Thank you for the reference. Very interesting.

For me, instincts are nothing more than habits that continue through duration. They may be shared our v personal. The personal type (personal memory) may be considered evidence of transcendental life. Shared instincts (memory) would be an example of a hierarchical​ morphic resonance fields. It is entirely plausible since fields exist everywhere and have "memory". Magnetic fields pointing to the North Pole would be an ideal example.

The hand waving happens when science turns neurons into little humans. Quite laughable, yet people believe it out of habit. This is the purpose of science education, to turn the laughable into acceptable.

Consciousness is precisely what everyone is experiencing throughout their awake state of living. Nothing more and nothing less. It is only mysterious if one wishes to make everyday living mysterious, which it certainly isn't for me.

What is a mystery is Unconsciousness and how Unconsciousness moves into Consciousness (the sleep/awake cycle) which would be somewhat analogous to the death/life cycle.

The hand waving happens when science turns neurons into little humans. — Rich

What could that even mean?

Observe how you yourself describe neurons. It's quite interesting how anthropomorphic your descriptions become. You don't realize it because of habit. Neurons can do this. Neurons can do that. But can they do the Cha-Cha??

Did I mention neurons?

But yes. If we were talking of mindfulness down at the level of simple creatures like sea slugs, then the habituation of neurons does become a relevant and unmystical framing of the discussion - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habituation

Would you care to describe all of the things that neurons can do in so far as human beings are concerned? I would suppose your neurons will be speaking for themselves.

Why? Do you have a reason to think that there is no brain doing something inside your skull?

I think we were discussing hand waving, indoctrination, and habits. Now in my science class they discussed the very mysterious activities of little neurons who apparently could do everything that humans can do including creating illusions. Same with your class?

Nope. Not in my class. Are we talking university or primary school?

Fine. Then how about you describing what neurons can do according to your advanced science class? Please try to be complete as possible because you are for sure going to be held to it. Be careful you don't embue any human characteristics in your definition because I am ready to pounce. I'm going to show you precisely where science transforms neurons into humans. It will be easy. It is unavoidable because science is a sleight of hand trick.

So I posted that link to habituation. Pounce away. :)

Oh gee. We are making it difficult aren't we?

I know all about habituation and how science classes are designed to indoctrinate and create habituatual thinking. What I am most interested in is what you think neurons can do? In your own words if it isn't too much trouble? Feel free to copy. I've already read standard definitions - which are a hoot if I am permitted to editorialize a bit. Sleight of hand that is all. I've only had an undergraduate education so feel free to amaze me with what advanced education buys you.

I know all about habituation — Rich

Great. So tell me what you find so anthropomorphic about the neuronal machinery of habituation. The more usual criticism is that it is a tad mechanistic. But I'm really excited by this prospect of you pouncing. Here's the diagram you want.

Still no answer to my question. I think I know why. If you analyze my question it is all right there. As I've read all the advanced, super-scientific, amazing scientific explanations - the ones people pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to learn, and all it is is a sleight of hand.

BTW, all see in this very fancy diagram is a few 2nd grade shapes (nicely colored in), a few fancy made up words, and some adjectives normally associated with human actions. Are those fancy words and little shapes suppose to be little humans? Besides inhibit, sense, and excite, what else can those little shapes do? Can they love each other? Or is loving just an intense form of exciting? I mean, can neurons get over excited?

As I've read all the advanced, super-scientific, amazing scientific explanations - the ones people pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to learn, and all it is is a sleight of hand. — Rich

Cool. They couldn't fool you, eh?

This is mechanistic:



This is anthromorphic:

Nope, and apparently you don't want to try to. Next time you decide to try to make little neurons into humans, try to do it without human-like sensibilities. It will be less obvious. What you demonstrated with your diagrams (while you wisely kept your own descriptions to yourself) is how science indoctrinates by imbuing shapes with human-like quality. Why doesn't anyone protest in class? Because they want to get an "A". More indoctrination. Point made.

(A Peircean definition for example does focus on triadic or hierarchical organisation - the maths of thermodynamic complexity. And it is a physicalist metaphysics in that it extends causation to formal and final cause by embracing the materiality of symbols, or sign relations. So the notion of universal habits means something specific in natural philosophy.) — apokrisis

This is a bit misleading. As you are no doubt well aware, although you have adopted and adapted many of Peirce's ideas in developing your version of physicalism, he explicitly rejected metaphysical materialism and characterized his own position as objective idealism. Furthermore, it remains controversial among Peirce scholars whether his philosophy is properly characterized as naturalist, especially since he himself was a theist.

How are you defining habits exactly? Is that an actual theory with some mathematical structure or simply vague hand waving on your part?

(A Peircean definition for example does focus on triadic or hierarchical organisation - the maths of thermodynamic complexity. And it is a physicalist metaphysics in that it extends causation to formal and final cause by embracing the materiality of symbols, or sign relations. — apokrisis

Just backing up a bit to this exchange on the page before this one.

What is the 'materiality of symbols'? A symbol is effective (I had thought) because of the meaning it conveys, and the meaning it conveys (or imparts) is not dependent on the matter from which the symbol is made.

'Sign relations' generally only operate in the the context of life and mind, don't they? I mean, biosemiosis shows how many of the processes of living beings are language-like, rather than mechanical. I had thought this is one of the main advantages of biosemiosis over mechanistic reductionism. And, if that is so, then I am finding it hard to understand the sense in which it is physicalist. Because, again, a sign operates at a level different to the purely physical level - it operates at the level of meaning. So it has a different kind of causal power, than the causal power of purely chemical reactions, doesn't it? That is how the 'formal and final' causes come into it, or so I would have thought.

What is the 'materiality of symbols'? A symbol is effective (I had thought) because of the meaning it conveys, and the meaning it conveys (or imparts) is not dependent on the matter from which the symbol is made. — Wayfarer

Good question. In Peirce's terminology, a symbol indeed represents its object only in so far as it will be interpreted as doing so. Furthermore, a symbol is a legisign or type, which must then be embodied in a sinsign or token. Of course, words are paradigmatic examples of symbols; between what I quoted from you and my response, there are four such replicas of the one word, "symbol" (now five).

'Sign relations' generally only operate in the the context of life and mind, don't they? — Wayfarer

Yes, but according to Peirce, matter is effete or partially deadened mind - "matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits." As such, sign relations are also operative in matter, albeit in a degenerate way - "inveterate habits becoming physical laws," which are often dyadic rather than triadic.

What is the 'materiality of symbols'? — Wayfarer

Symbols have to be physical marks. So they have materiality in that sense. Something needs to be scratched on a surface for it to endure as a sign.

And then the flipside is that semiosis - as acts of interpretance - must always be engaged in some world. There has to be an interaction going on - a modelling relation which is doing something physical in the end (like entropy production principally).

'Sign relations' generally only operate in the the context of life and mind, don't they? — Wayfarer

Well they definitely apply there. And the speculative metaphysical project that most interests me is pan-semiosis, where semiosis is generalised to the non-living or physico-chemical sphere. So even the Universe is explained in terms of a sign relation.

And that's not particularly mystical because it is all about regular self-organising condensed matter stuff - symmetry and symmetry breaking. Every symmetry breaking creates local information. Some kind of gradient or asymmetry is left to mark a direction in the world.

But it does mean that we can talk about everything from the mind to the cosmos in terms of a single unifying metaphysics.

This is a bit misleading. As you are no doubt well aware, although you have adopted and adapted many of Peirce's ideas in developing your version of physicalism, he explicitly rejected metaphysical materialism and characterized his own position as objective idealism. — aletheist

And you claim as your Peirce the non-scientist.

So I'm not that bothered about a notion of "the consistent Peirce" as clearly he was pulled in several directions quite powerfully as a thinker prepared to just go for it. And I can't imagine Peirce in the end making much of an impact on theism with his particular version of it (maybe you can see something different?), while with biosemiotics in particular, a lot of scientists are getting that aspect of his work.

And you claim as your Peirce the non-scientist. — apokrisis

It is not about "my Peirce" or "your Peirce" or even "the consistent Peirce," but about faithfully representing the man's actual views as expressed in his voluminous writings. You wish that he had gone farther in the direction of physicalism, and I wish that he had been a more traditional Christian theist; but he was what he was, and we both have drawn significant insights from his thought.

I have long practiced several of the arts myself (and a few crafts as well), so you're not telling me anything I am not already well familiar with. It is not the formation of habits by consciousness that is being discussed here. I fail to see any salient point in what you've said, to be honest.

Can't help you if you don't see how understanding the nature of habits and creativity applies to understanding and accepting ones personal experience. Hint: it had to do with Consciousness.

I couldn't see any relevance at all in what you linked. But then I was only able to view the synopsis. Perhaps you could explain the guts of it briefly in your own words?

But for me it really isn't about being faithful to anything. I'm not a Peircean historian.

So I do see him making a foundational contribution to what I would generally call the organic, or systems, or holistic vein of metaphysical thought in the Western tradition. But I don't apologise for sticking to a naturalistic reading of Peirce.

The post of mine you responded to was about morphic resonance in nature, not about the formation of habits by conscious creatures.

Symbols have to be physical marks. — apokrisis

What about mental arithmetic? or mental operations of any kind? And even if symbols are physical, the physical material they're made out of, is different to their meaning. That is why you can make the same sign in different materials. The material is different, but the meaning is the same, so how could the meaning be physical?

And the speculative metaphysical project that most interests me is pan-semiosis, where semiosis is generalised to the non-living or physico-chemical sphere. So even the Universe is explained in terms of a sign relation. — apokrisis

But I do see anything like 'signification' in the inorganic domain. A word or sign signifies an idea as interpreted by an observer; in biology, DNA is language-like, and it has morphological consequences, i.e. it expresses or causes forms. How does that apply to inorganic matter?

(Sheldrake says that 'nature forms habits' e.g. when a new crystal is synthesised for the first time, it takes much longer than on subsequent occasions when it is formed again. This is becuase the initial formation has started to form the 'habit'. I can't help but think this is related to Peirce's ideas of how regularities are initially formed out of "tychism".)

One simply cannot doubt ones own experiences. Experiences (memory) defines being. That is literally who we are as we create, evolve, and they exist through duration.
Habits are just another form of repetitive learning and memory which can also evolve. This particular point good to Morphic Resonance mentioned by Wayfarer in her discussion of Sheldrake.

What is sometimes called doubt, is a feeling one may get when there is a conflicting memories (experiences). So I may feel doubt when my brother tells me something different about my early life. A new memory is formed which is in conflict with a another memory. Both experiences or memories are real, they both exist in my consciousness but in some manner may conflict causing doubt. In other words, it is our real experiences and memory which causes a feeling of doubt.

It is impossible to doubt memory. Doubt itself is s memory (experience).

What about mental arithmetic? or mental operations of any kind? — Wayfarer

That's why you need networks of neurons. To mark a state. When you had to learn your times tables, a whole lot of neural connections grew to fix the patterns in your head.

And even if symbols are physical, the physical material they're made out of, is different to their meaning. — Wayfarer

Of course. That is how symbols get their power. They are as little physical (in an entropic sense) as it is possible for them to be.

You could chisel your thoughts on stone. But soft and erasable wax is easier. Then pen and parchment. Then word processor.

So symbols have to be material marks. But the more immaterial they can be, the more useful they actually are.

But I do see anything like 'signification' in the inorganic domain. — Wayfarer

A river tells the water which way to go as a mark on the landscape. No need to over-think it.