the steps can either be broken down into interactions explained by chemistry or there are people trying to do that. — Frederick KOH

(Sorry, couldn't resist...)

What is at issue in this thread is whether naturalistic grounds for order are plural or whether there might be just one unique fundamental ground for all the areas of orderliness that empirical investigation discloses in nature. — Pierre-Normand

I quoted a passage the other day, about Dennett's new book:

He thinks that we have souls, but he is certain that those souls can be explained by science. If evolution built them, they can be reverse-engineered.

A lot of naturalism wants to apply the same principle to the whole of the Universe:

...if we discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable by everyone, not just by a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason -- for then we should know the mind of God. — Stephen Hawking

Short History of Time, p 193

That's why Hawkings, Dennett, Stenger, et al, are so implacably hostile to religion: it's professional jealousy!

They are not nuclear bonds. — Frederick KOH

I meant molecular (or chemical) bonds. I've no idea how "nuclear" slipped though my fingers.

You should get on with Hawking swimmingly-- that statement is failed naturalism, in the similar way to the "God" did it argument.

Instead of dealing with the world as it exists, the approach attempts to reduce everything to a single force which enacts meaning where there was none. Hawking doesn't have professional jeleousy here, he's just upset you demand a different God to his own.

This may be because we like to disclose order in nature, and disclosing pockets of order often affords opportunities for prediction and control within the empirical/technological domains thus disclosed. This satisfies both out thirst for theoretical knowledge and our needs for security (e.g. reliably finding food in the future). — Pierre-Normand

But these things are achieved by even cultures that don't privilege naturalistic explanations.

What is at issue in this thread is whether naturalistic grounds for order are plural or whether there might be just one unique fundamental ground for all the areas of orderliness that empirical investigation discloses in nature. Investigation into emergent phenomena -- both within and from physical domains -- seems to reveal pluralism to more sensibly portray nature and our cognitive access to it. This finding also harmonises with what is to be found in social sciences where the phenomena are at least partially constituted by our plural human practices. — Pierre-Normand

Why can't someone say the same thing for grounds in general, natural or not?

But these things are achieved by even cultures that don't privilege naturalistic explanations. — Frederick KOH

That's certainly true. Naturalistic explanation just is one mode of explanation among many others. It does disclose specific empirical domains that aren't cognitively (or technologically) accessible through other means. But some cultures go by without much of it. They still are capable of making objective judgments and to provide varieties of rational explanations of human behaviors, animal behaviors, and natural phenomena -- some of which often elude us for want of familiarity with, and understanding of, untamed natural environments.

That's certainly true. Naturalistic explanation just is one mode of explanation among many others. It does disclose specific empirical domains that aren't cognitively (or technologically) accessible through other means. But some cultures go by without much of it. They still are capable of making objective judgments and to provide varieties of rational explanations of human behaviors, animal behaviors, and natural phenomena -- some of which often elude us for want of familiarity with, and understanding of, untamed environments. — Pierre-Normand

So back to the chicken soup and the King's Touch. Why?

Why can't someone say the same thing for grounds in general, natural or not? — Frederick KOH

Of course you can say it, truly. Grounds for functional behaviors of human artifacts, or grounds of human cognitive/social phenomena aren't any less plural than are grounds for natural phenomena.

Of course you can say it, truly. Grounds for functional behaviors of human artifacts, or grounds of human cognitive/social phenomena aren't any less plural than are grounds for natural phenomena. — Pierre-Normand

Then back to the chicken soup and the King's Touch. Why?

So back to the chicken soup and the King's Touch. Why? — Frederick KOH

You can leave the King's touch out of it. Superstition is rampant in both primitive and technologically advanced societies. What is at issue is the reductibility, or lack thereof, of successful explanations -- not illusory ones.

You can leave the King's touch out of it. Superstition is rampant in both primitive and technologically advanced societies. What is at issue is the reductibility, or lack thereof, of successful explanations -- not illusory ones. — Pierre-Normand

This was not your original response (the one involving naturalistic explanations).
Could you provide a synthesis of this response and the original one?

Could you provide a synthesis of this response and the original one? — Frederick KOH

My claims was and remains that the King's Trouch is a distraction. The issue of the King's Touch was raised by Weinberg because he believes faith in pure magic (and the attendant refusal to provide any explanation) to constitute the only possible alternative to his specific brand of reductive explanation. And he believes this because he can't countenance genuine scientific (or naturalistic) explanation not to consist into explanations of high-level scientific principles in terms of "deeper" scientific principles that belong to a more inclusive scientific theory that is closer to *the* unique "final theory". He isn't arguing against the possibility of a partial autonomy of the "special sciences" (Fodor's term), or of the possibility of intra-level causal explanation within emergent domains, or of downward causation from emergent properties to low-level ones. He is discounting those possibilities from the get go and without argument.

My claims was and remains that the King's Touch is a distraction. — Pierre-Normand

No, you used the criteria of whether an explanation was naturalistic:

It is the lack of confidence that there might be a naturalistic (i.e. non-supernatural) explanation of the healing power the King's Trough that undermines our faith in the genuineness of the phenomenon. In the case of the chicken soup, it is easier to imagine a naturalistic explanation. — Pierre-Normand

But then you say

Naturalistic explanation just is one mode of explanation among many others — Pierre-Normand

That being the case, why this mode of explanation and not others?

What do you find most irritating about the ways in which 'postmodernists' argue or discuss? Having witnessed your approach on this thread, I'm curious to hear how you would characterize the flaws of your bugbear.

I want to give them a hard target, in this case Steven Weinberg, and see what they really mean in plain language.

That's fine but (1) neither pierrw nor apokrosis are anywhere close to being postmodernists (pierre's more in the analytic traditon and apo is peirceian/biosemiotic and (2) they've both charitably engaged you, but you've deflected all their points in a manner most closely reaembling the stereotype of pomo sophistry

they've both charitably engaged you, — csalisbury

I'm not used to language like this. Too long in an egalitarian context I suppose.

but you've deflected all their points in a manner most closely reaembling the stereotype of pomo sophistry — csalisbury

Anyone is free to point specific instances and revive them. I have in Pierre's case.

That being the case, why this mode of explanation and not others? — Frederick KOH

OK, I see what you mean. My suggestion (or acknowledgement) that primitive (i.e. pre-scientific) societies rely on non-naturalistic explanations was a bit rash. When they explain a sickness by reference to the ingestion of some harmful plant, or the failure of a crop by reference to lack of rain, or why someone fell down because she tripped on a hidden tree root, they manifest a genuine understanding of nature. Those explanations are naturalistic. They may not know why exactly plants need water to survive or why this or that plant is poisonous, and they may be tempted to supply non-naturalistic explanations for those. E.g. they may attribute intentions and powers to gods or to salient features of nature itself.

It is a mistake, though, to conclude that what separates successful naturalistic explanations of a sickness, or of a crop failure, from an ineffective supernatural explanation is the primitiveness of the latter and the "reductibility in principle" of the former. Reductive scientific explanation just disclose one source of natural regularity among others (See Mayer's discussion of "analysis" in the previously referenced book chapter). The tribes-people may be wrong about the intentions of the gods (or, indeed, about there being gods) but they need not believe that the intentions of the gods are "fundamental" in Weinberg's sense, and hence unexplainable and to be accepted on faith. They rather believe gods (or animistically conceived forces of nature) to be parts of nature just as much as human beings are. Intentions of gods don't supply a successful explanation of real patterns of order in nature if the gods don't actually exist. The ostensive pattern in nature may in this case be illusory or, if real, misattributed. But there are other sorts of agents in nature whose intentions and reasons non-reductively explain what they do, namely human beings. And there are numerous examples of naturalistic albeit non-reductive explanations of phenomena within biology, physics and chemistry too. So, Weinberg's criteria of irreducibility and fundamentalism aren't good demarcation criteria of magical thinking versus objectively valid naturalistic explanation.

When they explain a sickness by reference to the ingestion of some harmful plant, or the failure of a crop by reference to lack of rain, or why someone fell down because she tripped on a hidden tree root, they manifest a genuine understanding of nature. Those explanations are naturalistic. They may not know why exactly plants need water to survive or why this or that plant is poisonous, and they may be tempted to supply non-naturalistic explanations for those. E.g. they may attribute intentions and powers to gods or to salient features of nature itself. — Pierre-Normand

But naturalistic/non-naturalistic is a distinction our culture makes. You are applying it to practices in theirs. Is our culture privileged?

But naturalistic/non-naturalistic is a distinction our culture makes. You are applying it to practices in theirs. Is our culture privileged. — Frederick KOH

I was discussing Weinberg's arguments regarding reductionism and "arrows of explanation". I didn't make any claim regarding the comparative merits of distinct human cultures. That seems a bit pointless, as well as off topic (for this thread, anyway). Each human culture embodies wisdom about some things and misconceptions or blindness about others. That doesn't mean that all cultures are equal or that they are incommensurable. In spite of the fact that I am disagreeing with Rorty's somewhat post-modern radical rejection of objectivity, I am somewhat in agreement with his view of the pragmatic basis for the necessity of a widening of the sphere of inclusive solidarity as a ground for the refusal of radical cultural relativism.

I didn't make any claim regarding the comparative merits of human cultures. — Pierre-Normand

Presuppose rather than claim.

Presuppose rather than claim. — Frederick KOH

What is it that I presupposed?

That seems a bit pointless, as well as off topic (for this thread, anyway). Each human culture embodies wisdom about some things and misconceptions or blindness about others. — Pierre-Normand

No, there is a chain from this that leads all the way to chicken soup and the king's touch. That is one of the ways Weinberg explained his reductionism.

What is it that I presupposed? — Pierre-Normand

How do you apply a distinction to practices within culture that does not recognize it (the distinction) without privileging you own?

Instead of a reply why not reformulate your response to Weinberg's chicken soup and the king's touch based on what has been exchanged so far.

No, there is a chain from this that leads all the way to chicken soup and the king's touch. — Frederick KOH

The belief in the power of the King's touch would be one the the things this culture is wrong about. It may even be the case that the widespread wrong belief is false by that's cultures own lights. (A majority of people flouting a norm doesn't make it not a norm). There hardly is a valid inference from the humdrum claim that not all cultures share the same body of knowledge and/or make the same mistakes to the conclusion that magical thinking is vindicated.

That is one of the ways Weinberg explained his reductionism.

And I explained why Weinberg's rejection of magical thinking falls far short from vindicating his very specific form of reductionism, which, remember, isn't a pragmatically grounded proposal for a mode of scientific practice but rather purports to be a claim about "the way the world is".

We have gotten from this:

It is the lack of confidence that there might be a naturalistic (i.e. non-supernatural) explanation of the healing power the King's Trough that undermines our faith in the genuineness of the phenomenon. In the case of the chicken soup, it is easier to imagine a naturalistic explanation. Such an explanation no doubt will make reference to some systemic effect of some ingredient in the soup on human physiology (or bacterial physiology). — Pierre-Normand

To this:

The belief in the power of the King's touch would be one the the things this culture is wrong about. It may even be the case that the widespread wrong belief it is false by that's cultures own lights. (A majority of people flouting a norm doesn't make it not a norm). — Pierre-Normand

Would you agree that they are different enough for a synthesis to be helpful?

Surely you know that DNA replication is something that has been explained at the level of individual molecules. — Frederick KOH

It really hasn't.

DNA replication in the biosphere involves animal behaviour: finding a mate, being sexually selected, fighting off rivals, creating a nest, ...

These, and many more behaviours, are required for replication to occur. This plus the molecular machinery.

How do you apply a distinction to practices within culture that does not recognize it (the distinction) without privileging you own? — Frederick KOH

This same problem arises whenever two people who belong to a common culture disagree. How do you apply a conceptual distinction to the "conceptual scheme" of an intellectual opponent who doesn't recognize this distinction without privileging your own "conceptual scheme"? First, there is no way of discussing anything that doesn't start from beliefs and understandings that are your own. (This is a point Putnam made, paraphrasing: "of course, I am presupposing the correctness of my own point of view in the world, whose else point of view could it be?") Secondly, this point also is reinforced by Davidson's considerations on the principle of charity and his views on radical interpretation. Davidson's considerations apply to the case of allegedly incommensurate cultures too. If a culture is to be intelligible as such (to an anthropologist or curious tourist, say) as embodying a body of knowledge and understanding of "its" world at all, then this only can be construed to be so on the background of an interpretation that discloses the beliefs of the members of this culture as being mostly true. This shared body of beliefs (and the understanding implied by them) then can serve as a stepping stone for engaging in a rational/political dialogue about the elements that are being disputed.

So it could turn out that the culture that does not recognize the naturalistic/non-naturalistic distinction might end up convincing you of its point of view. What happens to your original response to the soup and touch then?