But it's not analogous at all.

In logic, A can imply B without B implying A right? Now replace "A" with "Actual" and "B" with "Possible"

Conversely, that B does not imply A doesn't mean A does not imply B. That's why a "gap" is not analogous. Because it's possible to be able to move from A to B without it being possible to move from B to A.

There is a gap in mutual understanding here. All gaps can be logical, while at the same time being being realty-detached. Which logic is. A gap can exists litterally in spacetime, as a hole in a black.Though a gap in the common physicists mind is due to this gap. There can be gaps between all possible worlds of knowledge, as is surely the case in this case. There simply is no universal gap, and to pretend there is to deny the gaps of fellow people turning the discussion into a battle between the gaps.Which is very interesting, articulating the various gaps we have as human beings. The articulation of the gap seems, in my humble mind, a nice philosophical discussion, savely remote from standard lexicon like that standard dictionaries of Stanford and related institutions. Ah yes, the gap. How many of them I still have jump over, before reaching Nirvana? How many bridges I try to build, they always seem to crumble right after. Poor me. Luckily I have the power of the word, imagination, and sense of relativity, a God-given present, which came packed inside the God-given gift of life and existence. I rejoyce in the mad fool having found a logical proof of the obvious! Though I'm not sure what Quantum ElectroDynamics have to do with it.

:meh:

Metaphysics ... proposes criteria for discerning 'impossible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality necessarily cannot be) from 'possible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality can be) – btw, I'm an actualist, not a possibilist – thereby concerning the most general states of affairs ... — 180 Proof

such that

... by "a possible world" I understand a possible version of actuality (i.e. a possible way the actual world could have been or can be described), such that "actual" is not an index for any "possible world" at issue but rather is the extant domain, or universe, of possibilities (à la phase-space). — 180 Proof

and so a purported "gap between possible and actual" is conceptually incoherent in actualist terms. You're only chasing "possibilist" shadows, Fool, deeper and deeper into Meinong's Jungle. :chin:

I don't think there is a gap. If X is possible, X is actual. There's no such thing as a possible thing that isn't actual, except in colloquial terms.

I'm not sure if there's a philosophy centered around what philosophers mean when they say "possible." One only needs to know that God is possible to prove God exists, IMO.

The only things that can't possibly be known to be false are truths, as it's possible God exists and knows all things, true and false, and God can't possibly know Itself to be false.

lol It's so confusing. I'm out! Time to put this idiot to bed.

I am a theist, I believe in Holiness anyway...but how does God ever know that it wasn't created by the real God to believe it is God? And how does the real God know that, etc.

:eyes:
Theism is not true, "God" is imaginary; therefore your problem is (dis)solved. And if you're a theistic anti-realist (i.e. theological noncognitivist), then "the real God" makes no more sense than "the real Middle Earth".

Lots of imaginary things are true. Unicorns, for example.

Lots of imaginary things are true. Unicorns, for example. — theRiddler

Statements, not objects, can be true. :roll:

Shoulda figured you'd call me on that, but I disagree anyway.

There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio.

I don't think there is a gap. If X is possible, X is actual. — theRiddler

The God that kills the Christian God possibly exists, his name is Will Hoff.
Therefore Will Hoff exists.
God is dead and Will Hoff killed him.

It is also possible that you're not Christian and are actually lying about being Christian. Therefore it is actually the case that you're not Christian and are actually lying about being Christian.

You could be wrong about the possible being actual. Therefore you're wrong about the possible being actual. You could also be right about the possible being actual. Therefore you're right about the possible being actual. So you're right and wrong about the possible being actual.

And a whole lot of other messes happen when what's possible is what's actual.

Uh...I don't care what you name God...

I couldn't possibly be wrong if I'm right. I'm gonna go now and let you atheists try to solve the mystery of your anal retention.

I ouldn't possibly be wrong if I'm right. I'm gonna go now and let you atheists try to solve the mystery of your anal retention. — theRiddler

Great comment! I am sure there are gods. No one can prove me wrong how well they try scientifically (on which grounds I usually am the better).

I couldn't possibly be wrong if I'm right. — theRiddler

But also, it's possible for you to be wrong, but only think you're right. And since if something is possible it is factual, you are in fact wrong.

It is also possible for you to be right while thinking you're right. So you are indeed right.

You're right and wrong.

To All

First things first, what we agree on.

1. If X is an actual world then X is a possible world.

Now, the sticking point,

2. If X is a possible world then X is an actual world.

Statement 2, all of you say is false.

Consider now the following statement (contrapositive of 2)

3. If X is not an actual world then X is not a possible world (contrapositive of 2)

Invoking the principle of sufficient reason, if X is not an actual world, it follows that there are reasons why X is not an actual world. These reasons show why X can't be an actual world. In other words, there's an argument that proves X is not a possible world.

That is to say, it's true that,

3. If X is not an actual world then X is not a possible world.

Undoing what we did, we get

4. If X is a possible world then X is an actual world (contrapositive of 3). This statement is true.

QED.

I'm not happy to say I am god but I am aware of its truth nevertheless. — I like sushi

And a fortiori its implications. No small topic at all. Who knows, perhaps the original epiphany and understanding, revealing both organized religion and even the idea of a separate god as even more profound, fearful, ignorant, and ultimately contemptible escapism as a whole than ever realized by its parts. Anyway, amen!

Possible worlds are only relevant when it comes to propositions. The possible worlds make up for the sense ingredient for each separate reference. It does not point at the truth at all. For example, there is a world where snow is blue but in this world snow is white, so we get a sense of "white" when we mention snow because in this world snow is white.

Therefore possible worlds are needed as a way for us to make sense of what is NOT. It has no value when it comes to proving something that may exist in our world.

if X is not an actual world, it follows that there are reasons why X is not an actual world. These reasons show why X can't be an actual world. — TheMadFool

"Is not," "can't be": not interchangeable, not substitutable one for the other. Yours, then QE~D.

Also this is what you're saying.

1. If X is an actual world then X is a possible world.
2. If X is a possible world then X is an actual world.

I can also say:

1. If is apple then it is a fruit
2. If is fruit then it is an apple

Possible world has a greater scope that contains all actual worlds
Therefore you can't say that a possible world is an actual world because possible worlds do not completely contain actual worlds in its set- there are some worlds that are just potential. Otherwise it would be not be a set of potential worlds but actual worlds.

In a possible world we could be ants in the playground of a little kid. In another possible world there is a massive horse that rules the universe.

Therefore being ants in a playground and being subject to the whims of a horse are real. But if these words have no causal influence on ours at all, does it matter?

In other words, if God exists in another possible world what meaningful difference does that entail for us here? I can think of nothing, but perhaps you can tell me what I currently not seeing.

"Is not," "can't be": not interchangeable, not substitutable one for the other. Yours, then QE~D. — tim wood

Suppose a world Y is not actual. Why? There has to be a reason why that is. That reason becomes an argument the conclusion of which is Y is not actual. A conclusion is necessarily true i.e. Y is not actual implies Y is necessarily not actual. If Y is necessarily not actual then Y is not possible. Therefore, Y is not actual implies Y is not possible. That means Y is possible entails Y is actual. QED.

Also this is what you're saying.

1. If X is an actual world then X is a possible world.
2. If X is a possible world then X is an actual world.

I can also say:

1. If is apple then it is a fruit
2. If is fruit then it is an apple

Possible world has a greater scope that contains all actual worlds
Therefore you can't say that a possible world is an actual world because possible worlds do not completely contain actual worlds in its set- there are some worlds that are just potential. Otherwise it would be not be a set of potential worlds but actual worlds. — ninjachewit

Read my reply to tim wood

I'll repeat myself at the risk of boring you but it's quite exciting to say the least.

If a possible world X is not actual, there's got to be a reason why. That reason, in an argument, proves X is not actual. In an argument, the conclusion (here X is not actual) is necessarily true.

Therefore,

1. X is not actual implies X is necessarily not actual.

2. X is necessarily not actual implies X is not possible.

3. X is not actual implies X is not possible (1, 2 HS)

Ergo,

4. X is possible implies X is actual (3 Contra)

QED

This: =>, is not the same as this <=>. Implies does not mean means.
And you still have the problem of validity, truth/falsity, soundness. And even this not a complete specification.

George is at home or George is at the store.
George is not at home.
George is at the store.

Valid, true, sound. But oops, George isn't at the store! Logic, caveat emptor. Or at least understand its limits and boundaries.

This: =>, is not the same as this <=>. Implies does not mean means.
And you still have the problem of validity, truth/falsity, soundness. And even this not a complete specification.

George is at home or George is at the store.
George is not at home.
George is at the store.

Valid, true, sound. But oops, George isn't at the store! Logic, caveat emptor. Or at least understand its limits and boundaries. — tim wood

I have no idea what you're trying to say here.

My argument is rather simple.

Suppose X is not an actual world.

There has to be an reason why it's not actual (the principle of sufficient reason).

What does having a reason for X is not actual mean?

It simply means that we have an argument that proves X is not actual. If there's a proof for X is not actual, it implies X is necessarily not actual.

In other words,

1. If X is not actual then X is necessarily not actual.

2. If X is necessarily not actual then X is not possible.

Ergo,

3. If X is not actual then X is not possible (1, 2 HS)

Ergo,

4. If X is possible then X is actual (3 Contra)

QED

Suppose a world Y is not actual. Why? There has to be a reason why that is. — TheMadFool

There is a possible world in which my cat is ginger.

In the actual world, he is black.

Now the reason, if you need one, that the possible world in which my cat is ginger is not the actual world is that my cat is black.

Update

World X is not actual.

Why?

Reason R

Argument A1:

1. R

Therefore,

2. World X is not actual

However, given argument A1,

3. Necessary that world X is not actual.

4. If world X is not actual then necessary that world X is not actual. [from 2, 3]

Argument A2:

5. If necessary that world X is not actual then world X is impossible.

Argument A3:

6. If world X is not actual then world X is impossible [4, 5 HS]

Ergo,

7. If world X is possible then world X is actual [6 Contra]

QED.

1. If X is not actual then X is necessarily not actual. — TheMadFool

Nuh. "Actual" is an indexical. Like left and right. The folk in each possible world think they are in the actual world.

Add that "Necessarily" is just "In all possible worlds", and hopefully you will see why your proposition is ill-formed.

The problem with this argument is that the idea of God is not that he could exist in some possible world, but that insofar as he could be said to exist in any world then he necessarily exists in every possible world. But that, being a mere idea, doesn't tell us anything about God actually existing. This argument fails in the same way as the Ontological Argument.

I don't think all possible worlds exist(perhaps in a paradox).

There is randomness, not only technicality; not every world ends up being made depending on supply and demand.

The thought of possible worlds is the thought of a paradox, an illusionary phenomenon.

Are there any actual worlds where God exists?

Though, I may be wrong, there may be a creative entity that creates all possible worlds for the hell of it.

There is a possible world in which my cat is ginger.

In the actual world, he is black. — Banno

That whole idea is incoherent. Your cat could not be ginger in any possible world, because it would not be the same cat. All you're saying is that there could be a ginger cat in some possible world, which is trivially true. Modal logic is garbage.