by the largest military block on the planet.

Come to think of it, a good strategy would be for everyone to join NATO and paralyze Russia's ability to use their military ever again. Whom is Russia going to have left to attack? China? — FreeEmotion

The problem with this is that, sooner or later, in particular unstable regional powers, but generally speaking, diplomacy breaks down and push comes to shove. May also not be clear who fired the first shot.

By letting in unstable nations with their own regional ambitions, if not today perhaps tomorrow, then war inevitably follows and NATO won't actually respond to some cluster-fuck regional shit-show. I.e. in NATO, plenty of nations will abuse the position, NATO won't do anything as otherwise it will just encourage more abuse, and so the Article 5 will be undermined and the alliance start to fall apart in a practical sense.

Neither me nor Isaac or @Benkei (to the extent he's criticizing NATO / EU as well) have defended Putin's decisions morally.

We are simply being realistic that we cannot convince Putin to just give up on the war and turn Russia into an participatory devolved direct democracy somewhat loose confederation of cantons as a resolution to the problem of Ukrainians dying and children dying and being traumatized for life. — boethius

I think Putin's actions can be defended if, as he has said, Russia is fighting for its survival. As the world's greatest military power that won the cold war, it is only rational to beat down any nation to the size you want it to be so it stops interfering with your foreign policy.

That may not be morally defensible.

Is Russia fighting for her life? Does the 'invasion from the West' bring reminders of the Nazi invasion that cost so Russia so much? To the first question I simply do not know. The answer to the second I can only guess.

Democracy may not be the answer as apparently the Russian population does not want Ukraine to join NATO. If it came to a vote they may even support war, or 'military operations'. What then of democracy?

A Pacifist would be bound to suggest to Putin some have suggested to Zednesnkyy: don't fight oppression, fighting will get you killed. Make some sort of a peaceful settlement with Russia and for Russia to make some peaceful settlement with NATO and live with it, until an opportune time to re-assert yourself.

NATO, plenty of nations will abuse the position, NATO won't do anything as otherwise it will just encourage more abuse, and so the Article 5 will be undermined and the alliance start to fall apart in a practical sense. — boethius

So NATO is careful about who joins them as well, some sort of a balance.