The mind-body problem is precisely a problem, it is posed as a challenge for dualism, not something that dualism embraces. — SophistiCat

Apart from some panpsychism à la Spinoza, materialist explanations for the mind-body problem are usually self-contradictory. They saw the branch on which they sit. Even Spinoza only solved the problem via God, just like Descartes did. So I consider the mind-body problem a challenge for atheists or secularists (such as myself), more than a challenge to dualists.

Not. Even. Wrong.

You can do better than that.

Oh yes, and so can you. The point of my previous post ...

What seems to be the problem? Calling Spinoza a theist?

So I consider the mind-body problem a challenge for atheists or secularists (such as myself), more than a challenge to dualists. — Olivier5

The challenge could be put this way: "If there's no ghost of the universe, how come there's a ghost of us, human beings?" By ghost I mean something like mind or sentience.

What seems to be the problem? — Olivier5

It's unlikely you'll get a conversation.

I'm a monist but it's perfectly obvious, as you have pointed out, that the first challenge that a monist has to answer is: What is the explanation of the manifest duality that I see? This may be easily dealt with, or it may not. But it is a serious question, and not to be dismissed as an argument from incredulity, even if the challenge is framed using language like "I don't see how..."

It's unlikely you'll get a conversation. — bert1

Sad but true.

I'm a monist but it's perfectly obvious, as you have pointed out, that the first challenge that a monist has to answer is: What is the explanation of the manifest duality that I see? — bert1

Or triality, or n-ality.

There are dimensions, such as time and space, that seem to exist objectively and look radically unlike other stuff, such as roses, or even ideas of roses. Space may be a product of matter at plank scale, as loop quantum gravity appears to posit, but I'm out of my depth here.

The Dao 道 (the “way”) gives birth to one.
One gives birth to Two, 
Two gives birth to Three.. — Daodejing, Chap. 42

It seems Laozi was uninformed about geometric progressions: 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32,...

Maybe he was talking about the exponents and not the terms.

In my mind, a kind of stuff can be said to be fundamentally different from another IFF it is impossible to produce one from the other and/or vice versa (not even in theory) by re-arraging its components for instance. — Olivier5

Ok let's run with that.

E.g. since it is theoretically possible to change lead into gold, or clay into pot, or energy into matter, these two kinds of stuff are not fundamentally different. — Olivier5

Ok, so let's call the fundamental stuff all of those are made of "X".

Someone now proposes a different fundamental stuff stuff Y. Thus Y by necessity cannot be made into energy, or matter. So what proof do we have of the existence of Y? We can't see it or feel it or interact with it.

Y gets cut by Occam's razor. On the epiphenomenalism thread weren't you the one that opposed the view because you thought that something that doesn't affect anything else, would not be detectible and wouldn't exist?

“Hey guys, remember how we thought everything was ‘Hakuna Matata?’ Well, it turns out it’s just Matata.” — Pinprick

The example I used was to illustrate how you can't explain what Hakuna Matata is. So you can't say "it was just Matata". We don't know what Hakuna Matata is.

We are capable of imagining things that aren’t real — Pinprick

But those things are always combinations of existing properties. Unicorns are horses with horns. We know what horns are and we know what horses are. We can't imagine entirely new properties. Like a new color. Or a new taste.

But who believes that these categories cannot interact? — SophistiCat

The people that proposed them, necessarily. Or else what does "fundamentally" add to "fundamentally different"? My definition is that it means they cannot interact. Do you have a different definition?

The mind-body problem is precisely a problem, it is posed as a challenge for dualism, not something that dualism embraces. — SophistiCat

It is a challenge because it seems clear that incorporeal, immaterial stuff (minds) would have no way to interact with material stuff. It's not a solvable problem, just how long have people been trying to solve it. It's a problem that refutes the position.

And some forms of dualism DO embrace it, because that's what you have to do if you want to say minds and matter are fundamentally different. Example: Epiphenomenalism.

Dualism, in its most general outlines, carves out a special and exceptional place for the mental in its ontology and metaphysics. This is sometimes referred to as mentalism. So the best case for monism that I can see is a straightforward rejection of mentalism and nothing more. — SophistiCat

First you have "thing" which refers to everything (monism)
Then you split it into "mental" and "physical" with some objects being mental and others being physical.
You furthermore posit that this exhausts all objects that exist. So now, not every object is physical, and not every object is mental.

The problem with dualism is that these categories are defined as fundamentally different. Not just different. A hammer and a table are different, but they can affect each other very easily. That's because they're made of the same stuff (matter in this case). When you say things are fundamentally different you're implying they cannot interact (or so is my definition, if you have another one please share). How could a non-physical thing push a physical thing? It makes no sense because they're fundamentally different kinds of stuff.

Rejecting mentalism at this point will amount to rejecting the existence of some things. That's not what monism is. Monism is going back to "thing", though people don't call it that (usually they use "mind" or "matter" and fight over it)

The challenge could be put this way: "If there's no ghost of the universe, how come there's a ghost of us, human beings?" — Olivier5

Why would there not be?

Electrons and protons have charges but a balanced atom doesn't. Oftentimes properties are lost when you go from the constituents to the system as a whole.

I have a brain, Society doesn’t. Etc.

The example I used was to illustrate how you can't explain what Hakuna Matata is. So you can't say "it was just Matata". We don't know what Hakuna Matata is. — khaled

Seems like an irrelevant example then. We have a working definition of “physical” don’t we? Not saying it’s 100% complete, but we are able to at least partially describe it. If the fundamental thing in the universe fits our definition of “physical,” then physicalism prevails. We can define that without needing to know the definition of mind/idealism. So what’s the issue?

But those things are always combinations of existing properties. Unicorns are horses with horns. We know what horns are and we know what horses are. We can't imagine entirely new properties. Like a new color. Or a new taste. — khaled

I don’t see why this is an issue. Why would the fundamental “thing” possess new properties?

Electrons and protons have charges but a balanced atom doesn't. Oftentimes properties are lost when you go from the constituents to the system as a whole. — khaled

So the reason there can be some form of intelligence in the universe, is that there's a lot of stupidity in it too, and they tend to balance each other out? :cool:

But who believes that these categories cannot interact? — SophistiCat

The people that proposed them, necessarily.The people that proposed them, necessarily. Or else what does "fundamentally" add to "fundamentally different"? My definition is that it means they cannot interact. — khaled

It is a challenge because it seems clear that incorporeal, immaterial stuff (minds) would have no way to interact with material stuff. It's not a solvable problem, just how long have people been trying to solve it. It's a problem that refutes the position. — khaled

And that's why your construal of the core dualist position cannot be accurate. You've refuted it yourself (your construal). It would be like insisting that the core Christian belief is that Jesus did not rise from the grave, because the alternative is obviously impossible.

Do you have a different definition? — khaled

There are different varieties of dualism and different ways in which its proponents defend it. But the general idea is in singling out the mental as special and central to the conception of the whole world, while preserving a distinction between mental and non-mental. What, if any, position dualists take on the issue of interaction is not what makes them dualists in the first place. Descartes, the poster child of dualism, posited a very real causal interaction between mind and body, but that seemed to be more of an afterthought, when he felt that he had to address the question somehow.

The problem with dualism is that these categories are defined as fundamentally different. — khaled

Yes, but how is that fundamental difference cached out? I don't think there is a single criterion, like causal interaction, on which dualists stake their worldview. And for the same reason, if one views monism simply as a denial of dualism(s), which I think is correct, then there isn't a clear-cut definition of what it is - just a general approach to seeing the world.

We have a working definition of “physical” don’t we? — Pinprick

State it then. What does "physical" mean to a physicalist?

I don’t see why this is an issue. Why would the fundamental “thing” possess new properties? — Pinprick

It was a response to you. You said we can imagine things that are not real. I showed that even those things are based on things that are real. You can't imagine new properties.

So let's say we define "physical" such that it includes X, Y and Z properties while "mental" includes A, B and C properties. Then both "everything is physical" and "everything is mental" is clearly false by that definition.

Even if we say physical things don't exist and only minds do, the properties X, Y and Z were derived from things that exist, and minds don't have X, Y or Z. Therefore that view fails to account for the real things we got the properties X, Y and Z from.

And the opposite: Mental things don't exist, only physical things do is also false. The properties A, B and C must have been derived from something that exists, and since physical things don't have A, B or C, then this view fails to account for the real tings we got the properties A, B and C from.

But if we define physical so as to include X, Y, Z, A, B and C, there is nothing left for mental. Same with if we define mental to include all the properties. That's seems to me to be what physicalists and idealists are doing respectively.

singling out the mental as special and central to the conception of the whole world, while preserving a distinction between mental and non-mental. — SophistiCat

Even physicalism does that. If the observer wasn't doing a large part in our interpretation of reality, object recognition AI wouldn't be so hard to build. So your construal cannot be accurate.

Yes, but how is that fundamental difference cached out? I don't think there is a single criterion, like causal interaction, on which dualists stake their worldview. And for the same reason, if one views monism simply as a denial of dualism(s), which I think is correct, then there isn't a clear-cut definition of what it is - just a general approach to seeing the world. — SophistiCat

Then why do you ask what monism claims if you think it doesn't have a single definition? I take the criterion to be the one substance dualists use. I've been simply saying "dualist" so far but I did say substance dualist at first, and that's what I meant. In that since I'm talking about a "substance monism".

On the epiphenomenalism thread weren't you the one that opposed the view because you thought that something that doesn't affect anything else, would not be detectible and wouldn't exist? — khaled

Yes, I pointed out that if conscious thoughts had no impact on anything else (i.e. were epiphenomena) then nobody would know of their existence. But it was not my position that conscious thoughts were epiphenomena; it was yours. My position has always been that thoughts are impactful, that the pen is mightier than the sword so to speak.

Humans have the ability to give identity to things. Imagine a field of grass. That's one "thing". Now imagine a blade of grass. That's another "thing". Now imagine a cell in the grass. You get it.

While I demonstrated applying identities to things that are smaller, we can also apply them to things that are larger. The monism of "everything" is simply a logical limit of this identification process. Can we truly comprehend everything by experience? No. But we can comprehend everything as a logical consequence.

Is this useful? Consider that at one time in math, the number 0, did not exist. Zero symbolizes nothing after all. Nothing isn't something you can touch or feel. And yet, the number zero is incredibly useful in describing the other numbers. The state of "An absence of any identity" helps us come to conclusions about identities. Can the same be said about "An inclusion of all identities" help us in the same way? Perhaps.

You can't imagine new properties. — khaled

I would consider the concept of souls to be an exception, but maybe you disagree. Actually, immaterialism as a whole seems doesn’t seem like it could be derived from things that actually exist.

But if we define physical so as to include X, Y, Z, A, B and C, there is nothing left for mental. Same with if we define mental to include all the properties. That's seems to me to be what physicalists and idealists are doing respectively. — khaled

I feel like saying that there’s some thing, or some property of some thing, that doesn’t interact with physical material, and isn’t effected by the laws of physics would never be accepted by a physicalist. That seems to be the line between physicalism and idealism.

Actually, immaterialism as a whole seems doesn’t seem like it could be derived from things that actually exist. — Pinprick

Then it can't be derived as you defined it. How would you derive it?

If I tell you about the property of "unglabungla" but am not able to explain the difference between something that is unglabungla and something that is not unglabungla, then unblabungla is meaningless correct? Since then "unblabungla thing" adds nothing to "thing".

I would consider the concept of souls to be an exception — Pinprick

Really? Most people would be able to explain whatever they mean by soul. They could point to something without a soul, and something with a soul. In other words, they still derive it out of things that exist.

I feel like saying that there’s some thing, or some property of some thing, that doesn’t interact with physical material, and isn’t effected by the laws of physics would never be accepted by a physicalist. — Pinprick

It wouldn't be denied. The physicalist would point out that there is no way to confirm the existence of this thing that has no effect on anything (because it has no effect on anything), so proposing its existence is as significant as proposing the existence of the omnipotent teapot that chooses to do nothing and to hide its presence completely in the heart of the sun.

Yes there could be such a teapot, but first off: who cares even if it exists, it affects nothing, and secondly: you have no evidence to claim its existence.

Physicalists wouldn't state that it doesn't exist. They would state that you can't know whether or not it does.

That seems to be the line between physicalism and idealism. — Pinprick

I haven't heard an idealist positively claim the existence of something that doesn't affect us in any way either. Because what evidence could he have for its existence? Can you point out an example of an idealist making that claim?

There are multiple "kinds" of monists from idealists, to physicalists to materialists, to God knows what else. I think they're all the same, despite sparking such heated discussion (the first 2 especially). — khaled

Indeed, there has to be a Fundamental Existent, X, because nonexistence cannot be. Thus it is mandatory and it is all there is, as the simplest partless and continuous state, for it cannot be composite and still be Fundamental. it can't make anything different than itself, but it can rearrange itself into rather persistent but temporary forms such as the elementary 'particles' that are excitations of it at stable rungs of field energy quanta; thus it as X is the quantum vacuum with its overall quantum field.

So, we have the logic in accord with science. Can't beat that! It is proved! It made a temporary universe and it is ever there to make another.

Do you think that space and time are made of the same one stuff as apples and rocks? — Olivier5

Yes, actually. As is everything else. The "stuff" is merely differentiated, but fundamentally remains the same "stuff". A rock, space, time (arguably, time does not actually exist, it is a perceptive tool used by an observer, remove the observer and "time" is meaningless, ceasing to exist), a duck, this computer, all of it...same stuff, different packaging.

The challenge could be put this way: "If there's no ghost of the universe, how come there's a ghost of us, human beings?" By ghost I mean something like mind or sentience. — Olivier5

And you know there is no ghost of the universe because...?

Yes, actually. As is everything else. The "stuff" is merely differentiated, but fundamentally remains the same "stuff". A rock, space, time (arguably, time does not actually exist, it is a perceptive tool used by an observer, remove the observer and "time" is meaningless, ceasing to exist), a duck, this computer, all of it...same stuff, different packaging. — Book273

Would you mind if you were repackaged as, say, a lifeless corpse? Or would you be indifferent to it?

I will be repackaged as a lifeless corpse eventually, no worries there. I am enjoying this run as it is now, when it shifts to something else, I will experience that. If I am able to enjoy it, great! If not, I will still learn something, and learning is good, which brings us back to great!

See how this goes?

And you know there is no ghost of the universe because...? — Book273

I actually don't know that for a fact. It's a belief, a dear assumption if you prefer.

Sure, but what status does life has in a monist system? If seen as good, why? If it's all just one stuff, why care about life? What's so special about it?

In truth there is nothing special about life. Seriously, it is all around us and we snuff it out without regard. We only object when we are the ones being snuffed out, and so too does every other living thing. The rocks we crush for gravel may object to being crushed, however, since they cannot, or will not, communicate with us (or we refuse to listen, or cannot understand) we crush away with nary a care.

The mosquito values it's life as much as I value mine, and you yours, and yet we squish them with no concern when they try to bite us. However they are only trying to eat, so really, squish a mosquito because the itch is inconvenient, or kill the guy ahead of you line, because he is slow to make up his mind...both ways a life is ended for your comfort. The second involves a human, so we attribute more value to it, but there shouldn't be.

As for life being good, I am enjoying the experience and learning from it, and in my philosophy, all learning is good, therefore life is good. However, who am I to say your life, or someone else's life is good? That is their call to make, not mine.

Your assumption is there is no ghost in the universe. My philosophy is that the "ghost" is the universe. You have it, I have it, everything has it.