I think that we probably do have 'stone age brains' in many ways, but I think that the experiences we have, as well as our own philosophical searches, can probably stretch our perception and potential. I do believe that reading and thinking are very valuable but I think that it is our experiences, and probably the hardest ones, which will lead us to develop the greatest knowledge. This does go beyond epistemological reasoning, and it is probably about the inner process of synthesizing the knowledge and reflective self-awareness.

1. Understanding denotes conceptual reflection (i.e. metacognition) by which knowing is distinct from, and contextualized by, not knowing. — 180 Proof

To me, understanding means to become aware of the key elements/components of a(n) subject/issue/problem. As an example, take the debate on abortion. Understanding it, in my opinion, involve a number of related ideas - personhood, religion, feminism, secular ethics, medicine, politics, to name a few - on which the controversy is centered. Recognizing these as key to the question of whether or not to allow termination of pregnancy amounts to understanding in my humble opinion.

I reckon it takes both talent and practice to master this skill and despite a decade as a member of this forum, I still fail to put this into practice - most of the time, I haven't the foggiest idea what's going on.

2. Knowledge denotes (A) proven proficiency, (B) accurate description, (C) well-tested explanation or (D) a combination of two or three of kinds of knowing. And information is merely the contents (i.e. disambiguated / aggregated data) of which descriptions consist. In other words, oversimply put, knowledge is form and information is (descriptive) content. — 180 Proof

I concur. Knowledge is about form which I take to be pattern; the particulars, information, flow out of it as naturally as water from a working faucet.

(My "picked brain's" usages, Fool, which might not be dictionary standard.) — 180 Proof

Your versions are better than the dictionary ones. :up:

My own thinking on knowledge is that it is different from information in the sense of it being about a connection with the information and ideas in some kind of meaningful way. I believe that it is connected with understanding, because it involves being able to make use of what one has learned. Understanding may be something which we think we have, but I am not sure that it is that simple because it is about whether we are able to make use of what we consider to be our knowledge, and apply to the experiences which test our capabilities. In a way, my own view of understanding is related to the concept of insight. I think that it is a kind of deeper level of knowledge based on being able to reflect on the ideas which we have and take them on board to live in a greater conscious and responsible way. I am not sure that I am fully able to live with insightful awareness, but I am seeking to be able to do so. — Jack Cummins

Knowledge, sticking to the justified true belief definition, is about entailment between given propositions and others; understanding, though includes knowledge, also requires us to see the broader issues at stake. Information is simply propositional and is neither inferential nor general in the sense we take pains to tease out the fundamental ideas at play.

I don't find a tension in these ideas. But I do have a "metaphysical itch", so that may be why. I could imagine a different intelligent species from us being able to cognize the world in a deeper manner, perhaps perceiving more than we could, in some respects. So I don't see a problem with this idea in principle

Descartes and his contemporaries knew what they were looking for, in that they sought a mechanical explanation for things. It just happens that the world doesn't work like this.

Donald Rumsfeld famously said "there are unknown unknowns" i.e. things that we don't know that we don't know. However it seems me that as these things are discovered they will add to the breadth of our knowledge rather than the depth.

The search for a "deeper truth" is surely an artefact of the human brain and not something that actually exists in the universe. Did the discovery of quantum physics satisfy our need for deeper knowledge? It seems not and yet it is the deepest thinking that we seem to have currently. Neither does it tell us who will win the next election or how long we will live or whether our children will be happy and content in life.

I was just reading your comments and, yes, my question does involve the semantics of what we mean by the idea of 'knowing'. I believe that Kant thought that there were limitations of how much we can really know about metaphysics, apart from by means of intuition and a priori logic. Jung made his famous television broadcast, saying that he did not believe in God, but rather , 'I know', based on the direct experience of God in dreams and other personal experiences. However, I am sure that many people would challenge his use of the idea of such knowledge as reliable.

One aspect which I think about is how science gives us findings which are used to build theories, but the theories are interpretations, which may be modified at some point. But, most of all theories are only models, and, thereby, only partial pictures of reality or 'truth'.

I find the discovery of unknown unknowns as being very interesting and that is probably why I am interested in reading and thinking about philosophy. There is also psychology exploring and the question of how well we even know ourselves, let alone know other people, including those close to us.

Jung may know God like I know about the numinous. The phrase is fine and in ordinary conversation is not terribly complicated to speak like this. After all, we have to speak with each other in this world. But when you begin questioning what does knowing God consist of, complications arise very quickly.

It's a bit different when you say I know my favorite colour or my favorite song. That's ok. It involves in essence recognizing that such a phenomena or qualia are the ones you are most attracted to. What does this amount to? I'm not sure.

I agree, our grasp on reality is tenuous and constantly subject to revision of one kind or another. We are blessed that we are able to have theories at all. There's no obvious reason why any creature should have the capacity for explicit knowledge, much less theories about the world.

I believe that Kant thought that there were limitations of how much we can really know about metaphysics, apart from by means of intuition and a priori logic. — Jack Cummins

Kant proposed that our minds impose empirical limits a priori on our concepts and therefore that non-empirical speculations (i.e. metaphysical ideas) cannot be known by us but only believed as matters of faith (e.g. "God, freedom, immortality"). Read Kant's Prolegomena of Any Future Metaphysics.

I find Kant a bit heavy to read. I went through a period of reading his writings when I was a teenager. I read some of writing by him a year ago but I found it a bit of a struggle and, generally, find it easier to read what others have written about him, but I guess that it is probably best to go to the original texts, and, perhaps, it would be worth me reading his, 'Prolegomena of Any Future Metaphysics'.

Really, it is amazing just how much people do know. We are especially lucky being in the information age and having so much available for us, ranging from the internet and e-books. We are also able to look back on the ideas of so many different eras and cultures. But, of course, each of us has our limitations and we have to be selective. There is only so much one can read. I often think that there is so much importance literature and philosophy that it would almost require a few lifetimes to read it all. I guess that most people specialize and this does mean that certain areas are focused upon and others left out almost entirely.

I was just reading your comments and, yes, my question does involve the semantics of what we mean by the idea of 'knowing'. I believe that Kant thought that there were limitations of how much we can really know about metaphysics, apart from by means of intuition and a priori logic. Jung made his famous television broadcast, saying that he did not believe in God, but rather , 'I know', based on the direct experience of God in dreams and other personal experiences. However, I am sure that many people would challenge his use of the idea of such knowledge as reliable.

One aspect which I think about is how science gives us findings which are used to build theories, but the theories are interpretations, which may be modified at some point. But, most of all theories are only models, and, thereby, only partial pictures of reality or 'truth'. — Jack Cummins

I think for Kant, contra Spinoza, intuition is not a source of knowledge, and a priori logic tells us only about what must be the case regarding human experience.

So, he would also reject any claim to know there is a God on the basis of "direct experience of God in dreams and other personal experiences". Remember that Kant's central project was to establish the limits of (pure) reason to make way for faith.

I agree with you that scientific theories are models. As they say 'the map is not the territory'.

Descartes already complained about it back in his time, that no one would be able to finish reading all the books being published. If you strained yourself or were gifted, you could read most important work in science (including psychology, sociology, medicine), etc. This probably stopped being true by the mid 19th century.

Perhaps Russell was that last person able to master most topics and try to form a synthesis. I think Chomsky, may be the last one, though even he isn't as gifted as Russell was in terms of mathematics, not in terms of anything else.

In any case, yeah. The best one can do is to find a field or two you love or something like that. I like to read experts on specific fields, saving myself the work of several lifetimes by reading, say, 20-30 books as opposed to thousands. Whatever works for you.

And much knowledge is innate, in ways we cannot comprehend. This is a crucial aspect in knowledge, not emphasized nearly enough.

I don't find a tension in these ideas. But I do have a "metaphysical itch", so that may be why. I could imagine a different intelligent species from us being able to cognize the world in a deeper manner, perhaps perceiving more than we could, in some respects. So I don't see a problem with this idea in principle — Manuel

For me the issue is: why would the other species be seeing 'deeper' into reality? Maybe they have another sense organ, a bigger brain. I grant that they'll have a more adaptive/complex understanding. If that's all deeper means, then I withdraw my objection. For me the issue is the 'really' in the 'really know.' Or we don't 'really' know what X is despite being able to deal with X. I'm saying that this vague, hidden surplus is suspicious to me, as if it's feeling masquerading as thought.

Hmm. It's a subtle distinction you're making, I think. I mostly have in mind the first option, that of another creature having a more complex or maybe even comprehensive understanding of some aspects of reality such that we'd have no issues.

However, a part of it is quasi-Kantian, in the sense of dealing with X without knowing what X encompasses in its totality. Perhaps the things-in-themselves/phenomenon distinction would be formulated differently: instead of saying we know nothing about things-in-themselves, I'd say we know extremely little about it.

Another creature would perhaps know a bit more.

But I'm attracted to the idea that there is a grounding of the effects in nature that are non-representational in nature, which we can't access. A bit like trying to understand how the brain works by thinking about it.

So I entirely concede that I may be masquerading here, at least in part.

But I'm attracted to the idea that there is a grounding of the effects in nature that are non-representational in nature, which we can't access. A bit like trying to understand how the brain works by thinking about it.

So I entirely concede that I may be masquerading here, at least in part. — Manuel

I like the idea (which I can also make more sense of) that reality may just be too complex for us to model, that there are complicated patterns we'll miss.

What you mention above reminds me of the blindspot on the retina. Or the guy who can't find the glasses he's wearing.

... science gives us findings which are used to build theories, but the theories are interpretations ... — Jack Cummins

QM constitutes a theory. 'Many-worlds' or 'hidden variables' or 'collapse of the wavefunction by observation' are interpretations of QM. In other words: a theory (science) is a good explanation from which unique predictions can be made and tested; an interpretation (philosophy), on the other hand, derives from a theory what it presupposes about reality or the conditions which make some theory possible. (Read K. Popper or P. Feyerabend or D. Deutsch.)

Oh I agree Kant's main works are a tedious slog at best. I recommend the Prolegomena ... because it's an uncharacteristically readable summary of the Critique of Pure Reason which he wrote in order to sell the CPR to philosophers and students who were put off by Kant's dry prolix obscure style. No doubt Hegel would be even more opaque decades later.

That would be the idea. And maybe nature works this way.

Or maybe nature is too sophisticated for us as you say, which would make us agree on the main point if differing in our specific formulations.

I am definitely not opposed to theories and we need to develop them as working knowledge; but I it is all about different competing descriptions, ranging from the scientific accounts to metaphorical ways of viewing. I have downloaded a book by Popper, so I will try to read it.

But, one aspect of the development of knowledge is fitting all the different ideas together. Many of the well known philosophers sought to do this within the development of their own unique systematic perspectives. I also wonder about systems views because it may be that we are in the position of needing to juggle all the various specialist disciplines, ranging from quantum physics, neuroscience and the social sciences. I believe that we are in the position of needing to juggle all the different, multidisciplinary aspects of knowledge together in a synthetic way, with the logic and analytical scope offered through philosophical methods and ways of thinking critically.

I think that Russell did a great job and we should follow his example. I think that it is a delicate balance between focusing on the specifics of specialised knowledge and seeing the larger perspective. It is about seeing from more than one angle, the details and from a much wider perspective. It is a task in itself, but, of course, it involves our own subjective experiences and reading and thinking with a view to more objective frames of reference.

I think that the use of intuition alongside rationality is complex in the mapping of the widest perspective of our knowledge. In building of our models, I am inclined to believe that what is most important is incorporating the widest possible perspective rather focusing on specific facts, in order to build up a picture which is intricate and not based on the specific focus in a way which involves a narrowing of vision, or tunnel perspective. It may involve zooming in and out of specific ways of thinking and being able to juxtapose various ways of framing questions and answers.

I think that you make an important point about blindspots. One model which I am aware of is Johari' s model , which involves various aspects of which we may be conscious of certain aspects about ourselves, and how feedback can increase our own knowledge about ourselves . I think self knowledge and awareness are an important aspect as a starting point for further and deeper knowledge of everything else. Indeed, our own blindspots, and understanding of them, may be an essential part of finding greater depth of knowledge.

Yes. I mean, biology alone and I mean a specific subfield of it, would take a lifetime. Similar to many disciplines by now. So if we do want to speculate reasonably well, we must attempt to find sources which we think are reliable.

And risk ridicule. Or one can take philosophy as a matter of specializing in X or Y's thought on issues. Notice that today, there are very few figures (if any) which are considered giants in the field. Maybe people like Quine, Strawson and Kripke could be considered important.

But I don't think they had the breadth of the classical pragmatists, who lived only a few decades before these.

It's a bit depressing.

I try not to get depressed by all that we could strive to know. We live in the context of some appearing as 'experts'. Even within philosophy there are hierarchies, ranging from popular views and those who are ranked as being important. It seems to me to be a complex mixture of what we need to know to live meaningfully and, also, about the best and most accurate knowledge required to forward the human race in the complex circumstances of our times.

You've lost me, Jack. My focus :point: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/591539

Maybe people like Quine, Strawson and Kripke could be considered important.

But I don't think they had the breadth of the classical pragmatists, who lived only a few decades before these. — Manuel

:up:

I am sorry if I have lost you, and, sometimes, I think that I lose myself, trying to make sense of so much information and translating it into knowledge. I am aware that there is a thread on what is fact, which is probably considered to be far better than my own thread.

However, I come from the perspective of thinking about building systems of knowledge, but, perhaps, such a way of thinking is not relevant in philosophy any longer, or only on a personal level. Perhaps, philosophy of the future will only be concerned with outer reality and, the inner aspects of experience will just be seen as aspects of psychology and, outside the scope of philosophy entirely.

I come from the perspective of thinking about building systems of knowledge, but, perhaps, such a way of thinking is not relevant in philosophy any longer — Jack Cummins

Well, as Freddy says ...

I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. the will to a system is a lack of integrity. — Twilight of the Idols

To my mind, as I've said before elsewhere, philosophy is not theoretical, does not produce knowledge but instead reasons towards more probative questions and inquiries, proposes only 'interpretations of knowledge' rather than knowledge itself (pace Kant et al) and contemplates speculative ideas (i.e. creates thought-experiments) while exposing, even dis-solving, grammatical / semantic confusions which block discourse or derail dialectics. Philosophy is performative, like e.g. music or theatre or martial arts, not propositional in the way histories or sciences are propositional.

That said, why are you avoiding my questions here –?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/591539 :chin:
Do you think they are relevant (as correctives?) to the thread topic? If not, Jack, why not?

I will try not to avoid your questions, and I will have a look at your link, but, I really don't believe that philosophy can ever be entirely theoretical, because it is so tied up with the real questions of knowledge which impinge on our own sense of meaning directly.

I have just looked at your link and it is to my own thread. I am sure that the thread which I have created has great weaknesses, and I started it with a view to looking at the best scope of knowledge. I am aware that we have a history of thinking about knowledge going back to writers from Plato, Hume and Russell. Obviously, the scientific methods have brought us into a different perspective, with physics and many other aspects of discovery. I am certainly not opposed to science, or the thread on facts on this site, but thinking more of looking at knowledge on a panoramic scale, and how we can integrate it in the best possible way.

Ohhhh–kay. Nevermind, mate. :victory: