I haven't read most of this thread. I thought you meant you had just given that explanation to creative.

No. Cheers.

There are some interesting aspects to some of your objections. However, we seem to be having difficulty focusing upon what I think is of importance. That's on me.

The move to set it outside the scope of Jack's belief is due to the fact that it would be impossible for Jack to make such a statement based on his belief. — Harry Hindu

Well, yes and no.

While believing that that broken clock was working, it would be impossible.

However, after becoming aware of the fact that he believed that a broken clock was working, by showing him that clock had stopped, after becoming aware of exctly how he had come to believe that it was 3 o'clock, he could no longer believe that that clock was working. At this point in time, Jack could readliy admit to having once believed that that particular clock was working, and that that particular clock was broken at that time, so he had once believed that that particular broken clock was working.

So, no, it is not always impossible to make such a statement based upon his belief.

Here's the interesting part...

Never did he have an attitude towards that particular proposition(that broken clock is working) such that he believed it to be the case, or true. Thus, he cannot be sensibly said to have an attitude towards that proposition such that he takes it to be the case, or takes it to be true. If an accurate rendering of Jack's belief were put into belief statement form, he would not assent. That is not a problem at all for what I'm saying here. He did not know he was wrong. He believed that that broken clock was working nonetheless.

That example stands in direct opposition to underlying false presuppositions pervading some of the objections to the simple account I'm offering here. Namely, 1.that we must be aware of everything we believe, and 2.all belief can be rendered into propositional form such that the individual to whom the belief belongs would assent.

Neither of those are true. I'm offering an everyday example that warrants our tempering our confidence in those two notions. A bit more carefully well-placed skepticism is appropriate.

SO you do not understand that...

"the broken clock" is not a description Jack could correctly make?... — Banno

At least not while he believed that the broken clock was working.

SO you do not understand that...

"The broken clock" could not be within the scope of Jack's belief? — Banno

I would agree if what counts as being within the scope of our belief are only what we would assent to if asked. Jack would assent if asked after becoming aware of the relevant facts.

However, if the scope was broadened a bit so as to include what we all actually believe rather than what we know, and/or would admit to, we would surely see that the scope of Jack's belief is beyond his own knowledge.

...actually... — creativesoul

He actually believes that the clock is working.

I don't think you have understood this scope thing. A bit of formal logic would do you no harm.

Your notion of what counts as being within the scope of our belief includes only what we would assent to if asked.

Jack would assent to once believing that that particular broken clock was working if asked after having become aware of the relevant facts. Not before.

So, the scope of Jack's belief ought be broadened a bit so as to include what he believed rather than what he would admit to believing. The scope of Jack's belief ought include all of Jack's belief. He was totally unaware of his false belief that that particular broken clock was working while he believed it. He believed what the clock said, and would readily admit to this all after having become aware of the relevant facts. After becoming aware of the broken clock, he would have become aware of his own mistake. At this point in time he would readily agree if asked "Did you believe that that broken clock was working?"...

He would have never agreed if ever asked if the proposition/statement "That broken clock is working" were true. He never held an attitude towards the proposition (that broken clock is working) such that he believed it true.



That's a bit more cleaned up.

Seems to me that this is clearly a belief that does not allow itself to be rendered in propositional form such that the believer would hold it to be true, or as true.

It's that "broken clock" is an extensional definition, while believes is an intensional operator.

The typical example of intension is

Jack believes Stephen King's first novel is The Shining.

If we stuck an extensional definition in there it would read

Jack believes that Carrie is The Shining.

Same thing. — frank

Could you apply this to (Jack believed that a broken clock was working)? I'm curious to see exactly how it is the same...

...

Seems to me that this is clearly a belief that does not allow itself to be rendered in propositional form such that the believer would hold it to be true, or as true. — creativesoul

Here I'm extending this to barn facades and sheets in fields that resemble sheep...

Belief that that barn facade was a barn. Belief that that sheet hanging from a clothesline was a sheep. Belief that that man dressed in a sheep suit was a sheep. Etc.

Belief that does not permit itself to be rendered as a propositional attitude.

There's rather a big hole in all that, in that each is a belief represented as a propositional attitude.

SO now I am wondering if you have a clear grasp of what a proposition is. I just don't see anything here that supports your contention.

However, after becoming aware of the fact that he believed that a broken clock was working, by showing him that clock had stopped, after becoming aware of exctly how he had come to believe that it was 3 o'clock, he could no longer believe that that clock was working. At this point in time, Jack could readliy admit to having once believed that that particular clock was working, and that that particular clock was broken at that time, so he had once believed that that particular broken clock was working. — creativesoul

You're moving goal posts. Jack's beliefs can change, sure, but which belief is the statement about - before or after he became aware? You're being purposely obtuse, such that I don't believe your goal here is to reach any common ground with anyone, rather you seem to have too much time on your hands and a need to waste other people's time.

I take it to mean, something that at least can be shared by different sentences (e.g. “Jim loves Alice” and “that guy called Jim loves Alice” ), by different propositional attitudes (e.g. I believe that Jim loves Alice, I hope that Jim loves Alice), by different languages (e.g. “Jim loves Alice” and “Jim aime Alice”) and determines their usage/fitness conditions. Those who theorize about propositions have richer answers than this of course (e.g. Frege’s propositions, Russell’s propositions, unstructured propositions, etc.). But I’m not a fan of these theories, so I’ll let others do the job.
Anyways, I hear people wondering about images as propositions or as having propositional content, without elaborating or clarifying, so this was my piece of brainstorming about this subject. — neomac

"Something" that is shared by different sentences is too vague. What specifically do they share and is there a categorical term that can be used to refer to what is shared that allows us to group all propositional content under the the term, "propositional content"? What makes something propositional content? What allows us to say that different sentences that have different propositional content? There must be something that sentences share that allows us to say that they all have propositional content. If not, then how can we say that different sentences share things?

To know that I’m confusing the propositional content of that image, presupposes that you know what the propositional content of that image is. But I’m not convinced it’s that simple, see what you just wrote about that image: <it is a sheet of paper with red ink in shape of diamonds and a “7”> while you previously wrote something like: <it’s a seven of diamonds >. Is it essential for the propositional content of that image the mention of ink or paper? A seven of diamonds tattooed on the the body doesn’t share the same propositional content of the image on paper? How about the arrangement of the diamonds on the surface of the card? How about the shade of red? How about the change of light condition under which the image is seen? If I warped that image with an image editor to make it hardly recognisable but still recognisable after some time as a 7 of diamonds, shouldn’t we include in the propositional content of that image all the features that allowed me to recognise it as a 7 of diamonds, despite the warping? And so on…
Again, I’m just brainstorming, so no strong opinion on any of that. Indeed I was hoping to get some feedback from those who talk about propositional content of images, or images as propositions. — neomac

Well, again, it depends on our goals in communicating. What are we trying to talk about? How was a 52 deck of cards invented? What is the history of the 52-deck of cards? There had to either be an idea for a 52-deck of cards in someone's head that evolved from pre-existing ideas about games with cards that did not include 7 of diamonds. So it isn't likely that someone just created a 7 of diamonds card without also creating the rest of the deck, hence the 7 of diamonds is only meaningful with the rest of the deck. With that I can agree, but it still is possible for someone to find a card with the number 7 and 7 diamonds on it that has never seen playing cards. How would they go about determining the meaning of the card, or could they use it for something else, like a bookmark, or as an object for bringing luck (lucky 7)? When using it as a bookmark are they misusing the card, or are they simply co-opting an object (scribbles and images) for other uses?

Could you apply this to (Jack believed that a broken clock was working)? I'm curious to see exactly how it is the same... — creativesoul

I don't think you'll find it helpful.

He never held an attitude towards the proposition (that broken clock is working) such that he believed it true. — creativesoul

I think that it would be helpful to show how the objection is inapplicable to what I'm arguing here. Your example is one of switching referents. Mine is not.

You're moving goal posts. — Harry Hindu

(That broken clock is working) has been proposed as the belief from the beginning. Any change was for elucidation only, not as a way to avoid valid objection. Evidently you do not understand what's being argued. That reply was meant more for others anyway...

> "Something" that is shared by different sentences is too vague. […] If not, then how can we say that different sentences share things?

Right. But I left it vague on purpose b/c otherwise I should have taken position wrt what propositions are, which is not my intention. Yet a major intuition pump that is inspiring the philosophical theory of propositions lies in that kind of examples I provided.

> So it isn't likely that someone just created a 7 of diamonds card without also creating the rest of the deck, hence the 7 of diamonds is only meaningful with the rest of the deck. With that I can agree, but it still is possible for someone to find a card with the number 7 and 7 diamonds on it that has never seen playing cards.

Your last point is going back to where we started: images (taken as a representational kind of things) can match different descriptions that do not share the same proposition. Then, if you remember, you asked me “what rules would we need to remove the ambiguity of images that are not scribbles?”. So, I proposed you to consider the codification systems that we have to interpret images (traffic signs, deck of cards, national flags, emoticons, brand logos, etc.). These codification rules are certainly helping us identify and understand images, but the issue at hand is more specific: can they help us determine the right propositional content of an image? I’m inclined to think that the correct answer is no. Unless, say, images are trivially coupled with sentences by stipulation (but what if the problem is deeper than this?).

> How would they go about determining the meaning of the card?

Good question, but your question should be more demanding than this, and look for a meaning that has an intrinsic propositional form (that sentences can share etc.). So the question should be: how would they go about determining the meaning propositional content of the card?

I think that it would be helpful to show how the objection is inapplicable to what I'm arguing here. — creativesoul

I understand what you are arguing. You're just wrong.

A better approach would be to explore the implications of belief being limited by language.

I just don't see anything here that supports your contention. — Banno

To which contention are you referring?

I understand what you are arguing. You're just wrong. — frank

That's not at all convincing to an astute audience. Gratuitous assertions such as these may convince some, but not I. We'll see if I'm wrong. That has yet to have been determined and/or established. I'm not even finished yet. Time constraints.

SO now I am wondering if you have a clear grasp of what a proposition is. — Banno

There's a certain bit of irony here. I could say "pots and kettles" too...

Need I remind you of the absolute mess you made of the notion during the debate? There is more than one accepted use of that term. On my view, all propositions are proposed. It follows that having an attitude towards some proposition such that one believes it to be the case requires an individual capable of proposing and an individual capable of understanding that proposal and subsequently taking it to be true.

That barn facade is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That sheet hanging from a clothesline is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That man dressed in a sheep suit is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That stopped clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.
Jones owns a Ford and disjunctions are true if either disjunct is. Therefore, 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because Jones owns a Ford.

That broken clock is working) has been proposed as the belief from the beginning. Any change was for elucidation only, not as a way to avoid valid objection. Evidently you do not understand what's being argued. — creativesoul

Yeah but now you're talking about Jack having different beliefs after becoming aware of something that CONTRADICTS his prior belief.

However, after becoming aware of the fact that he believed that a broken clock was working, by showing him that clock had stopped, after becoming aware of exctly how he had come to believe that it was 3 o'clock, he could no longer believe that that clock was working. — creativesoul

That is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.

That barn facade is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That sheet hanging from a clothesline is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That man dressed in a sheep suit is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That stopped clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.

So, above are two different ways to describe some of the beliefs under consideration. It seems that I am the only one around here who finds the bottom set to be more accurate and/or acceptable than the first. Most of the objections are based upon the idea that the believer needs to assent to their belief when put into propositional form. That the scope of one's belief needs to be limited to only what they would say of themselves at that time.

It seems that I am the only one around here who finds the bottom set to be more accurate and/or acceptable than the first. — creativesoul

Accuracy with respect to what? All I can say is that the most accurate report of someone’s belief at time t1 is the one that best matches the point of view of the believer at time t1. Why would I pick the point of view of some person P at time t2 (or some other person Q at time t1) as a criterium of accuracy for reporting P's belief at time t1?

@creativesoul

Let me reformulate your proposal without mentioning all wrong hints I think you provided (and still provide) and in terms that I find less equivocal, in order to make it look better (at least, to me).
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We commonly take a believer’s perspective on a given situation as a fundamental accuracy condition for belief ascriptions about him, and intensional belief ascriptions are designed for expressing this understanding. This is why we reject extensional belief ascriptions, at least, when intensional belief ascriptions are available.
Yet one can wonder if all intensional belief ascriptions can be in principle replaced by extensional belief ascriptions without omitting the believer’s perspective. How? By rendering the believer’s perspective in terms of metalinguistic belief ascriptions (belief about the truth-value of some propositions).
This is why one can claim as valid both <Jack believes a broken clock is working> (extensional belief ascription) and <Jack believes the proposition “a broken clock is working” false> (extensional belief ascription rendering the believer’s perspective in metalinguistic terms).
Where is the benefit? At least, in preserving truth-value through substitution of co-referent terms, even for belief ascriptions, and without giving up on the believer’s perspective. [I’ll let you integrate with other benefits]
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Before commenting further, would you find this re-formulation enough acceptable? And if not, why not?

So, above are two different ways to describe some of the beliefs under consideration. It seems that I am the only one around here who finds the bottom set to be more accurate and/or acceptable than the first. — creativesoul

Neither way of describing the beliefs is more accurate other than from their different appropriate perspectives.

In your rendering of my contentions here, you've placed far too much importance on the notions of intentional, intensional, and extensional. One in my position could be easily flattered by such misattribution. I mean, it looks like a very intelligent viewpoint is being described.