What is Being?

Mikie

Why *is* there not nothing is like saying "why is there something?"

It's a fundamental question, and presupposes existence by the very act of questioning. The "is" in this sentence is apparently referring to being, but being is presupposed when using the "is." So it's almost like asking "What is 'is-ness'?"

The question also has something it's asking about, and therefore "knows" about to a degree beforehand -- so we must know something about "being" before asking about it. Yet being is not an object, not a being.

This is all similar to Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," in a sense, although perhaps inverted -- and is somewhat reminiscent of Kant in that the subjectivity of the subject has to be taken into account here; i.e., we're the ones who are conscious, thinking, perceiving, and questioning. We are ourselves beings while we're questioning beings (and being in general).

Heidegger is the person to read on matters of being, in my view (he later distances himself from the word "ontology"). Whatever else you can say about him, his entire corpus is centered on this question.

What I gather from his analysis, in a nutshell, is a very simple point: in the West, we've traditionally interpreted being in terms of presence.

Thus the "metaphysics of presence" is our philosophical ancestry, with several major variations: phusis, eidos, ousia, substance, God, nature, matter, energy.

The interpretation of beings in terms of presence occurs in a certain mode of the human being -- the "present at hand," as Heidegger calls it, which is a quite derivative or "privative" mode of our existence, because we're coping, habitual beings engaged in the world through our "ready-to-hand" activity, mostly unconsciously when looked at it in terms of average everyday behavior. To see something as an object, present before us, with properties is not how we usually see things -- unless things break down or we're in a contemplative mood.

This interpretation of being as presence also presupposes time. (The present moment.)

But time itself has been interpreted as a present-at-hand fact, beginning with Aristotle and continuing up to Kant. Kant gives time an important place in his philosophy (along with space), "bringing it back into the subject again," but still operates within the framework that Aristotle established. Time gets interpreted as a present-at-hand "now" point, with the past as "no longer now" and the future as "not yet now," with common examples being a number line or a clock pointer.

When looking at average human behavior in a phenomenological way (meaning a focus on what's usually hidden, concealed, covered over, or absent), we can begin to develop a different understanding of time from the traditional one -- one closer to average experience and less about quantification. Heidegger calls this "temporality," but I like "existential" or "experiential" time, related to the mostly unconscious (absent, concealed), habitual activities of daily life: things like skills, projection, anticipation, concern, flow, memory. What we call the future, the past, and the present all seem to occur simultaneously rather than in distinct places or as distinct quantities. Furthermore, there's no reason to believe they're occurring simultaneously simply in the "now." The future holds the present and past; the past holds the future and present; the present holds the past and future. There is a lot of privileging about the "present moment," in Buddhism and elsewhere, but is that not simply a prejudice? Are we not living the future as we speak? It's the future even if taken in terms of the number line -- this "was" the future in 1991 -- the deep future (consider Terminator II, a favorite of mine at the time -- the future scenes were dated to 2029, which we're rapidly approaching; or, a better example, Orwell's 1984.

So the interpretation of being as presence presupposes temporality, which we are. Like the awareness of being and the questioning of being, the interpretation of being also presupposes us, human beings.

Since we're the ones questioning and interpreting in the first place, we're the beings which "disclose" being. We're the beings for which being is a concern or an "issue." If it's true that we are embodied time, then we cannot help but interpret beings this way -- much in the same way we cannot help but perceive the phenomena of the world through the forms of space and time in Kantian philosophy.

The trouble in the West is really that of thinking. When we go to think about being, we (Westerners) have consistently done so as presence. But this way of thinking has led, through many generations, to an objectification of the world -- eventually taken or seen as "nature," as matter in motion -- and so to materialism, scientism, technological nihilism and, in political and economic affairs, to capitalism, which I argue is also an outgrowth of this objectification.

(As an aside, a digression: I think the Buddhists have interesting things to say about change and time that are much different than the West for the simple reason that they take present-at-hand thought, and thinking generally, as itself an object of awareness, and so the future and past become almost illusory to them -- thus, what is instead given privilege is change (anicca), especially our reactions to continuously changing pleasant and unpleasant sensations, the craving/aversion that coincides with them, and how best to cultivate it. Unlike the Buddhists, however, Heidegger tends to emphasize more the importance of the future more so than the present, calling human beings generally future-oriented beings.)

tim wood

I'll kick this can. It would seem that being is nothing at all, except as the one for whom it is a concern says it is. For me, beings are whatever I encounter: no encounter, no being. Of course the famous question is, "What is the Being of beings?" And I suspect the answer to that is analagous to questions as to truth. That is, no such thing except as an abstract collective label for all the trues, for truth, and all the beings for Being.

A different and sharper question is, "What does it mean to be (an X as an X)?" But this simply refers back to the one for whom the question is an issue, a matter of concern.

180 Proof

What is Being?

Nothing but an empty name. A transcendental, or categorical, placeholder. The shadowing of shadows ...

"~~Being~~ of beings"?

Void of (swirling, swerving) atoms. Nameless dao of the ten thousand things. (Unmanifest) natura naturans of (manifest) natura naturata. Brahman of māyā. Etc.

"The meaning of ~~being~~?"

(Look at how "being" is used in any language-game.)

Banno

Asking "what is being?" is asking "How do we use the word 'being'?"; a point worth keeping in mind, since it is immediately apparent that you can use it as you will, and unfortunately many students of philosophy do.

Here are two puzzles, from Frege and Russell, that must be explained if one is to treating "exists" as a property.

1. What is the difference between a sweet, juicy, red apple and a sweet, juicy red apple that exists? The difference between a red apple and a green apple, or a sweet apple and a sour apple, is pretty clear. But explaining clearly what is added to an apple by existing...?

2. It's not difficult to understand an apple that is not sweet, or an apple that is not red - but an apple that does not exist? What is it?

This is why existence is not treated as a predicate in logic. That is, there is no simple way to parse. "Xtrix exists".

This goes for the sentence at the beginning of the puzzlement expressed in the OP: "There is something" has no straightforward translation in logic. Now that of course doesn't mean one cannot use it, but if you are going to use it you have some obligation to be clear about what it is you are doing with it.

One way to picture this that saying that something exists is not yet doing anything; it's akin to putting the pieces on the board in preparation for playing the game, and so not a part of the game as such.

We can add some more complexity to the discussion by noting the presumption involved in equating "being" and "existing". The etymology of "be" is complex, "It is the most irregular verb in Modern English and the most common"*; while "exist" and "exit" are standing out and stepping out, respectively. So take care, lest you exit instead of exist.

Olivier5

But explaining clearly what is added to an apple by existing...? — Banno

The actual apple.

an apple that does not exist? What is it? — Banno

It is an idea about a non-existing apple. What else could it be?

existence is not treated as a predicate in logic. That is, there is no simple way to parse. "Xtrix exists". — Banno

∃ Xtrix = there exists Xtrix
∄ Xtrix = there does not exist Xtrix

unenlightened

Ontology is the concern with what is - sometimes called 'the furniture of the world. - unenlightened is a unique structure of matter. Or unenlightened is an embodied soul.

But "what is being?" is best answered with "Yes, being is what is". An alternative and even more informative response would be "Being is, and nothing happens." That is to say that being refers to the static state at a moment in time, and nothing to the continuous flow and transformation that being undergoes from one moment to the next.

Too much of nothing
Can make a man ill at ease
One man's temper might rise
While another man's temper might freeze
In the day of confession
We cannot mock a soul
Oh, when there's too much of nothing
No one has control. — His Bobness

EnPassant

If we define existence as the 'thereness' or presence of what is eternally and define being as a more developed form of mere existence (life) we can say the following:

In the beginning there is existence. Existence is not a property of anything, it simply is, eternally. It is what is. Existence has properties. Evolved things are properties of existence. With Russell's apple for example, taste, colour etc. are properties of existence. When these properties form a set we call that set 'apple'. Existence is the substance of the set.

Existence evolves properties and becomes being, life (if we define being as an evolution over and above primordial existence.)

Existence is God and God evolves and becomes being, life. This is creation. (we need to make a clear distinction between primordial existence and being)

ucarr

1. What is the difference between a sweet, juicy, red apple and a sweet, juicy red apple that exists? The difference between a red apple and a green apple, or a sweet apple and a sour apple, is pretty clear. But explaining clearly what is added to an apple by existing...?

Great question, Banno. My tentative response has me taking recourse to that rascal, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I'm supposing that when we claim something exists, we're withdrawing credit from the Bank of The Social Contract. Dubious though they be, socially sanctioned claims of an independent, objectively existing reality are needed (by most of us) in order to secure a functional society. Consensus about what's really "out there" is a necessary (if fictional) binding agent for social organization and culture

ucarr

Shout out to Xtrix for starting this expansive thread. Your detailed consideration of being gives me much to think about in the coming days.

Looks like I'll be paying additional visits to that neologizing esoteric, the ever fearsome Heidegger.

Joshs

↪Banno

Asking "what is being?" is asking "How do we use the word 'being'?"; — Banno

Better yet , from a Heideggerian perspective , asking ‘what is being’ is asking ‘what is the condition of possibility of ‘use’? Whist is it that is structurally common to any and all varieties of use? Heidegger says it is the structure of temporality.

frank

↪Joshs

In "What is Metaphysics" he says it's what we experience when we contemplate the void. I guess it's a matter of which "Being" we're talking about.

Alkis Piskas

↪Xtrix

I think the title is not very clear: "Being" with a capital raises questioning and ambiguity. E.g. "What does 'being' mean?" would be something more concrete and could be easier discussed. So, I will stick to your first clear-cut (to me) question:

"What is 'is-ness'?" — Xtrix

This is a quite interesting question and subject, and certainly debatable in this place!

I would describe "is-ness" as apparency of existence. It refers to something that apparently exists as true or fact. It persists in time and we agree upon that it exists, i.e. it is real for us.

Two examples:
1) When I say "My name is Alkis", I state that the name "Alkis" exists and this is how I am called. Usually such a statement is not disputed and we expect that the other person agrees! :smile:
2) If I say "This tree is big", I state that 1) a tree exists somewhere near and that 2) I consider a fact (true) that it is big. However, either of these two premises can be disputed: one may disagree that it is a "tree" (he would call it a "plant") and/or that it is "big" (he may found it "medium-size" or even "small").

We can see that personal agreement (and thus reality) plays a key role in what is and what is not.

(The description of the topic is quite long, and I don’t want to get involved more in it. Yet, I believe that my "selective" reply covers the subject well ...)

180 Proof

"what is being?" is best answered with "Yes, being is what is". An alternative and even more informative response would be "Being is, and nothing happens." — unenlightened

In other words "The beings are the frames and Being is the reel" :smirk: (and "frames moving" corresponds to (Einstein's) "persistent illusion" of (Newton's) time).

Manuel

The "is" in this sentence is apparently referring to being, but being is presupposed with when using the "is." So it's almost like asking "What is 'is-ness'?" — Xtrix

Whatever else it may be, you are going to get stuck on the word "is" and try to find some "essence" or a common attribute common to the word which may not (dare I say it?) exist. "Is" can only make sense in relation to something else. So what is "is-ness" cannot be answered unless it's connected with something else.

The problem comes when you say what is it that you are saying "is". For as soon as you say this is a table or this is a river, you've shifted from the word "is" to a concept "table", "river". But you aren't going to find something common to "is" by saying that a table is or a river is.

Joshs

↪frank

In "What is Metaphysics" he says it's what we experience when we contemplate the void. I guess it's a matter of which "Being" we're talking about. — frank

As one would expect, the ‘void’ means something different for Heidegger than what normal usage would suggest. It links to his writings on the ‘nothing’ and primordial anxiety. Taking a cue from Nietzsche, nothing is not to be thought in classical or dialectical
terms as a negation or lack but as productive, as no-thing. Btw, which translation do you have? Mine only mentions void once.

frank

As one would expect, the ‘void’ means something different for Heidegger than what normal usage would suggest. It links to his writings on the ‘nothing’ and primordial anxiety. — Joshs

I'm not sure why you call attention to this since that's made extremely explicit in that essay. :chin:

Joshs

↪frank

I'm not sure why you call attention to this since that's made extremely explicit in that essay. :chin: — frank

I called attention to it because you wrote “I guess it's a matter of which "Being" we're talking about.”
I may have misinterpreted you, but I thought you were referring to my previous comment on Being as condition of possibility for understanding ‘use’.

Did you instead mean to contrast Heidegger’s notion of Being with that of other philosophers?

Joshs

↪Manuel

Whatever else it may be, you are going to get stuck on the word "is" and try to find some "essence" or a common attribute common to the word which may not (dare is say it?) exist. "Is" can only make sense in relation to something else. So what is "is-ness" cannot be answered unless it's connected with something else — Manuel

Excellent point. Heidegger argues that the copula ‘is’ has been treated since Plato and Aristotle as a neutral connector binding a subject and predicate together.
Heidegger says that when we say S is P , we are seeing something AS something within a wider context of
pragmatic relevance. Making sense of something is an act that always has the ‘as’ structure.

“The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act.” (Heidegger 2010b)

The problem comes when you say what is it that you are saying "is". For as soon as you say this is a table or this is a river, you've shifted from the word "is" to a concept "table", "river". But you aren't going to find something common to "is" by saying that a table is or a river is. — Manuel

Heidegger addresses this by making the problem the assumption objectively present objects that the ‘is’ simply links together.

“ If the phenomenon of the "as" is covered over and above all veiled in its existential origin from the
hermeneutical "as," Aristotle's phenomenological point of departure disintegrates to the analysis of
logos in an external "theory of judgment," according to which judgment is a binding or separating of
representations and concepts. Thus binding and separating can be further formalized to mean a
"relating." Logistically, the judgment is dissolved into a system of "coordinations," it becomes the
object of "calculation," but not a theme of ontological interpretation.""If the kind of being of the terms
of the relation is understood without differentiation as merely objectively present things, then the
relation shows itself as the objectively present conformity of two objectively present things.”

180 Proof

For as soon as you say this is a table or this is a river, you've shifted from the word "is" to a concept "table", "river". But you aren't going to find something common to "is" by saying that a table is or a river is. — Manuel

:100: Quine says "to be is the value of a bounded variable", no? Makes pragmatic sense. Besides, "what is" is a sentence fragment, a cipher (or koan), that does not say anything. "Table is" and "river is", for instances, are oracular noises mistaken by Heideggerasts for reflective articulations (i.e. more charlatanry than mere sophistry).

frank

may have misinterpreted you, but I thought you were referring to my previous comment on Being as condition of possibility for understanding ‘use’. — Joshs

Maybe you could explain what the structure of temporality has to do with contemplating Nothing?

Seems like that would be more about Becoming than Being.

Joshs

↪frank

Maybe you could explain what the structure of temporality has to do with contemplating Nothing?

Seems like that would be more about Becoming than Being. — frank

Being and becoming are the same thing for Heidegger. He doesn’t begin with objectively present objects and then set them into motion or transition. He argues that this is the traditional idea of time we inherited from Aristotle. Instead he begins from change and derives. presence from it.

“What does it mean to be "in time"? This "being-in-time" is very familiar to us from the way it is represented in natural science. In natural science all processes of nature are calculated as processes which happen "in time." Everyday common sense also finds processes and things enduring "in time," persisting and disappearing "in time." When we talk about "being-in-time," everything depends on the interpretation of this "in." In order to see this more clearly, we ask simply if the glass on the table in front of me is in time or not. In any case, the glass is already present-at-hand and remains there even when I do not look at it. How long it has been there and how long it will remain are of no importance. If it is already present-at-hand and remains so in the future, then that means that it continues through a certain time and thus is "in" it. Any kind of
continuation obviously has to do with time.”(Zollikon)

Heidegger shows how the common notion of time dates back to Aristotle’s derivation of time
from motion.
“ The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are
interwoven with the experience of time.”(basic problems of phenomenology)
“ So far as time is kineseos ti, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking
time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion.”
“Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a how-long, a duration.”
Time is making present according to Aristotle, (the present at hand) and in so doing is a counting
of time as now, now, now.
“And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly "objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time.”(Being and
Time)

The past, present and future don’t operate for Heidegger as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is
in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”

frank

Being and becoming are the same thing for Heidegger. He doesn’t begin with objectively present objects and then set them into motion or transition. He argues that this is the traditional idea of time we inherited from Aristotle. Instead he begins from change and derives. presence from it. — Joshs

But you start by saying he saw no difference between Becoming and Being, then you say he derived one from the other (as Hegel did.). Is that a contradiction?

Heraclitus is supposed to be the original philosopher of Becoming. Parmenides is the Being guy. Interestingly, we don't know if Parmenides was answering Heraclitus, or if it was the other way around.

One of Parmenides' proofs of the One has to do with conundrums related to the progression from present to future. I'm not sure how Aristotle was different. I'm sure Heidegger would have known, but this:

present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time. — Joshs

Is the way Parmenides thought about time. He just thought time is impossible.

The past, present and future don’t operate for Heidegger as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence. — Joshs

Then he agreed with Parmenides. That's weird.

Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. — Joshs

So this is fine (although heavily mystical), but what does it have to do with Nothing?

Joshs

↪frank

But you start by saying he saw no difference between Becoming and Being, then you say he derived one from the other (as Hegel did.). Is that a contradiction? — frank

You’ll have to let me know how this differs from Hegel, but when I say that Heidegger derives Being from Becoming , what I mean is that he has to somehow explain where Western philosophy and science got the idea that there is such a thing as static being or ‘is ness’ , given that becoming is fundamental. His answer is that the concept of objective presence is a distorting abstraction, a leveling down or forgetting of the larger totality of relevance that gives sense to such notions.

In the following quote, you can see Heidegger trying to explain how such ideas as external sensation are generated as ‘artificial’ modifications of the ‘as’ structure of becoming:

“Acts of directly taking something, having something, dealing with it “as something,” are so original that trying to understand anything without employing the “as” requires (if it's possible at all) a peculiar inversion of the natural order. Understanding something without the “as”—in a pure sensation, for example—can be carried out only “reductively,” by “pulling back” from an as-structured experience. And we must say: far from being primordial, we have to designate it as an artificially worked-up act. Most important, such an experience is per se possible only as the privation of an as-structured experience. It occurs only within an as-structured experience and by prescinding from the “as”— which is the same as admitting that as-structured experience is primary, since it is what one must first of all prescind from."(Logic,The Question of Truth)

So this is fine (although heavily mystical), but what does it have to do with Nothing? — frank

It may sound mystical only because it’s so alien to the conventional thinking. To be honest , the traditional notion of time as sequence of nows sounds mystical
to me. Eventually , a reformed understanding of time will offer a new grounding for empirical science. There are already many efforts to move on from the old idea of time within cognitive science.

The nothing for Heidegger is the uncanniness of becoming.

“Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon." "The publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar"
"Even as covered over, the familiar is a mode of the unfamiliar

“In order to continue to be recognizable and familiar to itself, experience must at every moment come back to itself otherwise. It must continue to be the same
differently. In each occurrence, Dasein is thrown into a world, is never at home with itself, is absent to itself and thus always uncanny to itself. It is this structure of uncanniness that Heidegger claims we uncover via primordial anxiety.

“Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence...Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment-being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.”(Heidegger 1995)

frank

You’ll have to let me know how this differs from Hegel, but when I say that Heidegger derives Being from Becoming , what I mean is that he has to somehow explain where Western philosophy and science got the idea that there is such a thing as static being or ‘is ness’ , given that becoming is fundamental. His answer is that the concept of objective presence is a distorting abstraction, a leveling down or forgetting of the larger totality of relevance that gives sense to such notions. — Joshs

But didn't Heidegger do a lecture on Parmenides? He must have known his reasoning. If Parmenides' reasons weren't persuasive enough, Zeno slam dunked it for centuries of philosophy. Christianity was built on that foundation. I'm just saying, people did give the topic some sober thought, whether they were right, or half-right, or totally wrong.

Acts of directly taking something, having something, dealing with it “as something,” are so original that trying to understand anything without employing the “as” requires (if it's possible at all) a peculiar inversion of the natural order. — Joshs

It's always a pleasure to read your posts because you give examples. Thank you.

Manuel

↪Joshs

Yep, which is why with Heidegger one has to be a bit careful. He can be interpreted many ways, but sometimes some who read him pose questions that can have no answer, simply because the question isn't correctly articulated. One can, of course, form sentences that look like questions such as "what is here?" or "does being have being?", but that can lead you to word puzzles more than to phenomenology.

↪180 Proof

:up:

I think Dreyfus' Heidegger was interesting, but others just up his obscurity to the max and don't go far.

I agree, traditional pragmatism can help for a lot of these issues.

Banno

Whatever else it may be, you are going to get stuck on the word "is" and try to find some "essence" or a common attribute common to the word which may not (dare is say it?) exist. — Manuel

Yes, for example:

Better yet , from a Heideggerian perspective , asking ‘what is being’ is asking ‘what is the condition of possibility of ‘use’?...Heidegger says it is the structure of temporality. — Joshs

Why "now and then" but not "here and there"? After all, whatever being is, if it is structured by time it is also and just as much structured by location... Why the Heideggerian preoccupation with time?

Manuel has the right diagnosis, I think. Heidegger's approach lacks clarity. It doesn't help.

Banno

∃ Xtrix = there exists Xtrix — Olivier5

That your sentence is ill-formed is the point. You would populate the world with non-existent apples.

Joshs

↪Banno

Why "now and then" but not "here and there"? After all, whatever being is, if it is structured by time it is also and just as much structured by location... Why the Heideggerian preoccupation with time? — Banno

You mean location as in the localization of points in an objective geometry of space-time? Because that’s an idealization that desperately needs to be deconstructed.

Joshs

↪Alkis Piskas

I would describe "is-ness" as apparency of existence. It refers to something that apparently exists as true or fact. It persists in time and we agree upon that it exists, i.e. it is real for us. — Alkis Piskas

That’s a good description of the approach to Being and ‘is-ness’ that Heidegger is critiquing.

“…what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being.”

Heidegger explains that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence.

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to
present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.”

Banno

You mean location as in the localization of points in an objective geometry of space-time? — Joshs

Do I? Not words I would use.

Because that’s an idealization that desperately needs to be deconstructed.

That's a game you might like to play with your friends.

Heidegger explains... — Joshs

He really doesn't.

Ciceronianus

Just as the Nothing nothings, Being, being Being, itself beings.

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