metaphysical positions are neither true nor false. They have no truth value. They are more or less useful in a particular situation at a particular time. — T Clark

Makes sense. Like axioms.

wouldn't we treat someone who has done something wrong but does not have free will differently that one who does have free will — T Clark

Are our actions different if we assume no free will is involved than if we assume there is? — T Clark

We would treat them differently if we could observe different patterns of behaviour from them, or if we could reasonably expect different responses to our actions, either form them or from the society. We would focus not on the past, but on how our actions would impact the future.

What considerations would we apply to distinguish between someone with free will and someone without?

If the difference was impossible to detect, we would probably treat them equally. Even if we had a device that would tell us who has free will and who doesn't, as long as they their behaviours are indistinguishable we should treat them as equal.

In practice, such a device would probably create inequality in the society, but only because the human nature is flawed.

Hello @T Clark,

Although I may have just missed it, I think that most of this discussion has been centered around free will vs determinism and the implications of the world being deterministic with respect to accountability. However, hopefully, hereforth, I can provide a different perspective. Although I understand that you are not interested, within the scope of this discussion, about whether the world actually is determined or not, I would like to state that my position is that the world is determined, but we still have free will.

The way I see it, determinism does not, in itself, necessitate that all the forms of free will are incompatible, it's thereafter that another discussion can arise between what are typically called hard determinists (also called incompatibilists) and soft determinists (also called compatibilists), where the former argues for the eradication of all forms of free will and the latter argues against some forms of free will while still holding at least one form to be true. I am a compatibilist. I think that, although everything is determined, there are meaningful distinctions that hard determinists cannot account for. The most notable of these distinctions is the difference in where the individual's action was derived within the causal chain: the distinction between an "inner will" heavily coerced by external factors (basically anything not directly of the "inner will") and an "inner will" acting of its own accord (which has no dependency on it be a libertarian choice, where one could have decided to do otherwise). For example, the scenario in which I "decide" to eat vanilla ice cream and the scenario in which I eat vanilla ice cream because someone is holding a gun up to my head are both determined but, nevertheless, are meaningfully distinguishable in the sense that the latter is obviously the external factors heavily coercing the inner will whereas the former is it acting of its own accord. Now, we can get into what "inner will" and "external factors" really mean, and the fact that no one is ever completely acting in a way that is at least somewhat influenced by external factors, but I will save that for a later post if you are interested: for now, I am simply giving you the jist. Personally, this is where my frustration came from with respect to hard determinism (and, subsequently, the eradication of all forms of free will): it necessarily leaves obviously meaningful distinctions unaccounted for. On the contrary, more libertarian (not in terms of politics, but in terms of libertarian free will) minded individuals will incessantly advocate that we can do otherwise, which is, in my opinion, thoroughly refuted. This is, in my opinion, where a vast majority of the "free will vs determinism" arguments and dilemmas lie: in the false assumption that you have to pick a side, it's an either/or fallacy. Libertarian free will can be successfully negated by determinism and determinism can still, at the same time, allow for other definitions, or forms, of free will--such as one that is based off of the relation of external vs internal wills (or factors) instead of choices (in a "you could have done otherwise" sense of the term), which can, consequently, be utterly determined.

With that in mind, when you ask if we should hold each other accountable, I would ask for further clarification on what you mean. You see, I wouldn't say, technically speaking, that "punishment" is the right term but, rather, "prevention". However, I would also so that "justice", or "retaliation", is perfectly justifiable under a deterministic worldview. First of all, I think that "prevention" instead of "punishment" rightly shifts the individual's thinking process away from the incessant presumption that the individual could have done otherwise, which, in my opinion, is nonsense and, more importantly, produces an unnecessary level of apathy. However, with that being said, I can most definitely still blame someone for their actions, but, in doing so, I am not implicitly declaring that they should have done otherwise: I'm declaring that I do not approve of what they did, albeit my disapproval is just as much determined as their action, and I am rightly deriving the source of the action towards them because they did it primarily in alliance with their "inner will". On the contrary, if I know that the person was, in one way or another, not in their normal state of mind (and their normal state of mind I completely agree with--in the sense that they don't normally do things I would characterize as "bad") when they committed the act, then I would only blame them in a very strict sense that the action can be traced back to their body, but with the meaningful distinction that they normally do not act in this way (albeit that both are necessarily determined)(and it is much more complicated than this, as their tendency to be under the influence is also a factor here). Furthermore, if I know that the person did something "bad" but it was heavily coerced by another external factor (or factors), then I would not necessarily blame them at all. Most importantly, even with the fact that everything is determined, all of the aforementioned is still distinguishable in a meaningful sense that cannot be stripped down to merely "we can't judge anyone because its all a causal chain".

To keep this brief, I will conclude with one final note: I find retaliation and justice perfectly justifiable within the idea of determinism. If I witness a lion gruesomely devour my mother, I am surely going to be angry at that lion, however, more importantly, my anger won't be as directed at it as say a human if I consider humans to have the ability to do otherwise. This is what I mean by stating that libertarian free will can cause unnecessary amounts of apathy (or decreased amounts of empathy, however you want to think about it) because the individual, in my opinion, is holding a completely unjustified belief that holds humans to a much higher status than all other animals (and objects in general). Don't get me wrong, the spectrum of consciousness definitely elevates humans to have higher capacities which, thereby, can rightly determine humans to be held to a higher standard than other animals. But, most importantly, this higher standard, I would say, is only insofar as we make a meaningful distinction between the capacities of organisms in our world. This is why my lion analogy isn't completely analogous afterall: the lion doesn't have the same capacity, neural and thereby "causal potential" (so to speak), as a human; therefore, we can't, in a complete sense, erode a human to the level of a lion because human's have a higher capacity, but that capacity is still determined!

Bob

Criminal law takes the first person perspective, I experience free will, so assume you do too. — Tobias

I took a very straightforward interpretation of free will as my point of departure. There are others of course. The most sophisticated I have seen is the compatibiism of P.F. Strawson. — Tobias

That is more-or-less the ordinary language meaning of free will, and it is how P. F. Strawson, A. J. Ayer and some of the other compatibilists interpret free will as well.

Makes sense. Like axioms. — pfirefry

Yes. R.G. Collingwood calls them "absolute presuppositions."

What considerations would we apply to distinguish between someone with free will and someone without? — pfirefry

My stated assumption is that there is no free will. In that case, we would assume that all actions are determined. I guess my question is, would be treat offenders more leniently in such a case. We're not punishing them, we're trying to stop them from offending again.

As you note, a lot of what you write makes sense, but is beyond the intended scope of this discussion.

You see, I wouldn't say, technically speaking, that "punishment" is the right term but, rather, "prevention". However, I would also so that "justice", or "retaliation", is perfectly justifiable under a deterministic worldview. — Bob Ross

Definition of "retaliation" - The return of like for like; the doing of that to another which he has done to us; especially (now usually), requital of evil; reprisal; revenge. That's from the web.

Why does that make sense if it doesn't prevent the offender from offending again? How is revenge justifiable if there is no free will?

We're not punishing them, we're trying to stop them from offending again. — T Clark

That sounds very similar to our existing criminal justice system. Its goal is not to punish people, but to prevent future offences in the society. What's important is to establish law—the likelihood of being punished—in the society, but not punishments themselves.

My stated assumption is that there is no free will. In that case, we would assume that all actions are determined — T Clark

I'd call this metaphysical position less useful, because I think the existence of free will is not relevant for justice. Even if all actions are determined, the justice system still needs to deal with a lot of uncertainty. I.e. we know things have happened the way they were supposed to happen, but we just don't know the details. We still need to spend a lot of time to deconstruct the events, create different narratives and decide on which narrative is the most plausible. I think this works really well with the assumption of determinism.

It would be equally out of your control

Lets say there is no free will. If accountability, which is a pressure for a person to go against their unimpeded free will, gives them a better outcome in theirs and other's lives, then yes. If accountability is meant to merely shame, cause suffering, or revenge, then no. If one is truly a moral person, and one's influence causes yourself and others to live better lives, I don't think there's anything wrong with holding people accountable when they do not live their life in a positive way.

Natural processes just are. There is nothing that accounts for them. One can say they are completely determined by the laws of nature, but that's just a thought. Processes don't give a damned about the laws of nature and the notion of natural laws is just a silly human concept to capture things by a law.

Only in a lab the so called laws of nature are articulated by putting processes in the same experimental set up time after time and observing a behavior that's the same every time. The behavior is described by a law, and then we say that the process is determined by that law. Which is nonsense, because it's the law that is determined by the process. There is no such thing as a natural law existing in nature. Only in the human mind such laws exist. The law is a human invention projected onto nature, thereby giving it an apparent objective existence. The natural things observed don't care. They just show an aspect of them that's the same every time. The law of nature is not what accounts for them.

Likewise, in modern society, laws are introduced. They differ from natural laws in the sense that they are used to direct behavior before it shows unwanted forms. Which is also done in a lab to study natural processes, the difference being that the objects in a lab conform to the laws from the start (after enough repetitions to achieve stability). The processes are isolated from unwanted influences thereby creating processes that are the same everytme.

This can't be done with people. So laws are a priori introduced to steer their behavior, in favor of the powers that rule. Be it determined or not. Accountability is introduced because it relieves the power from the burden to control each and every one. Holding the individual itself accountable, mposing feelings of guilt, and promises of punishment is very effective to keep the individual within the lines of wanted behavior. And behold. The individual behaves determined by laws.

So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will? — T Clark

I'd say yes.

Reminds me of the Epicurus paradox. Free will is worthy of worship, to us, due to its positive practicality.

"So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will?"

The premise (the given) is false, when it's interpreted and measured along the lines and standard of the academia. So the question becomes:

"So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is a free will?"

For those trying to delimit unwanted action flowing from the will, it's a welcome instrument for realizing their vision of a world free from the eschewed action. With guilt and punishment it forms a powerful trinity for keeping the world free from unwanted thoughts and actions, thereby inevitably preventing the will, thoughts, and actions to be free.

The will, in that case, is submitted to the powers that reign. A power that uses accountability as an instrument to relief itself from the burden of responsibility by shoveling it into the unwilling mind of unwilling slaves it tries to control, giving them a false feeling of responsibility, because in fact it's an attempt to install the desired thoughts and actions without too much effort.

It's an addiction philosophers suffer from to conjoin the concepts of freedom and will. They are radically opposed in a way that leads to contradiction and paradox. I am free to walk to town, or take the bus; but I am only free to take the bus at the times the bus runs, and am only free to walk as long as my feet are not too painful.

Thus the bank robber asked why he robbed banks: "Because that's where the money is." One can say that he is determined by his will to become instantly rich, to rob banks, just as I am determined by my will to save my hurty feet, to catch the bus.

Thus will ends freedom, because the decision acts. I decide to take the bus, and my future is determined thereby.

So to ask if there is "free will" is to be caught between asking if one can be free from the determinations of one's will, and asking whether one can determine one's determinations before one has determined them. Neither make sense, and so there can be no resolution, and we are, alas, bound forever to revisit the topic in a vain attempt to understand nonsense, until a fuller understanding liberates us.

That sounds very similar to our existing criminal justice system. Its goal is not to punish people, but to prevent future offences in the society. What's important is to establish law—the likelihood of being punished—in the society, but not punishments themselves. — pfirefry

I'd call this metaphysical position less useful, because I think the existence of free will is not relevant for justice. Even if all actions are determined, the justice system still needs to deal with a lot of uncertainty. I.e. we know things have happened the way they were supposed to happen — pfirefry

There's a difference between justice and social control; retribution and coercion.

So to ask if there is "free will" is to be caught between asking if one can be free from the determinations of one's will, and asking whether one can determine one's determinations before one has determined them. Neither make sense, and so there can be no resolution, and we are, alas, bound forever to revisit the topic in a vain attempt to understand nonsense, until a fuller understanding liberates us. — unenlightened

I take that to be a bit of a strawman. I haven’t read of anyone upholding free will that endorses the things you mention.

Why not try to find a common understanding of what “free will” minimally denotes? Here’s my take:

First, let “to be determinate” be understood as “to have set limits or boundaries”.

P1: I am the cause of that which I decide whenever I deliberate between alternative outcomes. (If I don’t deliberate between alternative outcomes, I’m not consciously making decisions.)

P2: As the cause of the decision, a) I might be fully determined in all conceivable respects such that I do not hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; b) I might be partly determined and, thereby, partly not determined, in what I decide such that I do hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; or c) I might be utterly not determined by anything in the effects I generate (e.g., the limits or boundaries of my decision would in no way be set by anything I might perceive, desire, intend, etc.).

P3: “P2c” is an absurdity in part due to being contradictory to our experiences; what remains as viable options are “P2a” and “P2b”.

C: If free will occurs, it is defined by “P2b” in that it would be a semi-determinate process of generating the effect of a decision … and it would be necessarily semi-determined in part by the intents (goals) momentarily held. If free will does not occur, our sensations of our deliberative decisions being accordant to “P2b” is illusory, instead ontically being accordant to “P2a”.

Basically, I venture that the “free will” upheld by the people which endorse it is to be minimally understood as a semi-determinate process of effecting decisions wherein different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations – hence nether as a pan-determinate process nor as an utterly non-determinate process.

Edit: In case this comes up, free will thus conceived would then be a non-stochastic process in part due to being semi-determined by one's intents.

Does it make sense to recognize your original post as anything but incoherent nonsense? You have to draw a floor and ceiling somewhere when your mind is functional, such as it is.

I venture that the “free will” upheld by the people which endorse it is to be minimally understood as a semi-determinate process of effecting decisions wherein different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra

Yes. A great definition since there are no identical situations. for example, I have coffee in the morning every day. My wife always has tea. The crucial situational difference is that we are different people with different preferences.

So F.W.Java notices this and says, " I challenge you, unenlightened, to show your free will by having tea tomorrow." So I have tea. the next day.
"That's no proof," says D.Javra, "because you have been determined by my brother's challenge to drink tea, and without it you would have had coffee again."

Stalemate.

So define freedom, such that it encompasses the available choices, tea and coffee, and will as the choice one makes...

... and see from there, what the definition of free will might be. I would like to feel that I don't have to be drinking tea so that my choice of coffee is free - if you see what I mean.

So define freedom, such that it encompasses the available choices, tea and coffee, and will as the choice one makes... — unenlightened

As far as I can tell, I've already done so. Remember, free will, as with any notion of causation or determinacy, is a metaphysical one. So, the "freedom" in "free will" only entails the ontic ability to generate different effects in an identical situation (this, it might go without saying, in non-stochastic manners). Now, each an every unique situation is self-identical - this as per the law of identity. So, the position of free will affirms that in every instantiation wherein you've made a decision between a set of alternative outcomes, each such instantiation being a self-identical situation, you could have decided on a different outcome than that which you did. Otherwise expressed, "freedom" here is strictly defined as the metaphysically valid, or else ontic, freedom of consciously choosing any one of the two or more alternatives one consciously deliberates on (quite arguably, two or more alternatives whose presence to oneself during a conscious deliberation one does not consciously choose in any given self-identical situation ... but as cause only chooses amongst, thereby effecting one's choice).

As is obvious, this offered ontic ability is contradictory to the notion of causal determinism. And it is in this contradiction that free will becomes such as big deal to some.

Stalemate. — unenlightened

Yup. That was my current intended point. This in opposition to the position of free will being nonsensical to begin with.

and to anyone else in general ...

Out of curiosity, come to think of it:

Other than by positing the metaphysical position of causal determinism as true without first evidencing its soundness—which, by the way, as a metaphysical position can apply just as readily to those monotheistic metaphysics that posit an omnipotent deity as it does to the atheistic metaphysics of physicalism—on what rational or else empirical grounds can one deny the validity of free will as I’ve just described it?

----------

p.s. Regarding the Libet experiment: That certain actions of mind or body we willfully, voluntarily, hence intentionally, engage in will be determined by our subconscious mind seems to me to go without saying. It’s a natural outcome of how our minds operate. As one example, just because I, as a conscious self, voluntarily look at this monitor in front of me while typing out my post doesn’t necessitate that perceiving it is a conscious choice on my part. If free will can be ontic for our conscious selves in certain situations, namely those in which we deliberate, I see no reason to deny that free will can likewise be an ontic reality for our sub/unconscious selves as well. In other words, to deny that freely willed decisions can be made by our unconscious … which would cogently explain the Libet experiment in terms that, at the very least, validate the possibility of free will. Again, it seems obvious that not all of the intentions we consciously engage in are consciously chosen by us via deliberation between alternative outcomes … and a valid inference that those intentions not consciously chosen by us are/were freely chosen by our sub/unconscious selves.

At any rate, of sole concern to the question of free will I’ve here placed, again, is only the process of making conscious deliberations between those alternative outcomes we are consciously aware of.

That was my current intended point. This in opposition to the position of free will being nonsensical to begin with. — javra

My point was that your definition is already contradictory. One more time...

A chess player on her turn is free to make any legal move. Her will is to make the best move she can.
The only sense I can make of her 'free will' is not that she can make a poor move, but that she can stop playing chess.

The following is a simplification:-
Freedom is 'you can have what you want'
Free will is 'you can want what you don't want', or, 'you can not want what you want'. This contradiction is built in to your definition as...

different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra

This contradiction gives rise to curious unproductive ways of (mis)understanding addiction. One is addicted to nicotine, and it is hard to stop smoking. It requires a huge effort of will. One tries, and fails, and tries again, one tries to smoke less, or to change to patches or vaping. One finds one is weak-willed. This is a familiar story to many.

But now retell the story with the contradiction exposed.

There is nothing easier than not doing something that one does not want to do. Therefore, one smokes because one wants to smoke, and although one wants to not want to smoke, that is not an available choice; the choice is to smoke or not smoke, and one wants to smoke. This is the difficulty, that freedom for the will is to want what one wants, and also to not want what one wants. The latter amounts to wanting to be other. It come to the fore in all forms of self-improvement and self-control where the condition for even expressing the situation is that there is an internal conflict in which one's weak will is fighting one's strong will or some such. To be in this conflict is not to be free at all. It is the state of addiction itself.

One more time...

A chess player on her turn is free to make any legal move. Her will is to make the best move she can.
The only sense I can make of her 'free will' is not that she can make a poor move, but that she can stop playing chess.

The following is a simplification:-
Freedom is 'you can have what you want'
Free will is 'you can want what you don't want', or, 'you can not want what you want'. This contradiction is built in to your definition as...

different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra — unenlightened

We seem to have so far been speaking past each other.

To my best understanding, the issue is with your use of “will”, which in what I've quoted and like instances in your post is not common standard English use: You are conflating “choice” (common standard English synonym for “will”) with “desire” (archaic synonym for “will”).

In: “Her desire (or want) is to make the best move she can” one here is addressing "will" as the goal toward which she aspires. And, in this sense and context, it makes no sense to state that her desire, else goal, is something she can freely alter in the given situation - this on account of it being preestablished that that in fact is her desire/goal in the situation.

In: “Her choice is to make the best move she can” one here is addressing “will” as a conscious deliberation between two or more alternatives. And, in this sense and context, it does make sense to state that her choice is not fully predetermined in all conceivable manners. If her choice/decision is to make the best move she can, this then was one of two or more outcomes during a previous deliberation: the other potential outcome maybe having been that of intentionally allowing the other to claim a checkmate. Here, she chose to play the best she can rather than let the other win.

As to the smoking addiction example, it’s a good example for the issue of free will; but again, not when will is taken to be synonymous with desire. Rather it would make for a good example when addressed in terms of choice - which requires deliberation between alternative outcomes. But here we’d be addressing the more complex issue of willpower: the ability to adhere to one’s formerly made choice come what may; hence, in the example of addiction, irrespective of the passions (wants as you’ve termed them) and other dolors which goad you toward not realizing what you’ve chosen.

If you insist that “will” is not equivalent to “choice” in the context of (philosophical) free will, on what grounds do you do so?

If there is no determined free will, there is nobody to hold accountable. So no, it doesn't make sense, for how can you be accountable for something that carries you along including the choice to (or not) surrender?

You are conflating “choice” (common standard English synonym for “will”) with “desire” (archaic synonym for “will”). — javra

Yes, that is the simplification I mentioned. But the distinction I want to make clear is between if you like, choice as the number of items on the menu, and choice as the act of deciding what meal to order. I am saying one has freedom to the extent that is more than one item on the menu, and one exercises will in choosing what to order from the menu. That is the conflation that 'free will' makes, in the philosophical context. of course in ordinary parlance, one distinguishes what is done of ones free will with what is done under coercion, rather than with determinism.

Choice-making and desiring are not one and the same process, and so can’t be simplified into the same given. Other than that, I don’t see any significant disagreement between your latest post and what I’ve stated in regard to free will. But please clarify if you do.

I’m mainly replying because I don’t yet understand how you find my definition of free will contradictory, this given a modern standard English use of the term “will”. For ease of reference, I’ll succinctly summarize my tentative definition of free will here: Free will is the partly-determinate ontic ability to actualize different outcomes in those self-identical situations wherein one deliberates between two or more possible outcomes – this such that the decision one makes between said alternatives will be partly determined by, at the very minimum, one’s momentarily held goal (i.e., long term intent; long term desired outcome).

To be clear, I’m not here interested in whether free will thus defined occurs. Only in addressing other possible misunderstanding of semantics via which this general definition can be found, as you’ve previously said, contradictory (needless to add, when it is considered in whole).

Free will is the partly-determinate ontic ability to actualize different outcomes in those self-identical situations wherein one deliberates between two or more possible outcomes – this such that the decision one makes between said alternatives will be partly determined by, at the very minimum, one’s momentarily held goal (i.e., long term intent; long term desired outcome). — javra

On the menu is tea or coffee (2 different possible outcomes). My momentary long term desired outcome is coffee. The decision is coffee.

Where is the ability to actualise a different outcome, viz. tea? My fixed desire is for coffee. Does that make mean I do not have free will? Some choose variety, I choose consistency. This " ability to actualize different outcomes" is where all the difficulty hides.

Where is the ability to actualise a different outcome, viz. tea? My fixed desire is for coffee. — unenlightened

Well, going by what I previously said: If it is a fixed desire, then in this instance there would thereby be no deliberation between the alternatives of tea or coffee - no degree of psychological uncertainty between which to choose, which is requisite for deliberation - hence no consciously made choice/decision is being made and, hence, no conscious utilization of free will ... volitional thought the activity of you saying "I want coffee" to the waiter is (this on grounds of it nevertheless yet being in accord with some other longer-term goal you might have ... just guessing at hypotheses, such as that of quenching your thirst in manners that don't displease you).

One can argue that potential alternatives to what we do are rampant everywhere at all times: "choices" as you call them. But its only when we consciously deliberate between alternatives that we in any way engage in conscious choice-making.

And, in case this comes up: Yes, not each and every activity we engage in is freely willed/chosen by us as conscious beings at each and every instant. Or, at least, so I argue. Most of what we do is decided by out sub/unconscious - sub/unconscious decisions often enough guided by our previously made conscious choices. E.g., I chose to drink coffee after a bit of conscious deliberation between coffee and tea, so I then move the cup to my mouth without in any way deciding on how to best do so.

This " ability to actualize different outcomes" is where all the difficulty hides. — unenlightened

Full agreement here.

I guess we have no choice but to ask what decision should we make in a world where we can not make decisions. — T Clark

"My biggest problem is what to do about all the things I can't do anything about"—Ashleigh Brilliant

For instance, is the universe accurately described by physicalism, and are the innumerable consequences in respect to ourselves of the universe’s so being (or not being) thereby true (or untrue)? — javra

Problem is that you can never know. Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)?

Problem is that you can never know. — Janus

Not with infallible certainty, no, but I at least believe that one can justify the universe not being accurately described by physicalism to a sufficient extent.

Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)? — Janus

With what I just said in mind, imo, sure there are substantial points to entertaining non-physicalist systems of ontology. As one example I find noteworthy, if non-physicalism, then the possibility opens up of there ontically being such a thing as an objective good superseding any psyche (to be clear corporeal or, if such occur, incorporeal). This objective good in contrast to physicalism’s requisite moral relativism, which, for instance, at the end of the day maintains that the Nazis were good folks relative to their own social way of being. Concentration camps and all. This no more and no less in any objective sense then those who were/are antagonistic to them.

Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)?
— Janus

With what I just said in mind, imo, sure there are substantial points to entertaining non-physicalist systems of ontology. — javra

A decent analogy is a computer game. Within the game, everything is fully determined by the programmed flow of information, and every move of every game entity is fully determined, except those of the players, whose decisions moves and interventions come from outside the game world in meat-space. The question becomes, are we pre-programmed game characters or players of the game? If we are players, then we have an existence outside the physical universe, and there is an aspect of spirituality to our being. Religion is concerned with players, and science with the game.

There is no point looking in the 0s and 1s of the game for evidence of players; only 0s and 1s will be found. The avatar of a player and the avatar of a programmed game character are made of the same stuff. But in relation to my previous argument, I would suggest that while consciousness might be put forward as the unique attribute of a player, thought is very much a mechanical process of 0s and 1s.

This is a bit tangental, but might give another perspective on the source of freedom ...

http://accountability.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2016/08/Philosophy-of-Education-Chapter-2_-Pedagogy-of-the-Oppressed.pdf