And we are more and more far from understanding how such an account could ever explain what a belief is about and explain the related behavior not only on non-linguistic creature but also in irrational/ignorant linguistic creature. — neomac

Over the years, I've come to realize that parsing the issues in terms of linguistic and non-linguistic belief is fraught, it quite simply does not work. Almost, but not quite right, it seems to me. There's a substantial loss of explanatory power when it comes to creatures we call non linguistic having belief content that is existentially dependent upon language; things like bowls, cups, cars, etc. Such things are certainly linguistic things, meaning that they owe their very existence to language, and it leads us to muddle when trying to parse non-linguistic creatures' beliefs if they are about such things.

Philosophy proper has not really recovered from Gettier. That failure is solely as a result of getting belief wrong to begin with, and it's led to approaches like Banno's. While I certainly do understand the need for the JTB account, especially during the time, for some reason or other, that line of thought has been stretched beyond what's warranted. That's where the notion of all belief as propositional attitude comes from. Moore's paradox also shows how that accounting practice is found wanting.

seems to think that the position I argue for/from is somehow guilty of reifying belief. The notions of reification or misplaced concreteness work from basic taxonomy which I reject. Not all things can be properly taken into account with a dichotomy such as real/abstract, physical/non-physical, real/imaginary, physical/mental, etc. So, when Banno claims that I hold that beliefs are in the head or mind of the believer, or that they are mental furniture, he's quite mistaken. Belief, like many other things, are not the sorts of things that can have a spatiotemporal location, for the content of one individual's belief can be spread across the globe, indeed the entire universe. Or in the example of the mouse running behind a tree, the content does not have a precise location. The tree, the mouse, and the relationship between them are most certainly not inside the skull of the believer. Any dualist account or dichotomy such as internal/external, mental/physical, and the like is doomed to fail here for the belief is a result of a process that includes the individual who draws the correlations, the tree, the mouse, and the relationship between the mouse and tree.

- Implicit beliefs [8] can’t be verified until properly expressed (e.g. stated): “holding a belief true” can have both a dispositional and a non-dispositional account. In any case, considerations about truth-functional implications or equivalences based on propositional contents are fallible ways for belief attribution, because there are also irrational beliefs, conceptual indeterminacies and background knowledge that affect doxastic dispositions.



[8] I take it that you believe that you have more than one eyelash. But I suppose that up until now, you had not given this much consideration. If that example does not suit, perhaps you might consider if you believe that you have more than five eyelashes, or less than 12,678. Or you might bring to mind some other belief about something which you had up until now never considered …

The point is that we each have innumerable beliefs that we have never articulated, indeed which we never will articulate, but which nevertheless we do hold to be true. All this to make the point that there are unstated beliefs… — neomac

Here Banno was attempting to support the notion of propositions which had never been proposed, but somehow existed nonetheless as something a believer somehow holds to be true despite never having articulated the proposition or witnessing it having been articulated. To me, that is patently absurd. It amounts to claiming that one can believe something that they have never thought of before ever thinking of it. Such a parsing completely neglects the need for the believer to be a part of the process, and makes a complete muddle of the sequences of events that lead up to forming, having, and/or holding that some proposition or other is true.

- The actual propositional content of a belief seems to be identified with the possibility of being put in propositional form [9][10][11], and that sounds like claiming that the actual content of a glass is water because one can pour water into the glass.



[9] What we take to be true is what forms the content of a belief. What we take to be true can be expressed in a proposition. Hence, the content of our beliefs is propositional.

[10] beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form. And this can be rephrased as that the content of a belief is propositional.

[11] My contention is that the content of beliefs are propositional. What is believed can be stated, and is held to be true. — neomac

Yes, it seems that Banno thinks that because belief can be put into propositional form, and has been for centuries, that all belief content is propositional and all belief is an attitude towards that particular proposition.

There is a conflation between reporting upon and/or taking an account of anothers' belief and anothers' belief. The opening post in the debate covers this thoroughly. There are three basic kinds of belief, and believing that some proposition or other is true is but one kind.

It also does not follow from the fact that we can state the cat's belief, and do so using propositions or statements which are truth-apt, that the cat holds those to be true. The cat cannot believe such things, for the cat has no language. The cat believes that the mouse is behind the tree, but quite simply cannot believe that the proposition "the mouse is behind the tree" is true.

In the first, the naive realist believes that they can talk about how things are independent of some belief or observation. The first statement could be caused by an illusion, hallucination or a lie. — Harry Hindu

You seem to have entirely missed the point. Realist or idealist, one sentence is about the cat, the other about Harry.

Use them to accomplish what goal? — Harry Hindu

Whatever you choose.

Formal Representations of Belief:The Objects of Belief

You seem to have entirely missed the point. Realist or idealist, one sentence is about the cat, the other about Harry. — Banno

No, it is you who missed the point. It wasnt a comparison of realism vs idealism, but between two different versions a realism - direct vs indirect. Idealism would also have two versions: direct vs. indirect.

Whatever you choose. — Banno

Not useful. Any examples of use other than representation would be helpful.

Not useful. Any examples of use other than representation would be helpful. — Harry Hindu

Hello.

That's a very heavily theory laden link. Notice the term "representation" too. It's an accounting practice. What is true of it is not necessarily true of what's being taken into account.

Hello. — Banno

We've already been over this. No new examples?

"Hello" is the acknowledgement of two or more people to begin an exchange of information (have a conversation). "Good-bye" is the acknowledge of the parties' that the exchange of information has ended.

When a computer targets another to exchange information, they must acknowledge each other and the beginning of the exchange of information with what we call a "hand-shake" and then acknowledge the termination of the exchange with another acknowledgement from both nodes.

"Hello" is the acknowledgement of two or more people to begin an exchange of information — Harry Hindu

Yep. It's not referential. That's what you asked for.

That's a very heavily theory laden link. — creativesoul

It might show you how the notion of proposition fits into the belief stuff.

We've already been over this. — Harry Hindu

Yep. That's why I'm not overly interested in this thread.

Yep. It's not referential. That's what you asked for. — Banno

Like i said, it refers to the beginning of a conversation, or the intent to communicate with you.

If its not referential, then what is its use?

That's a very heavily theory laden link.
— creativesoul

It might show you how the notion of proposition fits into the belief stuff. — Banno

Yeah, I noticed the leaning on possible worlds arguments in your replies regarding unspoken statements and propositions.

ike i said, it refers to the beginning of a conversation, or the intent to communicate with you. — Harry Hindu

No, Harry - it doesn't refer to the begging of a conversation; it is the begining of a conversation.

No, Harry - it doesn't refer to the begging of a conversation; it is the begining of a conversation. — Banno

Or a reference to the intent to communicate.

Yeah, I noticed the leaning on possible worlds arguments in your replies regarding unspoken statements and propositions. — creativesoul

Not sure what use the idea of possible worlds is unless were talking about beliefs as predictions.

The possible world stuff is not that important. Nothing much hangs on the use of "proposition" in "propositional attitude" - as the article says, "statement" works just as well. The only reason for using the term is that it is so widely used.

The mooted counterexample you've been using fits the propositional attitude model.

Or a reference to the intent to communicate. — Harry Hindu

No, Harry. It does not refer to anything; it does something. It begins the conversation.

But you will continue to try to force it into your referential model. You are engaged in an ad hoc defence of a broken model.

i dont have to try that hard if "hello" is your one and only example. We can disagree on one example, but it take more than one example to prove your point.

@creativesoul

Take a look at Propositional Attitude Reports

It is an article about the actual difficulties with propositional attitudes. I go along with Davidson, although I must admit never having considered the objections closely.

i dont have to try that hard if "hello" is your one and only example. — Harry Hindu

Oh, there's plenty more. Most involve referring to things in order to do stuff with them. Have a look at "How to do things with words". It's been commended to you before, many times, and is an easy read - I found it quite amusing.

Edit: There's even a youtube video about the book, for you kids that can't read.

No, Harry. It does not refer to anything; it does something. It begins the conversation. — Banno

Like i have said numerous times, meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Effects are about their causes. Use requires intent. Intent is the cause of use, therefore use is about one's intent.

Speaking is a type of behavior and we attempt to get at the intent of other behaviors so that we form beliefs, or predictions about future behaviors.

Take a look at Propositional Attitude Reports

It is an article about the actual difficulties with propositional attitudes. I go along with Davidson, although I must admit never having considered the objections closely. — Banno

Will do. Thanks for the link. Now you're just verifying my earlier comment to you about being a guidepost of the highest caliber...

:wink:

Most involve referring to things in order to do stuff with them — Banno

Right, using words to refer to things that arent words in order to do stuff with those things that are not words. In other words, words are used to refer to the intent of the user to get some others to behave in a particular way.

Like i have said numerous times, meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. — Harry Hindu

Repeating it, even three or more times, does not make it so.

Is there anyone who agrees with you on this, Harry?

And again, if I were any good as a teacher, you would have long ago abandoned this silly line of thought.

I do not think that you understand what I'm arguing. It doesn't so much as contradict your own as much as further qualifies it. Some and all belief... whereas I hold the former and you the latter.

...using words to refer to things... — Harry Hindu

Yes, Harry, words can be used to talk about things. But they can do much more than just refer. The problem with a purely referential theory of language such as yours is that there is so much it cannot explain.

Repeating it, even three or more times, does not make it so.

Is there anyone who agrees with you on this, Harry? — Banno

Neither does pleading to popularity or orthodoxy that doesnt exist.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#Repr