These philosophers were unique in the West in consciously not developing belief about nonevident matters, pro or con. Such beliefs, they maintained, being about things nonevident, could not be substantiated, and so remained unstable and open to challenge from competing beliefs.... Beliefs about things nonevident therefore were to be avoided, they recommended, and their philosophy addressed how this was to be achieved" (1). — tim wood

I concur!

Nonevident matters bad; evident matters good, apparently. — tim wood

:up: Well put!

there is no reason to assume that appearances have to be explained; instead they themselves can become the principles of explanation. This is the 'Copernican revolution' — tim wood

:up:

Appearances are just the involuntary objects of consciousness, objects "not as abstract concepts, such as substances, forms, matter, etc., but rather as distinct pathai, like the sight of a tree, the taste of a lemon, or the dread that follows rejection" (75). — tim wood

:up:

On the evident, (from Against the Logicians, Sextus): there are four distinct classes of objects [pragmata, or facts]... 1) things manifestly evident, 2) things absolutely nonevident, 3) things naturally nonevident, and 4) things temporarily nonevident.

1) Things manifest are just the appearances themselves, sensations and thoughts
2) Things absolutely nonevident are "the things never to be presented to human apprehension"
3) Naturally nonevident things are those incapable of clear presentation to perception. "The soul, for instance, is one of the things naturally nonevident; for such is its nature that it never presents itself to our clear perception"
4) Temporarily nonevident are just those things but for circumstance are not manifestly evident, like the books in the library when you're in the kitchen (93-94). — tim wood

Excelente! Count me in, Pyrrho!

"Appearances constitute a reality;.. they resist, under the questioning of Pyrrhonists,.. resolution into any other reality.... Indeed, appearance appears as its own reality, provided we accept it just as the peculiar reality that it is.... But if we seek to explain appearance as a function of some... synthesis, or anything else, then it becomes... a secondary function of more basic factors, of other criteria, which are themselves beyond appearances as such, and so necessarily nonevident" (75). — tim wood

Pyrrhonism is not skepticism. Skeptics doubt. Pyrrhonists believe. — tim wood

Whoa! Hang on!

Of the non-evident, I believe we're on the same page - Pyrrhonists would withhold belief. However, for someone (a Pyrrhonist) who makes such a big deal of the non-evident how evident would be the evident? If I don't trust my enemies, how much trust do I have in my friends?

If I don't trust my enemies, how much trust do I have in my friends? — TheMadFool

My impression is that trust itself would not be part of any question. That is, if you appeared to be trustworthy, then you're trustworthy. And no doubt "appearance" more than just visual impression. The pencil in the glass of water and the dancing trees suggestively instructive of how they tried to think.

But I infer that you would have them skeptics in Pyrrhonist clothing, just itching to bust out into full-skeptic mode - wolves in sheep's clothing; and that was not at all the impression I got. I find in it a simplicity. But like most things, even simplicity itself is not simple, and if one strives to be rigorously simple, no doubt that's even hard. I find a resemblance, an echo, in Amish or Quaker/Shaker practice: you do what you want; we'll just stay over here and do our simple thing as simply as we can.

My impression is that trust itself would not be part of any question. — tim wood

What then helps you decide whether to believe a given claim or not? Perhaps there's a distinction to be made between trust simpliciter and trust won.

What then helps you decide whether to believe a given claim or not? — TheMadFool

Appearance. (Try reading the OP again; the substance of it is from the book referenced.)

What then helps you decide whether to believe a given claim or not? — TheMadFool

What helped them decide? it's not clear to me they either needed help or made a decision. Do you decide to believe the floor is under your feet when yo swing them out of bed in the morning?

Appearance. (Try reading the OP again; the substance of it is from the book referenced.) — tim wood

We're going round in circles. I question the claim that there are evident things.

What helped them decide? it's not clear to me they either needed help or made a decision. Do you decide to believe the floor is under your feet when yo swing them out of bed in the morning? — tim wood

All I'm saying is I doubt the reality of the evident.

We're going round in circles. I question the claim that there are evident things. — TheMadFool

Then you're neither Pyrrhonist nor skeptic. And yours seems a question lacking sense. Can you put any of its feet somewhere on the ground?

Then you're neither Pyrrhonist nor skeptic. And yours seems a question lacking sense. Can you put any of its feet somewhere on the ground? — tim wood

How am I not a Pyrrhonist or a skeptic when I doubt the existence of the evident? Perhaps I'm taking the notion of skepticism too far, so far that it begins to appear nonsensical. Can you explain how that happens?

Spending too much time on Internet forums, probably.

Spending too much time on Internet forums, probably — Wayfarer

Probably? How exactly?

Perhaps you're taking the notion of skepticism too far, so far that it begins to appear nonsensical. There's a kind of specious armchair skepticism which says that everything is debatable, but it cuts the ground out from under its own feet. There are things that can't be doubted - the painfulness of pain would be a good start. Attach a strong paper-clip to your earlobe, and then debate the point.

The author makes the point that echos of Pyrrhonism are heard in Berkeley, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and others. — tim wood

@tim wood- happened upon this rather fascinating essay in The Atlantic recently, on just this point. Touches on the Pyrronian aspects of David Hume's philosophy. Also a fascinating essay in its own right.

All I'm saying is I doubt the reality of the evident. — TheMadFool

Well, channeling Pyrrho, I'd say the evident is what it is. Not to be doubted because there is nothing to doubt. And, being undoubtable, it - the evident - is indubitably real. As candidate for doubt, that leaves yourself, but that being evident too is also indubitable.

And it leaves your thinking. Same result. But you can think one thing and another and lead yourself into απόρια, contradiction, and the state of confusion you call doubt - which again as evident must be real. But this reality just a morning fog that burns off under the sun. Or accounted by another evidenting, as with the pencil in water and the dancing trees.

He must have had a kind of grading system for appearances - that we in turn might call experience or street smarts or in one word judgment. Suggesting in turn that appearance would have been not of mere surface, but something multi-dimensional, including temporally, in any case case more than just looks.

I read Pyrrhonists (and apparently Buddhists) as avoiding that pitfall. Do you think we might call it considered/informed indifference? — tim wood

As for Buddhism: No, but a case of witholding final judgment until the conditions for it are met. Or, holding tenets tentatively, provisionally.

It's why in Eastern philosophies, realization is so important: with it, the distinction between holding a tenet tentatively/provisionally, and knowing something to be a fact (ie. realization) is made clear.

Like in this analogy with seeking a bull elephant:

The Blessed One said: "Suppose an elephant hunter were to enter an elephant forest and were to see there a large elephant footprint, long in extent and broad in width. A skilled elephant hunter would not yet come to the conclusion, 'What a big bull elephant!' Why is that? Because in an elephant forest there are dwarf female elephants with big feet. The footprint might be one of theirs.

"So he follows along and sees in the elephant forest a large elephant footprint, long in extent and broad in width, and some scratch marks high up. A skilled elephant hunter would not yet come to the conclusion, 'What a big bull elephant!' Why is that? Because in an elephant forest there are tall female elephants with prominent teeth & big feet. The footprint might be one of theirs.

"So he follows along and sees in the elephant forest a large elephant footprint, long in extent and broad in width, with some scratch marks and tusk slashes high up. A skilled elephant hunter would not yet come to the conclusion, 'What a big bull elephant!' Why is that? Because in an elephant forest there are tall female elephants with tusks & big feet. The footprint might be one of theirs.

"So he follows along and sees in the elephant forest a large elephant footprint, long in extent and broad in width, with some scratch marks and tusk slashes high up and some broken-off branches. And he sees that bull elephant at the foot of the tree or in an open clearing, walking, standing, sitting, or lying down. He comes to the conclusion, 'That's the big bull elephant.'

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.027.than.html

As for Buddhism: No, but a case of withholding final judgment until the conditions for it are met. Or, holding tenets tentatively, provisionally.

It's why in Eastern philosophies, realization is so important: with it, the distinction between holding a tenet tentatively/provisionally, and knowing something to be a fact (ie. realization) is made clear. — baker

And one could hope in all endeavors, except those requiring a shoot-first ask-later response. But if our elephant hunter were charged such that he had to shoot, likely he would not wonder if it were a bull elephant, or even an elephant at all. There's that which we may know, that which we had better know, and that which we have to decide upon, knowing or not. And it would be enough for the elephant hunter to know - as best he could - that he was being charged.

There are imo interesting subtleties to Pyrrhoism (as I understand it), and they leading me to suppose that while it would be difficult to live every minute as a Pyrrhonist, it could still be a useful methodology of living to apply when possible and appropriate.

And one could hope in all endeavors, except those requiring a shoot-first ask-later response. — tim wood

Such a scenario would not occur for someone who has vowed to train themselves according to the (five) precepts.

In other words, there are epistemic cunundrums that a person who has committed themselves to living a highly moral life would simply not face.

@Banno@tim wood

Perhaps you're taking the notion of skepticism too far, so far that it begins to appear nonsensical. There's a kind of specious armchair skepticism which says that everything is debatable, but it cuts the ground out from under its own feet. There are things that can't be doubted - the painfulness of pain would be a good start. Attach a strong paper-clip to your earlobe, and then debate the point — Wayfarer

:lol: Now, I see why :point:

Pains occupy a distinct and vital place in the philosophy of mind for several reasons. One is that pains seem to collapse the appearance/reality distinction. If an object appears to you to be red it might not be so in reality, but if you seem to yourself to be in pain you must be so: there can be no case here of seeming at all. — Wikipedia (Private Language Argument - Ludwig Wittgenstein)

It's as if pain makes it real.

See below the definition of have to pinch yourself

Used for saying that you do not believe that something good that is happening to you is real

Example: I had to pinch myself to make sure I wasn’t dreaming.

Why is this so? What's so special, so real about pain?

Perhaps because pain and what it heralds, death, both negate existence, they can be taken to confirm an existence that's being negated.

@schopenhauer1 Reality is painful (antinatalism).

:chin: