I managed to get hold of and read Dennett's, 'From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds(2017), for his later views on qualia. One important remark which he makes is that, ' Qualia are supposed to be somehow internal, subjective properties that we are acquainted with more directly, when we are slightly less directed with their normal external causes_ real red stripes, and so on in the world'.

I have read the comments in the thread and it does remain a complex issue. Previously, I had not been particularly impressed by what I had read by Dennett. However, at this specific moment, his writing is making sense to me of qualia being the link between the objective aspects of the world and the way it is transmitted in subjective internal states. The actual transmission of information may be important, as in music as a form of Vibrations which form into meaningful songs.

Another important remark which Dennett makes, which may be useful for reflection is:
'Doggedly pursuing the idea that qualia are both the causes and the intentional objects (the existing intentional objects) of introspection leads to further artifactual fantasies, the most extravagant of which is the idea that unlike our knowledge of other kinds of causation, our knowledge of mental causation is infallible and direct; we can't be wrong when we declare that our subjective beliefs about the elements of our conscious experience are caused by those very elements. We have "priviledged access" to the causes of our or sources of our introspective convictions. No room for any tricksters here.' In other words, in most instances we believe that our perceptions of the external world on the basis of our subjective experience.

Of course, there may be some exceptions, like in the way different people may recall details of an events differently, especially critical events. But, this may be more about the specific role of attention in perception and the way in which our own internal narratives weave their way into perception, with potential for distorting it.

I don't really know that we are our minds. What of our bodies? Are we not our bodies? If confusion results from saying that we have access to our minds, in what way do we have access to our own bodies, and then to the environment they are part of? Does this mean that "we" can exist apart from our bodies? If not, then wouldn't that mean that we are our bodies and not our minds? — Harry Hindu

Sure, all that. But you without you mind is a diminished you.

hallucinated spiders look just like real spiders. — Harry Hindu

Of course; but they are not real spiders. An odd thing about denying realism is that it leads to the conclusion that there are no real spiders, and hence it's all hallucinations; we no longer have the capacity to say that the paranoiac is wrong.

No, that's why Flubberts differ from person to person. You can't expect them to be all equal. Why should they? Because they differ they are even more useful in constructing an invariant picture of material processes behind them. If there would be only one common set of common Flubberts one couldn't even start looking for a common materialistic picture behind them.This picture is a subset of a much wider collection of Flubberts. Different and varying Flubberts can be reduced to a stable invariant set of common Flubberts, which are the Flubberts of the material processes. — AgentTangarine

:lol:

Yeah, alright. But that's a problem of language. You can rename objective material processes bocketibonders just as well. I think there is a relationship between flubberts and bocketibonders. Flubberts lay at the base. The offer a direct glimps on dundereekies. It's the outside of dundereekies we can percieve by means of flubberts, which lay inside the objective dundereekies. Bocketibonders are a special case of flubberts. They are colorless rather constant flubberts which, as such, correspond to limited dundereekie developments. Only in abstract experimental conditions, or in abstract views on dundereekies (like reducing the moon to a point mass or colorless mass, so it look the same to all people) it's a useful concept. Even in pointing to regions in the brain where flubberts get their shape by interacting dundereekies, they are useful as they can explain, besides direct introspection by experiencing them, relations or the internal dynamics of the flubberts (which, as said, form the inextractable inside of dundereekies, whose outside you can look at by by bocketibonders or flubberts.

So, when you examine dundereekies in my brain, you have only acces to their outside and you can only see it with your flubberts or bocketibonders, a more confined and seemingly more objective view. I, on the other hand, experience flubberts in my brain dundereekies directly. So you might be able to infer if I have a bocketibonders model in my mind.

Yes, a new kind of duality. But freed from the restrictive monism of material processes.

Only in abstract experimental conditions, or in abstract views on dundereekies (like reducing the moon to a point mass or colorless mass, so it look the same to all people) it's a useful concept. — AgentTangarine

Indeed, we adjudge bocketibonders by their interactions with those shared things around us on whcih we can agree - the dundereekies.

I, on the other hand, experience flubberts in my brain dundereekies directly. So you might be able to infer if I have a bocketibonders model in my mind. — AgentTangarine

That's the point; the supposition that you have privileged access to flubberts; as Wittgenstein might have said, the flubberts drop out of consideration, and all we have to talk about are the dundereekies.

That's the point; the supposition that you have privileged access to flubberts; as Wittgenstein might have said, the flubberts drop out of consideration, and all we have to talk about are the dundereekies. — Banno

I don't think one has privileged acces to flubberts. You have access as well, and even to that of mine, albeit only indirectly via the outside of the dundereekies they are situated in. This access can be gained by means of variable flubberts or more stable and abstract bocketibonders, which are a subset of flubberts. From one side of the moon I see a dark sphere with craters, while from the other side I see a while sphere with seas, and your flubberts might differ. Introducing a stable bocketibonders image might be helpful but it's still a flubberts image. I think you mix up dundereekies with bocketibonders. Dundereekies are fundamental and are no flubberts, although the contain them .By means of flubberts and bocketibonders, dundereekies present their outside. By means of their inside they allow flubberts and bocketibonders to exist. In our thinking about dundereekies we are bound by what's inside of them. So even in and outside is a flubbert or bocketibonder. But how else can it be? Dundereekies are weird stuff.

Yep. That pretty much sums up how the debate concerning qualia is best understood.

Hence my continuing view, that qualia lead to nonsense, and are best left out of the conversation.

Hence my continuing view, that qualia lead to nonsense — Banno

A materialistic view can't even exist without them. Let alone the material it refers to. Material processes are just empty qualia. So the stipulation of qualia leading to nonsense is the same as saying material processes are nonsense. Material processes are useful, an for micro processes they are all we've got. Qualia and their subset of material processes give us a pretty adequate view on the outside of things.

Stable material processes existing objectively and independent of us is a justified view though. So drink your material wassail and be sozzled by it. Mollycoddle it even. The qualia brouhaha bottle you pour it from won't mind materialistic argle bargle.

A materialistic view can't even exist without them. — AgentTangarine

Did you argue for this somewhere?

And why do you imply that my views are materialist? What gave you that impression?

Did you argue for this somewhere? — Banno

I proposed it. No need to argue for it.

And why do you imply that my views are materialist? What gave you that impression?
6m — Banno

Because the modern view on nature is that of material processes going on independently of us. Elementary particles and all that. Don't you agree with this?

So, are qualia useful? Yes, even indispensable, but after being replaced by an assumed qualia independent world, it's easy to throw them away as being useless. The assumption is wrong though.

I'm mystified how "qualia" is any more lazy or obfuscating than "consciousness" or "subjective experience"; and why Dennett and Banno continually want to let the others off the hook.

No need to argue for it. — AgentTangarine

A view espoused without reason may be dismissed on the same basis. I still do not see any merit in your contributions.


I've explicitly argued that both consciousness and subjectivity are overused by philosophers.

Ok, fair enough, Mr Banno, sorry to have taken up your time.

Oh, one more question...

Neither Dennett nor I have argued that there is no need to talk about experiences; rather that replacing talk of experiences with talk of qualia is unhelpful.

Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special.
— Dennett, Quining Qualia — Banno

Oh, one more question... — bongo fury

What question?

You habitually fail to make your point, ask your question, or present your argument. It's tedious and tendentious. Give me a reason to respond to your posts, apart from pointing out your personal flaws.

What question?

You habitually fail to make your point, — Banno

Said the murderer, before Columbo's gotcha. Was my poorly signposted allusion. Anyway... as usual, I'll be happy to clarify.

I'm mystified how "qualia" is any more lazy or obfuscating than "consciousness" or "subjective experience"; and why Dennett and Banno continually want to let the others off the hook. — bongo fury

I've explicitly argued that both consciousness and subjectivity are overused by philosophers. — Banno

Fair enough. Except you missed out "experience" there, so I held up the quote. For if you had the time. You're often in a hurry. That's fine.

As I was the person who asked the question I am still wondering how useful the idea of qualia is. There has been so much interesting discussion on the thread, but it is probably an area in philosophy which people will never agree about. It does seem that the terms subjectivity and consciousness are such buzz words in philosophy and it is possible to go round in circles at times, with the issue of qualia being somewhat in this.

I can remember the first time I ever came across the word qualia and how it took me a while to grasp and, then, I realised it was a almost a bit of a puzzle. I have mentioned the idea of qualia to friends who don't read philosophy and some seem to relate to the idea easily and the concept seems to make more sense to some than others. I am inclined to think that the idea of qualia is useful to some extent, but with some limitation, in the way in which it can become a bit of a knotty tangent at times.

some seem to relate to the idea easily and the concept seems to make more sense to some than others. I am inclined to think that the idea of qualia is useful to some extent, — Jack Cummins

There was a lot of interesting analysis of art and music based on qualia as colour scales and pitch and tone and time scales etc. Prall, Goodman, Boretz. But there, there was no philosophical bias, no claim of epistemological priority. It was just a matter of starting the analysis with those elements.

I think Dennett was possibly reacting more against the epistemological claim. Maybe that is a later usage of "qualia". I'm not sure. (Not entirely later. CI Lewis, who coined the term, is earlier, of course. I gather his bias was the strong and epistemological kind. @Manuel has mentioned having recently read his book. In this thread, I think.)

I do intend to try to read other writers on the topic and, would like to read CI Lewis in particular. The ideas within art and music are interesting too and even if they fall a little outside of philosophy, they probably raise the whole area of phenomenology in the arts.

Are brain organoids conscious?

The above pop-sci article is asking a question about ethics. "Qualia" wouldn't clarify anything for the average reader. The vast majority know they're talking about phenomenal consciousness, not function.

Note that the question they're asking can't be framed at all in Dennett-speak. I would say that where philosophy interferes with addressing a moral question, that's bad philosophy.

What can we say about the character of a Dennett fan in the light of this? Absolutely nothing. :lol:

Of course; but they are not real spiders. An odd thing about denying realism is that it leads to the conclusion that there are no real spiders, and hence it's all hallucinations; we no longer have the capacity to say that the paranoiac is wrong. — Banno

Sure, but the question was why do hallucinated spiders look like real spiders. How do you explain the behavior of someone hallucinating without "silly" qualia? How is it that something that isn't real looks like something that is unless they both take the same form (qualia)?

Denying realism isn't denying what is real. It just changes the reference to what is real. If there were only hallucinations (which doesn't make any sense without something real), then hallucinations would be the only reality. Reality would simply be a solipsistic mind and that is what would be real. Spiders would exist only as qualia and would be real as qualia, while the notion that spiders exist outside the mind would be the illusion.

Like you, I'm a realist. It's just that I'm also assert that qualia are real, and it would seem to be that you do to if you agree that we are our minds, which are composed of qualia. If qualia were so "silly" then how is it that solipsism could even be contemplated. A p-zombie could never conceive of the idea of solipsism. It would make no sense to them, just like the idea of qualia.

Thanks. I appreciate the exhaustive summary, it's made things clearer in terms of why there's such lot of confusion (on my part) about the various terms being bandied about. I think maybe just 'realist' is safest.

I'm working on what is involved in the intentionalist approach. It fits with Wittgenstein via Anscombe, and seems compatible with your comments about neuroscience, but there are some issues I'd like to clear up before committing to something like it. — Banno

Cool. I look forward to reading your thoughts (should you commit them to writing here at any time). It sounds like a really interesting approach.

The "perception" dispute is not like that. It's instead a disagreement over how the term is defined. — Andrew M

I think that's a gross deflation of all the work that neuroscience has done on this. Most of the neuroscientists I've spoken to or listened to consider themselves to be investigating the matter of what perception is as a scientific investigation, not one in philology.

Because the "veil of perception" model takes the ordinary term "image" (or "veil", or "representation") which is defined in terms of perceptible objects and then defines "perception" in terms of images (or veils or representations), which is circular. Also see the example below. — Andrew M

I don't see any of the works on active inference, or neural modelling using the terms that clumsily.

That is, this red flower here is the intended object of my perception. — Andrew M

I agree with this. It's the 'realism' bit. The object we're all trying (with our modelling processes and our social interaction) to react to is the red flower, out in the world. I don't see how it being the object of our intention somehow removes the 'veil' between us and it.

If I'm mistaken about what is there (because, like the above instrument's operation, things can sometimes go awry) then I haven't perceived anything. — Andrew M

This just doesn't seem to make sense. You're saying that any time we're mistaken about the properties of the object we've instead perceived nothing? If I perceive a flower, but in my mind it had red petals (I only briefly glanced at it). I return to it for a closer look and find I had merely assumed the petals were red - expectation bias - they were, quite clearly pink). Now I have to admit that I perceived nothing at all? I've got some bad news for you - literally all of our perception involves such assumptions in place of actual signals from the object. So you've never perceived anything in your whole life.

The object we're all trying (with our modelling processes and our social interaction) to react to is the red flower, out in the world — Isaac

This is awfully teleological.

Just as a question for people to think about: what do you see if you close your eyes? Some people see only darkness. Some but not all of the time I see geometric shapes and patterns, more in the right one recently. It may be due to the phosphenes or rods and cones. Is this the internal subjective qualia?

Is this the internal subjective qualia? — Jack Cummins

No. It's "see[ing] geometric shapes and patterns", as you said first... before introducing the word qualia. What's qualia doing that the first expression was lacking?

What's qualia doing that the first expression was lacking? — Isaac

Nothing. The debate just comes down to what the word means. We all agree that consciousness includes phenomenality. What difference does it make what you call it?

I agree that the idea of qualia is just a term and that the complexities of perception have been discussed by many ways by various writers without use of the word. It is probably simply that the term gives a specific framework for thinking about perception. Certainly, that has been my experience of reading and thinking about the term. I do wish to hold onto the term but with some fluidity, recognising that in some ways the term is a bit of a tangent, probably if the word qualia is used too concretely as if it solves many contradictions in perception.

It is probably simply that the term gives a specific framework for thinking about perception. — Jack Cummins

You're free to insist that this is true. However the broadest meaning of the word, per the SEP, is simply phenomenal consciousness: experience.

We don't know what causes it. Period.

We all agree that consciousness includes phenomenality. What difference does it make what you call it? — frank

And yet we hear talk of such spectres as the 'red quale'. Does the 'red consciousness' make any sense at all?