What are you still wondering? — Daemon

You have replied to me that your topic was a kind of answer to @TheMadFool about undestanding. This didn't change at all my wondering of how has the subject of "undestanding" in the title been replaced by the subject of "translation" in the description! But after this, I'll stop wondering! So, don't worry! :smile:

Whether the world is as it appears to be is another (vast) question, and perhaps off topic for the Philosophy of Language forum — Daemon

My point was that skepticism about our ability to communicate (Quine, for instance), is very like skepticism about the world.

In both cases the skeptic belies her supposed beliefs with her behavior. And I think both kinds of skepticism are very lonely places to be. :grin:

That's interesting about Quine. How absolute is his scepticism about communication?

(I think the curly c is much prettier than the kicking k in the word "scepticism").

My own provisional position is that when we say for example that a word or a sentence has or carries or conveys meaning, that is a metaphor, one we find difficult to rekognise as such.

That's interesting about Quine. How absolute is his scepticism about communication? — Daemon

He would say there's no fact of the matter regarding whether your translations are correct. I think he would want us to deflate the concept of correctness.

My own provisional position is that when we say for example that a word or a sentence has or carries or conveys meaning, that is a metaphor, one we find difficult to rekognise as such. — Daemon

Nietzsche agrees and so do I, except there's a special brand of language use called propositions. I think this is communication, not between people, but between an individual and the world. IOW, I think we relate to the world as if it's a person and true propositions are its utterances. I think this has its roots in the time when people really did think the world was alive.

But you still think that propositions are special, and the world issues utterances, even though you don't think the world is alive??

But you still think that propositions are special, — Daemon

They're special because they're supposed to transcend any particular speaker. You and I can express the same proposition in different ways at different times. This invites questions about the nature of propositions, especially false ones.

I think we relate to the world as if it can talk: we ask it questions and expect answers even if we may not understand those answers at first, as with quantum physics.

When we don't understand what the world is telling us, we proceed as if it's just a matter of asking more questions. In fact some physicists celebrate the fact that the world has not yet revealed all its secrets.

I'm saying this general framework of interrogation is something we've inherited, and it explains the nature of propositions.

It's not normal in my time to believe the world can really talk, so that's why propositions are philosophically confusing.

Is that "transcending any particular speaker" just a metaphor, a fiction?

Is that "transcending any particular speaker" just a metaphor, a fiction? — Daemon

You and I can assert the same proposition. Logically, that means the proposition is neither our utterances nor the sentences we use. See what I mean?

Tomorrow

@frank Perhaps you can point out more clearly what this thread is about?

All I can see at the moment is someone stating the obvious (nothing wrong with that!) and trying to look beyond the obviousness ... it is the later part I'm having trouble with seeing.

Computers don't understand and humans do. Translation programs don't 'think'. Our experience of language within a given context helps us choose the better/correct meaning behind statements made - computers are limited to what they're programmed to do.

We are self correcting and constantly learning and relearning the world about us.

Where in here is the OP's idea/point/question?

Daemon gives two sentences:

. A. The councillors refused to allow the protestors to demonstrate, because they advocated violence.

B. The councillors refused to allow the protestors to demonstrate, because they feared violence.

A computer can't understand that "they" applies to the protestors in A. but the councillors in B, because it's not immersed in our complex world of experience. — Daemon

Some would say human language is a matter of rule following, but making sense of the above sentences seems to require experience with a point of view.

It may be that you're so closely allied with Daemon's outlook that it seems he's stating the obvious, but some might argue that Daemon is wrong: no experience with life is necessary for translation. The motive for arguung that would be to eliminate any reliance on experience to explain anything because the goal is to deny that there is any such thing as experience.

Some would say human language is a matter of rule following, but making sense of the above sentences seems to require experience with a point of view. — frank

Well, there is no 'seems to' about it. There is no manual for language. Anyone 'arguing' against is just plain wrong! I think maybe that some people confuse Chomsky's view of language as saying that there are strict rules. That isn't at all what he is saying though. Undoubtedly there are certain elements that constitute what we commonly refer to as 'language,' but there is still a lot of work to do in terms of the cognitive neurosciences. Sadly a large section of the 'Philosophy of Language' group were a bit slow catching up with the science and were still occupied with problems that had be solved by neuroscience ... it takes time for things like that to bed down. Ironically habituation is a huge element of our experience and understanding about-the-world.

The only space where confusion arises is within what we're framing as 'language'. I have big issues with that. Also, some people view 'thinking' as purely about the spoken/written word where within actual studies of language this divide is not always applied (context dependent given what is actually being considered for study).

It might help us @Daemon if you told me if you'd loosely say that these here words are 'translations' of my 'cognitive capacities' expressed with the purpose of elucidating some common meaning/understanding?

I think we might be slipping into semiotics here.

@frank Any chance you could look at thread about 'Choice: The problem with power' and see if you can disagree with me or highlight something?

Computers don't understand and humans do. Translation programs don't 'think'. — I like sushi

I Googled the phrase "Can computers think". I got 21,000 hits, including this, from Oxford University's Faculty of Philosophy (my italics):

Can Computers Think?

The Turing Test, famously introduced in Alan Turing's paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (Mind, 1950), was intended to show that there was no reason in principle why a computer could not think. Thirty years later, in "Minds, Brains, and Programs" (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980), John Searle published a related thought-experiment, but aiming at almost exactly the opposite conclusion: that even a computer which passed the Turing Test could not genuinely be said to think. Since then both thought-experiments have been endlessly discussed in the philosophical literature, without any very decisive result. — Oxford University's Faculty of Philosophy

It seems it's still very much a live question.

You and I can assert the same proposition. Logically, that means the proposition is neither our utterances nor the sentences we use. See what I mean? — frank

From what you said previously though, we can't know if we are asserting the same proposition?

Computers don't understand and humans do. Translation programs don't 'think'.
— I like sushi

I Googled the phrase "Can computers think". I got 21,000 hits, including this, from Oxford University's Faculty of Philosophy (my italics):

Can Computers Think?

The Turing Test, famously introduced in Alan Turing's paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (Mind, 1950), was intended to show that there was no reason in principle why a computer could not think. Thirty years later, in "Minds, Brains, and Programs" (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980), John Searle published a related thought-experiment, but aiming at almost exactly the opposite conclusion: that even a computer which passed the Turing Test could not genuinely be said to think. Since then both thought-experiments have been endlessly discussed in the philosophical literature, without any very decisive result.
— Oxford University's Faculty of Philosophy

It seems it's still very much a live question. — Daemon

I can only suggest that you reread and ask yourself what you're referring to above^^

If you can read into what I write something that explicitly isn't there then you probably don't get paid much for your work (or shouldn't) :D

Jibing aside; have fun I'm exiting :)

I can only suggest that you reread and ask yourself what you're referring to above^^ — I like sushi

I don't know what you're on about.

If you can read into what I write something that explicitly isn't there then you probably don't get paid much for your work (or shouldn't) :D

But oddly enough I do.

Jibing aside; have fun I'm exiting :)

Oh good.

Any chance you could look at thread about 'Choice: The problem with power' and see if you can disagree with me or highlight something? — I like sushi

Sure!

From what you said previously though, we can't know if we are asserting the same proposition? — Daemon

Yes. I don't think there's any logic that overcomes skepticism there, you just have to look at the cost of it: how much do you actually lose if you embrace that skepticism?

I think one result is that you can't know whether you agree with yourself from one moment to the next.

As some have noted (I think Chomsky did) if you adopt Quine's skepticism, meaning of any kind breaks down, so there would be no understanding.

Skepticism about the external world also results in a breakdown in meaning if you note Heidegger's point: that you are inextricable from your world. So if you deny the external world, the thing that's left isn't you. It's some foreign entity.

Yes. I don't think there's any logic that overcomes skepticism there, you just have to look at the cost of it: how much do you actually lose if you embrace that skepticism? — frank

You can't just pick and choose though, can you? I mean if the scepticism is justified, then it doesn't matter if you embrace it or not.

You can't just pick and choose though, can you? I mean if the scepticism is justified, then it doesn't matter if you embrace it or not. — Daemon

The human mind has a flair for justification. You can justify pretty much any belief you like. Make your own religion and build a community of believers who will support you all the way to the Kool Aid.

Identity and emotion are in charge. Logic is a brittle autumn leaf in a hurricane.

I did start my own religion on the internet, years ago. I attracted some adherents! Can't remember much about it but it was called "The New Religion". I offered people a chance to be in at the start of a new religion, and the opportunity to help develop its tenets. It was fascinating how people did want to be involved in it!

But do you think identity and emotion are in charge of you?

But do you think identity and emotion are in charge of you? — Daemon

I think so. You?

Not entirely. I apply some logic. I don't think "identity" is important to me...not national identity or any group identity...

matching linguistic symbols (words, spoken or written) to their respective referents
— TheMadFool
...and you were the one talking about CAT tools as if that had anything to do with referents.

There's a giant difference between responding to "Can you pick up some bananas from the store?" ...by showing me the phrase translated (poorly or greatly) to Dutch; and responding to "Can you pick up some bananas from the store?" ...by showing up on my doorstep with a bunch in your hand. — InPitzotl

The word banna is mapped to the fruit banana - every word has a referent.

What's the referent of "almost"?

What's the referent of "almost"? — Daemon

A pattern (the referent) which we can extract from the following scenarios:

1. I tried to jump over the fence, my feet touched the top of the fence but I couldn't clear the fence.

2. Sara tried eating the whole pie, she ate as much as she could but a small piece of it was left.

3. Stanley tried to run 14 km but he managed only 13.5 km, he had to give up because of a sprained ankle.

So for a computer to understand "almost" it has to somehow extract it from that load of drivel? Come on man. Do you think because you don't know anything about this, nobody else does either?

So for a computer to understand "almost" it has to somehow extract it from that load of drivel? Come on man. Do you think because you don't know anything about this, nobody else does either? — Daemon

What drivel? You asked me a question, I answered it. If you have any issues with the way I view semantics (as mapping of word to its referent), please be specific about where exactly I go wrong. Kindly refrain from derailing the discussion from something worthwhile to something puerile.

A pattern (the referent) which we can extract from the following scenarios:

1. I tried to jump over the fence, my feet touched the top of the fence but I couldn't clear the fence.

2. Sarah tried eating the whole pie, she ate as much as she could but a small piece of it was left.

3. Stanley tried to run 14 km but he managed only 13.5 km, he had to give up because of a sprained ankle. — TheMadFool

Extracting "almost" from those three sentences is a good example of something a computer couldn't do! If you asked a human to identify what the sentences have in common, they might say "they are all about people trying and failing". There's no "mapping" from those sentences to the word "almost", even for us.

Your ideas are simplistic and naive.

Extracting "almost" from those three sentences is a good example of something a computer couldn't do! If you asked a human to identify what the sentences have in common, they might say "they are all about people trying and failing". There's no "mapping" from those sentences to the word "almost", even for us.

Your ideas are simplistic and naive. — Daemon

I'm surprised that you're ignoring important details in my examples that help you abstract the meaning of "almost". Also, try and use the word "almost" in some sentences and reason from them the pattern which the word refers to.

In general, understanding consists in being able to effectively orient oneself – find critical paths – around or through complexities and uncertainties inherent in some existential situation or discursive domain (i.e. how the fly finds its way out of the fly-bottle).

Can a 'thinking machine', according to this definition(?), 'understand'? I suspect, if so, it can only understand to the degree it can recursively map itself within a map of a domain (or domains) recursively nested within a situation (or diachronic process).

Btw, particularly in philosophy, I think understanding

[results from] making explicit ordinarily implicit (i.e. unreflective) discursive uses, misuses and abuses of e.g. concepts, criteria, questions, problems, knowledge, etc. — 180 Proof