What then about proofs that are independent of the subject? Proofs in Number Theory that are demonstrably true? For example ϕ(n),τ(n),d(n)etcϕ(n),τ(n),d(n)etc are indisputable values. They are what they are beyond any subject's opinion of them. — EnPassant

Such proofs are dependent on the axioms. And the axioms are not independent of the subjects.

Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. — Joshs

This is the position put forward by Hegel's dialectics. Being and its negation, not-being, are subsumed within becoming as the process known as becoming. It is a position which allows for violation of the law of non-contradiction by dialectical materialists, because this means that a thing both has and has not, the specified property, when it is becoming. But it is distinct from Aristotle's position which held being and becoming as distinctly incompatible, allowing becoming to violate the law of excluded middle, because the thing neither has nor has not the property, when it is becoming.

Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. Put differently, the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison. — Joshs

Suppose the law of identity intends to specify that that which appears, or stands out, or else is, cannot at that very juncture be anything else but itself. In so conceiving, there is no comparison involved in any instantiation of the law of identity—because there is no multiplicity involved in givens addressed. The tree I see (A) is the tree I see (A)—this without any multiplicity in the “tree that I see” that then facilitates comparison. Reflection, then, would only occur in thoughts intending to formulate this universal principle of thought—if not also ontology—into something communicable, such as “A=A”.

Also, becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. Within such perspective, “that into which this becomes” will not of itself be a becoming—such as can be claimed of that which is becoming—but will instead ontically be (here entailing being, which is self-identical at any given juncture) on account of its either relative or absolute finality. So—while I agree that being and becoming are not mutually exclusive—because the notion of “becoming” sans the notion of “that into which a given becomes” to me tends to ring hollow; and because I infer that “that into which a process becomes” is not itself a becoming on account of its finality (be it perceptual or ontic) but, instead, is something that is (being); I tend to believe that becoming sans being—at minimum, in the form of the finality toward which the becoming progresses—is not metaphysically feasible. Moreover, if the final cause (as being) is requisite for the becoming, then it will not be the case that becoming is prior to being.

p.s. I’m not intending to pester. Posting this on account of respecting many of your views. If I’m too far out in left field, no worries.

the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison — Joshs

You see how that subjectivizes and relativises the idea of reason. Reason becomes a product of an evolved brain, with no inherent reality beyond adaptive utility.

My interest in the reality of universals goes back to an epiphany I had into the reality of number. I suddenly saw that the reasons that ancient philosophers esteemed number, was because unlike phenomenal objects, it did not arise and perish, and was not composed of parts. Yet it are the same for any intelligence capable of counting.

Neoplatonic mathematics is governed by a fundamental distinction which is, indeed, inherent in Greek science in general, but it is here most strongly formulated. According to this distinction, one branch of mathematics participates in the contemplation of that which is in no way subject to change, or to becoming and passing away. This branch contemplates that which is always such as it is and which alone is capable of being known: for that which is known in the act of knowing, being a communicable and teachable possession, must be something which is for once and for all fixed. — Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra

That realisation got me interested in mathematical platonism, from a recent essay on which we read:

“I believe that the only way to make sense of mathematics is to believe that there are objective mathematical facts, and that they are discovered by mathematicians,” says James Robert Brown, a philosopher of science recently retired from the University of Toronto. “Working mathematicians overwhelmingly are Platonists. They don't always call themselves Platonists, but if you ask them relevant questions, it’s always the Platonistic answer that they give you.”

Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all? — What is Math?

(I've tracked down the book by that philosopher. Difficult read but a good book.)

The underlying issue, as I see it, is that if intelligible objects are real in any sense, then this undermines philosophical materialism - that the only real things are the objects of the physical sciences. That is what ie behind the palpable fear expressed in that rhetorical question. There's a deep issue here which hardly anyone I know of seems aware of. I'm working through Gerson's three recent books on Platonism v. Naturalism

He goes on to suggest that 'this strategy, the very dangerous trap inherent in this mechanistic, resigned-to-living-in-denial-of-the-human-condition — Jack Cummins

You won't find a more persistent critic of reductionism on this forum than me. See again the quote in this post about the barbarism of reductionism.

I encountered Griffith's book decades ago, I even corresponded with him once, but couldn't understand him, although I had a sneaking suspicion he might be a crank.

becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. — javra

As I understand it, which is not well, Aristotle's ideas were developed in response to the conundrums posed by Parmenides and Zeno, which attempted to show that change must be illusory.

the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison
— Joshs

You see how that subjectivizes and relativises the idea of reason. Reason becomes a product of an evolved brain, with no inherent reality beyond adaptive utility. — Wayfarer

Only if one is a Darwinian naturalist , which neither I, Wittgenstein, Husserl nor Heidegger are. Relevance and pragmatic use for us mean something quite different from the instrumentality of adaptive utility, which is defined relative to pre-existing objective structures. For Husserl, ‘relevance’ has a platonic foundation in the synthetic associative structure of temporal acts of consciousness. Unity, identity and number all arise out of syntheses of sense based on likenesses and similarities.

“I believe that the only way to make sense of mathematics is to believe that there are objective mathematical facts, and that they are discovered by mathematicians,” says James Robert Brown, a philosopher of science recently retired from the University of Toronto. — Wayfarer

I applaud your desire to locate a platonic ground of reason. That’s why I’m attracted to phenomenology. But instead of tracing the basis of reason to mathematical logic and then stopping there , they dig deeper. Husserl shows us how grasping the concept of number requires a constructive genesis.

In Philosophy of Arithmetic(1891), Husserl described a method for understanding the constitution of a multiplicity or plurality composed of independent parts, which he dubbed ‘collective combination'.

“Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in order to be able to arise at all, collective combinations of partial phenomena. There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations (e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as unified. This 'psychical' relation is, thus, an indispensable psychological precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever.”(p.78)

In any such whole the parts are united in a specific manner. Fundamental to the genesis of almost all totalities is that its parts initially appear as a temporal succession.

“Succession in time constitutes an insuppressible psychological precondition for the formation of by far the most number concepts and concrete multiplicities - and practically all of the more complicated concepts in general.”(Phil of Arithmetic, p.29) “Almost all representations of multiplicities - and, in any case, all representations of numbers - are results of processes, are wholes originated gradually out of their elements. Insofar as this is so, each element bears in itself a different temporal determination.”(p.33) “Temporal succession forms the only common element in all cases of multiplicity, which therefore must constitute the foundation for the abstraction of that concept.”(p.30)

While the first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed” , the collective combination itself only emerges from a secondary act of consciousness. This higher order constituting sense changes what was originally a temporal succession into a simultaneity by ‘bringing' back ‘ the previous parts via reflecting on them in memory. Husserl says that a combination of objects is similar to the continuity of a tone. In both cases, a temporal succession is perceived through reflection as a simultaneity.

“For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of second order.”(p.77) “It is essential that the partial representations united in the representation of the multiplicity or number be present in our consciousness simultaneously [in an act of reflection].”(p.33)

This series of constructive acts forms the basis out of which the concept of number is constituted.
It is not the mathematical itself which is platonically original, but the intentional structure of associative synthesis.

That's nonsense. A "practice" [ ... ] does not remove the need to make the judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

As usual, what's "nonsense", MU, is taking issue with something I've not claimed or implied.

Suppose the law of identity intends to specify that that which appears, or stands out, or else is, cannot at that very juncture be anything else but itself. In so conceiving, there is no comparison involved in any instantiation of the law of identity—because there is no multiplicity involved in givens addressed. The tree I see (A) is the tree I see (A)—this without any multiplicity in the “tree that I see” that then facilitates comparison. Reflection, then, would only occur in thoughts intending to formulate this universal principle of thought—if not also ontology—into something communicable, such as “A=A”. — javra

Can such a principle even be communicated from myself to myself without reflection? And if not, then before reflection do we have a principle or law, or just a contingent experience of momentary sense? In other words, think about the difference between experiencing an event right now and thinking of this event as a law or principle. These are two different kinds of experiences. Making the first into the second (specifying it as a principle or law) requires a secondary act of thought. If the law or principle isnt in the actual experience of an object, it has a different purpose or use.

Also, becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. Within such perspective, “that into which this becomes” will not of itself be a becoming—such as can be claimed of that which is becoming—but will instead ontically be (here entailing being, which is self-identical at any given juncture) on account of its either relative or absolute finality. — javra

“That into which this becomes”. If the ‘this’ and the ‘that’
are conceived as separate beings, moments or states, then we have a split between beings and becoming. But for Husserl and Heidegger there is no such split. The ‘this’ and the ‘that’ are the subject and objective poles of a single occurrence of becoming, not two separate moments or states.

, if the final cause (as being) is requisite for the becoming, then it will not be the case that becoming is prior to being. — javra

The objective pole of the occurrence of becoming isnt a cause, because it is as much determined by the subjective pole as the subjective pole is defined by the objective pole.

For my money science still provides the single most reliable pathway to knowledge about what we deign to call reality. — Tom Storm

For others money, there are other most reliable pathways. There simply is not one path which is the only enlightened one, as much as it says to be so. I realize I'm cursing in church, but that's simply how it is.

You can lead a person to science, but it doesn't mean they'll accept it. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean science is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.

So I do agree that science alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that science has to offer. — Philosophim

Just replace "science" by "God"... Science is a tool, a worldview. If the most valuable remains to be seen. Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If a tool is valuable depends on the part of the world you apply the tool to, which in the case of science are rather abstract parts, like theory adapted experiments or statistical calculations. The rational arguments it uses to convince others won't work if you haven't already accepted its rationality.

thanks, very interesting indeed. You're right, I do tend to see ultra-darwinists under every bed. I haven't yet attempted to tackle Husserl's philosophy of maths, but from the glimpses I have had, it seems highly congenial.

There's no doubt that people see reliable pathways in everything from astrology to handling snakes. The issue is demonstrating their reliability - separate from how they feel emotionally about them.

Just replace "science" by "God" — AgentTangarine

To what end? You can play a word substitution game with anything. Why not replace God with teddy bear?

The rational arguments it uses to convince others won't work if you haven't already accepted its rationality. — AgentTangarine

I'm not talking about rationality, I am talking evidence and results. Even the fundamentalist relies on the fruits of science when they have a ruptured appendix. Sure, they can claim a speedy recovery on God - but medicine did the hard work.

To what end? — Tom Storm

What do you think? To show there is no difference between the God story and the science story of course!

"You can lead a person to God, but it doesn't mean they'll accept Him. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean God is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.

So I do agree that God alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that God has to offer "

I have seen this reasoning in the past, and in the present...

I'm not talking about rationality, I am talking evidence and results — Tom Storm

And that's exactly where opinions differ. And evidence and results are part of the scientific rationality. If you don't accept these, it won't work.

As I understand it, which is not well, Aristotle's ideas were developed in response to the conundrums posed by Parmenides and Zeno, which attempted to show that change must be illusory. — Wayfarer

I'm fascinated by teleology, especially as it applies to psyches, and have found little to no metaphysical investigation of its possibilities and mechanisms outside of what Aristotle had to say. That mentioned, I'm myself not an academic scholar of Aristotle, and I haven't read most of his works (skimmed through De Anima ((loved the way he addressed deities as "universal anima")) and some of his Physics - all else I know of his ideas is second hand). So, in short, I have no informed opinion on the topic you mention.



As to being and becoming, I sense that we're approaching the issue from maybe very different perspectives. The notions you mention are quite interesting. I have the hunch that this topic would require a lot of discussion, but then there are metaphysical pre-judgments involved, at least on my part. For instance, arguably, the Aristotelian notion of "the unmoved mover", the Neoplatonic notion of "the One", and the Buddhist notion of "Nirvana" would each be considered (maybe, pure) being, this within their own worldviews, rather than processes of becoming. This though all else could be seen as becoming. Not sure if this is worth exploring, but I am acknowledgedly prejudicial in my favoring of such, or similar enough, views.

Can such a principle even be communicated from myself to myself without reflection? And if not, then before reflection do we have a principle or law, or just a contingent experience of momentary sense? — Joshs

I acknowledge the answer to the first question is "no". The second question is tricky, in that it seems to me to be beyond the relevant point of "laws of thought". A law/principle of thought, if it ontically occurs, would be a universal principle - i.e., a universal - applicable not to "a (randomly salient) contingent experience of momentary sense" but to all possible thoughts pertaining to all beings that have ever been, are, and ever will be. It would be a natural law, in other words, one that minimally applies to awareness, if not to everything that is (the latter being easily conceivable in systems such as that of objective idealism). The main point being, if a principle/law of thought, then it is universally applicable to all cognition and - as with any other natural law or universal - occurs very much independently of anyone's awareness of it. Hence:

In other words, think about the difference between experiencing an event right now and thinking of this event as a law or principle. These are two different kinds of experiences. Making the first into the second (specifying it as a principle or law) requires a secondary act of thought. If the law or principle isnt in the actual experience of an object, it has a different purpose or use. — Joshs

Discovering laws of thought does require reflection (granting that they occur), but the law of thought - like any other law of nature of other type of universal - would be ubiquitously applicable ... in this case, even to the reflections by which they might be discovered. Its not that we construct these laws from our inferences but - again, if they do ontically occur - that they govern everything which we cognize, again, including the inferences via which they become discovered.

So yes, what you address are indeed two different kinds of experiences. But we don't make the first into the second and thereby instantiate a law of thought. Rather the law of thought would be applicable to all experiences without any exception, including the two kinds of experience which you address.

Back to the law of identity: if indeed a law of thought, its occurrence would be independent of anyone's awareness of its being (e.g., a dinosaur's thoughts would be just as governed by this law as would be any humans) and, hence, its occurrence would be in no way contingent on reflections or comparisons. Only our discovery of it's occurrence would be contingent in on reflective comparisons.

(Sorry, too tired right now to edit this into something shorter.)

What do you think? To show there is no difference between the God story and the science story of course! — AgentTangarine

There's no 'of course' here at all. This seems to me to be a kind of content free assertion and lacks meaning. In what sense no difference? Details please otherwise it's just an empty aphorism.

but that doesn't mean God is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world. — AgentTangarine

Are you arguing against belief in gods now, or did you leave out a word?

The rest of your reply I am unable to follow, sorry.

Forget the "of course"... If you don't see what that means then I can't help that. Already now you start analyzing. It's just an expression used. To make you see you don't understand what I mean.

The quote is from someone here. I changed the word "science" in "God". Did you understand it when science was still in the quote? Probably yes, as that's how you (and I) are taught to think.

You're right, it seems we don't understand each other. Maybe another time.

You're right, I don't think we understand each other — Tom Storm

Because you speak one language only.

Because you speak one language only. — AgentTangarine

WHat language is that AT?

Well, if I change the word God back in "science", you probably understand. So it's the language of science that you understand. While non-scientific language is hard to understand if your language is the scientific mind (which I have myself!). I'm not arguing against science, but at the prominent role it plays in modern society. Like God in the old days.

Sorry TA, the quote makes no sense to me no matter what word you use.

My problem is the unclear English used and not whether this is science versus god language.

One last try then. When you said this for instance:

For others money, there are other most reliable pathways. There simply is not one path which is the only enlightened one, as much as it says to be so. I realize I'm cursing in church, but that's simply how it is. — AgentTangarine

You didn't provide any kind of argument and simply made an assertion. This is not much use. And no one talked about 'enlightened' paths. I just said 'most reliable'. So what you need to do in a rebuttal is demonstrate how your different pathways provide reliable knowledge about reality - evidence would be useful.

What I mean is that we don't need science to arrive at knowledge.

And again:

"So what you need to do in a rebuttal is demonstrate how your different pathways provide reliable knowledge about reality - evidence would be useful"

This is exactly the jargon of science. You want evidence that the non-scientific approach gives less reliable knowledge? Then science itself is the best example.

What I mean is that we don't need science to arrive at knowledge. — AgentTangarine

Another assertion without evidence - what does that mean? What kind of knowledge are you referring to? If you mean there is knowledge that can be arrived at without science then I agree.

Knowledge about the world, indeed. Why should the scientific approach be the most reliable? It offers an image of the world that's pretty distorted.

For example, the structure of millions of proteins was predicted on the base of their coding in DNA. AI was used to predict this. The structures differed from the real structure. You could also use other means to arrive at the right structure. Closer to the real stuff.

We're done - all you do is make assertions and never answer questions posed. Bye.

You put the burden of proof on me. You contend though that a scientific approach is more reliable. Why? Because it offers a view on how it really is? That's circular.

Reason becomes a product of an evolved brain, with no inherent reality beyond adaptive utility. — Wayfarer

I don't see why you are so averse to the idea that reason is the product of an evolved brain. This idea is consistent with most classical religions, and it does not conflict with the understanding of the immateriality of the soul. Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary to adopt a principle like this to account for the deficiencies in human reason, in its capacity to fully understand the material world.

The model adopted by Christianity, as described by St Thomas, is strongly based in Aristotle's De Anima. The various powers of the soul, self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, as well as intellection, are all explained by, and therefore seated in, the material body of the living being. As potencies, powers, these features of living beings are dependent on the material body of the beings for their specific reality; the concept of "matter" accounts for the reality of potential. The various different potentials (capacities) of the various living beings, must rely on the material body of the particular being. And this is also why each living being is truly unique in its material presence, and in its capacity to act.

In most religious traditions, there is an original union between the soul and a material body. This is often portrayed as a handicapping of the soul, a punishment for original sin, or something like that. We must remember though, that this is to place the soul in relation to other immaterial beings, divine beings like God and the angels. The proposed divine beings have a different temporal relation to matter, they are prior to matter, being the cause of material objects. The living beings on earth are dependent on their material bodies, for their powers, and only the soul itself, as the first principle of activity, the first form of the living body, bridges that medium, called "matter", into the immaterial realm of the divine.

This is why St. Thomas is very clear to stress the reality that the human intellect, while it is united to the material body, cannot obtain an understanding of the divine realm of immaterial existence. Due to the fact that the human intellect is dependent on its material body, it has that handicap in relation to supposed beings of the divine realm. To deny the reality of that physical constraint imposed upon us by the material conditions of our existence is a mistake and a misunderstanding of the reality of our existence.

But when we accept this reality, and we turn this handicap around, as Aristotle did, and see that the physical constraints which have been imposed upon us, are actually potencies, our powers, capacities, the tools by which we conduct ourselves through this world, and flourish within it, then we have a completely different perspective on our material being. No longer do we see being united to a material body as a punishment, we see it as a blessing, something done as necessary to enable us with the capacity to understand material existence. However, it is crucial that we understand the limitations of that capacity to understand, because that is exactly what constitutes understanding material existence.

I don't see why you are so averse to the idea that reason is the product of an evolved brain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue is understanding reason as 'the product of' or 'constituted by'. Certainly h. sapiens evolved and one of the abilities that evolved was abstract thought and the ability to reason. But the theory of evolution is a theory of the origin of species, not a philosophical theory of the nature of the mind, and what can be known through the faculty of reason is not necessarily explicable from the point of view of biology. When such a rationale is introduced, then it invariably turns into consideration of 'what is advantageous from the point of view of survival and reproduction'. Such considerations can't help but be reductionist.

Humans are uniquely able to transcend their biological roots. As you're well aware, in the Western philosophical tradition, the soul is associated with the faculty of reason, which is thought to be uniquely associated with humans as 'the rational animal'. But as modern culture has on the whole abandoned the traditional understanding, then humans are understood through solely biological and even mechanistic metaphors. It's a popular belief that life itself is kind of a fluke event, an 'accident of nature', and that the mind is 'the product of' this accident. Even though modern people pride themselves in being 'rational', this is actually an irrationalist attitude.

However, it is crucial that we understand the limitations of that capacity to understand, because that is exactly what constitutes understanding material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

An important caveat!

The issue is understanding reason as 'the product of' or 'constituted by'. Certainly h. sapiens evolved and one of the abilities that evolved was abstract thought and the ability to reason. But the theory of evolution is a theory of the origin of species, not a philosophical theory of the nature of the mind, and what can be known through the faculty of reason is not necessarily explicable from the point of view of biology. When such a rationale is introduced, then it invariably turns into consideration of 'what is advantageous from the point of view of survival and reproduction'. Such considerations can't help but be reductionist. — Wayfarer

We can accept the observed facts of evolution without accepting the hypothetical postulate as to what constitutes "advantageous". I'm sure you can see that "advantageous" is a value judgement. The obvious problem with the currently accepted evolutionary theory is that it takes the desire for survival, which is proper to an individual, and assigns this to a species. But there is nothing to ground the idea that there is anything advantageous to the continued survival of any species. In fact, we see that in living beings there is a vast variety of differences. And, having a huge multiplicity of variety is probably far more advantageous to "life" as a whole, in its capacity for existence, than is the advantage provided by the continued existence of any specific species.

So the issue here is that if we take the desire for continued existence, survival, which is proper to the particular, the individual, and assign it to something more general, then we need to move to the most general, life itself, instead of stopping at any particular species. The reality of "a species" as a particular object isn't really justified. So the commonly accepted theory of evolution, which assigns advantage to one species or another, does not grasp the whole picture in its conception of advantage. We need to look toward what is advantageous to life as a whole. And when we do this we see that simple survival is not what life is about.

Humans are uniquely able to transcend their biological roots. As you're well aware, in the Western philosophical tradition, the soul is associated with the faculty of reason, which is thought to be uniquely associated with humans as 'the rational animal'. But as modern culture has on the whole abandoned the traditional understanding, then humans are understood through solely biological and even mechanistic metaphors. It's a popular belief that life itself is kind of a fluke event, an 'accident of nature', and that the mind is 'the product of' this accident. Even though modern people pride themselves in being 'rational', this is actually an irrationalist attitude. — Wayfarer

I agree that looking at the existence of life as an accident is a huge mistake. But I also think that calling for a radical difference between human beings and other animals is also a big mistake. This is the mistake of Darwinism in general, described above, which assigns special status to what we call "a species", as if a species was a thing, thereby separating the human species from other species. If we dissolve these artificial divisions within the unity of living beings, we can understand that it is by means of "the soul", that we and all other living beings participate in the realm of the immaterial. Then the differences between us are attributable to our material bodies, and it is not the case that a human being, through the use of reason, has any more participatory capacity in the realm of the immaterial, then any other creature. What is the case is that we have developed a way toward understanding the immaterial realm. But this is a way of understanding which is firmly grounded in our material existence, so it does not actually admit us into the immaterial realm where the soul itself has its roots. In other words, we have found a way to use the material body to turn inward on itself, in an attempt to understand the immaterial source of its existence, but the material body still has no direct access to the immaterial itself, except through that source, the soul.

there is nothing to ground the idea that there is anything advantageous to the continued survival of any species. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the instinct for survival is assumed by biology, and that it's a safe assumption. The very simplest life-forms display the survival instinct. I would assume that any organism that didn't have the will to survive would not, in fact, survive.

a radical difference between human beings and other animals is also a big mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a factual observation. Radical means 'at the root', and h. sapiens are radically different to other species, even to their simian relatives. Not in biological terms, as our kinship with the biological order is obvious and manifold, but on the grounds of attributes.

Interestingly, this is where Alfred Russel Wallace parted company with Darwin in his essay Darwinism Applied to Man (much to Darwin's horror).

This is the mistake of Darwinism in general, described above, which assigns special status to what we call "a species", as if a species was a thing, thereby separating the human species from other species. — Metaphysician Undercover

'Species' are real, the term has a perfectly intelligible definition in biology, 'a group of living organisms consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding. The species is the principal natural taxonomic unit, ranking below a genus and denoted by a Latin binomial, e.g. Homo sapiens.'

Then the differences between us are attributable to our material bodies, and it is not the case that a human being, through the use of reason, has any more participatory capacity in the realm of the immaterial, then any other creature. — Metaphysician Undercover

You often refer to the classical texts, Aristotle, Aquinas et al, but what you say here is in direct contradiction to what they believed. According to them, rationality is the capacity to grasp the truths of reason and is the immaterial aspect or faculty of the soul. Google the rational soul:

rational soul: in the thought of Aristotle, the type of soul possessed by human beings. Unlike the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul, the rational soul has the capacity for rational thought. See also nous.

It's a factual observation. Radical means 'at the root', and h. sapiens are radically different to other species, even to their simian relatives. Not in biological terms, as our kinship with the biological order is obvious and manifold, but on the grounds of attributes. — Wayfarer

Well, this is where we disagree then. I do not see an "at the root" difference between human beings and other mammals. I think the fact that they are all mammals indicates that they are the same at the root.

'Species' are real, the term has a perfectly intelligible definition in biology, 'a group of living organisms consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding. The species is the principal natural taxonomic unit, ranking below a genus and denoted by a Latin binomial, e.g. Homo sapiens.' — Wayfarer

That it has a definition does not make it something real. That goes to the very heart of the weakness of mathematics and logic. Because it is an axiom, and is accepted by the community of mathematicians, or logicians, does not mean that it is true. And, the fact that untruths can be accepted as fundamental premises in any field of science, turns this weakness into a real problem.

The problem with the definition of "species" which you provide, is that it does not allow for the reality of the creatures "in between" species which constitute an essential part evolution. This is the incompatibility between being and becoming, demonstrated by Aristotle. If for example, there is a process whereby members of species A evolve, breed, and become species B, then we need to account for what type of species the "in between" are. We cannot posit a different species between A and B, to account for these individuals, for obvious reasons. And, as they begin to differ from A, these individuals are still capable of breeding with A, but for a number of possible reasons do not. By your provided definition, they would not constitute the separate species B, until they cannot breed with A. So this definition does not grasp the true reality of this "section" of A, which is becoming B, by classing it as a part of A, when it has already separated itself from A by not breeding with A, and therefore ought not be classed as part of A. This "section" is both species A and species B by your proposed definition.

Problems like this, which demonstrate that a vast number of individual living beings exist as "in between" beings, demonstrate that this way of classifying beings as "species", is inherently faulty. It is a convenient form of classification for many purposes, but for the purpose of understanding the reality of evolution, it fails miserably. And since we adhere to this archaic system of classification, despite the fact that we recognize the reality of evolution, indicates that we live in a society which has very little, if any real understanding of evolution.

You often refer to the classical texts, Aristotle, Aquinas et al, but what you say here is in direct contradiction to what they believed. — Wayfarer

Actually, as I explained already, this is very consistent with Aquinas. He explains quite clearly how the human intellect is deficient because it is dependent on the material body. And, the ideas and forms which are grasped by the human intellect are distinct from the independent Forms which are proper to the Divinity. The ideas and forms of the human intellect are not properly independent and immaterial, as the divine Forms of God and the angels are. This is because the human ideas are dependent on the material body, so understanding these ideas and forms does not properly bring the human intellect into the realm of the immaterial Forms which have a relation to material existence which is an inversion of the relation that human ideas have to material existence. Material existence is dependent on these Forms, whereas the ideas of the human mind are dependent on material existence.

That it has a definition does not make it something real. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it comes to a dictionary definition versus your own, I will choose the former.

a vast number of individual living beings exist as "in between" beings — Metaphysician Undercover

Such as?

[Aquinas] explains quite clearly how the human intellect is deficient because it is dependent on the material body. And, the ideas and forms which are grasped by the human intellect are distinct from the independent Forms which are proper to the Divinity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he explain this?

The ideas and forms of the human intellect are not properly independent and immaterial, as the divine Forms of God and the angels are. — Metaphysician Undercover

Show me where Thomas Aquinas says that the human intellect produces its own ideas and forms.

//edit// because universals are just that - they are universal. They're not peculiar to the human intellect, or they wouldn't be universal, as a matter of definition.//