It is not so much flawed as inadequate. Your persistent examples of billiard balls are the sort one might use to explain what "cause" and "effect" mean to a four-year-old. — SophistiCat

An inadequate argument is a flawed argument. I was a teacher for five years. If you can take a complex concept and break it down so that even a four year old can understand, it is one of the greatest accomplishments you can do. Thank you. Now that I know you understand the point fully, I expect that if you find a flaw, it will be simple to point out. If you cannot, then I'll know that it wasn't because you didn't understand it, but that you were unable to counter it. I await to see if you are able to do so.

Now you first need to define this nature of existence in order to argue about it. — Nickolasgaspar

Certainly. Cause and effect are measures of states over time based on interactive forces. A very simple and real world example is when you press you keys on the keyboard to type a response. The keys on the keyboard do not press themselves, you do. When we see your message on the screen, we can know the prior state of you pressing the keys caused that to be.

First of all causality doesn't exist. Its an abstract concept we as observers use to identify the order between interactions among entities and forces. Causality is a real phenomenon enabled by the EXISTENCE of those entities and forces. — Nickolasgaspar

If you don't believe it exists, simply explain to me how it is that you did not cause the message that you typed. Of course, you'll have to type that out to prove it, so that's pretty much out. Still, give it a try if you think you can. What is a phenomenon in your mind? I find its a word that needs a hard definition to be useful in a conversation.

This is what energy does.....produces work. Work causes things. — Nickolasgaspar

So, a cause and an effect?

Not like billiard balls and acorns, no, the concept abstracted from principles does not really exist. The principles themselves don’t really exist either. — Mww

Of course they exist. We're talking about them right now. Further, when they are applied to reality, reality does not contradict their application. So not only do these concepts exist, when we use them, reality does not contradict their use. Just like math right? 1 exists as a concept. When we apply it to reality, it turns out reality does not contradict its use. Now you can apply math improperly, that's true. That doesn't deny its existence either. It only denies its misapplication. What you can't do is deny that cause and effect exist at this point. What you could do, is make an argument showing that I'm misapplying it. That may be the case, but I need a good argument for that to be true.

Somewhere in that chain the empirical mechanisms....physical causality.... necessarily become exhausted. — Mww

So at some point there is a part in the chain that has no prior cause? That's what I've been describing in the OP this entire time. That's not a counter, that fits the conclusion of the argument.

Not counter. Satisfy. By finite regressive causality. Like I said. You claim a time and place for an alpha but not the when or the what — Mww

I do not claim any time, place, when or what an alpha is incepted. All I am claiming is that at least one alpha must exist along the chain of causality. In fact, it concludes from the argument that it is possible that there would be more than one alpha, and that they could appear anytime. There could be many alphas and many chains of causality in existence that stay separate, or intertwine. It is not about the nature of any specific chain. It is a logical conclusion about the chains themselves.

It is reasonable to logically grant, but it is an empty proof, in that the proof of empirical conditions is not served by merely logical conclusions. — Mww

Formulas are often not provable by application, but by logic. I can conclude that there is no end to the placeholder of a number. 10, 100, 1,000 etc. But it can never be empirically proved. Do you want to deny the idea that there are an infinite amount of numbers based on the fact it cannot be empirically proved. If you do not, then you are accepting a proof based purely on logical consequence. That is the form of my argument. If you accept one proof of logical consequence, then I see no logical reason you would not accept my proof of logical consequence. Unfamiliarity with the logical proof, or displeasure at the idea is not a valid reason.

Finally, this is not an argument from authority. We have the terms in front of us. We can challenge the logic of the terms, and the logic of their application. Feel free to continue to try.

-"Certainly. Cause and effect are measures of states over time based on interactive forces. A very simple and real world example is when you press you keys on the keyboard to type a response. The keys on the keyboard do not press themselves, you do. When we see your message on the screen, we can know the prior state of you pressing the keys caused that to be."
-Ok sure, but you defined causality , not the nature of existence.
My question was directed to your initial statement: " I have concluded that the nature of existence necessitates a "first cause"." So what is that "nature" of existence that necessitates a first cause?
i.e.The alternative energetic state(of matter) of the cosmic substrate. (If yes,I would agree with you on that)

-"If you don't believe it exists, simply explain to me how it is that you did not cause the message that you typed. Of course, you'll have to type that out to prove it, so that's pretty much out."
-No no, I think you didn't got my point. I was referring to the difference between "existing" and "real". Existence is for entities while "real" is for abstract concepts that describe emergent phenomena.
Of course my fingers will need to "work" in order to cause the typing of my message.
The concept of typing will be the cause...but "typing" doesn't exist on itself. The same is true for Existence (universe). Existence(Universe)...needs to be caused from something that already exists or is real.

In the case of the universe (everything that exists) we can agree(or not) that there is an underlying causal mechanism responsible for shifting the state of energy find in the cosmic substrate(Quantum fluctuations). I don't distinguish between Cosmos and Universe I only refer to a different state.

-" What is a phenomenon in your mind? I find its a word that needs a hard definition to be useful in a conversation."
- Well I had my own definition but I decided to use a common one so that I can make my point better.
"1.a fact or situation that is observed to exist OR happen, especially one whose cause or explanation is in question."
So this random definition also distinguishes between something existing or "happening"(real) in general.

-"So, a cause and an effect? "
-No, my point was that in an energetic cosmic substrate....causes are always available and they result to effects/phenomena.(if we are able to observe them).

We are not in disagreement , I just want to know what is your position on the nature of existence.

An inadequate argument is a flawed argument. I was a teacher for five years. If you can take a complex concept and break it down so that even a four year old can understand, it is one of the greatest accomplishments you can do. Thank you. — Philosophim

But you didn't explain a complex concept - you gave the sort of use example that would help four-year-olds connect the words "cause" and "effect" with something of which they already have some intuitive grasp. You didn't actually explain anything. Not only is this inadequate to a philosophical discussion of causality, but your repeated appeal to these simplistic examples is patronizing and insulting.

The principles themselves don’t really exist either.
— Mww

Of course they exist. We're talking about them right now. — Philosophim

Whatever we can talk about, exists? Something like this, you mean:

If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must. — Philosophim

Yikes.

But you didn't explain a complex concept - you gave the sort of use example that would help four-year-olds connect the words "cause" and "effect" with something of which they already have some intuitive grasp. You didn't actually explain anything. Not only is this inadequate to a philosophical discussion of causality, but your repeated appeal to these simplistic examples is patronizing and insulting. — SophistiCat

I'm not seeing any refutations here, which means despite your personal feelings, means the point stands. Your personal feelings or unbacked accusations do not matter in philosophy. Only points, counter points, and logic. If you are unable to counter my points, we both know they stand.

Whatever we can talk about, exists? Something like this, you mean:

If I can logically conclude that it must exist, then it must.
— Philosophim

Yikes. — Mww

Of course the idea exists. The idea of a unicorn exists. But can we discover a unicorn in reality apart from the idea? No. The idea of cause and effect exists as an idea. I clearly demonstrated it is real and well applied to reality as well from the keyboard example.

Are we at the point in the argument when you have nothing further to add or refute, so you start taking my phrases out of context and saying things like, "Yikes"? Will it be you start ignoring the points and start demeaning my intelligence? I've seen these patterns in argumentation many times, which are face saving techniques. You've been one of the better people discussing, and I don't want to see you devolve into that. There is nothing wrong with stating you cannot counter my points, but you just don't like it. I would have a lot more respect for you, and it would leave our conversation on a high note, not a low note.

Yikes. — Mww

I think Philosophim's mistake is haphazardly assigning logical necessity, without question, to the "first cause", identified as Y. A better way of calling it is the given. Geometry considers this an acceptable starting point -- such as given the presence of Alpha Y, therefore X.

But then it begs the question, do we need to have justification for the given or are we not required to provide justification for the given? Apparently no. This is simply saying, we work with what we have. Then the second question is, is there a point to our effort of building up the logical argument? Yes. Because the given is the variable one. We do not put much importance in the why of the given. What's important to us is we get to organize our thoughts, in a logical way, if the given is thrown at us.

I wish someone would open a thread about The Given. And give it a good whipping of exposition.

sure, you win the internets

I think Philosophim's mistake is haphazardly assigning logical necessity, without question, to the "first cause", identified as Y. A better way of calling it is the given. — Caldwell

I'm not sure you understood the OP, which is perfectly fine. The first cause is not Y. Y is when we look at a state and wonder, "Does this have a prior cause for its current being?" That would be the X, which comes before Y. A first cause would be an alpha. An alpha happens when we examine a Y, and conclude there can be no X. I use the term alpha because "A" is used also as a word, and I wanted the nice representation that it is the first letter of the alphabet with nothing prior. What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist.

Given that, re-read the OP one more time. Does the conclusion make sense, or do you see a flaw somewhere?

The problem is basically in (1), where you set up an erroneous picture of causality.

Have a think about Has physics ever been deterministic?

Determinism is opposed to randomness. Those are the two properties of physical causation. Physics has never proved things can happen without a cause in the universe for the very reason that science is undermined if and when things happen without laws within the framework of our perceptions

Oh oh. Now you went and done it. You hinted he may have made a mistake. To which, of course, invites the response that you, rather, may have not understood.

I just don’t get how a thesis of a lousy couple hundred words, that’s been around in its various iterations for millennia, and argued to death, can be misunderstood, but apparently half of us, have.

Guess we weren’t as smart as we thought we were.

Physics has never proved things can happen without a cause... — Gregory

...a thesis that has been both falsified and shown to be unnecessary.

What do you mean? The whole assumption of science is that laws work by causality. Virtual particles come from somewhere for example. We just don't know where from

The whole assumption of science is that laws work by causality. — Gregory

Nuh. Science doesn't assume that. That's just you.

Virtual particles come from somewhere for example. We just don't know where from — Gregory

Ah, you agree with Einstein.

But it ain't so. And that's all a matter of historical record.

Oh oh. Now you went and done it. You hinted he may have made a mistake. To which, of course, invites the response that you, rather, may have not understood. — Mww

:blush:

A first cause would be an alpha. .....What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist. — Philosophim

No it doesn't need to logically exist. That's what I'm saying. You call it a given.

Does the conclusion make sense, or do you see a flaw somewhere? — Philosophim

Your assumption cannot be your conclusion. This is a fallacy. Therefore, I disagree.

Randomness occurs causally

Randomness occurs causally — Gregory

Then the relation between a cause and its effect comes adrift, and any cause can be attributed to any effect. That is, the usefulness of the notion of cause and effect comes to an end.

One puts a kettle on a fire, and it does not heat up.

There is, as per Hume, no contradiction in this; the description is coherent; we know what has been said.

All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word "cause" never occurs.

Russel, On the notion of Cause

He's got a point.

If one posits a multi verse in order to explain life's unlikely rise then why not a multi verse to explain virtual particles? We have to understand the world as rational. Gravitational astronomy talks about gravity all the time because causation is the language of science. Randomness doesn't mean "without a cause" but instead "not perfectly predictable", and something " coming out of" nothing means nothing because nothing doesn't refer to anything except perhaps to spacetime itself

↪Philosophim The problem is basically in (1), where you set up an erroneous picture of causality.

Have a think about Has physics ever been deterministic? — Banno

I'm not assuming physics is deterministic though. I even mention several times that the physics of today might not have been the physics of thousands of years ago. Its because its not important to the argument. This is about barebones causality. Some state occurs because of a prior state correct? Either some prior state causes a current state, or nothing causes the current state but the fact that it simply is. While a few have stated this might be erroneous, no one has shown how it is erroneous.

Banno, I know you've been on these boards for a while and have a keen mind. I've been using a fairly basic example. Did the message that you typed simply display itself without any prior cause, or was there some chain of events that happened to make them appear? This is not claiming that it must have been a chain of events in any one particular way, only that there had to be a chain of events.

To counter it, you must type a message to display. But if you type a message to display, you are part of the chain of causality that lead to the event of your answer displayed. Can you explain the fact you can type a message and have it display on the boards and yet claim cause and effect is erroneous?

I just don’t get how a thesis of a lousy couple hundred words, that’s been around in its various iterations for millennia, and argued to death, can be misunderstood, but apparently half of us, have. — Mww

Apparently. A few people in this discussion have gotten the argument after discussion and clarification. Straw men attacks, or attacks on my character, are not counters to it. You stopped addressing the arguments and counter points, and have devolved your character. You can do better than that.

A first cause would be an alpha. .....What I conclude is that an alpha must logically exist.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't need to logically exist. That's what I'm saying. You call it a given. — Caldwell

What? How? That's the conclusion of the argument. I do not say anywhere in the initial set up that an alpha necessarily exists. I am setting the stage to show what the idea of an entity without prior cause would entail. No where in the premises am I stating that an alpha is a given. A given is something that does not need to be logically proven. I am logically pointing out that if the given premises are true, the conclusion is true.

If you look at the threads, everyone here gets that the argument is sound and valid. The only way to attack it, is to attack one of the initial premises by showing it is false. Check out Banno's critique. What I have been defending this entire time isn't the argument, because everyone knows its sound. I've been defending the idea of cause and effect. So far, I have not heard one valid argument against the existence of cause and effect. Check the example I gave Banno. That is how you can attack the argument.

Your assumption cannot be your conclusion. This is a fallacy. Therefore, I disagree. — Caldwell

Of course that would be a fallacy. The argument does not do that. Read it again please.

Randomness doesn't mean "without a cause" but instead "not perfectly predictable" — Gregory

I am trying not to interfere in your discussion with Banno, but I thought it would be useful to point this out for others. True randomness has no prior cause. A coin flip is not truly random. We say its random because the ability to measure it exactly is outside of our capability. Physics does not vanish on a coin flip, only our ability to measure it. If there is any confirmed limitation on randomness, then there is a cause for that. Which means, its not truly random. I hope this helps others understand the argument better.

Hello @Philosophim,

In short, I find it impossible to function without induction. The only thing we can do is figure out which inductions are more reasonable than others. The paper ends up declaring that. Regardless, if you do find it an unreasonable induction, I would ask a more reasonable alternative be provided. Doubt for its own sake doesn't lead anywhere.

Firstly, I would concur that it is, indeed, impractical to completely disband from induction. However, I don’t really agree with what you stated thereafter. It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. For example, if all of the options are absurd, and we hypothetically could not think of an alternative that isn’t absurd, I would not advocate to utilize the least absurd of them all (which I think ties directly to your argument being a self-proclaimed argumentum ad absurdium). On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). I do no think that someone needs to provide a reasonable alternative in order for an unreasonably derived inductive argument to be disbanded: one simply needs to prove that it is unreasonable (I would say). Now that’s not to say that one shouldn’t attempt to provide a better alternative, but picking the least unreasonable option (as opposed to simply recognizing our ignorance on the topic) isn’t something I would advocate for. Moreover, to your remark about doubt being useless without it being coupled with a better alternative, I take de omnibus dubitandum est (all things must be doubted) to heart. Although gathering reasonable alternatives to unreasonable positions is essential, the removal of unreasonable positions is vital even in the absence of an alternative option (and, I would argue, the best means of doing so it by skepticism, which, in turn, requires doubt). Now, with that being said, I understand that a posteriori knowledge is induction at work and we typically assume they are correct (in the manner you are describing—in that there isn’t a more meaningful alternative to them), but I think there is a distinction to be made from what I call immediate forms of knowledge (for all intents and purposes let’s just say it is synonymous with a posteriori) and mediate forms of knowledge (which would encompass a priori knowledge as an example thereof). To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. Anyways, I can’t expect you to know what I mean by “immediate” and “mediate” (although I would reckon you get a basic idea), it is relevant to the above quote and so, naturally, I felt obligated to at least slightly address it. If you would like to know more, feel free to ask questions about it!

Basically think proving formulas. If A is true, and B is true, C will always be true. But we will never be able to actively prove C is true by experience, because we cannot possibly test all C's in existence. C is logically necessary, but is ultimately an induction based on the idea that the truth of A and B will always hold no matter the situation.

To a certain extent, I agree with you: we do have to utilize induction to, for example, assume that the future will resemble the past. However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. This would be, I think, my biggest quarrel with such a line of thinking, one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. In fact, I would argue that causality (in terms of everything I could possibly conceive) cannot exist sans space/time fabric. The only way I can (in my own head) reconcile this with your OP is that the self-explained first cause must be space/time fabric (or potentially what caused it). But then I think we would be asserting that the PSR stops at space/time fabric: I don’t think we are warranted in saying that space/time (or potentially what caused it) is exempt from requiring a sufficient reason. And even if we were to produce an actual infinite of sufficient explanations, we would be lacking the sufficient explanation for that actual infinite (but, as we’ve previously discussed, we could arbitrarily circumvent this issue if we semantically define an actual infinite to be its own explanation—or requiring no further explanation). I think that this is exactly why I think that no matter how one derives the physical world, one is always going to be left with an absurdity (aka: explanatory-collapsibility).

If you can point out where I do, please do. I am interested in getting to the truth of the matter, and only other people can point out my blind spots.

I think that my main issue, with respect to inductive extensions, in your OP is as follows. I think that your OP is inclined to disband any notion of the use of causal induction beyond space/time fabric (due to causality having no basis sans space/time), and, therefore, you would have to establish the self-explained first cause as either space/time itself or entangled with space/time (somehow). If it is space/time, then I would ask for a sufficient reason (not cause) for why space/time came about, so to speak, as a self-explained first cause. Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! But then I would ask for a sufficient reason as to why we ought to semantically define it as so in the first place: I don’t find it evident why I should (I would argue, arbitrarily) stop issuing the principle of sufficient reason on any kind of seemingly first cause out of nothing (or self-explained in some other manner). On the other hand, if the self-explained first cause is somehow entangled with space/time fabric, then anything part of this first cause that is sans space/time would be irrelevant to your OP (because, again, I would argue that any notion of our causality sans space/time is an over-extension of induction with respect to causality), and, therefore, the only relevant parts would be that which is mixed in with space/time fabric. This would imply, to me, that any part of the first cause that is mixed in with space/time is simply just apart of space/time’s causality and, therefore, there is no actual distinction (that I can think of) between the first cause and space/time itself. In other words, I would ask you: what is the sufficient reason for space/time fabric? If any notion of causality (which only exists within a spatial and temporal framework) is utilized in the sufficient reason, then I would argue that you are over-extending induction (although I could be wrong of course!). Hopefully that made at least a bit of sense.

Is that space also filled with other smaller things?

If space was made up of smaller things, then those things would be space. Unless you are referring to something metaphysically explaining the physical space, which I don't see how we would have any pertinent knowledge on that.

I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.

I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it.

I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.I have heard this from a few posters. How exactly does the quantum world not have cause and effect? If it does not have cause and effect, then is it not simply an alpha? In which case, it seems the OP still stands.

I apologize: now that I understand your argument better the idea that physical causality may be broken at the quantum level has no effect on your argument. So I would agree with you here.

Correct. Something cannot cause itself, because then we are left right back to the question, "What caused it to cause itself?" So I find ascribing self-cause results in a contradiction, so should not be used.

This is exactly what I meant by a “semantic distinction”. You seem to be defining it in a way where it, by definition, doesn’t require the PSR anymore, which I don’t think is justified.

I hope I addressed it. If not, please point it out!

You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion.

And according to the conclusion of the OP, there must be a point in which the chain of causality ends.

I would ask: does PSR not apply to that conclusion? Besides semantically defining it to not require PSR, shouldn’t we have to provide a sufficient reason for why causality has to end? And how does causality exist beyond space/time?

It would be because if an self-explained entity was divisible, the reason for its existence would be the combination of those divisible parts.

I see where you are coming from on this, but I would (in an effort to provide some exposition on my confusion) ask: what is the sufficient reason for it being indivisible? To say that a self-explained entity cannot be divisible because those smaller parts would be, logically, the self-explained entity instead, would seem to me to be simply (and solely) a semantical distinction. We could then say that this thing A is not a self-explained entity because it is made up of B and C. But B and C also aren’t self-explained because they are made up of D and E. We could do this infinitely. Then we could postulate that the very reason for why everything is seemingly infinitely not a self-explained cause must be the self-explained first cause. But then, I would say, why stop there? Why not postulate that the explanation for the actual infinite regression is actually made up of smaller explanations, and those made up of smaller, and so on ad infitum. So now we are attempting to explain an actual infinite regression that has an actual infinite regression of explanations for it. As you can probably see, we could keep elevating, so to speak, to the next necessary explanation above each infinite regression forever (and thereby never logically deriving a self-explained first cause). Now this isn’t to say that your OP isn’t true, but just that we could (theoretically) create an infinite amount of infinite explanations of infinite explanations of infinite explanations, etc. This demonstrates, to me, the absurdity of the argument (no offense meant).

Hopefully that all made sense. I think that we are more similar than I originally realized: what you would deem a self-explained first cause, I deem an explanatory-collapse. It seems as though this is your origin of things, mine fundamentally (due to the explanatory-collapsibility) cannot be derived therefrom.

As always, I hope this finds you well!
Bob

Jesus fuck. 11 pages of scientific illiteracy despite having been pointed out that fact on almost every page. :roll:

It seems as though that you are implying that we should assess our options and pick the best one: I do not think this is the case. — Bob Ross

That is a choice, and one I respect. I believe there is no "correct" answer when this problem occurs, and should be left up to the individual.

On the contrary, I would argue that we suspend judgment until an adequate alternative is produced (in other words: I am perfectly fine stating that I simply do not know enough to make a meaningful conclusion). — Bob Ross

I have situations like that well. For example, if prior to the moon landing someone said, "The moon is made of green cheese, or blueberries, no alternatives", I would definitely suspend judgement until we arrived at the moon. Such inductions do not use tested reality as any basis. But, when we are living life, and questions about what the life means come up, I find I have to pick something. For example, morality. Lots of people have different inductions as to what they believe morality is. Some people choose to dispense with all of them, stating we cannot know. But some choose to pick one. In the second situation, I am the personality type that is the later. But in no way is the former personality type incorrect or inferior. I believe that is part of human variety, and essentially a way of humanity rolling the dice on different inductions to hedge our bets. :)

To keep this brief, consider the process of perception, which I would argue one witnesses: I would argue one utilizes their built in “rudimentary reason”, which is essentially the most basic derived faculty of their existence, to “induce”, technically speaking, that they are indeed perceiving. However (and, again, I am keeping this extremely brief), this is very distinct from your OP, which I would characterize as mediate knowledge: the use of immediate knowledge that is extended (in this case via induction) to derive a principle from which to deduce. You see, if one were to remove a mediate form of knowledge, there immediate forms stay intact (left unaffected) because (I would argue) mediate forms of knowledge should never be prioritized above the immediate forms. Therefore, if all the options regarding a topic (that, most importantly, pertains to mediate knowledge claims) are unreasonable, then they should be removed even in the case that there is no alternative provided. — Bob Ross

Fantastic point, and I am in agreement. I believe I understand the general meaning you wanted to convey with mediate and immediate. Because I do not know all the subtleties behind the definitions, let me list out the concepts that were pertinent from them.

If I understand correctly, there are conclusions from experience, and conclusions from our minds. Ideally, we want conclusions from experience and conclusions from our minds to match up. But in the heirarchy, conclusion of experience are more reasonable to pursue then conclusions of the mind which are contradicted by experience.

The difference in the OP is that there is a situation in which we cannot discover by experience, because arguably we may never be able to confirm an alpha through experimentation. If we did posit an existence as an alpha, one could always state, "Perhaps we do not have the tools at this time to discover the prior cause." Even further, since an alpha has its own effects it creates once it has been incepted, we could simply work backwards and reasonably conclude that there must have been something prior, despite the reality it just formed in a particular state.

For myself, when left with a situation that cannot be confirmed through experience, I like to cobble together logic of the mind that is confirmed by experience, and see where that takes us. Perhaps I could "logically" conclude the moon is made of green cheese, despite no experience that would lead to this conclusion. This would be an irrational induction that I would throw away like yourself.

But, I know that causality is both confirmed by experience, and the mind. I can take that, and predict a logical conclusion. Is this logical conclusion's final steps purely from the mind? Absolutely. But do they have an underlying basis that is based on conclusions of experience and the mind? Absolutely. As such, I take this as the most reasonable induction to use when faced with a situation that may never be able to be confirmed by experience.

However, mathematical induction (as far I as I understand it) attempts to induce that P(n) will be true for all natural numbers, which therefore is perfectly within its own scope and not over-extending, but it does not, most importantly, attempt to say that P(n) fundamentally works outside of a space/time fabric. — Bob Ross

To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.

one can’t assume that causality would be behave (even if they had extraordinary inductive evidence of causality’s uniformity in our universe) even remotely similar outside of the very two (conjoined) concepts: space and time. — Bob Ross

True. But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration. In my case, I have an experience of space and time. If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time. If you disagree with this, I see nothing wrong with that. But on the flip side, I don't think you could state there is anything wrong with what I am doing either.

Now, this gets contradictory (on my part) very quickly because of my next issue: the seemingly semantic basis for this OP—that to ask for a sufficient reason for a self-explained first cause makes no sense! — Bob Ross

That is the conclusion of the OP. What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully. The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct? And an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience, just like the conclusion of the OP. As such, the POSR is a conclusion of the mind alone. Yet, if taken to its end, we find the POSR breaks down. My conclusion does not break down. Therefore, if we have two conflicting inductions that can only be created within the mind, if one logically breaks down when fully examined, while the other does not, I am going to take the conclusion that does not logically break down.

To sum it up, the POSR states that everything has a reason, cause, or ground. But if we take it to its logical conclusion, we realize that does not mean that the reason, cause, or ground, is always due to something prior to that state of existence. Even if we envision the idea of an infinite regress, we still come to some conclusion that has no prior reason for its existence, besides that fact that it is. To preserve the POSR, we must add an addendum. "One reason for a things existence that has no prior cause, is the fact that it exists."

The OP points out the only logical conclusion that can be made while still preserving the POSR. To deny that there must be at least one alpha, points out a flaw in the POSR that cannot be answered, and it is refuted.

I do not deny that it may be impossible for true nothingness to exist, but I find it also impossible to deny that it might. The fact that we can doubt one, does not eliminate the possibility of the other.

I 100% agree here, but to be able to doubt something is distinctly different from doubting something on reasonable grounds. I am not advocating that we should disband notions because it is possible (or room to) doubt it, but, rather, it should be disbanded if the doubt introduces reasonable justification to disband it. — Bob Ross

True. But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.

You have done a marvelous job at addressing my questions! And thank you for that! But I would say that I am still having a hard time understanding how a “self-explained first cause” isn’t solely a semantical distinction? And even if I were to grant that it is perfectly valid to simply define PSR out of the concept, I would still have to confess that PSR (having such a strong will to live, metaphorically speaking) will wiggle itself back into existence! For I could then ask for a sufficient reason for why PSR is defined out of the concept. Hopefully you see my confusion. — Bob Ross

And you have done a magnificent job of questioning and providing alternatives to think on. I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR. I look forward to your response!

Jesus fuck. 11 pages of scientific illiteracy despite having been pointed out that fact on almost every page. :roll: — Benkei

And 11 pages of myself pointing out why these proposals of scientific illiteracy are incorrect. Feel free to take a stab at it yourself Benkei.

I make it a rule not to argue with idiots. Maybe study some actual cosmology.