In my view an aesthetic judgement always carries a discursive dimension, and I don't see a discursive dimension being involved in simply liking or disliking foods. ( — Janus

What about when a group of top international chefs get together for some food tasting? Do you think that their rich background as taste creators comes into play in determining their preferences, and that , like artistic and musical taste , their preferences were developed and shaped within a discursive community of foodies?
Isn’t that why there are shared preferences and fads for certain flavors and combinations of flavors in given periods and places? Salsa has replaced ketchup as the preferred condiment in the U.S., due to the influence of the hispanic population. Now is this different than the expanded interest in latin music?

David Chalmers: 'First-person experience is such that it cannot be fully described in third-person terms. Experience is inherently subjective, it has a quality of "something it is like to be...", and that quality is inherently irreducible to an objective description.'

Daniel Dennett: 'No, it isn't. A properly elaborated third-person description will leave nothing out. So there is no "hard problem" at all.' — Wayfarer

Is that an actual quote from Dennett: did he actually say that?

If he did say exactly that, then the obvious critique would be that a third person account is not a first person account; so by definition a third person account cannot include a first person account without being something more or other than just a third person account. So, I cannot see how Dennett could be claiming that a third person account could include a first person account; I doubt he would claim something so obviously absurd, so I conclude that he must mean something else, and we would need to see the context to find out what that is.

What about when a group of top international
chefs get together for some food tasting? — Joshs

(That is not to say there cannot be more complex culinary judgements that do involve some discourse, of course—first course, second course or main course :wink: ). — Janus

I think you may have missed the part in brackets (or maybe you replied before I added it since it was an edit).

:up:

I misread it to mean that discourse pertains only to practices concerning things like the ordering of the courses rather than to their taste.

Ah right, I can see how it might easily be read like that! The "first course, second course, main course" bit was just added as a flippant extending play on the words; "discourse, of course".

Is that an actual quote from Dennett: did he actually say that?

If he did say exactly that, then the obvious critique would be that a third person account is not a first person account; so by definition a third person account cannot include a first person account without being something more or other than just a third person account. So, I cannot see how Dennett could be claiming that a third person account could include a first person account; I doubt he would claim something so obviously absurd, so I conclude that he must mean something else, and we would need to see the context to find out what that is. — Janus

Do you agree then that there are phenomena in the universe (first-person experiences) that cannot be described by an objective third party?

Do first person experiences count as phenomena or are they experiences of phenomena?

Do you agree then that there are phenomena in the universe (first-person experiences) that cannot be described by an objective third party? — RogueAI

This is a common mistake found in posts in perception/phenomenology threads.

Try to be clear about what it is you're referring to.

Do first person experiences count as phenomena or are they experiences of phenomena? — Janus

Are first-person experiences a thing? I think they are. If they are, then you are admitting there is some thing in the universe that cannot be described by another observer.

This is a common mistake found in posts in perception/phenomenology threads.

Try to be clear about what it is you're referring to. — Caldwell

I'm saying there is a class of things (mental states) that cannot be described by observers other than oneself.

Are you suggesting that we experience the effects of things prior to cognitive experience. If so, that would not be conscious experience, though. Sorry, beyond that guess, I'm not sure what you're getting at; can you explain a little? — Janus

I am thinking about the experience as form of recognition. As with all forms it cannot really be separated from it's content. Therefor I think it is too lax to take the form as content for it's own when talking about such topics.
Take music as an example - there are different aspects to it:
- When listening there are judgements like "I like that song", "It reminds of another song" and so on.
These are judgements about the music.
- Then there is the aspect of the musicians who make the music who might have another view on it which is concerned with how to make it. Those are thoughts about their doings or activity.
- Then there is the physical side of things, e.g. sound waves. This plays a big role when reproducing or transporting the music.

Now, when talking about music you cannot subtract the sound-waves easily as this is what the musicians(or record) produces. In a certain way the subjective judgements about the music in the first point are the most distant from what the music _is_ - they are dealing with an effect they have on the subject.

I'm saying there is a class of things (mental states) that cannot be described by observers other than oneself. — RogueAI

Then, are you an observer or the perceiver? Mental states, as a phenomena, are supposed to be latent (in philosophical term) to the perceiver, but an objective account by an observer, if it could be observed at all.

I think you mean, if the perceiver is eating an apple, he is not perceiving the mental states, but the qualities of the apple -- color, shape, taste.

And just so you know, Husserl, if I was reading it correctly, believes that the existence of objects is a necessity. Why would he say something like this? Because it could only exist - the material world - if it's perceived. So, objects exists, if and only if we perceive them.

So, objects exists, if and only if we perceive them. — Caldwell

Nonsense. If I don't perceive you, you still exist.

Nonsense. If I don't perceive you, you still exist. — DecheleSchilder

As I would like to say so myself -- I did not create a bullshit account so I could log in to this nonsense!

Are first-person experiences a thing? I think they are. If they are, then you are admitting there is some thing in the universe that cannot be described by another observer. — RogueAI

I don't know what you mean by "thing" there. I would say experience is not a thing, although it involves things. To describe an experience you describe the things involved in that experience.

I think I understand what you are saying but I'm not seeing how it relates to what you originally were responding to, here:

According to our investigations there are electromagnetic wavelengths that give rise to seeing coloured things in suitably equipped percipients, but those wavelengths are not themselves consciously experienced, obviously. — Janus

I think I understand what you are saying but I'm not seeing how it relates to what you originally were responding to, here:

According to our investigations there are electromagnetic wavelengths that give rise to seeing coloured things in suitably equipped percipients, but those wavelengths are not themselves consciously experienced, obviously. — Janus — Janus

You were - in consequence - saying that, when I play guitar, that I am not hearing my play. That is what I deemed objectionable. The form of hearing what I play has the activity of my fingers, the vibration of the strings and the sound-waves as content.

\

You were - in consequence - saying that, when I play guitar, that I am not hearing my play. That is what I deemed objectionable. The form of hearing what I play has the activity of my fingers, the vibration of the strings and the sound-waves as content. — Heiko

I don't disagree with what you say there, but what I said doesn't bear on that at all, as far as I can tell.

I think I understand what you are saying but I don't see how it relates to
what what you were responding to here:

According to our investigations there are electromagnetic wavelengths that give rise to seeing coloured things in suitably equipped percipients, but those wavelengths are not themselves consciously experienced, obviously. — Janus — Janus

Okay, another try: You take the synthesis of form and content and say the content was not experienced, as if we were talking cause-and-effect. But that is not the relation between form and content.

Okay, another try: You take the synthesis of form and content and say the content was not experienced, as if we were talking cause-and-effect. But that is not the relation between form and content. — Heiko

All I was saying was that wavelengths of electromagnetic energy are not consciously experienced; meaning that we don't see wavelengths, we see coloured things. To put it another way, prior to scientific investigations people had no idea that colour was the result of different electromagnetic.wavelengths.

All I was saying was that wavelengths of electromagnetic energy are not consciously experienced; meaning that we don't see wavelengths, we see coloured things. To put it another way, prior to scientific investigations people had no idea that colour was the result of different electromagnetic.wavelengths. — Janus

But that is the same as saying when looking on a piece of paper (form) with a text written on it (content), the content was not experienced. It doesn't matter if you are able or unable to translate the text as we are not dealing with it's meaning.

But that is the same as saying when looking on a piece of paper (form) with a text written on it (content), the content was not experienced. It doesn't matter if you are able or unable to translate the text as we are not dealing with it's meaning. — Heiko

I don't see how what I said equates to that at all.

In any case in your example what distinction are you making between content and meaning? If I'm reading text in an unfamiliar language I would surmise that there is a content or meaning there, but I don't know what it is. How then could I be said to have experienced it?

In any case in your example what distinction are you making between content and meaning? If I'm reading text in an unfamiliar language I would surmise that there is a content or meaning there, but I don't know what it is. How then could I be said to have experienced it? — Janus

Exactly. The "meaning" here would be the "thing" that you try to put in first place.

Exactly. The "meaning" here would be the "thing" that you try to put in first place. — Heiko

Again I don't know what you want to say here.

If you are a piece of cloth with a shadow cast onto it one cannot say the light or absence thereof was not experienced even if the idea of a shadow-casting object is manifest.

Do you know what the paper is called, and who wrote it? — Wayfarer

I have a poor memory but here's what I managed to get ahold of :point:

David Chalmers first formulated the problem in his paper Facing up to the problem of consciousness (1995). — Wikipedia

Are there no novels of life as an animal...a bat?

Bear in mind that I said "consciously experienced"; I already allowed that there is a sense in which we could say that reflected electromagnetic radiation is (pre-consciously) experienced by the body. giving rise to the (possibly) conscious experience of coloured things.

As I would like to say so myself -- I did not create a bullshit account so I could log in to this nonsense! — Caldwell

Abstract nonsense sense even more. You created a bs account to ventilate an abstract missing intelligence, depleted of any humanity and respect for others. To ventilate a sense of abstract divinity showing a sense of abstract detachment from human reality. I have read some stuff of yours, as most others. Most of you, and luckily there are exceptions, are science aging freaks, without having actual knowledge, well maybe in that abstract greedy modern phony philosophical way,, without truly wanting to understand each other or trying to really know something. That's not what philosophy looks like. I have eagerly looked around here, and found truly interesting stuff. But as the abstract philo imperative says, all thought here here seems to be reduced to an abstract system. Without content. Showing any true physics or math or science, except tiring endless references to the both. Linger on, in your abstract, phony philosophy way. Linger on in your abstract beauty, your abstract no humor derived jokes (an inconsisteny). I set up as many bs accounts as I like, and I realize what you are doing. You are joining forces with other abstract minded phony philosophers, to get rid of someone who more in his mind than just abstract bs, to which modern philosophy is reduced. Linger on in your reality detached world. If I was standing near you I would gave you a wake-up slam in the face. Djeeezus, the envy that radiates from you and most of your fellow "philosophers". No signs of intelligence, no signs of being fun, no humanity left, except abstract definitions of it and quibbling about it. If philosophy is reduced to this...well, then luckily I will not call myself a philosopher. I will help on setting up bs accounts. This forum is the best way for coming to know closer the modern western way of thinking. The abstract way. I don't see philosophy as a part of it luckily. You gave me even more material to use. I'm thankfull for that! You confirm my substance. What a great argument you gave on my comment. If reality is just a perception, the hey, what do you care? Just close your eyes and all will be gone.