:up:

Interesting - Bernardo Kastrup calls it Mind at Large. Inspired, it seems by "Will" from Schopenhauer. — Tom Storm

'Mind' would do.

Maybe. Although for Schopenhauer the English translation could also be 'energy'. The problem with 'mind' however is that it brings baggage. In the case of the aforementioned thinkers, the mind they are describing is instinctive and not meta-cognitive and does not relate to or communicate with people or have plans. It is not a god surrogate. It's a funny kind of mind.

You haven't addressed my points as far as I can tell. Doesn't the cat have its own life,nature and attributes, which contribute to constituting anyone's perception of it? — Janus

I’m going to be lazy and hide behind the following quotes. Let me know if they answer your question.

Ratcliffe says:

“The unquestioned givenness of the objective world that is constitutive of scientific descriptions cannot capture the way in which the given is disclosed by a meaning-giving background. Thus, if anything, it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description.”

Zahavi concurs with Ratcliffe:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our
conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

Indeed, for Schopenhauer the will is mindless; only the representation is a product of mind. And insofar as the will or primal energy drives the representation; the latter is not solely a product of mind.

Husserl’s notion of intentionality fragments the holistic weave of our frame of intelligibility into separated elements.

“It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside. But what is meant by intentionality-the bare and isolated directing-itself-towards-must still be set back into the unified basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. This alone is the authentic phenomenon which corresponds to what inauthentically and only in an isolated direction is meant by intentionality.” — Joshs

It is care that unifies dasein. This is from The History of the Concept of Time, and I read the chapter and can see here why Heidegger might be accused of psychologizing in the way he deals with urges, propensities, love, drives and so forth. Seems convoluted but that is only because it takes a lot to get familiar; but so full of surprising entanglements as with with Augustine and the fable of Hyginus. What an extraordinary thinking person.

Still though, Husserl believed in a transcendental experience, as if, as I see it, if one were in the pov of divine omniscience, one would see it thusly.

The conversation has moved on but I wanted to adress this question: — Wayfarer

I'll have to read it. Just a bit...

Don't you accept that we are affected by the world below the level of our conscious awareness? If you want to say that we construct the world, that each one of us constructs our own worlds, and that we are not affected by anything unconsciously or other than ourselves, that would be pure idealism and then we should know just how we construct the world. But we do not and the idea seems incoherent and absurd. — Janus

Well, that depends on what you consider ‘the world’ to be, as distinct from ‘we’. At what point do we end and the world begins? My point is that affect refers to a relative aspect of energy at the level of potentiality. Language structure insists on a subject-object distinction, describing the relation of ‘affect’ as a verb - but I think this can limit our understanding of what affect is in potentiality. The more we understand the broader scope of affect in potentiality, the more self-consciously we can collaborate in the process.

You say "collaboration with the world" which is pretty much what I've been saying, but then when you claim that we are not affected in the sense of being acted upon by things other than ourselves, you seem to be denying that very collaboration. — Janus

For me, there is a subtle but important qualitative difference between ‘collaborating with’ and ‘being acted upon by’. It goes back to the Tao Te Ching, and the idea of wu-wei, or ‘acting as’. Collaboration refers to a direction of intentionality rather than just effort. It’s about our capacity to anticipate the most efficient and effective directional flow of energy through our ‘being in the world’. So it isn’t that “we should just know how we construct the world”, but that we are at least capable of more accurately understanding how we can participate in the ongoing creative process.

You say that depression may be "more accurately described as an ineffective distribution of attention and effort"; as though it all relies on the willing subject, and I can only say that if you had ever suffered from severe depression you would not say that. Depression can result from "abnormal" brain chemistry, and that fact is uncontroversial. — Janus

But again, I am suggesting that we put aside this subject-object distinction in order to more accurately understand ideas such as affect, reason and value beyond the limitations of language structure or a subjective will. I’m not sure what you’re offended by: there is nothing in my description as it’s written to identify subject in relation to object, so you’re imposing your own assumptions here. ‘Abnormal brain chemistry’ is one way to describe what ‘causes’ depression, but the fact that such a description relies on Big Pharma to ‘fix what’s wrong’ with someone doesn’t sit well with me. Personally, I suspect the growing prevalence of depression has more to do with an evolution of ‘brain chemistry’ (towards greater variability) than any apparent ‘abnormality’ (which is a value judgement), but I’m not really in any position to back this up.

Also I haven't said that affect is nothing but energy. Everything is energy of one kind or another, but it doesn't follow that anything is nothing but energy. — Janus

We are agreed here, at least.

Yes, I think that's exactly right. — Janus

It is confused, therefore hardly exactly right. In Berkeley, Kant’s thing-in-itself wasn’t eliminated; it was never considered in the first place, hence whether a material cause, is moot.

From Berkeley, speaking as Philonous contra Hylas......

“....I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see and feel. These I know, and finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous of any other unknown beings...”

....it is clear Berkeley’s and Kant’s foundational epistemology is well-aligned, in that the source of empirical knowledge is entirely predicated on real things met with the senses. Furthermore, Berkeley’s “unknown beings” are very far from Kant’s unknowable things.

It is only upon the consideration of a representational cognitive system, which Berkeley as Philonous of “vulgar cast” doesn’t invoke, does the thing-in-itself obtain any meaning, and then, only in such case, can the thing-in-itself be eliminated as a material cause, that is, of sensation.

Just sayin’.....can’t eliminate that which was never the case.

Or did I miss something?

The modes of necessity are interrelated with the modes of contingency, so that perfect necessity is contingent in relation to a priore necessity, a priore necessity is contingent in relation to logical necessity, and logical necessity is contingent in relation to an "ur-contingency" that would transcend non-contradiction. Each mode of contingency, in turn, represents the possibility of something different from what we see in each subsequent mode of necessity. The very possibility that, in time, we can open the window or make some other alteration in reality is a case where we deal with the contingency of present time and our ability to bring about some new possibility. What this adds up to for universals is that as forms of necessity they represent the rules and guideposts that limit and direct possibility: Universals represent all real possibilities. Thus, what Plato would have called the Form of the Bed, really just means that beds are possible. What would have seemed like a reductio ad absurdum of Plato's theory, that if there is the Form of the Bed, there must also be the Form of the Television (which is thus not an artifact and an invented object at all, but something that the inventor has just "remembered"), now must mean that the universal represents the possibility of the television, which is a possibility based on various necessities of physics (conditioned necessities) and facts (perfect necessities) of history. — Meaning and the Problem of Universals, Kelly Ross

Well, I read most of it, and I know this history, though not as well as Kelly Ross. I don't get it, this is the kind of thing a Buddhist should run a mile from .

A Buddhist, and I am not consulting text on this, is first someone who practices a method (you can argue against all of this, of course), and that method is a withdrawal from conditions of normal experience, that day to day business with one's affairs. A radical withdrawal, not simply relaxing the mind; the kind of withdrawal that makes profound changes in the way the world is perceived, at the level of perception itself. This method has an end, which is the annihilation of time. Time is the everydayness of our affairs (not some absurd Kantian intuition). It is not the taking the trash out, making the dental appointment, and so on; it is the "taking" of the taking the trash out AS the real; it is the reification of our practical world into an ontology. By ontology I do not mean to discuss Plato or Aristotle or any of that philosophical heritage at all. As I see it, that presumptuous talk causes all of philosophy's problems.

Wondering if universals are real certainly does beg that impossible question, what do you mean by 'real'? Such question stops all inquiry in its tracks. If a particular or a universal is real, then 'real' has to have meaning in order for the proposition to make any sense. This brings the inquiry to unproblematic occasions of the real, and this leads to what is apprehended "most directly". This then is an obvious Cartesian turn, for what is MOST direct is what is immediate, unquestioned, intuitive, such that nothing can stand between the affirmation and what is being affirmed.

To me, this is where Buddhism begins. Buddha, the ultimate phenomenologist, who "reduces" the observable environment to what simply appears before one as it appears, and not as it is anything else. All else in meditation is radically suspended, and by this I mean annihilated. Time is annihilated, for though one may analyze the condition in terms of Kantian time (certainly the apriority of the succession of events certainly holds, if you want to talk like that) this analysis is suspended along with everything else. The radically reduced world looms large with all presuppositions in abeyance.

In the west we have phenomenology. Consider what Husserl says in his Cartesian Meditation about his method:

I have thereby chosen to begin in absolute
poverty, with an absolute lack of knowledge. Beginning thus,
obviously one of the first things I ought to do is reflect on how
I might find a method for going on, a method that promises to
lead to genuine knowing

Absolute poverty, of course, is never achieved here or in his Ideas nor in Heidegger, or anywhere else Only in Buddhism (and Hinduism. I drop the metaphysics and the "differences" it makes. I have little patience for the way people invent issues with religion and philosophy. Sit, observe the world. What you seek is a method, not an argument).

Berkeley's system is coherent only because he postulates the existence of a Transcendent Master-Mind.

Kant's system is coherent only because he postulates the existence of a Transcendent Thing-in-Itself.

Fichte's system is coherent only because he postulates the existence of a Transcendent Absolute Ego.

Schopenhauer's system is coherent only because he postulates the existence of a Transcendent Will.

Can any system of philosophy be coherent without having to postulate the existence of some kind of Transcendent Factor?

And with respect to each system, what is it precisely that needs to be explained by the Transcendent Factor? Is it something peculiar and unique to each system, or something common to all the systems?

Has any thinker formulated a complete system of philosophy that did not necessitate postulating the existence of a Transcendent Factor?

Indeed. Or is transcendence another way to fill gaps in incomplete ideas?

Tom, any conjectures as to the "incomplete ideas" which might be unique to each system, or common to them all?

For example, Berkeley needed a transcendent Master-Mind to preserve, maintain, and explain the existence and inherent organization of ideas if and when they were not being perceived by any human mind.

Has any thinker formulated a complete system of philosophy that did not necessitate postulating the existence of a Transcendent Factor? — charles ferraro

Caspar Hare?

And with respect to each system, what is it precisely that needs to be explained by the Transcendent Factor? Is it something peculiar and unique to each system, or something common to all the systems? — charles ferraro

I'd say what needs to be explained is the commonality of experience. I see a cat, and others will also see it just where I do. Even my dog will see it, judging from his behavior.



What I was agreeing with was the positing as outlined by Charles in his most recent post, of God, Absolute Ego, the thing in itself and will in the respective philosophies. As to their respective roles in explaining commonality of experience, I think Kant's and Berkeley's work best. Either there are things in themselves that explain our commonality of experience or else Berkeley's "God does it". Fichte's "absolute ego" and Schopenhauer's "will" are too nebulous to be explanatory of that commonality, at least as far as my understanding of them goes, which admittedly isn't all that far in the case of Fichte.

I'd say what needs to be explained is the commonality of experience. I see a cat, and others will also see it just where I do — Janus

But perhaps "others" report seeing a cat because you expect them to. Maybe there are no others.

We perceive others, so there seems to be no reason to deny they are real. What could it even mean to deny that there are others? To put it another way, in what sense could we think of others as being unreal? Who do you think you are conversing with on here, for example? Yourself? If I were unreal to you and you were unreal to me, where would that leave us?

Who said that? :gasp:

Haw haw. Just playing devil's advocate. Actually, I'm a physicalist.

But that points out why I find immaterialism so ridiculous : either the immaterialist is essentially claiming solipsism to be true, or they are just giving another name to the transcendent.

:ok:

RGC, what is the written work of Caspar Hare titled wherein he sets forth his system of philosophy which does not need to reference a transcendent factor?

Tom, any conjectures as to the "incomplete ideas" which might be unique to each system, or common to them all?

For example, Berkeley needed a transcendent Master-Mind to preserve, maintain, and explain the existence and inherent organization of ideas if and when they were not being perceived by any human mind. — charles ferraro

Exactly. That's what I mean. The sorts of questions these expressions of idealism raise for me are: If everything is mind then why can't we change the world mentally? Why is there so much consistency between the experience of people? Why can't I read minds or be read? How does the 'physical' world remain stable? It seems clear that an overarching mega-mind is needed as the ground of all experience.

The notion of a Big Mind or cosmic consciousness which is not metacognitive seems intriguing to me. Berkeley has a version of Big Mind that is essentially God, so his idealism is guided and I imagine in some kind of reflective dialogue with all that is.

It's a little bit of a stretch, but Hare's egocentric presentism in On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects. It's the closest work I could think of.

Thanks. Will take a look at it.

Be that as it may, it is nothing but a commentary on the intellect that does philosophy, rather than the philosophy being done by it. In any case, either the intellect thinks that which is a condition for its antecedents, in which case it is already unconditioned and serves as the means, or, thinks that which is conditioned by its antecedents, in which case it becomes the unconditioned and serves as the ends. No big deal; just logic writ large.
———-



Yeah....I guess I’m too literal. When presented with a proposition worth thinking about (Berkeley and Fichte seemed to have successfully eliminated Kant's Thing-in-Itself as a material cause), I limit myself to what the propositions says, not some possible hidden conjecture it may or may not imply. Regarding the parenthetical herein, Kant’s thing in itself never was a material cause, which tends to make the claim for its successful elimination as exactly that.....incoherent.

The Berkeley quote was meant to show the basis of at least part of his epistemology to have no concern for the thing in itself in the first place, whether or not it ever was supposed to possess material causality.

Fichte, on the other hand, writing contemporaneously with Kant, at first accepted Kant’s thing in itself as Kant intended, but then suffered a serious change of mind, mostly in his revamped theory of science, 1795-6, thereby rejecting it. Whether or not he ever conceived the thing in itself as material causality, thereby setting the ground for denying it as such, I have no idea.

That’s all I’m saying.

Right, "material cause" does seem somewhat inapt given Kant denied space and time and the twelve categories of judgement as being applicable to things in themselves.And this denial does seem to be a somewhat problematic element in Kant's philosophy, since surely it must be said that things in themselves are necessary for the appearance of phenomena, no? Which means that if they are not the material or efficient causes then at least they must be a necessary condition.

The other point is that to "eliminate" the thing in itself is to posit an alternate necessary condition for the appearance of phenomena. So, for Berkeley this is God; things in themselves are things as God "thinks" them. Thinks can still be (our) mind-independent physical existents, but they are not the bare "physical existents" of physicalism because their existence depends on their having their being in God. For Fichte it is not something physical at all but "Absolute Ego"; the problem being that it is not clear what such a thing could be. And Schopenhauer;s "Will" cannot account for differentiation or order.

it must be said that things in themselves are necessary for the appearance of phenomena, no? Which means that if they are not the material or efficient causes then at least they must be a necessary condition. — Janus

Maybe they are one of two necessary conditions:

"Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”

Yes, exactly, which is to say that the both the thing perceived and the percipient are necessary for the appearance of phenomena.

If everything is mind then why can't we change the world mentally? Why is there so much consistency between the experience of people? Why can't I read minds or be read? How does the 'physical' world remain stable? — Tom Storm

To say something occurs 'in the mind' is not the same as to say it occurs in your mind or my mind alone. Consciousness is a collective. Through language, enculturation, and common standards we each are an aspect of a collective consciousness. This is made explicit in Jung's doctrine of the collective unconscious and the archetypes.

We do change the world intentionally. Look around you - every single thing you see is a product of the human mind. It needn't be as dramatic as pyschokinesis or spoon-bending! Even psychosomatic medicine is an indicator of 'mind over matter'. (I don't totally discount the existence of psychic powers but I never go into bat for them, as it's always such an acrimonious subject.)

One analogy I have given before is like this. Imagine if mountains were conscious. Because their life span is hundreds or millions of years, a mountain could not comprehend a mountaineer - the span of a human life would be infinitesmally small in comparison. A river, you could understand, because it hangs around long enough to make an impression, so to speak.

At the other end of the scale, imagine an intelligent microbe. It's lifespan might be minutes or hours. The mountaineer's size and time-scale would be incomprehensible to it, on the other end of the scale.

That serves to illustrate how our 'species consciousness' determines the kind of world we see. I think something like that underlies Kant's notions of the 'primary intuitions' of space and time. They are architectonic to our experience of reality, which is reality.

So humans have both a cultural and biologically-determined consciousness, and that is not yours or mine. We're all participants in it, but we don't personally originate it. That is very much like Hegel's view, although you also find it in Ken Wilber's spiral dynamics. We're not atomic individuals, completely separated from others or from the world, but participants in the evolution of consciousness.

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.” — Dan Zahavi

:100:

To say something occurs 'in the mind' is not the same as to say it occurs in your mind or my mind alone. Consciousness is a collective. Through language, enculturation, and common standards we each are an aspect of a collective consciousness. This is made explicit in Jung's doctrine of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. — Wayfarer

The problem with this is that Jung did not posit a collective consciousness, but a collective unconscious. In any case the idea of either is nebulous, what could such a thing be? Are human minds connected at some deeper level, or only in the sense that we participate in a common culture?

Good question! Next book after Kastrup's Schopenhauer, is Kastrup on Jung.

And the reason it's nebulous, is because it's not a thing. Our culture only prepares us to deal with things, and if it's not a thing - why, it must be nothing!