My example seems to have diverted you away from the main topic. I'll accept that there's a significant difference between a person and an object.

However your stand on the ship of Theseus paradox is still unclear to me. Kindly share your thoughts on the matter.

What is a 'concrete entity using concrete visual marks and sounds?' — Wayfarer

It's just another way of saying a physical entity using physical marks and sounds. I mean, there's no way of conveying meaning other than by using physical mediums. And meaning can only be known (so far as we know) by physically embodied entities, and knowing the meaning of something is physical; it's a physical experience involving certain feelings and sensations.

So, I think the mind and the spirit are just the body seen in a different way. There are no mysterious, spooky abstract entities floating around in some realm. This is not to objectify the body, because it is equally mental and spiritual, and neither is it to objectify the mind or the spirit. Objectification is nothing more than a bodily (logical) process that is used for sense-making. As I have come to understand it, it is a case of 'the word made flesh all the way down'.

your stand on the ship of Theseus paradox is still unclear to me. Kindly share your thoughts on the matter. — TheMadFool

My initial response was simply that if there are two ships, that they're both instances of the same thing (although at the time my response wasn't informed by having read up on the classical 'Ship of Theseus' problem.)

But in any case the way I resolved it was to say that the identity of the object does not belong to this or that instance of it. In other words, I designated 'Ship of Theseus' as a type, rather than as an individual instance - and so whether there is one, or more than one, of the Ship, is no longer problematical.

But I also acknowledged that if you were a collector that needed to acquire an original 'Ship of Theseus' and not a replica, then it's a different matter - you're concerned with a particular Ship. I suppose, were I a collector, and were it known that the Ship of Theseus had been replicated by having all its planks replaced, then I might take that into consideration and classify the particular one that I am looking for in accordance with that knowledge. ('Oh, Director. You're after The Ship of Theseus, are you? You know there's an issue with provenance in respect of that particular ship, don't you.....')

But that is one of the aspects of the problem - whether the identity of an individual thing is dependent upon it being made of the same material. I'm inclined to say it's not, because I don't see identity in materialist terms.

It's just another way of saying a physical entity using physical marks and sounds. I mean, there's no way of conveying meaning other than by using physical mediums. — John

Well, one response is that the meaning of a sentence can be shown to be independent of both the language and the medium it is represented in. In other words, if I take a particular sentence, with a very specific meaning, that can be represented in a number of languages and retain the same meaning. It can even be represented in codes such as binary codes, or semaphores, or Morse code, and retain the same meaning. So, the physical signal or sign is one thing, but the meaning is another.

And meaning can only be known (so far as we know) by physically embodied entities, and knowing the meaning of something is physical; it's a physical experience involving certain feelings and sensations. — John

I don't know about that at all. I think there are genuine instances of telepathy, and I don't know if that's a physical process; or it's certainly not a process that most people who describe themselves as physicalist would be inclined to admit. But books such as Irreducible Mind have a lot of evidence for non-physicalist accounts of the nature of mind.

And again, abstract ideas are demonstrably not feelings or sensations. Doing a mental calculation doesn't require or invoke a sensation. An insight into an intellectual problem is demonstrably not a sensation, although it may provoke a sensation of exhilaration. Sure, there are physical implications, neuronal activities going on in the brain but I don't agree that it is meaningful to describe those processes as being only physical, unless you obtain to a materialist theory of mind, which you say you don't.

There are no mysterious, spooky abstract entities floating around in some realm. — John

'Realm' is a metaphorical description. There is no literal realm or place, but there is nevertheless, for example, 'the domain of natural numbers' and numbers can only be apprehended by an intelligence capable of counting. They're not 'floating around' in a 'realm', that is an attempt to objectify the idea.

As oxymorinic as it sounds it could be a case of reason-based convention, just not arbitrary convention. — TheMadFool

If arbitrary means without reason, then I don't believe there is any truly arbitrary convention, as human beings always act with intention in there somewhere, so there is always reasons for why they are doing what they are doing. The problem is that we are often incapable of determining those reasons, so it's easier just to say that things are arbitrary.

The point being that if the paradox has any worth i is the exposure of our poor understanding of identity. — TheMadFool

I agree with this, and I suggest that it is not really a paradox. Do you recognize that there are two distinct senses of "identity", two distinct meanings of "the same"? One is identity according to a continuity of existence, which we have been discussing. If we can identify a continuity of existence, then despite numerous changes to the identified thing, (even taking it apart and rebuilding it, or changing all the parts of it in repair), we say it remains as "the same" thing. This is the common sense meaning of "the same".

The other is a sense of identity which is more proper to logic. In this sense, identity is a formal description, or formal definition, not a continuity of existence. Identity is determined by a statement of "what" is being referred to. So we could have a description of ship A, and so long as the thing referred to fit that description, it is ship A. But it must fit that description. In this case, then, as soon as we removed one plank from ship A, we'd have to refer to the definition of ship A, and see if it allows for this change. If not, then the ship is no longer ship A.

The appearance of a paradox is created by mixing up these two distinct senses of 'the same". There is an illusion created that "the ship" has a formal definition, in the logical way, that there is a definition of ship A, and we must adhere to that definition, in order that the object is ship A. But no formal definition has been provided, so we are left only with the continuity of existence as our only form of identity. We take this default sense of identity naturally because it is the common sense form of identity. This allows for change to the ship. Change to the ship implies that we may contradict the formal definition of "the ship". But there is no formal definition of "the ship", so there really is no contradiction and no paradox, because we are simply left to distinguish ship A according to prevailing conventions, not any principles of logic. And there is always discrepancies between such conventions. The apparent paradox is just a matter of these discrepancies, not a failure of logic.

Well, one response is that the meaning of a sentence can be shown to be independent of both the language and the medium it is represented in. In other words, if I take a particular sentence, with a very specific meaning, that can be represented in a number of languages and retain the same meaning. It can even be represented in codes such as binary codes, or semaphores, or Morse code, and retain the same meaning. So, the physical signal or sign is one thing, but the meaning is another. — Wayfarer

I don't believe there absolutely strict determinable meanings; there are rather families of association due to commonalities in the forms of human life.

What kind of reality do you imagine meanings have outside their being understood by body/minds?

Doing a mental calculation doesn't require or invoke a sensation. — Wayfarer

My experience is that mental calculation very definitely does involve bodily feelings and sensations; inner sounds, images or sensations of movement, for example. So, where do we go from here?

'Realm' is a metaphorical description. There is no literal realm or place, but there is nevertheless, for example, 'the domain of natural numbers' and numbers can only be apprehended by an intelligence capable of counting. They're not 'floating around' in a 'realm', that is an attempt to objectify the idea. — Wayfarer

'Realm' represents the idea of something like a real domain (although I am not suggesting that the etymology of 'realm' is associated with the etymology of 'real'). You say that "numbers can only be apprehended by an intelligence capable of counting. some animal species are thought to be able to count and yet they do not represent symbolic numbers to themselves. No doubt abilities with symbols vastly extend arithmetical capabilities, because numbers may be physically encoded in signs external to our bodies, such as sounds and marks.

The question is whether number has any reality beyond its instantiations and/or its being perceived or apprehended by body/minds, and if so, what exactly that reality could consist in. You say "apprehended by an intelligence" which is a loaded way of putting it that evokes the notion of a free-floating disembodied intelligence. Inherent in your way of putting it is the presupposition that intelligence is 'something' non-physical that "apprehends" other non-physical things like numbers and ideas. Why must intelligence be non-physical, and why would you think that its being physical rules out its being mental and spiritual? I'm trying to understand where these prejudices come from, and not just in you: they are widespread..

I don't believe there absolutely strict determinable meanings; there are rather families of association due to commonalities in the forms of human life.

What kind of reality do you imagine meanings have outside their being understood by body/minds? — John

Take scientific laws, formulas, plans, blueprints - any number of those things might have 'strict determinable meanings'. Say it's the formula for some substance used in manufacturing. The ingredients, method of combining them, and way of processing them, might be extremely exacting - get it wrong, and it doesn't work. Get it right, and it produces the exact outcome. But they can be represented in different ways - so the physical representation is different to the information being conveyed. (This is the same basic principle as behind Apo's 'epistemic cut', I think.)

A very simple example - I say to you, 'draw a triangle'. If you do anything other than draw a plane area bounded by three straight lines, then you haven't got it. Concepts are indeed determinate - see Ed Feser's piece, below.

And also, the notion of 'triangle' is not dependent on my thinking about it - a triangle is real in any possible universe. As are the natural numbers, I'm sure.

Recall the Pioneer Plaque, and the reasoning behind it. It was presumed that any alien intelligence advanced enough to discover the Plaque would be able to infer the meaning of the symbols on it.

My experience is that mental calculation very definitely does involve bodily feelings and sensations; inner sounds, images or sensations of movement, for example. So, where do we go from here? — John

To your demonstration of how that is relevant, perhaps.

The question is whether number has any reality beyond its instantiations and/or its being perceived or apprehended by body/minds, and if so, what exactly that reality could consist in. You say "apprehended by an intelligence" which is a loaded way of putting it that evokes the notion of a free-floating disembodied intelligence — John

Numbers can only be perceived by an intelligence capable of counting. If you can disprove that, please do so.

This argument is basically about 'whether numbers are discovered or invented'. It is a famously difficult problem, and it is beyond adjutication i.e. there are credible authorities for both views, but I'm generally advocating a form of Platonic realism. It really isn't that outlandish, but it's against the grain of modern culture, that's all.

I'm trying to understand where these prejudices come from, and not just in you: they are widespread.. — John

I suggest you don't know how to envisage the possibility of incorporeal or immaterial truths. This all goes back to the debate between medieval realism and nominalism. The outcome has shaped the way Western culture thinks about it.

About the only modern philosopher I know of who argues for the kind of dualism that I am advocating is Ed Feser (although he's a lot better at it than me, he's a professional). He's neo-Thomist, and Thomism preserves the 'traditionalist' idea of the reality of intelligible objects.

Here are some refs:

Augustine on Intelligible Objects

Think, McFly, Think, Edward Feser.

Take scientific laws, formulas, plans, blueprints - any number of those things might have 'strict determinable meanings'. — Wayfarer

Well, we're swapping back and forth between verbal language and more determinate mathematical languages, now. Make up your mind what you want to talk about.

To your demonstration of how that is relevant, perhaps. — Wayfarer

It's obviously relevant because you say your experience (presumably) tells you that no physical feelings and sensations are involved in calculating and understanding, and I say my experience shows me very clearly that they are involved. So, either someone's right, and the other does not attend closely enough to their own experience,(and how could we demonstrate that?); or we each simply have experience of a different nature. I don't think you're taking much trouble to carefully read and consider what I am saying, which makes for poor conversation.

physical feelings and sensations are involved in calculating and understanding, and I say my experience shows me very clearly that they are involved. — John

I think in this case, the burden of proof is on you.

This point is addressed in detail in the Feser blog post I linked to.

Why do you say that when there's no way of proving it either way?

By the way, the 'embodied' or 'enactive' philosophers, as well as early phenomenologists such as Merleau Ponty and Heidegger and contemporary phenomenologists such as Alphonso Lingis and David Abrams would agree with me, so it is not as if I am articulating some incredibly radical standpoint.

Why do you say that when there's no way of proving it either way? — John

The question of whether maths is 'invented or discovered' is a notoriously thorny problem, and also a metaphysical question. There are many views, often irreconciliable, so there's no ultimate court of appeal. That's what I mean by 'beyond adjutication'.

it is not as if I am articulating some incredibly radical standpoint. — John

No, you're just making 'concrete marks', based on 'sensations and feelings'. It's why you think that means something that is problematical. ;-)

No, you're just making 'concrete marks', based on 'sensations and feelings'. It's why you think that means something that is problematical. ;-) — Wayfarer

It's only problematical to your conception of meaning, which thus begs the question, as I see it. And, relatedly, I think the question of whether mathematics is "invented or discovered" is a malformed one, based on the very kind of preconceptions about reality and meaning I would want to call into question.

Wayfarer is more or less a substance dualist.

For bodily feelings and sensations to be involved means making mathematical thought part of causality. It means understanding or experience of mathematics must emerge out of their body. It requires bodily sensations to cause or inspire me to think of mathematics. In this context, experience because material (or body, in the context of substance dualism)-- states of my mathematical thinking emerge out of state of bodily sensation, which in turn emerged out of my body.

For many, it simply can't be true because it would mean substance dualism is false.

Wayfarer is more or less a substance dualist. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am, with the caveat that the mind is never an object of cognition, which is the subject of debate in the panpsychist thread.

In this context, experience because material (or body, in the context of substance dualism)-- states of my mathematical thinking emerge out of state of bodily sensation, which in turn emerged out of my body. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I would hate to think of what a square root would feel like.

I would hate to think of what a square root would feel like. — "Wayfarer

That's a starwman. The argument isn't that the thought of square root is a bodily feeling, but that a bodily sensations cause or manifest with a distinct state of understanding a square root.

The square root doesn't feel like anything. Our bodies feel before or concurrently with us thinking about a square root.

John made an important point that seldom comes up in this debate. Its also important to note that the original version of this example did not include Ship B. That was added way later in history, around Kant's time if I'm not mistaken. However, when the Greek's posed this question it was in the pre-Cartesian sense of identification. And in the sense of identification, a possession require agency, thus Theseus' ship is always the one captained by Theseus & his crew.

But in the later examples, Theseus is long since passed on, therefore is Ship A or Ship B Theseus' Ship. Semantics is important here, because the words we use necessarily condition our view of the situation. In this case, once Theseus' ORIGINAL ship is torn apart, neither are Theseus' Ship anymore. Ship A is a new ship that takes up the same point in space/time that occupies the point that was once occupied by Theseus' ship. Ship B is a 'reconstructed' sum of the parts of Theseus' original ship.

Not sure if anyone is feeling those answers, but that is a possible outlook after having addressed this problem through multiple lenses and looking for different aspefts embedded in the argument.

So, according to you (process metaphysics) ships A and B are both ''the ship of Theseus''. I may have misunderstood but the reason you say why this is so is that both ships are part of the same process (on the same worldline) - therefore indistinguishable. Am I right?

If so, consider a pregnant woman and her fetus. They're both part of the same process/worldline. Therefore, according to process metaphysics, they should both be the same person. Yet, we consider the mother and child to be two different persons. What gives here?

I designated 'Ship of Theseus' as a type, rather than as an individual instance - and so whether there is one, or more than one, of the Ship, is no longer problematical — Wayfarer

I fear ''type'' is a weasel word here. It is more a matter of convenience (to eliminate the paradox) than any real progress to a solution.

Following your line of reasoning there would be no individual identity at all. Everything would simply be a ''type''.

'Weasel words' are words that are intentionally ambiguous or misleading, and that is not my intention here.

I don't know if identity can be said to be something fixed or absolute. It is something that can be maintained, while still changing over time. IN fact the human being's cells are regularly changed and renewed throughout their life; aging is mainly the slowing of that process, and when you die, all change stops (except decomposition.) I believe the paradox appears because of the need to regard identity as being something fixed or immutable, when it actually never is. So I think I'm defending the 'relative identity' thesis, if you or anyone has any objections to that, I'd be interested in hearing them.

However, when the Greek's posed this question it was in the pre-Cartesian sense of identification. — Wolf

Interesting point. I hadn't thought of it in terms of 'the Cartesian sense of identication'. Perhaps you might elaborate?

This "paradox" simply illustrates how identity is not an intrinsic aspect of macro-scale objects; it is something that we assign to them in accordance with our purposes. Strictly speaking, ship A at one time and place is not identical to ship A at another time and place, even if none of its planks have been replaced yet. Instantaneously replacing all of its planks just makes it more obvious that it is a different object.

So ship A becomes ship B, but remains "the ship of Theseus" because people continue to call it that, despite the replacement of all its planks. As apokrisis would say, echoing Bateson, for most people having one new plank - or a lot of new planks, or even all new planks if they are replaced gradually - is not a difference that makes a difference for the purpose of referring to the ship. Hence I suspect that most people would call the reconstructed ship A something like "the original ship of Theseus" to distinguish it from ship B as "the current ship of Theseus." — aletheist

I agree with this answer.

If this is described as a continuity of existence of the object, then it becomes part of the object's identity, as per the description. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not so much about description, but about how identity is assigned. If a group of people think of it in the way that you describe above, and assign identity accordingly, then that is the practical meaning of identity for that group of people.

If the act is described as an annihilation, and the rebuilding of a new object, then there is no such continuity of existence, as per the description. There is a description of one object ceasing to exist, and a new one coming into existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strickly speaking, there can be no annihilation of an object and a rebuilding of it. That is impossible. It would have to be something else which is annihilated, or something else which has ceased. An object can lose one or more features and be rebuilt, but it can't be annihilated and rebuilt. You could think of one or more of those features as essential, but that would be your thinking, and would be subjective, relating to you, the subject.

Your example of the glass is not an example of an object being annihilated and rebuilt. The object is just broken, melted and reformed, not annihilated. What changes is how we identify with it. I used to be able to drink out of it, but when it smashed into lots of tiny pieces, it lost that function. It was temporarily no longer a tool in this way, and so lost that identity, until it was rebuilt and regained that identity.

So for instance, if you break a drinking glass, and collect the pieces, melt and remould them into a drinking glass, we would describe this as one object being annihilated and a new one coming to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

That "we" is misleading. Some people would describe it that way and others would describe it in a different way which contradicts that way, for example, by saying that it was the same object reformed, not that there were two objects: an old one and a new one, but that there was one object under different forms. That is one common way of identification: a way which maintains persistence of identity over time, despite physical change.

The object wasn't annihilated, so if that's what whoever you're referring to is describing, then, strictly speaking, whoever you're referring to is mistaken. But if that's how they identify with the object, then, practically, it may as well have been annihilated.

Any attempted solution which priorities one way of speaking and rules out others will always have to compete with the opposing proposed solutions which it rules out, rather than reconcile these proposed solutions under a broader encompassing theory which avoids the kind of problems that these proposed solutions face. There are more sophisticated and less problematic proposed solutions to this problem.

The point is, that identity, as a continuity of existence is something which is assumed. Continuity of existence has never been proven, so you hear things like people wondering if an object continues to exist if it is not being looked at. Since continuity of existence, and therefore the "identity" which is associated with it, is just an assumption, then what constitutes continuity of existence, in our beliefs, depends on how we define it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, basically.

I think it depends on whether the people talking about the ship consider it to be the same or different, or on the purposes of some linguistic community, in other words. I don't think that there is some truth of the matter beyond this as to whether it is the same or different at t1 compared to t2.

It's not so much about description, but about how identity is assigned. If a group of people think of it in the way that you describe above, and assign identity accordingly, then that is the practical meaning of identity for that group of people. — Sapientia

What I said early, is that identity in the sense of the temporal continuity of an object, is something which is simply assumed. It has never been proven that an object continues to exist as itself, through temporal duration, so there are no firm principles whereby we determine that an object is the same object through a period of time. However it is a very useful practise, and that practise is shaped by convention, just like language use.

There can be no annihilation of an object and a rebuilding of it. That is impossible. It would have to be something else which is annihilated, or something else which has ceased. Your example of the glass is not an example of an object being annihilated and rebuilt. The object is just broken, melted and reformed, not annihilated. — Sapientia

As I said, it's a matter of convention. I think that when a drinking glass has been broken into a whole bunch of bits, it has been annihilated, you don't.

Problems like this are the reason why we developed a second sense of identity, which I call logical identity. In this sense, we have a defined term, and as long as the object meets the conditions of the definition, it has been identified accordingly. So we could agree on a definition of "drinking glass" and we could agree on a definition of "annihilate", and determine whether or not the drinking glass has been annihilated.

Logical identity has its own problems though. The object is identified through a definition, so it is more likely that a "type" is identified, and unless the description is extremely thorough, it doesn't properly single out a particular identified object. There could be more than one object which fits the description. Following the Leibniz principle, identity of indiscernibles, some effort has been made to define temporal continuity, such that we could determine logically whether something maintained its identity as the same thing through a period of time, but we have no such principles.

Any attempted solution which priorities one way of speaking and rules out others will always have to compete with the opposing proposed solutions which it rules out, rather than reconcile these proposed solutions under a broader encompassing theory which avoids the kind of problems that these proposed solutions face. There are more sophisticated and less problematic proposed solutions to this problem. — Chief Owl Sapientia

Yes I agree, it's a matter of convention, so there will always be disagreement. however, if we could determine the principles which constitute temporal continuity, and we could all learn these principles, and refer to them when deciding whether or not an object continued to be the object which it is, then we'd have much better agreement.

As I said, it's a matter of convention. I think that when a drinking glass has been broken into a whole bunch of bits, it has been annihilated, you don't. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think that it has been annihilated, rather than just broken? Is it just an exaggeration? Or something else? (Although, if it was just an exaggeration, then you wouldn't really mean what you say, and you wouldn't really think that it has been annihilated).

Problems like this are the reason why we developed a second sense of identity, which I call logical identity. In this sense, we have a defined term, and as long as the object meets the conditions of the definition, it has been identified accordingly. So we could agree on a definition of "drinking glass" and we could agree on a definition of "annihilate", and determine whether or not the drinking glass has been annihilated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then let's see if we can do that, because I want to understand your point of view, which seems to differ from my own. It seems to me like you might be moving the goalposts by referring to a "drinking glass". The drinking function ceased, but that is just a subject's way of seeing the object. The drinking part is not a part of the object.

If a certain structure is an essential part of the existence of an object, and that certain structure is destructed, then the object would cease to exist. Is that your thinking?

Logical identity has its own problems though. The object is identified through a definition, so it is more likely that a "type" is identified, and unless the description is extremely thorough, it doesn't properly single out a particular identified object. There could be more than one object which fits the description. — Metaphysician Undercover

But one can identify the object in different ways, so as to identify a particular. We're talking about this cup, not that cup, or any other cup. I could point to it or give it a unique name or specify its time or location with enough precision to differentiate it from others.

Following the Leibniz principle, identity of indiscernibles, some effort has been made to define temporal continuity, such that we could determine logically whether something maintained its identity as the same thing through a period of time, but we have no such principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm. Maybe.

Why do you think that it has been annihilated, rather than just broken? Is it just an exaggeration? Or something else? Although, if it was just an exaggeration, then you wouldn't really mean what you say, and you wouldn't really think that it has been annihilated. — Chief Owl Sapientia

When something is destroyed we can say that it is annihilated. The drinking glass no longer exists, it has been broken, destroyed, therefore I say it has been annihilated. There is no exaggeration. If something comes to its end without being destroyed we might not say it has been annihilated, such as when a human being simply dies we wouldn't say that person was annihilated. But if the human being is blown to bits, like what happens to the drinking glass, we can say that it was annihilated.

Then let's see if we can do that, because I want to understand your point of view, which seems to differ from my own. It seems to me like you might be moving the goalposts by referring to a "drinking glass". The drinking function ceased, but that is just a subject's way of seeing the object. The drinking part is not a part of the object. — Chief Owl Sapientia

"Drinking glass" has a particular meaning, that's why I used it instead of just saying "glass", so there would be no ambiguity. There is no moving the goalpost, because I intentionally used "drinking glass" from the beginning to avoid such ambiguity. A drinking glass is a glass which is used for drinking out of. Annihilate means to destroy. When the drinking glass is broken to bits, why do you not agree that it has been annihilated?

If a certain structure is an essential part of the existence of an object, and that certain structure is destructed, then the object would cease to exist. Is that your thinking? — Chief Owl Sapientia

I don't think it's a case of being a "certain structure", it's a case of fulfilling the conditions of the definition of the word. We have certain expectations of what any word refers to, and it could be a certain structure, but in many cases, like "drinking glass" it is mostly a purpose, a use. If the object no long fulfills the conditions expected of the word, it should no longer be referred to by that word. And since the object was broken to bits, we can say it was annihilated.

But one can identify the object in different ways, so as to identify a particular. We're talking about this cup, not that cup, or any other cup. I could point to it or give it a unique name or specify its time or location with enough precision to differentiate it from others. — Chief Owl Sapientia

In many cases one can point to the object, though right now it would do me no good if you pointed to the object. But what is at issue here is if it is still the same object which you pointed to, after you point to it. Say you point to the object, and this acts as our defining of the object, if we leave and come back later, how do we know that it is the same object we are looking at?

When something is destroyed we can say that it is annihilated. The drinking glass no longer exists, it has been broken, destroyed, therefore I say it has been annihilated. There is no exaggeration. If something comes to its end without being destroyed we might not say it has been annihilated, such as when a human being simply dies we wouldn't say that person was annihilated. But if the human being is blown to bits, like what happens to the drinking glass, we can say that it was annihilated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Broken? Yes. No longer serves the purpose of drinking out of? Yes. But how has the object itself been destroyed or annihilated? If the object itself has been destroyed or annihilated, rather than just broken down, then how could it be rebuilt? The object is the sum of its parts, yes? So if the object is destroyed or annihilated, then by implication, so are the parts. If you conceive of it as a drinking glass, then it seems that, if anything, it is your conceptualisation which has been destroyed, rather than anything else, in the sense that it is no longer applicable when the object is broken.

Similarly, when someone is blown to bits, their body isn't annihilated - even though we might say that it has been as an exaggeration or a word which seems appropriate - because it is still there in bits. One change might be that we refer to body parts instead of a human being.

"Drinking glass" has a particular meaning, that's why I used it instead of just saying "glass", so there would be no ambiguity. There is no moving the goalpost, because I intentionally used "drinking glass" from the beginning to avoid such ambiguity. A drinking glass is a glass which is used for drinking out of. Annihilate means to destroy. When the drinking glass is broken to bits, why do you not agree that it has been annihilated? — Metaphysician Undercover

But you also refer to the object, and there is nothing in the object itself which makes it a drinking glass. So it seems that your attachment to your conceptualisation of the object as a tool is getting in the way of talking about the object itself.

I don't think it's a case of being a "certain structure", it's a case of fulfilling the conditions of the definition of the word. We have certain expectations of what any word refers to, and it could be a certain structure, but in many cases, like "drinking glass" it is mostly a purpose, a use. If the object no long fulfills the conditions expected of the word, it should no longer be referred to by that word. And since the object was broken to bits, we can say it was annihilated. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, are we talking about the drinking glass or the object? If the former, then yes, the drinking glass has ceased to be. But what about the object?

In many cases one can point to the object, though right now it would do me no good if you pointed to the object. But what is at issue here is if it is still the same object which you pointed to, after you point to it. Say you point to the object, and this acts as our defining of the object, if we leave and come back later, how do we know that it is the same object we are looking at? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I understand that problem. It relates to the ancient question of whether one can step into the same river twice.

It's not physically identical, but we can nevertheless identify it and categorise it as we did before, if we do not regard physical identity as the be-all and end-all

Why would you think that completely annihilating an object, and then completely rebuilding a copy of the original object, with the same parts, constitutes having the same object? — Metaphysician Undercover

The answer to this earlier question of yours would be that it hasn't been completely annihilated and it has all the same parts, and they are the criteria being used to conclude that it is the same object.

In the case of something being disassembled and then reassembled, its period of "non-wholeness" is part of its history, and cannot be considered a "destruction". — John

There's another reason, @Metaphysician Undercover. The glass that is smashed into pieces and then rebuilt from those pieces is an example of something being dissembled and reassembled. It therefore cannot be a destruction.

What if we use a simpler example? You and I each have an axe. We swap axe-heads. Do we each have the same axe we started with? Have we swapped axes? Or do we each have a new axe, with the old axes having been "destroyed"? If we each have the same axe we started with, what if we then swap handles?

Does the time between the swapping of axe-heads and the swapping of handles matter, such that if we did this within the space of a few minutes then we've switched axes but if we did this within the space of a year then we've retained our original axes? Does the proportion of the change matter, such that if we swap 10% of each axe at a time then we've retained our original axes but if we switch 60% (and then 40%) of each axe then we've switched axes? — Michael

Objectively, no axe is destroyed and each axe is different. Something about them is always different, even when you don't do anything to them. Time doesn't matter, except in the sense that things change over time, and proportion doesn't matter, since they'll change anyway, and therefore differ, whether the change is minute or large.

Customarily, you could answer in a number of different ways, including by saying that by swapping the heads back, you regained your original axe, and that when the axes swapped heads the first time, they were the same as they were beforehand except for the heads.

Well I can't help you answer this question, after studying Kripke it appeared resolved to me. I agree it is an important issue to consider.