The account @Hanover presents has been shown to be incoherent.

The arguments against it here have been presented previously, several times.

Unless there's some new argument, the show is over.

Those are also imposed on us though, aren't they? — Janus

I'm not sure what you're getting at. Every event has a cause.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. — Hanover

You said

The properties experienced of the object are subjectively imposed. — Hanover

I pointed out that experienced properties of the object are not imposed by us (that is, are not subjectively imposed), then you cited the genesis of non sensorially produced phenomenal states by drugs, brain stimulation, tumors and brain dysfunction, and I pointed out that those are not imposed by us either.

So I was just purporting to refute your claim is all.

Apart from representational models another simple way of framing perception is saying that we see objects as they are revealed to us — Janus

This is correct, as far as framing perception. But perception is not representation, it is sensation, and that fully empirical. Some representations are of empirical perceptions, but representations themselves are rational.

there is for us the merely logical idea of what the object could be in itself. (...). Or what import could it have — Janus

It’s import, in accordance with the theory from which it arises, is to limit our empirical knowledge to only that which can be a phenomenon for us. Otherwise, nothing prevents us from claiming knowledge of everything there is, even without the possible experience of it.

It’s import, in accordance with the theory from which it arises, is to limit our empirical knowledge to only that which can be a phenomenon for us. Otherwise, nothing prevents us from claiming knowledge of everything there is, even without the possible experience of it. — Mww

I am in total agreement with that aim; not so much with the "making room for faith" part though (which I am not claiming you are advocating). This is the beginning of the "destruction" or deconstruction of metaphysics as it had been traditionally understood, and the accompanying idea of "rational intuition of reality".

When it comes to empirical knowledge, I would say the limits cannot be predetermined. The logical limits of what count as empirical knowledge; the logic behind " we can only know things as far as our experience of them allows" is really a tautology which could be phrased as "we can only know things as far as we can know them". I don't think anyone sensible could have any argument with that; but it really doesn't tell us much.

When it comes to empirical knowledge, I would say the limits cannot be predetermined. — Janus

Oh absolutely. We can’t say what the limit of knowledge is, but we can still say what the limit of knowledgeable things is. This isn’t so much a limit on knowledge, but rather, a limit on experience.

But then, some say experience is knowledge, so there is that.....

I dunno. If that which we can know about is limited to phenomena, then parsimony suggests that serves as a limit on knowledge itself. On the other hand, the sheer quantity of possible phenomena far exceeds the time available for any one human to know of them.......

And new knowledge changes old knowledge.....

And we don’t even know what we don’t know.....

AAARRRGGGG!!!!

AAARRRGGGG!!!! — Mww

Yep, it is a bit like that!

Maybe, but I for one won’t be stepping off the curb in front of a sufficiently massive fast-mover to test a mere possibility. — Mww

I mentioned the holographic universe. Matt O'Dowd devoted a bunch of Spacetime episodes to explaining it and I'm still confused by it. Apparently it's a serious thing, tho.

... the limit of knowledge ... the limit of knowledgeable things ... a limit on knowledge ... a limit on experience.

... some say experience is knowledge ...

... that which we can know about ... a limit on knowledge itself ... to know of them ...

... new knowledge ... old knowledge ...

And we don’t even know what we don’t know.....

AAARRRGGGG!!!! — Mww

Suppose we wondered, is knowledge either the fundamental way human beings relate to the world or one of the fundamental ways human beings relate to the world? If either of these is the case, you should be able to abstract away the rest of the human being, and their other ways of relating to the world, and still produce a full account of human beings qua knowers. (Knowledge in this sense would have, at the very least, logical co-priority, so to speak.)

As a step halfway toward answering that question, you might abstract away the rest of the human being and see whether you can produce a full account of knowing. (You could, for the sake of the experiment, ‘pretend’ that knowing is fundamental.)

How would you know if you had failed?

That is, suppose, for the sake of argument, that knowing is not quite fundamental, and in abstracting away the rest of the human being you had cut away something essential to understanding the character of human knowing.

How would you know that the account you produced was not an account of human knowing, but only of how human beings would know if they were completely different — that is, if knowing really were fundamental?

We do not impose those properties; they are imposed upon us, like it or not. — Janus

So the blacks impose on other people that blacks are an inferior race?

LOTR imposes on you that it is a good book?

....knowledge...the fundamental way human beings relate to the world.... — Srap Tasmaner

How would you know if you had failed? — Srap Tasmaner

HA!! Exactly right. Toss this....ok, still know stuff. Toss this....ok, still good. Toss this...still here. Toss.....

...knowledge....one of the fundamental ways human beings relate to the world — Srap Tasmaner

Hmmmm. You’d end up tossing the tossable, and still know stuff. At last, you end up with THE fundamental way you started with.

.....knowledge.....not quite fundamental..... — Srap Tasmaner

Ahhh, after defeating the other two, what’s left? What if knowledge is merely an end in itself, having nothing whatsoever to do with the means? It becomes the case, then, that the means are the more fundamental, and if we start tossing them one at a time, we might find knowledge evaporates at the very first toss. And if that happens, we’ve arrived at the THE fundamental way of understanding the world, we’d find it isn’t knowledge itself, but that which makes knowledge possible.

Impasse. How do we know what it is that makes knowledge possible. Common rejoinder is.....education. Nobody wants to deny that they were taught everything they know. From day one they’ve been instructed in every-damn-thing, which leads to the abominable construct that culture/language is more powerful than reason.

Humans. Forever taking the easy way out.

The properties experienced of the object are subjectively imposed.
— Hanover

I pointed out that experienced properties of the object are not imposed by us (that is, are not subjectively imposed) — Janus

I wasn’t invited, but I’m taking a seat on the affirmative side of the bandwagon anyway. You know.......”Copernican Revolution” and all.

holographic universe. (...) Apparently it's a serious thing, tho. — frank

Could be. Some have likened “The Allegory of the Cave” as a forerunner, and that was certainly a serious thing, at least philosophically, in that things are not always as they seem.

But I wonder.....how far-fetched does it have to get, just to argue established criteria?

But I wonder.....how far-fetched does it have to get, just to argue established criteria? — Mww

The holographic universe is contemporary speculative physics. Why would it be far fetched?

What are the chances that you are both able to carry on this conversation so long without experiencing the words of this screen in similar ways? What are the chances that each post follows the arguement of the other without having a similar experience of the words on this screen? Are we always talking past each other when talking with anyone but ourselves?

When a professor gives you an exam, what are you being tested on if not whether your interpretation of the professor's lectures is accurate and that you interpret the professor's words the same way they do ?

If I were to ask you to copy and post everything that I said here, would you be able to do it? Why or why not? What are the chances you'd be able to do it if you weren't experiencing the same words on the screen? Even if you copy and paste the words you'd still need to interpret the scribbles, "copy and paste" the same way I do.

Why would it be far fetched? — frank

Sorry. I didn’t mean to come off as pejorative. I was just paying more attention to the keyword “speculative”, then the subject “holographic universe”.

Even established precepts or methods can seem far-fetched. It’s just that the speculative carries the implication of being more-so.

I see. But a fair amount of the non-speculative physics would also appear far fetched to the average person.

Thus the importance of honoring language games?

Thus the importance of honoring language games? — frank

I honor reason, without which there wouldn’t even be a language game.

Which just shows reason isn’t perfect.

How do we know what it is that makes knowledge possible. — Mww

Maybe. But there are two other ways to ask that question: (i) what makes human knowledge possible? and, in a somewhat different vein, (ii) what makes human beings knowers?

So, yes, one version of the question would make room for an argument that language ‘comes first’, or some conceptual apparatus, or history and culture, or biology. Indeed, how do you make rabbit stew?

The other version might be brought out by the tired analogy of describing the progress of a game in terms of its rules: that everything happening on the field or on the board is in accordance with the rules leaves out almost everything about what people are doing when they play. And not just their motivations, but everything about the way they play.

Ever watch little kids playing soccer? It’s like watching a flock of birds chase a soccer ball around the field. They are playing in accordance with the rules (mostly — offside is confusing), but their understanding of the game of soccer is not the same as you would find among adult players. One reason for that might be readily described as cognitive: there are things about playing soccer they do not know. But there are also things they do not know how to do in the other sense: they cannot do them; they lack certain skills. And there are things about playing soccer you cannot understand if you lack those skills. The development of a skill new to you can change how you understand the game; the development of a skill new to those you’re playing with can change their understanding of the game. (Imagine only one player on the field figuring out how to chip — deliberately rather than by accident — and how that would change everything.)

My question was meant to land around here. You could produce an account of playing soccer that looks a bit like the rulebook, but you will miss almost everything, not only about why people do what they do when playing soccer (leaving aside why they play at all), but also how they play, how they understand the game, how they understand what they’re doing, and some of that is not a matter of cognition but of skill. If having some skill is a prerequisite for having some cognition, then by ignoring skill you would miss an entire class of cognition, and mischaracterize what’s left.

honor reason, without which there wouldn’t even be a language game. — Mww

But what if reason evolved to provide fitness rather than truth?

But there are two other ways to ask that question: (i) what makes human knowledge possible? and, in a somewhat different vein, (ii) what makes human beings knowers? — Srap Tasmaner

Interesting.

(i) asks the same as the original, insofar as there is no good reason to ask about knowledge in other creatures when a human isn’t even certain of the conditions for his own.

(ii) is given immediately upon his knowledge of something. He who knows is a knower. Somewhat tautological in itself, but still leaves unanswered what makes knowledge possible, hence what makes knowers possible.
————

tired analogy of describing the progress of a game in terms of its rules — Srap Tasmaner

Tired indeed. What a waste of time.

there are things about playing soccer they do not know. But there are also things they do not know how to do in the other sense: they cannot do them; they lack certain skills — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, found as far back as at least Platonic “knowledge of” vs, “knowledge how”, and later in Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”, and a veritable myriad of similarities in between. I for one know nothing about soccer, but I could learn it well enough to play the game according to its rules. On the other hand, I simply do not have the musculature required to play soccer as a actual game, which implies competitive abilities.

And there are things about playing soccer you cannot understand if you lack those skills. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I suppose, maybe. Like....how the HELL did he do that!!! But I think I would still maintain that I can understand how, e.g., a bicycle kick can be done without my personal ability to do one. This shows understanding antecedes experience, except for sheer accident or reflex.

The development of a skill new to you can change how you understand the game — Srap Tasmaner

That, or I’m just putting the understanding I already have to more profitable use. I think a sense of accomplishment most often is merely conformance to an expectation, which must have been understood as possible in the first place.

But I get it.
—————

If having some skill is a prerequisite for having some cognition, then by ignoring skill you would miss an entire class of cognition, and mischaracterize what’s left. — Srap Tasmaner

I would agree, if such were the case. Having some cognition because of a skill doesn’t tell you how you got the skill, if it didn’t come naturally. So we end up with, practicepracticepractice, at the end of which we cognize how wonderful we’ve become at some particular thing.

But what if some cognition is prerequisite for a skill? Musical prodigies, natural athletes excepted, the rest of us have to think before we act.

Good stuff. Maybe elaborate some more, here and there?

If you hold that everything and everyone is part of this world and belongs in it, then how do you explain what are considered aberrations and evil (such as mental illness)? And how do you justify morality, a sense of right and wrong?

If you accept aberrations and evil as somehow normal, as part of this world, then on the grounds of what can they be called "aberrations", "evil" to begin with? — baker

We explain mental illness, to the extent we can, as we explain other illnesses to which living organisms are subject. To the extent they are aberrations, they are in the same sense as any other disease. Illness, disease, are present in the world with everything else. Being part of the world doesn't imply normality. Extraordinary and unusual things happen all the time. If we must, we can ascertain what is normal statistically. Morality is something we learn as we learn other things; by interaction with others and the environment in which we live. There are no illnesses or morality which are "outside" of the world.

But what if reason evolved to provide fitness rather than truth? — frank

What sense of fitness?

Is this an epistemological or a metaphysical/ideological/ethical consideration?
(Or do you believe that there cannot be one without the other?) — baker

I'm not sure, really. I don't know that it's necessary or useful to categorize considerations in that fashion.

I agree with Dewey on many things, and one of them is regarding what he called "the philosophical fallacy"--the tendency of philosophers to neglect context by seeking to impose general rules upon the world. As in the case of those who maintain that mirages, illusions, errors and such establish that we can't truly know the rest of the world--that our senses deceive us. Based on such things some philosophers have concluded that we must not perceive the real world and instead perceive only qualia and sense data and representations .

This is to take circumstances in what are individual cases as applicable to all cases, when such things as mirages, errors, illusions may be explained by consideration of the context in which they occur (context would include us).

We can (or should) acknowledge that we live in a world we're a part of, and understand that we necessarily are dependent on it, but don't merely receive impressions caused by it because we're participants, not observers. We shape the world as we live (we alter it, build things, destroy things, etc.). That doesn't mean the world exists without us, and I think the whole "question" of the "external world" to the extent it addresses whether the world exists without us dissolves when we understand there is no world separate from us because we're parts of the world. But being part of the world doesn't mean there's no world.

What are the chances you'd be able to do it if you weren't experiencing the same words on the screen? Even if you copy and paste the words you'd still need to interpret the scribbles, "copy and paste" the same way I do. — Harry Hindu

I don't think either of us disagree with whether we are speaking to one another intelligibly. The disagreement is whether there has to be a common point of reference in order to do so. I don't see why there must be, considering we speak of pain to one another, yet there is no pain outside the phenomenal state to point to to be sure we're speaking of the same thing.

We both look at a cup and we may have no idea what part of the cup is descriptive of the cup and what are things we impose in order to better navigate our world. It's likely we see the cup the same way, but not necessarily so, and it's not required in order for us to speak of the cup.

I pointed out that experienced properties of the object are not imposed by us (that is, are not subjectively imposed), then you cited the genesis of non sensorially produced phenomenal states by drugs, brain stimulation, tumors and brain dysfunction, and I pointed out that those are not imposed by us either.

So I was just purporting to refute your claim is all. — Janus

My position is that you have an experience, and it might be caused by a variety of things, but the sensation itself ultimately was caused by your brain, or some such internal faculty that experiences. It's like asking what caused the blip on the radar screen. The wave bounced off the object, did this, did that, and then a blip. A malfunctioning screen might also create blips as might a blip appear if we stick a probe in the circuitry. What ultimately caused the blip is a causal chain question like any other. We can look to first initiating cause or last cause, much like what caused the billiard ball to fall in the hole. Was it my muscle contraction, the cue, the slope of the table, the resiliency of the various other balls, etc.?

I agree with Dewey on many things, and one of them is regarding what he called "the philosophical fallacy"--the tendency of philosophers to neglect context by seeking to impose general rules upon the world. — Ciceronianus

This is only an argument against classical dogmatism as opposed to a scientific approach arising from experience. If I lost my car keys after dark Dewey would suggest that I should search in context under the streetlights because it is more efficacious. Unfortunately, the odds of success depend on the spacing of the streetlights. Science does not follow either Hercule Poirot's advice to retrace my steps from the pub nor the pragmatist's to look only where I can see. Science builds portable lights to scan at ground level which lengthen and put in motion the shadows of all lost objects along the path.

This is only an argument against classical dogmatism as opposed to a scientific approach arising from experience. If I lost my car keys after dark Dewey would suggest that I should search in context under the streetlights because it is more efficacious. Unfortunately, the odds of success depend on the spacing of the streetlights. Science does not follow either Hercule Poirot's advice to retrace my steps from the pub nor the pragmatist's to look only where I can see. Science builds portable lights to scan at ground level which lengthen and put in motion the shadows of all lost objects along the path. — magritte

I don't know what you think constitutes "context" in this situation (nor do I know what you think pragmatism is), but I think it more likely Dewey would determine the context in which the keys were lost. If the keys weren't lost while you were under a streetlight, there would be no reason to search under all streetlights. If you don't know where you lost your keys, but think you did so while taking a path by which you passed under streetlights, no doubt it would make sense to check along the path you took which would include, but not be limited to, the area of the streetlights. And I think Dewey would, in determining the appropriate manner in which to search, take into consideration the context in which the search took place, i.e. if it took place in the dark, in which case it would make sense to use the portable lights you mention, or if it took place in daylight, in which case those lights wouldn't be helpful.

Now you're just being stupidly perverse. You know that was not what I was talking about. Go troll somewhere else.

My position is that you have an experience, and it might be caused by a variety of things, but the sensation itself ultimately was caused by your brain, or some such internal faculty that experiences. — Hanover

You're ignoring the fact that without an environment the body is sensitive to there is no sensation. Try a sensory deprivation chamber for a while. That said it's undeniable that the body can generate vivid experiences of its own (the content of which ultimately derive form experience of environments). That is exactly what happens in a sensory deprivation chamber. But you, the subject, have no control over what is experienced whether in or out of the environment. You don't impose it, you are subjected to it; that's just what it means to be a subject.