Yeah, this dialogue is just not fun. It's interesting in so far as it offers a critique of the theory of forms, but it assumes this type of "the one", which may not even exist. Is it a thing? A concept, maybe. But then the concept would be different from the one, but the one cannot have something different from itself, so it's part of the one.

I think the Sanford Encyclopedia on Parmenides is better than the dialogue.

In any case Parmenides is urging reason above sense data, which is a good point. Unless your reasoning clouds the way you interpret the world. In this case, his "the one" is a kind of trap. I can understand the appeal of this logic thousands of years ago, but today, there are better ways to articulate issues of monism and change or non-change.

This is an interesting interpretation of Parmenides by Raymond Tallis. Just something to think about:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8K9bes5UcjA

Yeah, this dialogue is just not fun. — Manuel

It's really not, and a fair amount of the argumentation seems silly to me. I keep looking for what I'm missing.

The idea of the One is something I kind of live with. It emerged from my own thinking, so I'm attracted to philosophers who use it (or something like it, like the Absolute).

It's like: the mind always breaks the world into halves: light, dark, near, far, etc. These halves are dependent on one another for meaning.

It's a theory of meaning, sort of: meaning arises from oppositions. But when we think of the meaning of Unity, and note that it's dependent on the idea of Plurality, a second, transcendent unity appears, one where all thought ends.

As far as this dialogue goes, I'm in favor of putting it aside. What do you think?

I think that we can put it aside and leave this thread as a general discussion of Parmenides, that way if someone wants to speak about him, whether his own Poem, or different articles, they can do that.

Sounds good.

It's like: the mind always breaks the world into halves: light, dark, near, far, etc. These halves are dependent on one another for meaning.
It's a theory of meaning, sort of: meaning arises from oppositions. But when we think of the meaning of Unity, and note that it's dependent on the idea of Plurality, a second, transcendent unity appears — frank

Plato's Parmenides character is not Parmenides. Uncovering the foibles of the primitive logic of opposites and pluralities and how this evolved from Parmenides to Plato is what reading Plato's Parmenides is mostly about. The proof of this is in the 'unreadable' and controversial lesson of the second half of Plato's dialogue. The IEP and SEP are the best intro for starters.
The absolutes of cosmology and cosmogony are elsewhere.

I was explaining why the One and it's related issues are familiar to me.

I think this dialogue is about challenging the concept of the Forms. Do you want to look at some of the arguments?

I think this dialogue is about challenging the concept of the Forms — frank

That's true, but without logical clarification that challenge is incomprehensible. Parmenides only has one Form. Then that Form is kicked around quite confusingly from logic to proposition to ontology to the Absolute. Plato's middle period Forms are many little ones yet the unexplained Good mimics the great One. If this expansion doesn't work for Plato then why not?

Recall that for Parmenides, it doesn't really make sense to say a thing is not, because if X is not, then how were you just talking about it? — frank

Yes, for this One, not-One cannot even be thought of. As in looking at the Universe subjectively, from within there is nothing else, there is no outside.

Plato's view is an objective view from the outside. There are many Forms and there are some opposites to talk about. In fact, for any single 'one', others, whether opposites or not are unavoidable.

So let's back up and see the problem the Forms are solving for us:

Zeno says plurality is flawed because it means we have things that are like and unlike at the same time.

So think of horses. They're obviously all the same (horses), but different (individuals).

Socrates explains something that's so ingrained in us that it's practically automatic:

Separate the form, universal, category, species, etc. from the sensible, particular, object, representative.

Voila:. problem solved. I guess this solution was an aspect of language and thought and Plato just brought it forward for consideration?

Really, the Forms are not an invention. It's just recognition of the way we think, correct?

It's just recognition of the way we think, correct? — frank

I think this step seems intuitive to us but it isn't the direction that Plato took. In his view the Forms were all that existed and the only things about which we could have knowledge. The particulars are shifting impressions and are the objects of perception and opinion merely.

Why did he conclude that?

There are many reasons. One which I'll offer to this thread has its roots in Parmenides's own words. The Greek word 'esti' - used by Parmenides in crucial lines in the Way of Truth - can mean interchangeably:

It is [something] (as in 'It is blue' , 'It is round')
It exists
It is true

The 'is' of predication, the 'is' of existence and the 'is' of truth-attribution are not here distinguished. So the expression 'ouk esti' (= 'it isn't') yields (for Parmenides) a paradox. You tell me that the ball is round and that therefore the ball is not square. The 'is not' of 'is not square' seems to be telling me that the ball does not exist and that what I'm saying about the ball is not true. But if I cannot say the ball is not square then equally I cannot specify that it is round. And since the ball is something that other things are not then I cannot even specify the ball. I end up just being able to say of It (whatever It might be) that It Is.

(Seems weird to us. But if you smudge the distinctions between existence, predication and truth then you can think your way into the problem. And it took Aristotle to unpick it all the way we might approach it.)

Thanks! Informative post.

Zeno says plurality is flawed because it means we have things that are like and unlike at the same time. — frank

Zeno's plurality is flawed because he applies the deductive binary logic of the Way of Truth to the changing world of opinion without warrant. For a discrete Form, gradual change is impossible because change must involve repeated becoming and perishing of each object in time which a Form does not possess. Opinions which do change therefore must be indeterminate in every way, and must lack identity altogether.

Parmenides' One is a perfectly uniform closed (bounded, limited) sphere, an object that can be said to either exist or not exist because it has Identity. The alternative, raised by Melissus, is that the One is unbounded and open. (Analogously, think of a circular standing wave, or an electron that extends infinitely in the electron field.) Opinion is open, continuous, formless, and indefinite, where binary logic cannot apply. Therefore everything Zeno says has to say must be flawed.

Incidentally, whatever is mythical and mysterious is also vague, indefinite and unknowable, which makes it intriguing for speculative thought. Once it is bounded with attributes, it becomes less interesting.

Really, the Forms are not an invention. It's just recognition of the way we think, correct? — frank

I think of it the other way around. Let's suppose that the Forms do not come from heaven but are a cultural heritage catalogued in dictionaries and encyclopedias. Now Ideas would take on much more meaningful reality for us. However, doing away with God's contribution would destroy the soul of Plato's Socratic philosophy which is absolute God-given morality.

I have difficulty following your posts. I probably just need to study a little more.

So do I. Parmenides and Plato are too dense a topic and I don't expand and slow down the exposition enough. For example, to

the Forms are not an invention. It's just recognition of the way we think, correct? — frank

, the direct Platonic answer is "No, not correct".

We think with our own private psychological conceptions of common cultural ideas. It isn't possible to have thoughts or conversations without using socially common ideas as these present themselves to suit specific occasions in our lives.

Ideas are cultural collections that are handed down to us. Ideas are catalogued in public dictionaries and encyclopedias. We don't personally invent any of them. We just learn them as children, or in schools, or through reading.

Plato arbitrarily takes these ideas and creates a class of mathematical or logical objects from them, called Ideas or Forms. Forms are only used to build Plato's abstract metaphysical models, and have no psychologically useful correlates.

Forms are only used to build Plato's abstract metaphysical models, and have no psychologically useful correlates. — magritte

Doesn't our experience with recognizing kinds, types, and universals in the realm of particulars count as 'psychologically useful' correlates?

Your description seems to suggest that the problems of Parmenides have all been surpassed by means of some complete explanation. Some of the effort in the dialogue is troubled by the consequences of complete explanations. Are 'we' beyond that now?

Doesn't our experience with recognizing kinds, types, and universals in the realm of particulars count as 'psychologically useful' correlates? — Paine

Like other academic endeavors, philosophy has a pure theoretical side. You may disagree with this sharp divide, but to me metaphysics should only be interested in building and examining models. Each and every ancient philosopher in our historical surveys had a unique metaphysical outlook. It is this variety that I try to capture.

I don't think you can support that mental constructs of pure philosophy are useful in any way to a person. They are like the layout and elements of an architectural drawing. They exist to provide a range of potentialities for applied philosophy. But if you just mean applied philosophy, then some ad hoc rules of wisdom do suggest useful mindsets or courses of action, like for example not eating beans, or the golden mean, or golden rule.

Recognizing material objects is a fact of sensation. But kinds, types, universals, particulars are made up for their own sake. They're the sort of stuff only we can talk about. Forms, like those others, only have meaning to some but not all philosophers. Psychology lives in each and every and person, and even in cats.

Your description seems to suggest that the problems of Parmenides have all been surpassed by means of some complete explanation. Some of the effort in the dialogue is troubled by the consequences of complete explanations. Are 'we' beyond that now? — Paine

Unlike most science, good philosophy doesn't obsolete but its usefulness is limited to the metaphysical venue where it belongs. Parmenides was a very great philosopher who linked a simple metaphysics to a simple metaphysically loaded logic and then implied aggressively a matching (false) ontology. The One 'is or is not'. Plato expanded that not only to 'if not A then B', but also to 'if not green then not-green'. These were important steps in Western culture. All of them are valid given their premises, whatever those may be.

I don't think you can support that mental constructs of pure philosophy are useful in any way to a person. — magritte

As far as I know, 'persons' are the only ones who might be possibly interested in these 'constructs.'

Most philosophers and that includes Socrates, Plato, et al were, my hunch is, uncomfortable with the Heraclitean position because it has sophist written all over it. After all, to a philosopher veritas numquam perit (truth never expires or, positively rendered, truth is eternal). Given this view of truth is non-negotiable to a philosopher, Parmenides, for the reason that he subscribed to eternalism, was viewed as toeing the official line and thus favored. — TheMadFool

Your hunch is supported by Plato's Theaetetus, where the alleged Protagorean subjectivist theory of sense-perception is accused of secret alliance with Heraclitean universal flux. Since the same theory is reiterated in the Timaeus, it becomes obvious to readers of both books that this unseemly subjectivist theory is Plato's own, uncomfortably adopted, whether borrowed or invented.

Some of the effort in the dialogue is troubled by the consequences of complete explanations. Are 'we' beyond that now? — Paine

Do you take this dialogue as a warning against complete, self-contained systems of thought?

.....a warning against complete, self-contained systems of thought — frank

We keep trying to get rid of Platonism (understandably, for all its faults) and it keeps coming back (understandably, for all its attractions). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/

Plato's metaphysics are not a closed logical system like modern maths are. Goedel has nothing to say about open and modifiable systems.

Aha!

Do you take this dialogue as a warning against complete, self-contained systems of thought? — frank

That is unlikely given this writing is one of the first of its kind. I was referring to the willingness to have every proposition be challenged as such. The permission to hear new ideas. Why would one extend such an invitation?

Why would one extend such an invitation? — Paine

Because of a belief that the truth is beyond words?

Yes.

Parmenides is urging reason above sense data — Manuel

Bingo! You nailed it, señor, you nailed it! I feel like a blind man whose sight has been restored! Can you please expand and elaborate this line of thought. Thanks a million. Urging is an understatement though.

Personally, I think that the Parmenides is one of Plato’s most interesting dialogues and it has held a central position in the Platonic tradition from antiquity into modern times.

Unfortunately, it isn’t the easiest to interpret and this has led to controversial views among scholars and ordinary readers of Plato alike.

The main strands of interpretation have been divided along logical versus metaphysical lines. The first tends to read the dialogue as an exercise in logical argumentation. The second takes it to contain some of Plato’s most profound thoughts about the structure of the suprasensory world of Intelligence. This is why Platonists like Plotinus have regarded it as a treasure trove of invaluable metaphysical insight.

One of the sources of confusion and misunderstanding seems to be the points raised against Platonic teachings like the “Theory of Forms”. Young Socrates is made to defend his (and Plato’s) position against Parmenides and Zeno’s objections and isn’t doing too well (129 ff.)

But it is Parmenides who declares that there must be Forms, because otherwise we will have nowhere to turn our thoughts to and this will totally destroy the power of dialectic (135b-c3).

Then comes Aristoteles’ turn (137c) and the discussion – consisting of eight arguments - revolves on the One and the Many. The final conclusion is that “if the One is not, nothing is” (166c).

So, I think that on the whole, the criticism is ultimately constructive and the dialogue is consistent with Plato’s position on the Forms and on the One as a first principle of all.

The metaphysical interpretation makes more sense in a Platonic context than the logical one.

Most philosophers and that includes Socrates, Plato, et al were, my hunch is, uncomfortable with the Heraclitean position because it has sophist written all over it. — TheMadFool

One way of looking at it is that there were two forms of Heracliteanism. The "extreme" one held that everything was in flux in every way, which meant that things could not have properties. The "moderate" one held that there must be some permanence, otherwise the "eternal flux" itself would be impossible.

Plato obviously rejects extreme Heracliteanism. But he nevertheless holds that sensibles are always in some way becoming. This is why he contrasts the world of Becoming and the world of Being.

The Platonic world of Becoming (the world of sensibles) is similar to the Heraclitean world of flux and, therefore, less than real. The real world is the world of Being which is the world of unchanging intelligibles.

:up: Well said.

Reason is telling you one thing, that there is "the one", the senses are telling you there are many. When these are in conflict with each other, trust reason, no matter how absurd the consequences may be.

Today, we know that colours aren't in objects and that deep down, things aren't made of small impenetrable participles, but of probabilities and strange quantum vacuums. Our senses tell us this can't be right, just look at the world, but reason tells us to trust the evidence.

There's a lot more to say about this part, but that's the rough idea, as I understand it.

The only problem here is if you get stuck on the wrong idea, Einstein refused to believe QM was probabilistic, he had the wrong idea, though it's sensible, it's not correct.