Nothing you have said impacts on Lewis' critique. Those Christians who chose to worship a god they believe will damn fol for eternity remain morally reprehensible. — Banno
It may seem unduly contentious to return to the first line of the OP, But it creates the entry wound of many, many pieces on g/God, including your references. Not, then, a fault uniquely yours, but a considerable fault nevertheless. Very simply, no definition of terms. What g/God? Is it? What is it? What kind is it? What are its special features? And no appeal to vox populi because no consensus there.Those who do not believe in god, when they die, will be cast into eternal torment. — Banno
Simply that you appear to hold that what a Christian is, is what people who call themselves Christians say it is, period. — tim wood
And I disagree. What a Christian is, is more-or-less well-defined; and by those established understandings anyone may judge, and sometimes ought to judge, whether such claims are legitimate. By more-or-less I mean well-defined at the core, though allowing for some wiggle-room at the edges.
And what is of some interest is that your approach does not merely deny knowledge, which of course implies knowledge, but denies the possibility of knowledge.
In failing to affirm that being a Christian just might have something to do with a Christ,
and by supposing the issue joined on who or what he is - or was: his existence/being in question, you adroitly side-step the question and significance of the belief that is the creed of Christians, "We beleve."
And in presenting yourself in this way you most resemble a man in a dark corner muttering to himself and fighting with shadows, no one to pay any attention to. And while in Homeric terms this not exactly heroic, it is certainly Odyssian.
So you agree it's not to any concrete end. — frank
But the criticism you make is unfair. Whoever erects an altar does so with the intention of burning at the stake the one who does not bow down to his god. — Primperan
So what is one to make of the moral character of folk who hold someone who tortures folk unjustly in the highest esteem? — Banno
. . . From now on, let us suppose, for simplicity's sake, that these Christians accept a God who perpetrates divine evil, one who inflicts in finite torment on those who do not accept him. Appearances notwithstanding, are those who worship the perpetrator of divine evil themselves evil? . . .
They think that, if [someone satisfies god's damnation criteria] happens, the perpetrator will be right to start the eternal torture. They endorse the divine evil. And that's bad enough. . . .
In admiring [some otherwise admirable Christian], we too admire evil. . . .
If admiration transmits evil, then so do chains of admirers of arbitrary length.. ..
Chains of contagion can be broken because admirers are often not fully informed about the attitudes of those they admire, because admiration can be a selective matter, a response to a particular qualities. This is probably how things work in actuality. We are not all tainted with evil . . .
I suspect that the vast majority [of Christians] are more orthodox. They genuinely think that their God will commit those who do not accept him to eternal torment. . . Of course , they do not see this as divine evil. Instead they talk of divine justice and the fitting damnation of sinners. . . .
But can we [otherwise] admirer them, despite their preparedness to worship the perpetrator?
The balance seems to tilt in the negative direction.For, as the original neglected argument makes clear, the evil that God causes is infinitely greater than the entire sum of mundane suffering and sin. . ..
— Lewis at 238
Is universalism really a Christian option? Can Christians afford to deny divine evil? Christianity, properly-so-called, requires a redemption. At its heart is the claim that Jesus was born to save us from something. The condition from which we have been redeemed must be truly horrible. What can be horrible enough except for eternal torment? — Lewis at 236 to 241
As we move into the middle of the 2nd Century, a shift takes place from writing works considered “Holy Scripture” to interpretations of it. The first writer on the theology on Christian Universalism whose works survive is St. Clement of Alexandria (150 – 215 CE). He was the head of the theology school at Alexandria which, until it closed at the end of the 4th Century, was a bastion of Universalist thought. His pupil, Origen (185 – 254 CE), wrote the first complete presentation of Christianity as a system, and Universalism was at its core. Origen was the first to produce a parallel Old Testament that included Hebrew, a Greek transliteration of the Hebrew, the Septuagint, and three other Greek translations. He was also the first to recognize that some parts of the Bible should be taken literally and others metaphorically. He wrote a defense of Christianity in response to a pagan writer’s denigration of it.
Prior to the Roman Catholic Church’s condemnation of all of Universalist thought in the 6th Century, Church authority had already reached back in time to pick out several of Origen’s ideas they deemed unacceptable. Some that found disfavor were his insistence that the Devil would be saved at the end of time, the pre-existence of human souls, the reincarnation of the wicked, and his claim that the purification of souls could go on for many eons. Finally, he was condemned by the Church because his concept of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit did not agree with the “official” Doctrine of the Trinity formulated a century after his death! After the 6th Century, much of his work was destroyed; fortunately, some of it survived. . . .
According to Edward Beecher, a Congregationalist theologian, there were six theology schools in Christendom during its early years — four were Universalist (Alexandria, Cesarea, Antioch, and Edessa). One advocated annihilation (Ephesus) and one advocated Eternal Hell (the Latin Church of North Africa). Most of the Universalists throughout Christendom followed the teachings of Origen. Later, Theodora of Mopsuestia had a different theological basis for Universal Salvation, and his view continued in the break-away Church of the East (Nestorian) where his Universalist ideas still exist in its liturgy today.
— Christian Universalist Association
maybe Lewis really has a problem with Catholics — Ennui Elucidator
As noted above, it's apparently a characteristic of monotheism. But yes, the criticism applies to islam, and to any religion that worships a god who is so unjust. Both Lewis and I have said as much. — Banno
. . .does not excuse the likes of Israel Folau. — Banno
We still somehow have to live in this world with the religious/spiritual.
This is why such themes as brought up in the OP matter.
We can't just crawl into a dark corner and die, even though this is probably what the religious/spiritual expect us to do. — baker
. . . The interesting variation here is that the argument asks us not to consider the morality of such an evil god, but of those who consider him worthy of praise or worship. — Banno
You protest too much, Methinks. — Banno
My interest here is as to the extent to which Christians (and Muslims) ought be allowed at the table when ethical issues are discussed. Given their avowed admiration for evil, ought we trust their ethical judgement? — Banno
Lewis invites us to consider two possible worlds. In the first, actions are somehow physically determined. In the second, actions are freely chosen. Yet in both possible worlds, the exact same events occur. Then he asks: "Why should we think of the second world as a great advance on the first?" — Banno
I want to talk about the ethics of those who would worship a torturer. You pretend there are not very many folk who worship tortures. Your point is irrelevant. — Banno
Trying to reconcile the two may be where you are running into problems. — Ennui Elucidator
Does no one wish to defend incompatiblist freedom? — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.