The Nature of Consciousness

Yun Jae Jung

I've been contemplating whether consciousness is physical or spiritual. I'm sure that there are some flaws in my way of thinking and I decided that this would be a good place to ask as to what they might be.

My idea was to simulate two worlds and observe the difference of my choosing (consciousness) so that I can determine what the type of that difference is (physical or spiritual) by seeing what can remain the same between the two worlds in a hypothetical situation.

So this is the thought experiment. Imagine that there are two worlds. Both worlds have the same physical laws e.g. gravity, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, etc. However, from one world emerges the possibility of consciousness in the right conditions, but from the other, there is no such possibility even under the same situation. Now, it's possible for me to imagine a world where causality progresses without consciousness of any kind despite having gravity, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, etc. In that world, there would be humans that act like humans but wouldn't be sentient at all. (Fake People) Likewise, I know from experience that a world exists with physical laws and consciousness (our world).

So these two worlds have the same physical laws, but they're still different from each other. What is that supposed difference? It's consciousness. Therefore, does that mean consciousness is not physical by merit of me being able to imagine said two worlds?

There's a potential criticism because this is based on a hypothetical imagination, but logic still follows from even hypothetical situations. For example, I could imagine a blue balloon and a red balloon and know for sure that one of the differences in type is color. It would be wrong of me to say I could imagine these two balloons have the same color. So as you can see, you can still draw logical conclusions from even imaginary scenarios. -The very fact that you can imagine it shows that it's concurrent with the concept of a characteristic or type.

Thoughts? Flaws? -Yes, I know where babies come from but maybe physicality alone can't create self-awareness and there's a magical man that puts souls in objects.

I like sushi

This is basically a philosophical zombie.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/

SolarWind

I have written something similar: Imaginary proof of the soul .

It proves the existence of an "Ipointer" (or soul) independent of the existence of p-zombies.

Whether the Ipointer or the matter carries the qualia cannot be shown with this proof.

I wait for the one who comes after me to continue the proof.

Yun Jae Jung

↪I like sushi

Very interesting, I didn't know that there was already theory on this. Now I have some references when talking about this idea which is great!

Yun Jae Jung

↪SolarWind

Is there a reason why you're so concerned with whether matter contains qualia? I'm personally more interested in how causality would work between physical matter and spiritual matter.

I like sushi

↪Yun Jae Jung

Sounds like pan psychism … which I think you’ll find interesting. Personally I think it’s blind speculation.

MondoR

Why are you bothering to imagine anything? Just observe.

You are conscious. You interact with a physical world. Is there any boundary between you and the physical world. Between you and your physical body? Everything interacts, because it is all the same, just like steam-water-ice. There is no magical barrier between the three.

Mind is immanent and from itself is creates matter. No magic is needed to pull mind out of matter.

Manuel

So these two worlds have the same physical laws, but they're still different from each other. What is that supposed difference? It's consciousness. Therefore, does that mean consciousness is not physical by merit of me being able to imagine said two worlds? — Yun Jae Jung

I think the problem lies in thinking that what you mean by "physical" automatically excludes consciousness. Why? Why can't consciousness be a wholly physical phenomenon? It presumably comes out of certain configurations of matter, i.e. brains.

So what if the laws of physics don't say anything directly about consciousness? We need consciousness to access the laws of physics, so in a certain sense, they cannot be of a fundamentally different nature as experience. This does not mean that atoms think, or that panpsychism is true.

This should be taken as meaning that "physical stuff" is much, much more than what we initially take it to be, as it includes experience.

Matter which lacks the potential for consciousness in any possible configuration is not the physical stuff we actually deal with in this world, or maybe any.

SolarWind

Why can't consciousness be a wholly physical phenomenon? It presumably comes out of certain configurations of matter, i.e. brains. — Manuel

Simple questions: Does a housefly have consciousness? Does it have feelings? Or is it just a bio-machine? What about plants? Are reactions to the environment sufficient or necessary conditions for consciousness?

Someone with a complete worldview should be able to answer that.

TheMadFool

No magic is needed to pull mind out of matter. — MondoR

:up: We've been wasting our time.

TheMadFool

Does a housefly have consciousness? — SolarWind

Let's work with gut feelings. Do you hesitate, even if only for a moment, before swatting a fly?

Does it have feelings? — SolarWind

Same question as above.

Or is it just a bio-machine? — SolarWind

Ditto.

What about plants? — SolarWind

Ditto.

SolarWind

Let's work with gut feelings. — TheMadFool

This is not a scientific answer. It is about answering questions through experiments. In philosophy also through thought experiments.

What is then your gut feeling to dark matter? Why research? We'll just ask you.

TheMadFool

This is not a scientific answer. It is about answering questions through experiments. In philosophy also through thought experiments.

What is then your gut feeling to dark matter? Why research? We'll just ask you — SolarWind

I merely offered my thoughts on the matter. Sorry it didn't click. Sometimes it does, it should actually but I'm just getting to learn the ropes.

Vince

Simple questions: Does a housefly have consciousness? — SolarWind

Difficult to answer without a clear definition of what consciousness is.
The author of a neuroscience book I read defined consciousness as "the ensemble of all mental experiences ". Is it what we are talking about, or just some of these experiences? Like self-awareness for example.

NOS4A2

↪Yun Jae Jung

There is some question begging occurring in the scenario. The conclusion is assumed in the premise. Why would consciousness occur in one but not the other? In the world without consciousness the people are not sentient. Why are they not sentient? There is no consciousness.

SolarWind

"Simple questions: Does a housefly have consciousness? — SolarWind"

Difficult to answer without a clear definition of what consciousness is. — Vince

Would you ask the same question if someone hit their dog? Is the dog even conscious?

Why is it self-evident for you that the dog is capable of suffering, but you start to wonder about the housefly?

Do you also think about the clear definition of consciousness with the dog?

Vince

Would you ask the same question if someone hit their dog? Is the dog even conscious?

Why is it self-evident for you that the dog is capable of suffering, but you start to wonder about the housefly?

Do you also think about the clear definition of consciousness with the dog? — SolarWind

When I step outside, it is self-evident that the Sun is going around a flat Earth, which most of us know not to be true. It seems to me that non-human animals are not bio-machines, so I assume that they
have consciousness, but it doesn't make it true. But let's assume it's true, is animal consciousness the same as human consciousness? There are just too many elements in the definition of consciousness to answer the question with a simple yes or no. There's also a wide variety of animals with different types of brains, brain/body ratio, etc...Are animals sentient? Are they capable of introspection? In my opinion, trying to answer specifics will give a better picture than lumping everything together into one big question.

Apollodorus

maybe physicality alone can't create self-awareness — Yun Jae Jung

I think the question of self-awareness is a very interesting one.

What is "self"? Presumably, what (individual) "consciousness" identifies with, e.g., body, emotions, thoughts, etc.

But can consciousness be aware of itself beyond that? If yes, what is the object of that awareness? How could it be described or conceived?

Vince

First, awareness, then self-awareness, then awareness of self-awareness?

SolarWind

It seems to me that non-human animals are not bio-machines, so I assume that they have consciousness, but it doesn't make it true. But let's assume it's true, is animal consciousness the same as human consciousness? There are just too many elements in the definition of consciousness to answer the question with a simple yes or no. — Vince

It only matters if they can feel suffering, because suffering is the definition of conscious life.

So:
1) Can dogs feel suffering?
2) Can houseflies feel suffering?
3) Can plants feel suffering?

Corvus

For example, I could imagine a blue balloon and a red balloon and know for sure that one of the differences in type is color. It would be wrong of me to say I could imagine these two balloons have the same color. So as you can see, you can still draw logical conclusions from even imaginary scenarios. -The very fact that you can imagine it shows that it's concurrent with the concept of a characteristic or type. — Yun Jae Jung

That sounds like epistemic or psychological conclusion based on your perception. Logical conclusion involves premises, arguments. One can say that they are different colour without being illogical because the statement / judgement is based on one's sensory perception rather than analytic reasoning.

Thoughts? Flaws? -Yes, I know where babies come from but maybe physicality alone can't create self-awareness and there's a magical man that puts souls in objects. — Yun Jae Jung

Souls? - isn't it rather ancient religious or mystic tone rather than modern philosophy of mind?

litewave

So these two worlds have the same physical laws, but they're still different from each other. What is that supposed difference? It's consciousness. Therefore, does that mean consciousness is not physical by merit of me being able to imagine said two worlds? — Yun Jae Jung

Not necessarily. I can imagine a physical world that is the same as ours except it has no tomatoes. Yet there are tomatoes in our world. Does that mean that tomatoes are not physical?

Joshs

↪Apollodorus

What is "self"? Presumably, what (individual) "consciousness" identifies with, e.g., body, emotions, thoughts, etc.

But can consciousness be aware of itself beyond that? If yes, what is the object of that awareness? How could it be described or conceived? — Apollodorus

My favorite thinkers say self is not an entity , not a specific content , but a relation. We often use the word ‘self’ to talk about a unified multiplicity. We say a configuration is self-consistent or self-organized. We do t mean self here as a pure identity, but the way a process of change is consistent with ‘itself’ over time. Body, emotions, thoughts all belong to and at expressions of such an ongoing process of change.

Yun Jae Jung

↪litewave

I probably should've been more clear. I'm not talking about differences in whether something like tomatoes actually exist in one but not the other. I'm talking about intrinsic differences that arise from following the rules of a world (physical laws) like whether tomatoes COULD exist in one but not the other.

In the case of tomatoes, if the two worlds had the same physical laws and one of them had the possibility of producing a tomato, you would point out how a biochemical configuration representing a tomato can exist in the other world as well. You would not be able to say that there are two worlds - each which have the same physical laws in which tomatoes can exist in one but not the other. Either they can exist in both or they can't exist in both. It would be a logical fallacy to say otherwise.

In the case of consciousness, you can imagine two worlds - one in which consciousness exists and another where it doesn't despite the two having the same physical laws as evident by the philosophical zombie introduced by "I like Sushi." Since the zombie acts and reacts in the exact same way a real conscious person would, it would still follow the causality intrinsic in physical laws.

In logical proof, it's known that under a set of givens, if you hypothesize something and you have logical derivation that shows that you can evaluate something to be true and false at the same time, the thing that you have hypothesized is false. The negation of that is also true in that if you hypothesize something and you can't have logical derivation that shows you can evaluate something to be true and false at the same time, the thing that you have hypothesized is true.

The fact that you can imagine something and not find any contradiction in its imagination shows that you don't have logical derivation that shows you can evaluate something to be true and false at the same time. This would make the hypothesis (consciousness not being physical) true.

Yun Jae Jung

↪NOS4A2

Ironically, this led me to realize that what I've been trying to do this whole time was perform a negation over the proof by contradiction method. That is to assume the hypothesis is true and then see if you can find anything wrong with its conclusion. I've been making my life so much harder than it needs to be as that falls under circular reasoning as you pointed out when you have insufficient life experience to balance theoretics with reality which occurs quite frequently in simulation. This whole process would've been so much easier if I just did normal proof by contradiction where I only negate the hypothesis rather than the whole process so thank you for your comment.

Yun Jae Jung

I decided to rephrase this concept in a way that I hope will be much clearer to everyone. Everyone's comments have been very helpful to me in finding out some flaws in my reasoning and am hoping that there are less of them in the second iteration. I decided to try my hand at formal logic this time since that way, it would be easier for anyone to analyze. It's an attempt at Proof by Contradiction.

Premises
1. Logically impossible things cannot be imagined.
2. It’s possible to imagine that a philosophical zombie exists.
3. If consciousness is a purely physical process, philosophical zombies are logically impossible.

Hypothesis
H. Consciousness is a purely physical process.

Reasoning
4. (1) and (2) produces “Philosophical Zombies are Logically Possible” by Modus Tollens.
5. (3) and (H) produces “Philosophical Zombies are Logically Impossible” by Modus Ponens.

Conclusion
C. Consciousness is not a purely physical process by Proof by Contradiction w/ (H), (4), and (5).

Validity of Premises
1. Try imagining a triangle with 4 sides.
2. Physical laws and causality have nothing to do with whether consciousness can or can’t exist. The world could be entirely devoid of sentience yet still follow the same physical laws we know today. There is no reason why an inner experience should exist in regards to certain interactions; no physical rule prohibits lack of consciousness and therefore no reason exists for people to not be unconscious in relation to its physicality.
3. Qualia would have to remain consistent between real people and zombies if consciousness was purely physical and the two were physically identical to each other yet real people have qualia whereas zombies don’t by definition. Since real people can and do exist, this would mean that zombies can’t and don’t.

The Nature of Consciousness

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