So if I say your cat is on the mat and you look over and see that it isn’t, your interpretation makes me wrong?That's not my claim. The world is always and already interpreted. — Banno
I don't understand what EE has written well enough to figure out whether I agree or disagree. — T Clark
1.4 Facts, Intentionality, Semantics and Truthmaking
We have mentioned the view that facts may explain actions and mental states and the view that facts are what we know. Facts are also invoked in the philosophy of mind by philosophers who claim that judgments or beliefs enjoy the property of intentionality, of being “directed towards” something, because they represent states of affairs or are psychological relations to states of affairs and that judgments and beliefs are correct or satisfied only if states of affairs obtain, that is, if facts exist. Versions of these claims are given by many philosophers from Meinong, the early Husserl and Russell to Searle (Searle 1983). Analogous claims in semantics are sometimes made about propositions or other truth-bearers: the proposition that Sam is sad represents the state of affairs that Sam is sad and is true only if this state of affairs obtains. Versions of this view are given by Husserl, Wittgenstein and Carnap. See the supplementary document on the History of Philosophies of Facts.
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Does the proposition that Sam is sad represent the state of affairs that Sam is sad? It may be objected that the proposition does not refer to anything as a state of affairs. And once again the friend of states of affairs may retreat to the safer claims that the proposition that Sam is sad is true only if the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains and that if the proposition that Sam is sad is true, it is true because the state of affairs obtains. Facts make propositions true.
Facts, then, are perhaps qualified to play the role of what makes judgments correct and propositions true. But the theory of correctness and of truth does not require us to accept that there are facts. Indeed it may be thought that the requirements of such a theory are satisfied by the observations that a judgment that p is correct only if p, and that the proposition that P is true only if p. If arguments in metaphysics or epistemology persuade us that there are facts, then we may perhaps appeal to facts in giving accounts of correctness and of truth. In the case of the theory of correctness conditions for judgment and belief the argument that knowledge is of facts together with the view that, contrary to a long and influential tradition, the theory of belief and of judgment presupposes a theory of knowledge (Williamson 2000) may persuade us that facts make judgments and beliefs correct.
The view that facts make propositions or other truth-bearers true is one theory among many of truthmaking. The theory of truthmaking deals with questions at the intersection between ontology, metaphysics and semantics. The view that facts are what make truth-bearers true is the oldest theory of truthmaking. — “SEP on Facts”
Ennui Elucidator In the light of your comments, how do you contextualize a phenomenon like, say, climate change and what to do? — Tom Storm
it generally gives me stuff that I prefer (even if I find the circumstance distasteful). — Ennui Elucidator
The world imposes itself on me and I try to mold it to my desires using whatever contrivance available. All “facts” are understood contingently and abandoned/modified as necessary. — Ennui Elucidator
I am unconcerned with whether a state of affairs obtains or if I am wrong if my epistemology cannot account for such. I am much closer to using ideas as tools to help obtain my ends and those of people/things within my scope of moral regard (to whatever level they fall within it). Either acting as if is efficacious or it is not. The world imposes itself on me and I try to mold it to my desires using whatever contrivance available. All “facts” are understood contingently and abandoned/modified as necessary. Facts are understood in a political context (all speech is political speech) and assertions of fact which you insist other people acknowledge as being such is a ploy. — Ennui Elucidator
fact, belief, knowledge, and truth are all pretty much the same thing.
— T Clark
Hanged for one hanged for any, no difference to you? — tim wood
And why insist that there is a territory for our map when all we can deal in is maps?
— Ennui Elucidator
Hmm. I'll invite T Clark and @Olivier5 to respond to Ennui, given what they have claimed here. — Banno
Or an actual state of affairs — Janus
I'm on the golf course. I look at my lie. I look at the flag. I turn to my caddy and say "What do you think?" He reaches in the bag, pulls out a club, and hands it to me. I turn to make the shot. Now... What do I care about? I don't care if he believes it's the right club. I don't care if he knows it's the right club. I don't care if it's a fact it's the right club. I don't care if it's the truth it's the right club. Just give me the fucking club. — T Clark
Yes.Do I accept this as 'her version of truth/facts' or do I take issue with her decision? — Tom Storm
I'd talk it through with her as much as she's willing without badgering or taking issue with her "faith" directly in order to maintain a trusting open relationship (assuming that's what we have) which, I think, makes persuasion more likely than not.What would you do?
It is also the state of affairs set out by a true statement. — Banno
the cat is in a hat" is true iff the cat is in a hat.
That's the whole of it. — Banno
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