The final conclusion is that “if the One is not, nothing is” — Apollodorus

Another pre-Socratic approach was to say that the Parmenidean One exists but there happen to be lots of them. Each 'den' ("thing" - made-up word, opposite of 'ouden' = no-thing) is indivisible, without parts, absolute being without specific properties such as colour or taste. They buzz around in the vacuum and make up the familiar world of sensible objects and properties. The result is Atomism.

Plato's Parmenides character is not Parmenides. Uncovering the foibles of the primitive logic of opposites and pluralities and how this evolved from Parmenides to Plato is what reading Plato's Parmenides is mostly about. — magritte

I agree. Which makes the actual Parmenides interesting. Zeno's paradoxes are themselves interesting, highly popular and lead to math that surfaced far later.

And wasn't during this time the belief in Greece that all numbers were rational broken by the observations that not all geometric magnitudes can be expressed by rational numbers? Which also begs the question.

And wasn't during this time the belief in Greece that all numbers were rational broken by the observations that not all geometric magnitudes can be expressed by rational numbers? — ssu

Apparently so. Plato was considered the leading Pythagorean as well as Eleatic of his time. His mathematical preoccupation at times obscures the main discussion making either difficult to separate and follow. Part II of the Parmenides is presented as an exemplary complete lesson in a version of binary logic. Our job is to adjust the premises to fit the conclusions.

Mathematics, due to the nature of deductive proof, has the good fortune to be able to build on all of its past achievements. Cultural advances in our education allow ancient specialized research topics to now read as childish or foolish.

Plato repeatedly honored the young mathematician Theaetetus who supposedly came up with the solution to the problem of incompatibility of geometric continuous lengths and rational representation. This work is presented as Book X of Euclid's Elements. But I am even more impressed by Plato's achievement in the Timaeus of constructing ontological elements by raising the dimensions of bound geometric objects from two to three. It has even been suggested that a complete rigorous proof for Platonic solids was the purpose of Euclid's Elements.

:100:

One way of looking at it is that there were two forms of Heracliteanism. The "extreme" one held that everything was in flux in every way, which meant that things could not have properties. The "moderate" one held that there must be some permanence, otherwise the "eternal flux" itself would be impossible.

Plato obviously rejects extreme Heracliteanism. But he nevertheless holds that sensibles are always in some way becoming. This is why he contrasts the world of Becoming and the world of Being.

The Platonic world of Becoming (the world of sensibles) is similar to the Heraclitean world of flux and, therefore, less than real. The real world is the world of Being which is the world of unchanging intelligibles. — Apollodorus

As far as I can tell, there are two issues:

1. Change itself. For example motion. [Changes]

2. The cause of change: The laws of motion. [Does not change]

Another pre-Socratic approach was to say that the Parmenidean One exists but there happen to be lots of them. Each 'den' ("thing" - made-up word, opposite of 'ouden' = no-thing) is indivisible, without parts, absolute being without specific properties such as colour or taste. They buzz around in the vacuum and make up the familiar world of sensible objects and properties. The result is Atomism. — Cuthbert

Correct. It’s amazing how the “findings” of modern science were already anticipated thousands of years ago.

The only problem with Atomism is that, though it makes sense at atomic level, it takes something more than just atoms to explain anything bigger like, say, the Universe. That’s why Plato isn’t very fond of Atomism. And his Parmenides doesn’t seem to be a follower of Atomism, either.

As far as I can tell, there are two issues:

1. Change itself. For example motion. [Changes]

2. The cause of change: The laws of motion. [Does not change] — TheMadFool

Sure. It is difficult to tell what Heraclitus taught exactly. But if everything is in constant flux, then the flux itself qua flux must remain the same.

The water in a river may change between the times you step in it, but the river itself as a riverbed with flowing water is the same river - or changes its course sufficiently slowly to qualify as the same for practical purposes.

Heraclitus’ position, if our understanding of it is correct, seems to be similar to the Indian Theory of Momentariness (Kshanika-Vada).

Plato would agree that the physical world is in constant flux, but the intelligible world is changeless. Hence his theory of eternal Forms which Pamenides seems to endorse in the dialogue.

Because of a belief that the truth is beyond words? — frank

This seems to be the whole point of the dialogue.

Platonic texts are traditionally interpreted on several levels of meaning, (1) literal (logos), (2) moral (nomos, typos or doxa) and (3) allegorical (hyponoia). This multi-layered interpretation was already common practice by the time of Plato.

The literal Platonic (or “Platonist”) reading of the Parmenides is that it represents Plato’s synthesis of Ionian and Italian (Eleatic) philosophical schools.

The moral interpretation is that the departure of Cephalus (the narrator of the dialogue) from his homeland in Clazomenae and arrival in Athens symbolizes the philosopher’s need to leave his native home (= the body) for the City of Athena, the Goddess of Wisdom (= intellect), in order to attain wisdom, the goal of philosophical endeavor.

The allegorical interpretation is even more elaborate and subtle. Ionia stands for the Physical World, Italy stands for Intelligent Being, Athens for the intermediate way upward that takes the awakened souls to their spiritual home in the Intelligible World. The visitors from Clazomenae represent the individual intelligences that are leaving the physical Cosmos on a journey to the One, the unifying first principle and cause of all under the guiding light of Wisdom cast by Athena (Parmenides and Zeno have come to Athens for the Panathenaea, the most important Athenian festival in honor of the Goddess).

As Proclus explains in his Commentary, Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates represent the highest principles. Adeimantus and Glaucon represent guiding deities who lead the Clazomenaeans to their brother Antiphon who leads them to Pythodorus. And Pythodorus is the divine messenger who relays the inspiring discourses (logoi) taking place between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. Parmenides himself stands for the Divine Intellect, Socrates as the youngest of the three represents the plurality of the Ideas or Forms, and Zeno, who is of an intermediate age between Socrates and Parmenides, the principle that unifies plurality in a drive toward the One itself (1.662).

In other words, Parmenides and Zeno, i.e., their views, are interpreted in a positive light and on par with Socrates’ (and Plato’s) own teachings. Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, remained highly valued for many centuries both in the Greek East and, through Latin translations made in the 1200’s, in the Latin West.

It must be recalled that the dialogue relates a conversation between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, that took place at Pythodorus’ house in Keramikos, a quarter of Athens whose notable features are an ancient cemetery and the Sacred Gate, the starting point of the Sacred Road from Athens to Eleusis, the route taken by the annual procession celebrating the Eleusinian Mysteries.

(We can see that the location already points to the metaphysical content of the dialogue, which supports its traditional interpretation.)

Zeno had written a book in defense of Parmenidean Monism and brought it to Pythodorus’ house for discussion. Pythodorus, who is said to have been Parmenides’ closest student, later related the conversation to Antiphon and Antiphon related it to Cephalus, who now narrates the dialogue.

The dialogue consists of two parts, a shorter First Part from 126a to 137c, which is between Socrates and Parmenides and revolves on the Platonic Forms.

The Second Part from 137c to 166c, is between Parmenides and Aristoteles (not Aristotle, but the similarity of name may suggest a connection) and is about the intellectual exercise needed for the correct understanding of the Forms.

When Zeno has finished reading his book, Socrates asks him about the meaning of the first hypothesis of Zeno’s first argument, “If the things that are, are many, they must be both like and unlike. But that is impossible as what is unlike cannot be like, nor what is like be unlike” (127e).

Socrates points out that Parmenides holds that “the all is one” and Zeno that “it is not many”, which is “beyond the rest of us”.

Zeno, a pupil of Parmenides who believes in the universal unity of being, attacks those who believe in a plurality of things. He says that his book intends to pay back those who criticize Parmenides, claiming that “If the all is one, many absurdities and contradictions follow” (128d).

Socrates retorts that there is a Form of Likeness and an opposite Form of Unlikeness and that the many participate in the two, which means that the many can be both like and unlike themselves and many and one, without contradiction.

On the other hand, if someone could show that separate Forms like Likeness and Unlikeness, Multitude and Oneness, Rest and Motion, could themselves be combined and separated, and demonstrate the same difficulties that Parmenides and Zeno have shown in regard of the perceptible many, then he, Socrates, would be very much astonished (129e).

Parmenides now points out the difficulties that arise from positing a world of Forms each of which exists “itself by itself” and a world of things that participate in Forms but are separate from them.

Argument 1. (130e–131e) If particular objects participate in the whole of a Form, then the whole Form is present in many objects. If the objects participate in only a part of the Form, then the Form would no longer be simple.
Argument 2. (132a–b) If we posit a Form of Largeness to explain the presence of that property in a group of large things, then we must also posit a second Form of Largeness to account for largeness in the group of things and in the first Form, followed by a third Form of Largeness to account for largeness in the first and second Forms and their corresponding objects, etc. As a result, the Form cannot be one, it must be infinite in number.
Argument 3. (132b–c) If, as Socrates suggests, a Form is just a thought in our mind and therefore single, not multiple, then each thing is composed of thoughts and all things either (a) think or (b) though being thoughts, are unthinking, which is unreasonable.
Argument 4. (132c–133a) If, as Socrates now suggests, Forms are patterns in nature of which the multitude of instances are copies or likenesses, then the Forms are like their instances and things are like by participating in the Form of Likeness, which results in another infinite regress as in Argument 2, above.
Argument 5. (133a–134e) If particular objects are separate from their corresponding Form, there can be no relation between the world of Forms and the world of perceptible particulars. Similarly, there can be no relation between knowledge of one world and knowledge of the other. God himself would be deprived of knowledge of our world, and the Gods would be unable to rule us.

Socrates admits that such an argument would be too strange to contemplate.

Parmenides says that only someone remarkably ingenious would be able to understand the Forms and even more so to teach it to another. On the other hand, if the existence of Forms were to be denied, there would be no stable concepts to turn to, and this would “completely destroy the power of discourse” (135 c).

It is clear that despite the criticism, Parmenides does not reject the Theory of Forms. His true objective is to show that Socrates has an incomplete understanding of the Forms. He has attempted to define Forms prematurely. This can be redressed through rigorous intellectual training which involves examination of the consequences of each hypothesis not only when we hypothesize “if a thing is”, but also “if that same thing is not”.

Socrates asks for a demonstration and Parmenides, taking Aristoteles for interlocutor, proceeds with his arguments. The Eight Arguments he now presents answer the problems raised by Socrates in the First Part. They revolve on concepts like Being, Unity, Likeness, Difference, etc., i.e., the critical elements that Plato uses in his definition of Forms.

Four of the Arguments (or groups of arguments) are based on the proposition that “the One is”, and four on the proposition that “the One is not”, and are constructed on the following basic pattern:

1. “If the One is, then the One is neither F nor con-F”
2. “If the One is, then the One is both F and con-F”
3. “If the One is, then the Others are both F and con-F”
4. “If the One is, then the Others are neither F nor con-F”
5. “If the One is not, then the One is both F and con-F”
6. “If the One is not, then the One is neither F nor con-F”
7. “If the One is not, then the Others are both F and con-F”
8. “If the One is not, then the Others are neither F nor con-F”

Where F = property and con-F = property contrary to the property of being F and properties and their contraries refer to parts-whole, limited-unlimited, same-different, like-unlike, motion-rest, equal-unequal, etc.:

Argument 1. (137c–142a) “If the One is” (i.e., if it is One), then the One neither has parts nor is a whole”.
Argument 2. (142b–155e) “If the One is, then the One both has parts and is a whole”.
Argument 3. (158b5-7) “If the One is, then the Others both have parts and are a whole”.
Argument 4. (154b-160b) “If the One is, then the Others neither have parts nor are a whole”, etc.
Argument 5. (160b–163b) “If the One is not, then the One partakes of both likeness in relation to itself and of unlikeness in relation to the Others”.
Argument 6. (163b–164b) “If the One is not, then the One partakes neither of the like nor of the different”.
Argument 7. (164b–165e) “If the One is not, then the Others both appear to be one and are not one”.
Argument 8. (165e-166c) “If the One is not, then the Others are neither one nor many”, etc.

In short, Argument 1 states that if the One is, then it has neither parts nor is a whole, has neither beginning nor end, neither limit nor shape, is neither in another nor in itself, is neither in motion nor at rest, is neither different than nor the same as itself or another, not equal to itself nor another, etc. but that these things cannot be true of the One.

On its part, the final Argument 8 ends in the conclusion (at 166c) that “if One is not, nothing is”.

We can see why Plato’s Parmenides tends to be regarded as something of an enigma. Key questions revolve around issues such as the identity of “One” and the meaning of negation.

Fortunately, we have traditional interpretations like those of Plotinus and Proclus that can provide valuable guidance.

One way of looking at non-being is to see it not as “nothingness” but as “otherness”. Similarly, the One itself may be distinguished from human thought about the One, etc.

In his Commentary, Proclus acknowledges the fact that some have been persuaded to take Argument 1 as meaning that the existence of the One is an impossibility. The problem with this is that it would be inconsistent both with Parmenides’ monistic views and with Plato’s belief in the One.

Proclus, therefore, writes:

This is, then, a single negation summing all the rest and added to them. The One, not being one among all things, is the cause of all. So the general negation represents at the same time the whole progression of all from the One.
….
But from another point of view one must say that he first denies everything of the One, thinking that negations are more suited to it than assertions, and keeping the hypothesis which says “is” of the One. But since, as he advances, he has taken away from it not only everything else but also participation in substance and Being, and has shown that it is neither expressible nor knowable, now at the end he rightly removes from it even the negations themselves. For if the One is not expressible and if it has no definition, then how will the negations be true for it?
….
He is therefore right in ending with the removal even of the negatives, saying that it is impossible that they should express anything about the One, which is inexpressible and unknowable. And one should not wonder that Plato, who always respects the principles of contradiction, says here that both the assertions and the denials are false of the One at the same time.
….
Next then, let us take up the fourth way of solving the problem. The soul ascending to the level of Intellect, ascends with her multitude of faculties, but sheds everything that dissipates her activities. Now going further and having arrived there she comes to rest in the One Being, and she approaches the One itself and becomes single, not becoming inquisitive or asking what it is not and what it is, but everywhere closing her eyes, and contracting all her activity and being content with unity alone. Parmenides, then, is imitating this and ends by doing away both with the negations and with the whole argument, because he wants to conclude the discourse about the One with the inexpressible (Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, 7.68K-74K).

Sure. It is difficult to tell what Heraclitus taught exactly. But if everything is in constant flux, then the flux itself qua flux must remain the same.

The water in a river may change between the times you step in it, but the river itself as a riverbed with flowing water is the same river - or changes its course sufficiently slowly to qualify as the same for practical purposes.

Heraclitus’ position, if our understanding of it is correct, seems to be similar to the Indian Theory of Momentariness (Kshanika-Vada).

Plato would agree that the physical world is in constant flux, but the intelligible world is changeless. Hence his theory of eternal Forms which Pamenides seems to endorse in the dialogue. — Apollodorus

Heraclitus wasn't blind to the fact that, for example, in a small stream, the form - the location and size of the wavelets on its surface - doesn't change even though the water is continually being replaced.

Change is the only constant — Heraclitus

I also feel that this apparent paradox reflects what Wittgenstein referred to as "bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" because replace "is the only constant" with "is continuous" in the above statement by Heraclitus and we get...

Change is continuous — Heraclitus

Sorry, I've been busy. What did Heraclitus think the enduring, river is? An illusion?

If the world we see is an illusion, there still has to be someone experiencing the illusion. What did Parmenides think individual humans are?

If the world we see is an illusion, there still has to be someone experiencing the illusion. — frank

Correct. As far as I am aware, Heraclitus believes in an immortal soul. So, presumably, the soul is the changeless element in the midst of a changing world.

Parmenides has a conception of the soul that is quite similar to Plato’s: the soul is immortal and divine and inhabits various bodies as it journeys through the cycle of death and rebirth.

I also feel that this apparent paradox reflects what Wittgenstein referred to as "bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" because replace "is the only constant" with "is continuous" in the above statement by Heraclitus and we get... — TheMadFool

Yes, language can create as much as solve problems. This is why some believe that truth is to be found in silence.

Correct. As far as I am aware, Heraclitus believes in an immortal soul. So, presumably, the soul is the changeless element in the midst of a changing world.

Parmenides has a conception of the soul that is quite similar to Plato’s: the soul is immortal and divine and inhabits various bodies as it journeys through the cycle of death and rebirth. — Apollodorus

I see. So Heraclitus wouldn't have accepted the Forms?

Yes, language can create as much as solve problems. This is why some believe that truth is to be found in silence. — Apollodorus

:zip:

We can see why Plato’s Parmenides tends to be regarded as something of an enigma. — Apollodorus

That is a great detailed summary you wrote, very clear. I have to admit I don't see where the dialogue is going -

Is it aiming to leave us in aporia, unsure whether there are Platonic Forms, a Parmenidean One or Many?
Is the structure - There cannot be One (because of contradictions), there cannot be Many (same reason), therefore there must be Forms?
One what, by the way? Substance, object, universe, thing?

I mean, even if by working terribly hard I could understand this dialogue, what's the point of it?

I mean, even if by working terribly hard I could understand this dialogue, what's the point of it? — Cuthbert

Plato's dialogues reflect philosophical problems discussed in the Academy. This can be seen, for example, from the way Forms are dealt with as if everyone involved was familiar with the topic.

Given the existence of the Academy, where discussion was ongoing, the dialogues do not provide solutions to all the problems raised.

The "aporia" here belongs to outsiders. The insiders, i.e., Academy students, presumably have a pretty clear understanding of what Plato is trying to say and I believe so does Proclus.

The dialogue starts with the discussion between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides, that takes place by the Gate to the Sacred Road from Athens to Eleusis, the seat of the Mystery Rites.

The Mystery Rites aimed to bring about the union of the initiates with the Deity, here represented by "the One".

So, the discussion of the Forms and the One is the intellectual equivalent of the Mystery Procession, i.e., the means by which the philosopher proceeds from Athens to Eleusis or from ordinary to higher experience.

As the Mystery Rites end in a vision of and union with the Divine, so the discussion or philosophizing must end in silent contemplation of the One which represents the Ultimate Reality of Socrates/Plato, Zeno, and Parmenides.

The Forms, of course, do exist because as Parmenides points out, dialectic or intellection would be impossible without them. But the point of the quest for Ultimate Reality is not to talk or think about it, but to experience it and to experience it means to be it.

And this can only happen by leaving dialectic and all intellectual activity behind, activity that actually creates an unwanted distance between philosopher and his goal, and enter a state of complete mental and emotional stillness, the only state in which the unity of subject and object, of Ultimate Reality and individual intelligence, can take place.

As Proclus puts it:

This whole dialectical method, which works by negations, conducts us to what lies before the threshold of the One, removing all inferior things and by this removal dissolving the impediments to the contemplation of the One, if it is possible to speak of such a thing. But after going through all the negations, one ought to set aside this dialectical method also, as being troublesome and introducing the notion of the things denied with which the One can have no neighborhood.

For the intellect cannot have a pure vision when it is obstructed intelligizing the things that come after it, nor the soul distracted by deliberation, of the things that are lower than the soul, nor in general is it possible to have perfect vision with deliberation. Deliberation is the mark of thought’s encounter with difficulties. It deliberates only when it is doubtful and falls short of being knowledge.

Just as there deliberation ought to be eliminated from our activity, although it is brought to perfection by deliberation, so here all dialectical activity ought to be eliminated. These dialectical operations are the preparation for the strain toward the One, but are not themselves the strain. Or rather, not only must it be eliminated, but the strain as well. Finally, when it has completed its course, the soul may rightly abide with the One. Having become single and alone in itself, it will choose only the simply One.
….
It is with silence, then, that he brings to completion the study of the One (7.74K).

Western philosophy began with ontology. — frank

Where do you base this assumption-statement on?

It was a mighty turn away from Homeric myth to secular explanations, if not yet what we would recognize as science. — frank

From Homeric myth to what we know as Western philosophy a lot of things have happened. One cannot way that ontology was a (sudden) turn away or a separation or whatever from Homeric myth. They are two totally different worlds.
Much less can we talk about ontology and science, which have no relation whatsoever. If an ancient philosopher was closer to science, that would be Thales of Miletus, who is regarded as the father of Science. And he is also regards by most people as the philosopher with whom the Western philosophy has begun.

Parmenides was indeed one of the first philosophers who had ontological views on nature, but he had other fishes to fry, nothing to do with science neither have I found a reference talking about him or his ontology as the origin of Western philosophy.

The above are two simple ramarks I wanted to make on the introduction of the topic.
As for studying Parmenides' and Zenos' ideas to a point where I can talk responsibly about them, this will take quite long. So, unfortunately I cannot contribute to that at this point.

Plato's dialogues reflect philosophical problems discussed in the Academy. — Apollodorus

Thank you for your clear and patient explanation. Frankly, I had no idea.

To me, this is a new aspect on Plato. Perhaps I have the wrong view - or an incomplete view. I know him as a philosopher of big simple questions rooted in our lives. What is justice? How do we know anything? What happens to us when we die? What is love? What do the gods or god have to do with mortals? How can we distinguish appearance from reality? This seems to be a Plato of abstract mysticism, removed from life completely. Once we've eliminated dialectic and become one with the One, what is left? Perhaps we achieve release from rebirth in nirvana. Shantih.

Where do you base this assumption-statement on? — Alkis Piskas

Thales. Water.

Much less can we talk about ontology and science, which have no relation whatsoever. — Alkis Piskas

This is not true.

Where do you base this assumption-statement on?
— Alkis Piskas
Thales. Water. — frank

Have you made this up right now? Because you have not mentioned Thales in your description. It comes after a comment of mine. Anyway, you made it worse, because Thales is not connected to ontology. Parmenides, is. (Whom you did mention.)

Much less can we talk about ontology and science, which have no relation whatsoever.
— Alkis Piskas
This is not true. — frank

I can't compete with this! :smile:

:zip: — TheMadFool

:grin:

This seems to be a Plato of abstract mysticism, removed from life completely. Once we've eliminated dialectic and become one with the One, what is left? Perhaps we achieve release from rebirth in nirvana. Shantih. — Cuthbert

Good point. I agree that Plato is not to everyone’s liking. But there is no harm in trying to understand him on his own terms even if we don’t agree with everything he says.

Ancient Greece was a world of rival city-states and hostile foreign powers. Many philosophers sought to reinterpret established religion and were often regarded with suspicion in Athenian society, especially when they were involved in politics. For example, if Plato had taught about the Good or the One as a single omnipotent Being, suspicious minds could have interpreted this as an endorsement of absolute monarchy, dictatorship or, perhaps even worse, “worship of foreign Gods”.

It wasn’t just Biblical Jews who objected to foreign Gods. The relationship between man and Gods in Greece (as in much of the Ancient World) was contractual. The Gods protected the City if the City worshiped the Gods. Disrespecting the Gods or worshiping other Gods was considered a crime against the Gods and against the whole community.

So, Plato had to be cautious for political and religious reasons, aside from the fact that the metaphysical realities implied in his writings have to be experienced, not philosophized about. Even the Mystery Rites, though popular and respected, were secret.

The approach to Plato’s teachings took place on three levels:

1. The written dialogues served to introduce the readers to philosophical problems and modes of addressing them.

2. The Academy taught students certain dialectical methods such as dieresis and assigned problems to be solved by senior students as part of the curriculum.

3. Higher esoteric teachings were made available to the most advanced students who had developed adequate philosophic and spiritual aptitudes.

Platonism may indeed sound like “mysticism” to some, but the Platonic “nirvana” or liberation (lysis) is definitely NOT disappearance into Nothingness or into the Ultimate (however defined).

According to Plato, having attained the highest possible experience and knowledge of reality, the philosopher must come back down to earth, as it were, and do his duty to society. He must let his experience and knowledge of reality inspire, guide, and direct him in everything he does. In fact, he is compelled to do so as exemplified by Socrates.

The accomplished Platonic philosopher dedicates himself to the production of good and beautiful things as a poet, artist, teacher, craftsman, architect, town planner, law-maker, or politician, or in any other capacity (including as a parent), and in doing so, he brings down the One, i.e., Divine Creative Intelligence itself (or part of it) into the realm of matter in order to make the world as divine and perfect as possible in the same way he has made himself as divine and perfect as humanly possible.

So, basically, Plato takes the Greek ideal of striving to be good and beautiful in every respect and provides a metaphysical foundation for it.

In any case, the Road to Eleusis is open to all. The very Gate to it is but a few steps away from Pythodorus’ house in the Keramikos, where the best philosophers of Ancient Greece, handpicked by Plato himself, are discussing the way to Ultimate Reality. It is for the reader to decide how far he or she wishes to travel in the Platonic Way.

If one can demonstrate that change, any and all kinds of change, involves going from nothing (Unbeing) to something (Being), change is impossible. Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Yet, some believe creatio ex nihilo.

Of course there are many things that can be said but cannot be meant.

1. Why is there something rather than nothing?

2. Why is there something rather than everything?