In what way does...

No, he isn't. Jack is "drawing correlations that include the words 'a [ ] clock is working.'" So his belief is propositional. — ZzzoneiroCosm

...attribute truth or falsity?

Can you give me an example of a belief that is not a Proposition?

Can you give me an example of a belief that is not a Proposition? — Michael Sol

The answer has been given over and over for the last ten or so pages.

Believing that a broken clock is working is not a proposition.

:roll:

You're not interested in discussing how belief that a broken clock is working does not have propositional content.

Stick around and learn something.

To each and every detractor:What, in the fewest exact terms as possible, is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

I think you lost the plot quite a ways back.

"The clock is both working and not working" is a proposition that is false.

"The clock is both working and not working"is a proposition that is necessarily false. — Banno

What does that have to do with the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

Yeah, I should have known better Than to post, hey.

Notice that this claim is a de re belief ascription analogous to "Jack believes of that broken clock that is working" (which I was talking about a while ago) where the expression "the broken clock" is outside the completive clause of the predicate "to believe", and within the semantic scope of the one who makes the belief ascription. — neomac

If any of that or all of that and possibly more leads you to believe that the content of Jack's belief cannot be a broken clock, in large part at least, and that broken clocks are not propositions, then I don't know what to tell you honestly without sounding like a grumpy old guy...

Bewitched.

Not all belief amounts to believing that p.

...what is more critical, is that this rendering allows you to keep unclear what constitutes non-propositional belief contents. Which is what you should still explain to support your claims. — neomac

Belief that does not consist of propositions consists of other things... trees and mice and spatiotemporal relationships between them... for example. Broken clocks and wondering what time it is, for yet another.

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

If it were the case that, at time t1, Jack's belief was "a clock is working", then Jack's belief would be true, because somewhere at that time, a clock was working. Jack's belief about the clock was false.

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.

At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much?
— creativesoul
Yes I do. — neomac

Okay, good.

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

I'm sorry, I don't follow you at all. Why is it not a proposition, as it attributes a (false) belief to subject?

Broken clocks and wondering what time it is, — creativesoul

I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believe and can not knowingly believe true when you claim of him "Jack believes that brocken clock is working". It's always the same example. In such content there is "broken clock" but there is no "wondering what time it is".
There are 3 items in this non-propositional "brocken" "clock" and "is working". What are these entities? What is the meaningful correlation that is drawn by them? And who is drawing this meaningful correlation between these 3 parts "broken", "clock" and "is working"? I take it to mean the real-world referents of the word you are using in your non-quoted belief ascription report. Is that right?
"clock" is the real object existing in the world
"broken" is the property this real object in the world truly has
"is working" is the property that this real object does not have.
If not, spell out what these 3 items are, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief.

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1? — creativesoul

I answered that already. Belief contents express the point of view (the intrinsic fitness conditions) of Jack's believing attitudes which best explain his behavior in the given circumstances at t1. In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" is better than "that broken clock is working" because that clock is working can be either true or false, while "that broken clock is working" is contradictory so always false i.e. it can not adequately express a case of ignorance.

It seems you do not fully appreciate the different theoretical tasks of your approach wrt mine. My theory of belief is based on what I take to be some pre-philosophical linguistic facts (common belief ascription practices). These belief ascription practices are not based at all on my theory of belief. These belief ascription practices are not based at all on a full blown theory of propositional content (like frege's or russell's). And my theory of belief is not based at all on a full blown theory of belief as propositional attitude (like frege's or russell's). Indeed my theory of belief and a theory of belief as propositional attitude may compete to explain the very same linguistic facts. That is why:
- my primary task is not to develop a theory of belief, but to understand as much as I can the logic of our common belief attribution practices.
- I don't care about your distinction between propositional and non-propositional content as such, as much as I care about how your view and the usage of this distinction may compete against our common belief ascription practices.
- I don't care to specify further my theory of belief, because understanding and defending the logic of our common belief ascription practices it's more important to me than my theory of belief. That is also why you shouldn't care about my full-blown theory of belief coz I don't have one yet. And to critisize your view it's enough for me to counter your misconception about the logic of our common belief ascription practices as I understand them, or to question the internal coherence of your assumptions and claims.

Your situation is different: you are developing a theory of belief and belief ascription in competition with a specific theory of belief as propositional content (whose source is still unknown to me) and our common linguistic practices. So your primary task is to provide the details of your theory of belief and then judge our common practices accordingly.
That is why the primary explanatory task for you is to exactly and completely explain the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief content as you understand it in the relevant example which are always the same two (never ever change them):
At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

That is why I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believing (and can not knowingly believe true) when you claim of him "Jack believes that broken clock is working". There are 3 items in this non-propositional content: "brocken" "clock" and "is working". What are these entities? What is the meaningful correlation that is drawn between them? And who is drawing this meaningful correlation between these 3 parts "broken", "clock" and "is working"? I take it to mean the real-world referents of the words you are using in your non-quoted belief ascription report. Is that right?
"clock" is the real object existing in the world outside of our mind
"broken" is the property this real object in the world truly has
"is working" is the property that this real object does not have.
Is that it? If not, spell out what these 3 items are, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief. You keep saying that Jack's non-propositional content is about a broken clock but you never mention "is working". Yet the non-propositional content is not "Jack believes that broken clock" but "Jack believes that broken clock is working" and if the broken clock is the real world object than what "is working" in the real world? Nothing?
There is no progress if you keep just repeating your distinction between propositional and non-propositional content (without offering an analysis of it) and then projecting it on to me as if I were committed to it, to make me play the role of one who confuses the 2. That's framing and question begging accusations.

Why is it not a proposition — Michael Sol

What does the word "it" refer to?

Belief contents express the point of view (the intrinsic fitness conditions) of Jack's believing attitudes which best explain his behavior in the given circumstances at t1. In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" — neomac

So you're saying that those words in quotes are the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" is better than "that broken clock is working" because that clock is working can be either true or false, while "that broken clock is working" is contradictory so always false i.e. it can not adequately express a case of ignorance. — neomac

Sure it can adequately express a case of ignorance. I mean, it is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working(treat this as if we are pointing at the clock). So, when one believes that broken clock is working, it is most certainly a case of ignorance. Jack's is precisely such a case.

While it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood, it is not impossible to believe one. Jack's belief is false. We know this. It cannot be either true or false. Jack's belief can only be false. Therefore, if we say that he believes a falsehood(as compared/contrasted to just being mistaken), then our report of Jack's belief ought produce a candidate that is impossible to knowingly believe. Falsehoods are language constructs on par with false assertions. So...

The candidate "that clock is working" is not impossible to knowingly believe. Jack's belief is false, and all false belief is impossible to knowingly believe. Therefore, "that clock is working" cannot be what Jack believes.

If we say that Jack holds false or mistaken belief, then our report ought produce a candidate that is impossible to knowingly believe.



If, at time t1, we're pointing at the clock and saying Jack believes that clock is working, we could be saying that the content of his belief is not equivalent to a proposition because clocks are not, and his belief is about that particular clock. All of this would be true for he does indeed believe that particular clock to be working. So, our report would seem fine. However, if we're aiming at the most accurate or precise description of the content of Jack's belief, we cannot leave out the fact that that particular clock, which has become meaningful to Jack as a result of his belief formation, is a broken one.

It is as a result of Jack's belief not being propositional in content, that our saying that he believes that that broken clock is working does not attribute a contradictory belief to Jack, because it is only the words that are contradictory. Jack's belief does not consist of those words. Jack's belief that that broken clock is working consists of correlations drawn between the broken clock and his wondering what time it was. Jack's belief that that broken clock is working does not have propositional content. It's not belief about the words I just used to report upon it. It's not belief about assertions, sentences, utterances, or any other language use. It's belief about a broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. Thus, Jack's belief that that particular broken clock is working does not have propositional content.

Jack's belief has that broken clock as it's content, in very large part at least. The broken clock is not all there is to Jack's belief(for it is a complex one indeed with other necessary prerequisites), but without that particular broken clock to look at, Jack's belief would not have been formed at all.

Jack's belief would pose no problem at all if it were not broken. Perhaps that's why there is such a fervor to leave that much out.

the primary explanatory task for you is to exactly and completely explain the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief content as you understand it — neomac

The former includes propositions. The latter does not.

That is why I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believing (and can not knowingly believe true) when you claim of him "Jack believes that broken clock is working". There are 3 items in this non-propositional "brocken" "clock" and "is working" — neomac

While words are not propositions, on my view, the content of Jack's belief is not words either. The correlations he draws at the time as a means for believing what the clock says do not include language use. Those words are not being thought by Jack at time t1. Jack is wondering what time it is, so he looks towards a clock to know. That's the way it happens. This is well established habit, to the point of it's being nearly autonomous. That is to say that it is something done without much thought at all about the clock aside from believing what it says. We do not look to a clock and think silently or aloud "I believe that that clock is working". We just don't. That's just not how it works. That is a metacognitive endeavor. Believing a broken clock is not.

To give the full non-propositional content is impossible. There's no way to know that much and to set such a standard is unacceptable as a result of this sound consideration. Omniscience is neither possible nor necessary here. I mean, I'm not defending the God of Abraham. By the way, it doesn't matter which notion/sense of "proposition" you're using, they are all fatally flawed. It's just that some are flawed differently than others.

The basic arguments are simple.

Either propositions exist completely independently of all language use in some way such that a language less creature is capable of having an attitude and/or disposition towards them, or language less creatures do not have belief. I've yet to have seen a notion/sense of "proposition" that succeeds here. Hence, many who hold such a view(belief as propositional attitude) reject the idea of language less belief.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Language less creature's have belief. Therefore, belief are not equivalent to propositional attitudes.

Much the same holds good for claiming all belief has propositional content.

my primary task is not to develop a theory of belief, but to understand as much as I can the logic of our common belief attribution practices. — neomac

Logical notation? The form of belief attribution? "The logic"???

How can anyone establish what counts as acceptable and/or unacceptable attribution of belief to another if there is no standard regarding what counts as belief? We're faced with the dire need for an adequate minimal criterion for belief which, when satisfied by some candidate or another, warrants concluding that that candidate counts as a belief.

What exactly would we be attributing to another when ascribing some belief to them, if we did not already have an idea of what beliefs are?

This especially comes to the forefront when ascribing belief to language less creatures.

To give the full non-propositional content is impossible. — creativesoul

Impossible? We are discussing here if "that clock is working" is more or less accurate than "that broken clock is working". The full account I'm asking is about this and only this belief content attribution in this and only this example, not the belief of everybody in the universe present past and future.
So again:spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) is, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering. You can start from |is working| , since you keep saying that Jack's non-propositional content is about a broken clock but you never mention "is working". Yet the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is not rendered as in "Jack believes that broken clock" but as in "Jack believes that broken clock is working" and if the broken clock is the real world object than what "is working" in the real world? Nothing? A property? So spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working|
BTW even for the claim "While it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood" you have yet again to explain exactly why it is impossible to knowingly believe "that broken clock is working".

So you're saying that those words in quotes are the content of Jack's belief at time t1? — creativesoul

No. In the example "Jack believes that clock is working", the belief content is the fitness condition expressed by the completive clause, so it's the state-of-affairs (i.e. the object "clock" and its property "is working") in the real world that would make that belief content cognitively accurate or, to simplify, true. There might be something else misleading in talking like this though.


> Logical notation? The form of belief attribution? "The logic”???

By “logic” here, I’m generically referring to the rules of our common belief ascription practices.

> How can anyone establish what counts as acceptable and/or unacceptable attribution of belief to another if there is no standard regarding what counts as belief?

Of course there is a standard, but it’s implicit in our belief ascription practices. What is hard it is to spell it out. Also grammar rules are implicit in our language practices, but it’s a non-trivial task to abstract them. So there are cognitive rules that are implicit in our common belief ascription practices to identify beliefs, and my theoretical effort is to abstract those cognitive rules from our common belief ascription practices. But rule abstraction presupposes rule application. Yet again there might be something else misleading in talking like this though.

> What exactly would we be attributing to another when ascribing some belief to them, if we did not already have an idea of what beliefs are?

Right, this idea however is implicit in our common belief ascription practices. Indeed one learns the usage of the word “belief” from those competent speakers that utter belief ascriptions in the given circumstances.


Look, I won't answer any more your questions if you do not answer my previous post. Coz it's the 4th time in a row that I'm asking the same question (that I already asked other times) but you avoid to answer it, which is fishy. So:

spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering, is. You can start from |is working| — neomac

you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief — neomac

No, I'm not.

the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is... ..."Jack believes that broken clock is working" — neomac

No, it is not.

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.

The content of Jack's belief are correlations drawn by Jack between directly and indirectly perceptible things. That would include the broken clock and his wondering what time it was, amongst other things less relevant. That's at least the fourth time I've said that and answered your question. It's fishy that you act as if I've avoided it.

the belief content is the fitness condition expressed by the completive clause — neomac

Could you elaborate?

That's at least the fourth time I've said that and answered your question. It's fishy that you act as if I've avoided it. — creativesoul

Then quote yourself when you explain what "is working" stands for. Because this is what I asked. And if you not find it, that's because you did not answer my question.
So try again (5th time):

spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working| — neomac

Could you elaborate? — creativesoul

try again (6th time):

spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working| — neomac

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief. — creativesoul

I might conflate whatever you see me conflating if you continue to frame my questions. But I will return to such a claim of yours later because I suspect you are committing yet another big mistake.

Anyway you wrote this:

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much? — neomac

I'm asking you (7th time): in the belief report that you claim more accurate, namely "At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock was working.", I see 3 items: broken, clock, was working. Explain what each of them stands for. Start from was working.
It's always the same question, but I removed the part that triggers your framing (i.e. "belief content").

P.S.
Too often the questions of mine you think you are answering, are not my questions but the questions that you misunderstand as a consequence of framing my position.