Any property we think of is only a property if there is something that doesn't have it. "Orange" makes sense because you can take something orange, and something that is not orange, and point to the difference. If you couldn't, no one would be able to learn what "orange" means. Same with all the other properties. We understand them because there is something that doesn't have them, and something that does. — khaled
So monism is ultimately meaningless because uniformizing? — Olivier5
There is nothing wrong, or contradictory, or even difficult about the idea that something can be two things at the same time - diversity and unity. It's a matter of perspective and the situation at hand. — T Clark
Not meaningless. But the debate between the different monisms is. Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. — khaled
Not meaningless. But the debate between the different monisms is. Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. "Mental thing" adds nothing to "thing" when "mental" is a property of everything. Same with "physical". — khaled
What is monism's substantial claim in your view? Is it about the existence of some fundamental "stuff" from which everything is formed? — SophistiCat
What is monism's substantial claim in your view? Is it about the existence of some fundamental "stuff" from which everything is formed? — SophistiCat
How could all this diversity stem from just one stuff? — Olivier5
In reality it's always two to tango; one needs two different things to make a ying-yang. There's not enough tension and dynamism in monism to explain the world as we know it. — Olivier5
You can have a circle and a square (and infinitely more shapes) all made out of lines. Different combinations of the same thing. — khaled
"Our Nada, who art in Nada, hallowed be thy Nada ..."It's just that to me, one unique stuff cannot possibly self-differentiate ... If we conceive of a world made of only one kind of stuff, whence the dynamism and creativity in it? — Olivier5
I think you're quite mistaken, Oliver. Daoism, for instance, is fundamentally monistic. To wit:How could all this diversity stem from just one stuff? Monism can only be static, dead, boring; it's simplistic at the extreme. In reality it's always two to tango; one needs two different things to make a ying-yang. — Olivier5
So are Democritean atomism¿, Spinozist dual-aspect holism (i.e. "property dualism"), Advaita Vendata's māyā (re: acosmism), Heraclitean fire (i.e. flux¿), ... Meillassoux's hyperchaos¿, etc, more or less, instances of dialectical monism.The Dao 道 (the “way”) gives birth to one.
One gives birth to Two,
Two gives birth to Three.
Three gives birth to thousands of things or all things in the universe.
All things carry yin and embrace yang.
When yang and yin combine, all things achieve harmony. — Daodejing, Chap. 42
Yeah, "logically equivalent" as members of the same set of "monism"; however, they are not conceptually equivalent: "idealism" – protestations notwithstanding – presupposes (or supervenes on) "materialism" – mind is nonmind-dependent (i.e. idea-tion is embodied) – and not the other way around; otherwise one gets the kind of 'Parmenidean idealism' which you aptly describe asOkay, materialism is logically equivalent to idealism. — Olivier5
i.e. an unpredicated, useless concept.... can only be static, dead, boring; it's simplistic at the extreme.
Yes, but because of his teleology (i.e. a variation on Hegel's dialectic), IME, not materialism per se.For instance, wasn't materialist Marx the epitome of political idealism?
Yeah, "logically equivalent" as members of the same set of "monism"; however, they are not conceptually equivalent... — 180 Proof
The Dao 道 (the “way”) gives birth to one.
One gives birth to Two,
Two gives birth to Three... — Daodejing, Chap. 42
For instance, wasn't materialist Marx the epitome of political idealism?
Yes, but because of his teleology (i.e. a variation on Hegel's dialectic), IME, not materialism per se. — 180 Proof
Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. — khaled
"Mental thing" adds nothing to "thing" when "mental" is a property of everything. Same with "physical". — khaled
Failure of (your) imagination isn't an argument, O.This is precisely the point I am arguing against. One cannot really "give birth to two". — Olivier5
Yes. That it's ONE fundamental stuff not many. — khaled
Failure of (your) imagination isn't an argument, O.
Consider: suppose the "One" thing is dynamic, unstable, chaotic, unbounded ... — 180 Proof
As pointed out already, two or more whatevers (substances?) would not be fundamental, and so the question would be begged. Even "there is no fundamental whatever" is, in fact, fundamental no-thing-ness (i.e. atomism's void, Buddhist sunyata, etc). — 180 Proof
Do you think that space and time are made of the same one stuff as apples and rocks? — Olivier5
I take your point that stuff interacts with stuff, which may constrain the degree to which there can be essentially different stuff in the universe. — Olivier5
It's just that to me, one unique stuff cannot possibly self-differentiate. — Olivier5
Some external force would have to be applied to that unique stuff in order to differentiate it into particulars — Olivier5
So the debate is about what properties (I.e. mental=A, B, C; physical=X, Y, Z) every “thing” has. — Pinprick
Sometimes we make distinctions, sometimes we lump things together. — SophistiCat
What does the word "fundamentally" add to "fundamentally different"? — khaled
Let's say you find out, after long exhaustive search, that the fundamental thing making up the world is Matata. How would you go about explaining what Matata is? — khaled
Except it matters how we make these distinctions. To me, positing that there are two fundamentally different kinds of stuff would also mean they cannot interact. Like in the mind body problem.
Monism isn't against making distinctions, it's against making distinctions that make it so that the categories cannot interact. — khaled
Failure of (your) imagination isn't an argument, O. — 180 Proof
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