No, I'm not saying that bad buildings are akin to bad acts. As I said above, I'm saying that the use of the word bad is not always subjective, it depends on what our point of reference is.

I do, believe rape is bad or morally wrong because of the objective nature of the harm done. It's just as objective, in my view, as the existence of the building. And ya, rape is bad regardless of what anyone thinks. — Sam26

This is moral relativism.

A building is "bad" if it does not fulfill its purpose, contextualized to the needs of the person building the building. The key here is that the "bad" judgment of the building is relative entirely upon human needs. A building designed to collapse under minimal strain for experimental purposes is a good building under that context, but if it fails to fail, it is bad. We can agree then, it's a matter of context when talking about good and bad buildings. We judge the building based upon pre-agreed criteria, and once those criteria are agreed upon, we can be objectively right or wrong in saying whether those criteria are met.

It's the criteria that aren't objective here, and that's the problem I'm pointing out. The criteria are relative to our needs and possibly arbitrary.

Turning to moral realism: Rape isn't bad relative to the needs of society. It's absolutely bad. It is bad not like the Leaning of Tower of Pisa is a bad building. It is bad like the Leaning Tower of Pisa is over 50 feet tall. It's just part of reality that rape is bad. That's what moral realism means. If you want to say that reality is entirely subjective, created by humans for humans, that's not realism, that's idealism. If you want to say that what we designate as morally bad is a human creation, that isn't moral realism either. That's subjectivism.

A building is "bad" if it does not fulfill its purpose, contextualized to the needs of the person building the building. The key here is that the "bad" judgment of the building is relative entirely upon human needs. — Hanover

Even in ancient Athens, we might abstract over temples, markets, homes, and so on, to come up with something we call a "building". For all I know, there's a dialogue where Socrates does exactly this (right before showing that every proposed definition of "building" fails).

The world we live in now has buildings because we have made it so: we now deliberately make buildings suitable for a variety of purposes.

We could look at ancient Athens, employ our abstraction, and say that there are buildings there; but those are not buildings in the same way that our buildings are buildings, are they?

Here's another question.

If you are a hobo, you might find a decrepit old barn and use it, temporarily, as a house.

If you are a wealthy couple on This Old House, you might spend half a million dollars to turn an old barn into a house.

Are those the same thing? Is one or the other "really" a house?

My beliefs are internal to me, just as my sensations are internal to me, so just as an expression of pain, which is something internal (the sensation) is expressed via ouch or a cry (external), so too, are our or my beliefs (internal) expressed via acts in the world (external), whether linguistic or not. — Sam26

Hmm. Internal... you mean private? Something is amiss.

How many planets are in our solar system? — Srap Tasmaner

A neat case in point - thanks. The number of planets is both an observation and an imposition.

We could look at ancient Athens, employ our abstraction, and say that there are buildings there; but those are not buildings in the same way that our buildings are buildings, are they? — Srap Tasmaner

I'd say there are things and there are categories. Pluto was a planet, then it was not, but it was always there. All sorts of criteria must be met for us to call Pluto a planet and we can choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have, but Pluto remains regardless of what we call it and regardless of what category we assign it. That I take to be the fundamental tenant of realism. There is an independent substance sustaining the thing; otherwise the thing exists as a pure construct of our imagination.

Moral realism requires that good and bad exist, just as Pluto exists, but good and bad don't exist in just the form that planets exist. That is, I can decide if Pluto is a satellite or a planet, but I can't decide it's not there. Pluto exists whether there are people to categorize it or define it.

Moral realism posits goodness and badness at the ontological level. It claims that it is the moral that is real (ergo "moral realism"), not just what we happen to call it. So, rape is bad. It doesn't become bad depending upon our purposes. That goodness and badness exist outside of us, offering it a place in reality, apart from our imagination.

To state otherwise, I contend, leaves us in a subjective state of morality, which is what you either accept or you accept what I've stated above. Both are fairly difficult to swallow, to be sure, because moral relativism and subjectivism require an admission that abhorrent acts are bad until we decide they're not. Moral absolutism is bizarre in that it has concepts floating about, truly existing, seeking a god to hold them firmly in his bosom.

If nothing else, God's Bosom is a pretty good name for a punk rock band.

I noticed that those you rejected, as a realist, are either abstract (mathematical stuff), or highly intangible (values and morality). And the one you embrace, as a realist, is reality itself -- which to me is a concrete stuff. Were in it.. We can't separate our selves or musings from reality. But somehow, morality and mathematics can be talked about as if they have a separate, permanent space somewhere that can be called into action at a moment's notice. — Caldwell

Cheers. Hence my puzzling about direction of fit. Consider Srap's planet example - what counts as a planet is imposed on the world, and yet restricted by the world. That same process is in place for maths. and perhaps for ethics.

If a self-described realist claims to be making a metaphysical assertion founded upon reason, and if he accepts that the tribunal of reason are his experiences, then at the very least he is describable as being a methodological solipsist, even if he believes to have obtained conclusions that aren't reducible to personal experiential verification... — sime

Interesting.

Realism is embedded in a language and hence in a community. Solipsism doesn't get a foothold.

Cheers. Hence my puzzling about direction of fit. Consider Srap's planet example - what counts as a planet is imposed on the world, and yet restricted by the world. That same process is in place for maths. and perhaps for ethics. — Banno

What part of the planet do you propose is restricted by the world?

What we think is out there is what enters the conversation. Unless you're saying they're the same thing? — khaled

Pretty much.

But we don't know when we have succeeded. — khaled

Success doesn't enter into this. There's only consistency.

The world is not what we experience, it is what is the case. That's a difference that few here seem to have picked up on.

Meh. use "reality" if you prefer, instead of "world".

I do. If I don't "know better" than an Iron Age philosopher, given all that humanity has learned in the interim, then God help me. Old Siddhartha believed in the "soul" and in reincarnation (and most certainly in the pantheon of Hindu gods to one or another extent), both obvious fallacies, and the latter an obviously ridiculous fallacy, to a logical positivist like me. — Michael Zwingli

Oh, he believed those things? Then it shouldn't be difficult for you to provide some citations for your claim.

Relief Without Drugs... — Wayfarer

,

Compulsory reading fifty years ago. He and Ian Gawler were part of my early training in meditation. They did not invoke the bullshit found in Transcendental Meditation and Krishna Consciousness. I've used the technique for some simple dental procedures.

Curious, this shared background.

I may or may not have a different opinion than Gautama. What do you think? Do you know exactly what he thought? — Janus

For all practical intents and purposes, we agree that the Pali Canon is "the word of the Buddha".

I have read Buddhist works a fair bit. Works in Zen (Dogen, D T Suzuki, Shunryu Suzuki, Hui Hai, Kaplan (I think) Thich Nat Hanh, Tibetan Buddhist works by authors whose names I can't remember and I've read some of the sutras (the Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra are two I can remember the names of) I've read a little Vasubandhu, Nagarjuna and some early discourses of the Buddha, and lots of other stuff I can't remember the titles of. I'm familiar with the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path and the idea of interdependent origination and so on.

I'm not a Buddhist and my relationship with Buddhism is rather complicated. But when someone claims to know better than the Buddha (or better than the Pali Canon), this catches my attention and I am very curious as to whether the person can live up to their claim.

Obviously much of it is open to interpretation, and there are and have been many schools of Buddhism. I understand the idea of the truth of suffering, that it is caused by craving and attachment, the idea that suffering can be ended, and the proposed way of ending it.

The question is as to whether any of that is proposed as the way to end just individual suffering, or whether it is proposed as the way to the final end of all suffering. I have some sympathy for the former, as I think there is some truth in it, but the latter is an unattainable goal, unless you were to destroy the world entirely. To be born into this world is to be subject to inevitable suffering.

Your two paragraphs contradict eachother.

At least one of the causes of suffering caused by human attitudes and actions has been identified. What possible solution could there be to suffering caused by natural events? Do you really believe that the behavior of the natural world is going to change, or that humans could cause it to change?

Gautama suffered old age and death just as we all will. Do you really believe he felt no pain whatsoever? — Janus

You said you read all those Buddhist sources, but you still have those questions??

If we can achieve a good death and the ability to suffer pain and physical decline cheerfully, what more could we ask? — Janus

A.k.a. "The Third and a half noble truth: Suffering is manageable".
No, this is not part of the Buddha's teaching.

All "external objects" are the products of experience based upon the shortcomings of our human sensibilities, — Michael Zwingli

I don't agree with that. Setting stuff out as the "product of experience" detracts from what actually occurs - as if we choose reality. No, we are embedded in the world, and the interaction is mutual.

We're stuck playing tennis in our heads between 'object' and 'subject' with an invisible, or non-existent, ball called 'metaphysics'. There is no clear winner and it just might be that there actually isn't even a game being played at all. — I like sushi

Indeed, and the solution may well be to stop playing that game by rejecting the division between object and subject. Look for a formulation that is not exclusively one or the other.

Indeed, and the solution may well be to stop playing that game by rejecting the division between object and subject. Look for a formulation that is not exclusively one or the other. — Banno

The aim or purpose of looking for such a formulation being what?

Let's say that we in the UK abolish the monarchy. Does the Queen of England exist? Well, Elizabeth Windsor exists, but as there is no monarchy there is no Queen of England, and if there is no Queen of England then the Queen of England doesn't exist. — Michael

That's an equivocation then.

I think the philosophical stance that is implicit in Buddhism is quite intelligible if studied diligently. — Wayfarer

Sure, and, as I said, it's a stance that is counterproductive for success in the world. People who think "it's all in their head" tend to end up in institutions with white padded cells.

Anyway, what prompted this detour into Buddhism is what Isaac said earlier:

/.../ I think a lot of the talk about realism and anti-realism gets stuck on this, but unhelpfully so. There's little point in getting hung up on that problem because it cannot be surmounted. The solution is to accept that state of affairs and move on. We're talking about the way things seem to us to be.

For some of us, things seem to be such that there's an external cause of our internal representations, something we cannot alter in real time (we can, of course, alter it after the perception, interact with it's construction - Joshs). I'd hazard a guess that for any who think there's not an external cause of our representation, the argument rests not on some way things seem to them to be, but rather on the above meta argument (that everything is ultimately some way things seem to us to be) and we should discard discussion of that meta argument as unhelpful.

So the issue really is in what things seem to have an external cause and why they seem that way. — Isaac

Distinguishing between subject and object, between the internal and the external is helpful for many purposes, notably, for successfully functioning in the socio-economic system.


Developing epistemological and ontological theories is a purposeful activity, and the purpose is more than just the ostensible "to get to the bottom of things, to figure out how things really are", but is purpose or goal oriented. In the case of the Buddha, the purpose was the complete cessation of suffering. For some others, it is power over other people. Etc.

Possibly, I'm mistaken; and you can prove this. Do tell o sage – what is "the cause of suffering" and how ought we "uproot" it? — 180 Proof

It's not a matter of ought. You're free to suffer.

For all practical intents and purposes, we agree that the Pali Canon is "the word of the Buddha". — baker

Yes, and like any text open to interpretation.

I'm not a Buddhist and my relationship with Buddhism is rather complicated. But when someone claims to know better than the Buddha (or better than the Pali Canon), this catches my attention and I am very curious as to whether the person can live up to their claim. — baker

I haven't said I know better than the Buddha. I said that I may disagree with aspects of what is taken to be his teaching.

Your two paragraphs contradict eachother. — baker

That statement is useless without accompanying explanation.

You said you read all those Buddhist sources, but you still have those questions?? — baker

Those questions are not directed at the Buddha's teaching. They are general questions. You seem to be stuck in your strawman view of me as thinking I know better than the Buddha. I don't accept that the Buddha was perfectly enlightened, so for me the Buddha is just another man that I might agree or disagree with, depending on interpretation; so it's not a question of knowing better or not knowing better.

A.k.a. "The Third and a half noble truth: Suffering is manageable".
No, this is not part of the Buddha's teaching. — baker

So explain what you think is meant by extinction of suffering, given that the pains and afflictions of the body cannot be extinguished without extinguishing the body, and that would mean its death.

Of course all of this is, at least in regard to the sense in which I think the OP intended to question the idea of Realism, way off topic. Perhaps it should be moved to a thread of its own.

I haven't said I know better than the Buddha. — Janus

You said:

There is no "final" or complete solution to the problem of suffering. — Janus

The Buddha maintained that there is a final solution to the problem of suffering. So if you say that there is no "final" or complete solution to the problem of suffering, you are in direct opposition to the Buddha.

Of course all of this is, at least in regard to the sense in which I think the OP intended to question the idea of Realism, way off topic. Perhaps it should be moved to a thread of its own. — Janus

Indeed!

Fitch's Paradox
There's a thread elsewhere about this, but it's a dog's breakfast. Since the topic is directly relevant to anti-realism it is worth mentioning here.

Anti-realism holds that stuff is dependent in some way on us, that thinking makes it so. That is, some statement p is true only if it is believed or known to be true.

For anti-realism, something's being true is the same as it's being known to be true.

Now a direct implication of this is that if something is true, then it is known - that we know everything.

Anti-realism is apparently committed to omniscience.

The problem does not occur in realism, which happily admits to there being unknown truths.

I haven't said I know better than the Buddha. — Janus

You said:

There is no "final" or complete solution to the problem of suffering. — Janus

The Buddha maintained that there is a final solution to the problem of suffering. So if you say that there is no "final" or complete solution to the problem of suffering, you are in direct opposition to the Buddha. — baker

That should be read, obviously, as "In my opinion there can be no final solution to the problem of suffering". So, as I have said, if Buddha says there can be a final solution to suffering then I disagree with him. If you agree with what you have imputed to Buddha and think there can be a final solution to the problem of suffering, a solution that would completely end all suffering for all time, a solution other than the total extinction of the world (which could not be effected anyway), then what do you think that solution could be?

The aim or purpose of looking for such a formulation being what? — baker

Understanding.

Anti-realism holds that stuff is dependent in some way on us, that thinking makes it so. That is, some statement p is true only if it is believed or known to be true. — Banno

I don't need to be a mathematical realist to claim that I don't know the square root of 123.

Oh, he believed those things? Then it shouldn't be difficult for you to provide some citations for your claim.
1h — baker

I have read a teaspoon's worth of text about Buddhism, not because of any of it's doctrines, but rather because I feel that the basic methodology involved therein violates basic human nature, and so involves a renunciation of human nature (I personally believe that aggression is the defining characteristic of maleness, and hold my animal nature dearly, even if it does cause me psychic pain and frustration). Even so, I do know that the achievement of moksha, which I believe to be the eschatological goal of Buddhist philosophy, is the release from samsara, the cycle of death and rebirth impelled by karmic law, and so the end of reincarnation. How, then, could the Buddha not have believed in reincarnation, and how can one accept reincarnation to be true without believing in the incorporeal self, aka "the soul"?

I don't need to be a mathematical realist to claim that I don't know the square root of 123. — Michael

Then where does the argument supporting Fitch's paradox go astray?

For anti-realism, something's being true is the same as it's being known to be true.

Now a direct implication of this is that if something is true, then it is known - that we know everything.

Anti-realism is apparently committed to omniscience. — Banno

Also, a verificationist need not claim that everything has been verified.

Anit-realism in Aesthetics and ethics.

Let's consider Fitch's paradox in the case of aesthetics. The anti-realist claim is that beauty is in the eye of the beholder - for all (a), (a) is beautiful if and only if (a) is thought beautiful.

It follows, fairly innocuously, that everything that is beautiful is thought to be beautiful.

In Ethics, ethical anti-realism holds that what is good is exactly what we know is good.

It follows that we know everything that is good.