If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel
If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel
He relies heavily on the case of the phenomenal zombie, which is functionally and psychologically identical to him, but has no phenomenal experience. — Pantagruel
However convenient would might be for him to built his case on, still can never be right. — dimosthenis9
Are we to exclude deliberate deception? If so, how about innocent confusion? — bongo fury
But it is still possible to come to the right conclusion for the wrong reason. — Pantagruel
Clearly both twins are deceived."My zombie twin does not have any conscious experience, but he claims that he does" (p. 174). — Pantagruel
Any number of ways. Perhaps the zombie argument can yield the correct result if the conclusion-begging premise is better analyzed. — Pantagruel
I've always claimed to be the zombie, without lying about it. I don't think I'm conscious, at least not by Chalmers' definition, so no, they don't necessarily lie about it. Sure, I can detect red, but so can the simple mechanical device.If zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? — Pantagruel
I've always claimed to be the zombie, without lying about it. I don't think I'm conscious, at least not by Chalmers' definition, so no, they don't necessarily lie about it. Sure, I can detect red, but so can the simple mechanical device. — noAxioms
One difference must be that the actually conscious being can know that it is conscious (in the strong sense); — Pantagruel
Well, I've pretty much eliminated the immaterial mind as described by Chalmers, but the stanford page on eliminative materialism describes a 'radical position' which basic monism is not. I think my mental states supervene on physics, making me sort of materialist of sorts, hardly a radical position to take.But anyone who takes this view will likely be an eliminativist — Pantagruel
The OP says they're functionally identical, so by definition, immediate evidence does not rule out the possibility.If one accepts that our immediate evidence does not rule out the possibility that we are zombies, then one should embrace the conclusion that we are zombies
How is that a problem? It simply leaves it open to interpretation (as does any position without empirical differences).But the reason there is a problem about consciousness is that our immediate evidence does rule out that possibility.
How does this work? Acquaintance of the head with an immaterial picture inside it? — bongo fury
I think my mental states supervene on physics, making me sort of materialist of sorts, hardly a radical position to take. — noAxioms
If a machine with no ghost thinks it has a ghost, it is wrong. — bongo fury
In that case, it's probably the ghost thinking it's not a machine with no ghost, and the ghost is correct. The opinion of the machine is not given.If a machine with a ghost thinks it is not a machine with no ghost, it is correct. — bongo fury
"P-zombie" incoherence.He [Chalmers] relies heavily on the case of the phenomenal zombie, which is functionally and psychologically identical to him, but has no phenomenal experience. — Pantagruel
Chalmers’ zombie twin is not “logically coherent”, to me. He can only assume, and not prove, that “conscious experience” is missing from the zombie. — NOS4A2
Zombies are functionally equivalent to conscious entities. Generically different entities have different evolutionary histories (because "you count to two when you count them"), but given the functional equivalent clause in the definition, any treatment of p-Chalmers as saying something Chalmers says is by definition fair game.Would Chalmer's P-zombie twin also have the same evolutionary history as Chalmer? — RogueAI
But at some point, there'd be a common ancestor, which means that a non-conscious entity bred a conscious one with this new relationship with the external entity.Generically different entities have different evolutionary histories — InPitzotl
if zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel
if there were such machines with the organs and shape of a monkey or of some other non-rational animal, we would have no way of discovering that they are not the same as these animals. But if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — René Descartes
Actually Chalmers touches on this because, if his zombie-twin has an "inverted spectrum" of any conscious experience, for example, (sees blue where the other sees red i.e.) then there necessarily will be different "causal histories" of that type of experience, even if the experiences themselves are the same. So isomorphic mapping of history can be problematic. — Pantagruel
I'm wondering how P-zombies could have a history that involves the development of words that refer to conscious experiences they don't have. — RogueAI
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