This is not to say that there are not (in-finite) aspects of mind, matter and life that will never be understood; either scientifically or philosophically, simply in virtue of the limitations of finite intellects. — John

Right. That's similar to my response to Apokrisis (the paragraph about 'where science is in the hierarchy of understanding), although perhaps not so clearly stated. But in any case, if that is your view, then there's nothing to take issue with.

I'm not sure whether you mean my response or yours was 'perhaps more clearly stated"; but in any case that doesn't matter. :)

We seem to have returned full circle, and I think that perhaps what we would still disagree about is the philosophical status, significance and what might be the implications of the ultimately "mysterious" nature of mind (and matter and life).

That's similar to my response to Apokrisis (the paragraph about 'where science is in the hierarchy of understanding), although perhaps not so clearly stated. — Wayfarer

Are life and mind any more "mysterious" than matter? The problem with the idea of 'mystery', is that it suggests something hidden, something occult, that might be somehow uncovered, rather than just the simple fact that matter, life and mind are thinkable in their temporal, finite senses, but as ultimate, absolute, infinite and/or eternal, cannot be fully grasped by a finite mind. — John

As John points out, there is a difference between expecting the mystery to be cleared up in some radically different way (revelation? poetry?) and accepting that science - as the refined form of rational inquiry - is a finite exercise. (Or even, as I always argue, pragmatically myopic in that it seeks control over reality much more than it seeks any "truth" of reality.)

Dennett, in particular, is desperate to 'de-mystify' the nature of mind and life - to say 'at last, science has unravelled the mystery'. You see, I think that is in some sense pathological - I think it's driven by the actual fear of the mysterious nature of life and mind. It is instructive that Dennett, Dawkins, and the like, are always obliged to deny or obfuscate the mysterious nature of life and mind. Robert Rosen, I suspect, would never do that. — Wayfarer

This was the bit where you had a go at scientific inquiry as refusing to acknowledge its epistemic limits when really, even these arch-reductionists would see themselves as being anti-occult explainers. So they don't pathologically fear "a mystery" - your suggestion of some personal foible. They quite sensibly oppose "unnecessary mystification" - and so express a communal standard that rationality seeks to apply to the scope of speculative hypothesis.

If it ain't testable, it ain't in the game. And that is a deliberate choice that arises from accepting practical limits to making models of the world.

Of course I then agree that Dennett, Dawkins, the usual candidates, play a part in the great dichotomising cultural war of Enlightenment monadic materialism against Romanticism's dualising transcendence. So outside of the formal boundaries of science, you have this other big show going on as a folk metaphysical battle.

But I like to keep the two things separate.

Of course I then agree that Dennett, Dawkins, the usual candidates, play a part in the great dichotomising cultural war of Enlightenment monadic materialism against Romanticism's dualising transcendence. So outside of the formal boundaries of science, you have this other big show going on as a folk metaphysical battle.

But I like to keep the two things separate. — apokrisis

Right. We have basically different interests - I'm commenting on the 'culture wars', 'science v religion', and so on, and you're commenting on the new developments in biosemiotics and biological sciences.

Biosemiotics, as you say, offers a model which much better reflects the nature of mind and life, because of its basis in language and signs. That is not really what is at issue in the debate about the significance of first-person understanding and its relationship with science.

As John points out, there is a difference between expecting the mystery to be cleared up in some radically different way (revelation? poetry?) and accepting that science - as the refined form of rational inquiry - is a finite exercise. — apokrisis

I think if one accepts science as a finite exercise, then one is indeed exercising the humility that I was referring to in the previous post - kind of a Socratic humility, 'all I know is that I know nothing'. I'm sure plenty of scientists - maybe even most scientists - are like that. But would they then be interested in the task of trying to 'reverse engineer the soul', do you think?

And, you see, the reference to 'folk metaphysics' really does put you more towards the reductionist end of the spectrum, I'm afraid; after all, it is the elminativists that speak of the mind in terms of 'folk psychology'. (Those old-fashioned superstitious types, who believe in the elusive nature of the soul....)

even these arch-reductionists would see themselves as being anti-occult explainers. So they don't pathologically fear "a mystery" - your suggestion of some personal foible. They quite sensibly oppose "unnecessary mystification" — apokrisis

No, it's deeper than that. It's no coincidence that Dennett in addition to describing humans as 'moist robots', is also an evangalising atheist who sees himself locked in a battle of (rational) science vs (superstitious) religion. These writers exemplify what Nagel - professed atheist though he might be - identifies as 'the fear of religion':

IN SPEAKING OF THE FEAR OF RELIGION, I don't mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper—namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the [End Page 160] ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world.

Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion (in The Last Word 2006).

And, you see, the reference to 'folk metaphysics' really does put you more towards the reductionist end of the spectrum, I'm afraid; after all, it is the elminativists that speak of the mind in terms of 'folk psychology'. — Wayfarer

But I would be a weak eliminativist in that I am only arguing that there are models that are better or worse in the light of some purpose.

So folk models are those that may be actually good for what they are meant to do - produce a conformity of thought targeted at the creation of an enduring social system. While scientific models are meant to serve a different purpose - talk about the world at the level of abstract, globally invariant, "objective" formalisms.

So my epistemology recognises the part that purposes play in the production of models or paradigms. A basic "subjectivity" in this regard is built into the pragmatic position. Whereas you are talking as if this is a competition between rival objective truths. That is why - in attacking scientism the way you do - you come off as championing the alternative objectivity of the occult.

No, it's deeper than that. It's no coincidence that Dennett in addition to describing humans as 'moist robots', is also an evangalising atheist who sees himself locked in a battle of (rational) science vs (superstitious) religion. — Wayfarer

Or is he a blowhard that likes the thrill of public controversy and big publishing deals?

I find it hard to think he actually takes himself that seriously. He actually seems smarter than that. But also his ego shines through. So its his way of having fun.

And yes, it is also legitimate for rationality to be in a fight with religion. Immanent naturalism is up against transcendental discourses that want to leave the window open to creators, miracles, dualism and other kinds of supernatural goings-on. Naturalism's point of view is that it has gone around closing all those windows and so is creating a picture of nature which is self-organising or closed for causality. The idea of a unified Cosmos makes sense. So to now make a case for transcendent causes, you can't just talk about "the essential mystery of it all". To be playing the rational game, you have to come up with rather more concrete evidence of something that naturalism seems to have missed.

So it is not that there isn't a subject matter. However where I personally part ways with the reductionists is in taking a systems or holistic point of view. And that in turn brings me back towards some fairly "religious" sounding metaphysics.

It's complex. :)

Immanent naturalism is up against transcendental discourses that want to leave the window open to creators, miracles, dualism and other kinds of supernatural goings-on. — apokrisis

Yes, there's a mob of them on the street outside, trying to burn down a library. I should go and intervene.

that in turn brings me back towards some fairly "religious" sounding metaphysics. — apokrisis

Actually, on a more serious note, the problem is that some religious ideas are taboo in modern academic discourse. My belief about that is, that it's a consequence of the history of how such ideas were dealt with in the West. Mainly, it's because of the unbearable amount of pressure brought to bear against heresy, and conversely, the importance attached to orthodoxy.

I formed the view, when I studied History of Religion, that this went back right to the formation of orthodoxy in the Western tradition. There was a sense that certain 'articles of faith' were compulsory - you had to believe particular things in a certain way. That is what 'orthodoxy' came to mean.

There used to be a passage floating around on the Web, of the original charter of the Royal Society, which was the first truly scientific association in the world. A big part of that charter was 'keep away from anything the churchmen are interested in'. That was understandable on a lot of grounds, at the time, considering the constant wars and conflicts of religion that had gripped Europe for centuries.

So I think that led to the parting of the ways - the division between what would be considered the natural sciences, and matters spiritual.

So now that has lead to certain kinds of ideas being effectively taboo in modern culture - but the reason why they're taboo, or what drove them underground, is itself forgotten. And that drives a lot of the debate in this matter,

I dunno. I in fact had a close interest in parapsychology research in the early 1990s as an example of science in real world action. Even did a ganzfeld psi test (as a sceptic, of course it didn't work for me - the "experimenter effect" I guess. :) ).

Same with research into meditation, OOBs, homeopathy and anything fringey. I talked with a lot of those researchers.

So I agree that scientism is alive and well and not willing to listen. But on the ground, there are a lot of believers who actually hold down research positions and who get to publish what the heck they like in journals or at conferences.

Frankly cranks abound in science. I've met a heap of them. And science - as a social institution - can afford to be pretty tolerant of "heresy" because it can trust in the overall rationality of its process. It is self-correcting in the long run and doesn't need to impose its authority on every idea.

Of course when it comes to public funding, attitudes tighten up. But really I never saw any general attempt at suppressing way out ideas so long as they were in some way "science" in being in at least some sense prospectively testable.

That's not at all what I meant, although it's significant that what I said is intepreted in terms of 'parapsychology' and the like. It's more about:

naturalism is up against transcendental discourses... — apokrisis

I was attempting to pinpoint the origin of that division, of the supposed barrier between the natural and supernatural, and why some ideas in particular are categorised with the latter.

I never saw any general attempt at suppressing way out ideas so long as they were in some way "science" in being in at least some sense prospectively testable. — apokrisis

Interesting to consider the treatement that is regularly meted out to Rupert Sheldrake. He claims his ideas are capable of experimental validation, and yet from his very first publications his ideas have been derided as scientific heresy. John Lennox, in his review of Sheldrake's first book, A New Science of Life, declared it 'a book for burning' in Nature magazine, of which he was then Editor. Later, in a BBC interview on why he used that phrase, he said:

I was so offended by it, that I said that while it's wrong that books should be burned, in practice, if book burning were allowed, this book would be a candidate (...) I think it's dangerous that people should be allowed by our liberal societies to put that kind of nonsense into currency. It's unnecessary to introduce magic into the explanation of physical and biological phenomena when in fact there is every likelihood that the continuation of research as it is now practised will indeed fill all the gaps that Sheldrake draws attention to. You see, Sheldrake's is not a scientific theory. Sheldrake is putting forward magic instead of science, and that can be condemned, with exactly the language that the popes used to condemn Galileo, and for the same reasons: it is heresy.

Note that it's heresy because of its subject matter - not because of the methodology. Sheldrake is an experimental scientist and subjects his theory to experimental validation. What appears to be at issue, is whether the perceived effects he claims to demonstrate are caused by the factors other scientists are willing to acknowledge, or whether they are caused by the novel idea of morphic resonance. It is that idea which Maddox calls 'heretical'.

Note that it's heresy because of its subject matter - not because of the methodology. — Wayfarer

I concur with the point you're making here (shocking, I know). I believe it's misguided to define "pseudoscience" solely or primarily by its subject matter, as opposed to its methodology. (I don't necessarily believe that there's a hard-and-fast line between the two, but there are no doubt unambiguous cases which drop out on both sides of the line).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/

In his otherwise sober book Consciousness and the Brain (which, fair warning, is somewhat tough going even for a "pop" neuroscience book; actually I'm not sure if it's all that "pop," as it's packed with technical details. But I digress...) author Stanislas Dehaene derisively refers to those conducting experiments to detect out of body experiences (by placing cards containing certain symbols near the ceiling in operating rooms, where they could only be seen from a vantage point near the ceiling, looking down) as "pseudoscientists."

That bugged me a bit because those investigators' methodology seems prima facie perfectly sound from a scientific perspective, eliminating as it does certain confounding variables, such as the possibility that whatever information the subject acquires during his supposed OOB came from subconsciously hearing chatter in the OR while coming into or out of consciousness.

Perhaps the notion of OOBs is completely spurious (or perhaps not), but one should not dismiss the possibility out of hand, lest science fall into the dogma and close-mindedness which it decries in other spheres of human thought.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_and_the_Brain

That's a strawman. My point was the presences of the experiences are undoubtable. One may still doubt the content of experience is true. Here the point is not that our knowledge or experiences are always accurate, but that they are present. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's no strawman, every aspect of experience can, and should be doubted, therefore the "presence" of experience, or that experiences are "present" is dubitable as well. Time is understood to us as a combination of past time and future time, your assumption of a "present" is a highly dubious assumption.

You seem to want to allow that all the content of experience is dubitable, but there is something else, other than the content which is not dubitable. But experience is just that, content, so to make your point, you need to demonstrate that there is something more to experience than content. What would that be?

Experiences without awareness of the self are not dubious. They are common. Indeed, most of our experiences are exactly that. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I've never ever had an experience without an awareness of myself. I've tried to do this through meditation, but all that does is heighten my awareness of myself. An awareness of myself is even highly evident in my dreams, and this is not even a conscious experience. If you are going to make such a bold assertion, that experience, without awareness of self, is common place, then you need to explain what you're talking about, and tell me how to get myself out of my experience. Otherwise, I believe you're just making up fiction.

With the experience of doubting them one will never know which ones are mistaken. Knowing is not something that can be warranted by some other criteria. As Spinoza suggests, before you can know that you know, know that you know that you know, know that you know that you know that you know, and so on to infinity (this being the supposed skeptical challenge to the possibility of knowing anything) you must first know. — John

I think you're flat out wrong here. We always doubt before we know. First, one might think that one knows, or you might believe that you know, but this is not really knowing, it's just an attitude of certitude. But it's an unjustified certitude, a false sense of confidence. True certainty is only produce by doubting, questioning your believes, and from this real knowledge is produced.

That what you say is false is demonstrable from the fact that there was a time on earth prior to any knowledge. Therefore knowing emerged from not-knowing, so it is impossible that knowing is first, as you claim. Not knowing is prior to knowing, and with not-knowing exists uncertainty and doubt. Therefore doubt is prior to knowing.

So do you believe Sheldrake's theory has been experimentally validated?

I am aware of Consciousness and the Brain, it has a very good reputation from what I can ascertain. I didn't have that in mind, it was more the Churchlands and their ilk who I was taking a shot at.

I find discussion of parapsychological research a bit uncomfortable, because it's often heated, and because the subject matter too often seems like a carnival sideshow. But I think, overall, the assertion that 'nothing has ever been found' is unwarranted. When I looked into some of the literature about it, it is packed with statistical arguments about what constitutes a significant deviation from the mean, which makes it both boring and hard to understand.

The sceptic attitude is that, because claims of PSI are 'extraordinary', then these 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence'. This attitude is what drives all the debates about significant deviations for the various trials that were done over the years. But I recall reading one of the professional sceptics (Richard Wiseman) saying that, had remote viewing been non-controversial, then it would have been considered proven, but the 'extraordinary evidence' requirement could be invoked to declare that in this case it was not. Very handy being able to move the goalposts as required.

(The best short account I read was Parapsychology and the Skeptics: A Scientific Argument for the Existence of ESP, Chris Carter, http://a.co/avLzrxb.)

But I think the interesting philosophical question is: why PSI is considered 'extraordinary' in the first place? In a debate I watched between Sheldrake and Massimo Pugliucci (whose writing I have a lot of respect for), the latter said that if PSI were shown to be true, it would 'overturn the basic facts of physics and chemistry'. Sheldrake countered that it would do no such thing, it would simply indicate another type of causality over and above those understood by the hard sciences. I mean, it may not actually contravene any physical laws - it might simply suggest that there are forces or fields other than those known to the physical sciences.

If, for example, there were biological fields that could propogate information - as Sheldrake claims - this might explain a great deal. After all, electro-magnetic fields weren't discovered until the mid-19th century. And how would a biological field effect be detected? Why, it might manifest itself in the form of the phenomena that PSI attempts to study.

I don't see how this undermines science at all. What I think it does, is undermine materialism - and that's why it is considered a taboo.

f PSI were shown to be true, it would 'overturn the basic facts of physics and chemistry'. — Wayfarer

Not to mention the profitability of the casino industry.

I think you're flat out wrong here. We always doubt before we know. First, one might think that one knows, or you might believe that you know, but this is not really knowing, it's just an attitude of certitude. But it's an unjustified certitude, a false sense of confidence. True certainty is only produce by doubting, questioning your believes, and from this real knowledge is produced.

That what you say is false is demonstrable from the fact that there was a time on earth prior to any knowledge. Therefore knowing emerged from not-knowing, so it is impossible that knowing is first, as you claim. Not knowing is prior to knowing, and with not-knowing exists uncertainty and doubt. Therefore doubt is prior to knowing. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can true certainty be produced by doubting? Thinking that one knows is not knowing. If we know anything at all we know it with absolute certainty. If there is to be any such knowledge, real knowledge which is truly distinct from mere belief, then it must be impervious to doubt, by mere definition. How could you ever know when your process of doubting is rightly ended? Certainly not by means of doubt!

Nothing I said is contrary to the idea that lack of knowledge precedes knowledge, or that less knowledge precedes greater knowledge. The point is that knowledge, if it is truly knowledge, cannot be subject to doubt. If it is merely belief, then of course that is a different matter.

So, your assertion that not-knowing is prior to knowing is irrelevant because it is not contrary to what I have been saying. I have been saying that once we have knowledge as opposed to mere belief, if we ever do have it, then that knowledge cannot be subject to doubt, and also that that knowledge cannot have originated in doubt, since doubt can only lead to more doubt, Perhaps you could explain how you think it is that the absolute certainty of knowledge could ever proceed from the state of doubt, and how it is that you could ever know from within your state of doubt, that all doubts have now finally been put to rest.

I mean, it may not actually contravene any physical laws - it might simply suggest that there are forces or fields other than those known to the physical sciences. — Wayfarer

If they cannot be known via empirical means then how could we ever decide that they are "forces and fields"? We would be in the position of being unable to show that 'something', 'we know not what', exists. Of what use could that ever be for philosophical enquiry?

On the other hand if I could regularly and reliably experience for myself what PSI claims, then of course I would have good reason to believe. But I have not regularly and reliably experienced such things at all. Have you?

I don't see how this undermines science at all. What I think it does, is undermine materialism - and that's why it is considered a taboo. — Wayfarer

I also viewed the same video quite some time ago. No great revelations other than they were quite polite to each other. But the point you made here was actually the major point of the debate. Suggesting wave patterns such as Morphic Fields that guide physical development explains a lot and only upsets materialists who have lots to lose, in much more ways than just loss of face. Materialism is a huge industry. The biggest on this earth.

If they cannot be known via empirical means then how could we ever decide that they are "forces and fields"? We would be in the position of being unable to show that 'something', 'we know not what', exists. Of what use could that ever be for philosophical enquiry? — John

Sheldrake's description of morphic resonance:

Morphic resonance is a process whereby self-organising systems inherit a memory from previous similar systems. In its most general formulation, morphic resonance means that the so-called laws of nature are more like habits. The hypothesis of morphic resonance also leads to a radically new interpretation of memory storage in the brain and of biological inheritance. Memory need not be stored in material traces inside brains, which are more like TV receivers than video recorders, tuning into influences from the past. And biological inheritance need not all be coded in the genes, or in epigenetic modifications of the genes; much of it depends on morphic resonance from previous members of the species. Thus each individual inherits a collective memory from past members of the species, and also contributes to the collective memory, affecting other members of the species in the future.

Morphic fields can't be detected through the same instruments that detect electromagnetic effects because they're not electromagnetic fields.

As regards the philosophical implications: this thread is about the nature and signficance of first-person experience; what is the nature of the experiencing mind? That is a subject about which there is great diversity of views, from 'no significance whatever' to religious theories of an immortal soul. As you have already acknowledged, many of these questions are beyond the scope of the empirical sciences, or at least the 'empirical sciencs' as construed by materialism. So perhaps it is a subject where the consideration of alternative perspectives is relevant.

do you believe Sheldrake's theory [of morphic resonance] has been experimentally validated? — apokrisis

I can't say that I do, but I also don't think that the possibility ought to be ruled out. Sheldrake's page on morphic resonance contains some of his published papers, and some refutations of the conclusions from his opponents.

Although my view is that from the perspective of philosophy, the question ought to be treated hypothetically - i.e. if there is such a form of causation, then it is something not acknowledged by current science.

However I will note in passing that Sheldrake's view that the so-called 'laws of nature' are in fact habits, is not miles away from the idea that 'matter is effette mind'.

I understand the idea of morphic resonance. I read Presence of the Past more than 20 years ago and it is still on my shelves somewhere. I thought it is a nice, elegant, imaginative idea, but the problem is, I am not convinced, as Sheldrake seems to be, that the idea can be adequately tested. If anyone can explain to me how it could be adequately tested. then I would be happy to grant that it might have scientific, and hence philosophical (as opposed to merely literary), significance.

However I will note in passing that Sheldrake's view that the so-called 'laws of nature' are in fact habits, is not miles away from the idea that 'matter is effette mind'. — Wayfarer

So, God develops new habits and then incorporates then into His practice?

I understand the idea of morphic resonance. I read Presence of the Past more than 20 years ago and it is still on my shelves somewhere. I thought it is a nice, elegant, imaginative idea, but the problem is, I am not convinced, as Sheldrake seems to be, that the idea can be adequately tested. If anyone can explain to me how it could be adequately tested. then I would be happy to grant that it might have scientific, and hence philosophical (as opposed to merely literary), significance. — John

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1550830710000820

So, God develops new habits and then incorporates then into His practice? — John

No, Consciousness does which is precisely what it is doing all of the time as a definition of life. I do it all of the time when I'm studying any of the arts. This is why anyone who wishes to explore the c nature of nature might want to consider studying, for a long period, the nature of creativity and the arts. It is a way to experience the nature of nature from personal experience. It is different from thinking and reading. It is creating.

Although my view is that from the perspective of philosophy, the question ought to be treated hypothetically - i.e. if there is such a form of causation, then it is something not acknowledged by current science. — Wayfarer

But to talk about causes, first you have to be able to demonstrate the reliable existence of an effect (so something more than coincidences, accidents, randomness, etc).

That hasn't been the case in parapsychology labs (or at least, only believing researchers are able to report significant results). And in the real world, casinos can set the odds on their slot machines with decimal precision.

Though I guess morphic resonance is the kind of non-theory that could explain the non-existence of negative casino profits. The psychic memory of failed gambling must hang over these places in a way that ensures a steady statistical level of loss on their games of chance. The casino owners think they win because of the mechanical design of their pokies and roulette wheels. But in fact it is this alternative psychic force.

You can see why science as an institution does roll its eyes when you have jokers that can't show there is some effect in want of a theory, then invent theories anyway that apply no matter how the world behaves. It might sound like science to the uninitiated, but it breaks the philosophy of science on at least those two basic counts.

Casinos win because of habits in the universe, and they set the payoffs accordingly. Habits of non-living matter and habits of humans. Science had no explanation for habits other than making up some terms like "laws of nature". Of course, many people accept this sleight of hand as something significant, also out of habit. Habits which are thoroughly inoculated into humans via the education system. It is difficult to break habits. As for me, I was always naturally skeptical of am education that pretended to exist for the benefit of it's students but really existed for is own perpetuation. Just another industry.

You can see why science as an institution does roll its eyes when you have jokers that can't show there is some effect in want of a theory, then invent theories anyway that apply no matter how the world behaves. — apokrisis

Well, yes, but you also have to acknowledge that there is a self-reinforcing tendency even amongst the intelligentsia. In the video interview I mentioned, Piggliuci said there had been only two PSI research labs, and they had been shut down. (This is actually incorrect.) Sheldrake pointed out that the so-called 'sceptic associations' have tens of thousands of members who agitate against proposals to fund any such efforts. There was, or is, a group called PSICOPS (I think the name was changed) - Paul Kurtz, Michael Shermer, and many others of that ilk. They have been an effective activist lobby in all such matters. And of course they carry the supposed mantle of scientific authority.

And of course it should be mentioned that there are far more lucrative career prospects than challenging the philosophical outlook of the mainstream. The reception to Thomas Nagel's book, Mind and Cosmos, is an indication of what happens when you challenge the mainstream.

So we're dealing with a consensus model of reality, of the kinds of things that respectable scientists ought to study, and the kinds of things they ought not to. There are whole subject areas, like past-life research, PSI, and so on, that are simply categorised as pseudo-scientific because they challenge the mainstream view of materialism. To even put a research proposal forward is to risk ostracism - because 'everyone knows' it's 'just pseudoscience'.

Another interesting philosophical point is that what is now called 'scepticism' actually usually amounts to a defense of scientific realism. Because of the way empiricism is understood nowadays, the kinds of things that are considered to be evidence have to meet certain criteria of reproducibility (not even mentioning the 'replication crisis'.) Whereas the original scepticism doubted even 'the evidence of the senses'. It would seriously contemplate the possibility that sensory experience was itself delusional in some sense.

Now you see this crop up in forms such as - is the Universe a hologram? A simulation? and in sci-fi films llike Inception and the Matrix. And in those cases, 'scientific types' are quite willing to consider the possibility that 'the sensory domain' is really a kind of illusion - because simulations and holograms sound at least scientifically respectable. But if you were to ask those same people whether this possible illusion could be described in terms of 'the veil of Māyā' - the answer would be, of course not, that's an ancient superstition! That's religion, it's not science - don't want any of that around here!

So what we see 'scepticism' nowadays doing, is the exact opposite of what scepticism set out to do, namely, it nowadays defends the consensus reality of scientific realism, which determines the bounds of what reasonable people are supposed to think in the way religion used to do. And that is precisely the point where it morphs into scientism.

How are you defining habits exactly? Is that an actual theory with some mathematical structure or simply vague hand waving on your part?

(A Peircean definition for example does focus on triadic or hierarchical organisation - the maths of thermodynamic complexity. And it is a physicalist metaphysics in that it extends causation to formal and final cause by embracing the materiality of symbols, or sign relations. So the notion of universal habits means something specific in natural philosophy.)

Habit is a learned, repetitive, constantly evolving behavior of Consciousness that assists in the continued process/cycle of creating, experimenting, and learning. Breathing is a habit as is everything else. It appears to exist in hierarchies as shared habits.

Well, yes, but you also have to acknowledge that there is a self-reinforcing tendency even amongst the intelligentsia. — Wayfarer

Sure. Scientists are human too. They have investments in belief systems. They have social boundaries to mark. They like fame and fortune as much as the next guy.

So what makes a difference is the institution of science. If that is strong, that is what shines through in the long run.

If psi exists and evidence for it is being suppressed, that would be bad news. But why shouldn't science as an institution suppress psuedo-science?

There was, or is, a group called PSICOPS (I think the name was changed) — Wayfarer

Yep. Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal. Now called CSI - Committee for Skeptical Inquiry. http://www.csicop.org/

So we're dealing with a consensus model of reality, of the kinds of things that respectable scientists ought to study, and the kinds of things they ought not to. — Wayfarer

And what's wrong with a consensus view? Isn't that the whole bleeding point of rational inquiry into nature?

And when it comes to the careers of "respectable scientists", they don't have research careers unless they are at the fringe pushing for something new. The difference is that the existence of a consensus is what defines that fringe mostly. Scientists know where the next profitable place to dig is located.

So what we see 'scepticism' nowadays doing, is the exact opposite of what scepticism set out to do, namely, it nowadays defends the consensus reality of scientific realism, which determines the bounds of what reasonable people are supposed to think in the way religion used to do. And that is precisely the point where it morphs into scientism. — Wayfarer

So what you are describing is first the scientific mindset being born and now it being able to look back in satisfaction with all that it has achieved. Yah, boo, sucks to all the mystics out there.

Sure there is scientism - that excessive confidence in materialistic explanation. And yet it is within science that you find the best resources for also criticising that overly-reductionist viewpoint.

Sheldrake had zero impact on the state of consensus within theoretical biology. Yet holism and semiosis are alive and well in those same circles, building up their mathematical muscle.

And yet it is within science that you find the best resources for also criticising that overly-reductionist viewpoint. — apokrisis

Is there anything of interest in this so-called 'third way' of evolutionary theory that I've started to notice?

I was reading about the eels that live in ponds in a park in the middle of Sydney. Once a year the adults return to the ocean, which nowadays means negotiating their way across some areas of open ground and drains. They swim to a deep trench near New Caledonia to breed - around 1800 km. The elva then float around the coral sea for the first six - 12 months, and then they return to Botany Bay Sydney's coast, thence the ponds from which their parents had left - across drains and open fields.

It seems they remember the route - even though they themselves have never traversed it.

http://www.smh.com.au/environment/conservation/a-very-fast-drain-to-the-south-pacific-20111105-1n11j.html

See what I mean by hand-wavy? You didn't mention the basal ganglia once. Instead you capitalised consciousness to show that all that messy neuroscience that fills hundreds of textbooks is stuff "you don't need to know". You can go right on talking confidently about this Consciousness as some mystic substance or plane of a creative being that all those dumb scientists have no freaking clue about.