Creatures without free will can also change. Instead of coming from free will, the change can come from external factors that can happen through deterrence and rehabilitation. I'll stick to the dog example, assuming you agree they don't have free will.

You can deter a dog from barking by using a shock collar. Similarly, rehabilitation or training the dog to obey his master can be done by rewarding desired behaviours and punishing undesired ones.

Creatures without free will can also change. Instead of coming from free will, the change can come from external factors that can happen through deterrence and rehabilitation. I'll stick to the dog example, assuming you agree they don't have free will.

You can deter a dog from barking by using a shock collar. Similarly, rehabilitation or training the dog to obey his master can be done by rewarding desired behaviours and punishing undesired ones. — Samuel Lacrampe

One word, Recidivism

I understand hard determinism to be the combination of two views: a) that causal determinism and free will are incompatible; and b) that determinism is true. Thus, if hard determinism is true, we lack free will.

For the record: I think hard determinism is demonstrably false, for if a is true, then that's evidence that b is false and vice versa. But you're asking what it would entail if true - so, I take it you're asking what is entailed if we lack free will.

Well, if we lack free will, then we lack all obligations. Or at least, that seems self-evident. Obligations, whether moral, instrumental or epistemic, presuppose free will. Thus, if we lack free will, then we lack any obligation to do or think anything. As such, if hard determinism is true, nothing you think is anything you ought to think, or ought not to think, and likewise for anything you do. So it is a kind of dead-end.

Kool I did not know about that word! That said, what is your argument? Are you saying that recidivism prevents deterrence and rehabilitation from being effective? But if so, how would having Free Will solve that issue?

Kool I did not know about that word! That said, what is your argument? Are you saying that recidivism prevents deterrence and rehabilitation from being effective? But if so, how would having Free Will solve that issue? — Samuel Lacrampe

Recividism refutes your belief that criminals can be deterred or rehabilitated. Mind you, not in an absolute sense because in some, but problematically, not all, cases, what you recommend does work.

If free will exists, there's a good chance that a criminal will see the error of his ways and turn over a new leaf in his life but, more importantly, a criminal can resist/overcome his predelictions/tendencies.

Well, if we lack free will, then we lack all obligations. Or at least, that seems self-evident. Obligations, whether moral, instrumental or epistemic, presuppose free will. Thus, if we lack free will, then we lack any obligation to do or think anything. As such, if hard determinism is true, nothing you think is anything you ought to think, or ought not to think, and likewise for anything you do. So it is a kind of dead-end. — Bartricks

What we should or should not do cannot be derived from being.
Since determinism is part of being, it has no influence on ought.
And the free will has also no connection with it, because it is only a feeling.

These are all islands of knowledge that have nothing to do with each other.

Mmmh... Let's put it this way: For a given case, if recidivism happens, then deterrence and rehabilitation will not be effective, regardless if we have free will or not. Likewise, if recidivism does not happen, then deterrence and rehabilitation will be effective, regardless if we have free will or not. In short, free will does not change the effects of deterrence and rehabilitation.

That said, I agree that the existence of free will would add another "internal force" that can change our behavior.

In the end, for our practical purposes, it should make no difference. If true, then we still need to apply laws to deter bad behavior all the while striving to make laws as humane as possible.

If false, then the same consideration applies.

It's fine if many determinists think that criminals or people who commit crimes (of small offence) should be thus treated less harshly. But this option should be the one we have in mind we thinking about reforming criminal justice the world over.

Total nonsense. You can't seriously think this -

What we should or should not do cannot be derived from being. — SolarWind

has any meaning?

Mmmh... Let's put it this way: For a given case, if recidivism happens, then deterrence and rehabilitation will not be effective, regardless if we have free will or not. Likewise, if recidivism does not happen, then deterrence and rehabilitation will be effective, regardless if we have free will or not. In short, free will does not change the effects of deterrence and rehabilitation.

That said, I agree that the existence of free will would add another "internal force" that can change our behavior — Samuel Lacrampe

My personal opinion is that if we have free will, rehabilitative and deterrent aspects of justice will work because a criminal has the ability to change his ways. There's no guarantee of course since a criminal's proclivities might get the better of faer; the conflict between a person's free will and faer nature not always resolving in favor of the former. Thus, yes, even if we did possess free will, recidivism won't just go away.

In the absence of free will, recidivism would be the norm; no criminal, no matter what rehabilitative/deterrent measures, would be able to resist faer tendency to commit crimes.

It appears then that we have a simple, albeit crude, way of testing for the existence of free will; we could look at the rates of recidivism. The higher the rates among known outlaws, the lower the probability of free will - basically recidivism is inversely proportional to the degree of freedom of will we possess.

What say you?

↪SolarWind
Total nonsense. You can't seriously think this -

What we should or should not do cannot be derived from being. — SolarWind

has any meaning? — Bartricks

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalistic_fallacy

We’d still do ethics in much the same way. You’d be punished for harms you directly cause and not punished for others, with people frequently disagreeing on what “directly caused” means. Being able to do otherwise doesn't seem necessary for moral culpability.

Say someone implanted a device into Sam that makes it so that the next time Sam gets angry at someone, but then decides to forgive them, the device activates forcing Sam into a fit of rage and killing them. Sam bumps into someone on the street and gets so angry he kills them without the device activating. Is Sam deserving of punishment? I’d say yes. Even though he couldn’t have done otherwise. Because he intended to do harm and did what he intended to do. That seems to be what really matters for ethics.

Being able to do otherwise doesn't seem necessary for moral culpability. — khaled

Well, it may be necessary in some sense - just not in the sense of physical indeterminism. Indeed, if one insists on considering the question in this key (determinism vs. indeterminism), then indeterminism appears to be just as inimical to moral responsibility, if not more so, than determinism. (Hence some philosophers, like Galen Strawson, go so far as to argue that moral responsibility is altogether impossible.)

Say someone implanted a device into Sam that makes it so that the next time Sam gets angry at someone, but then decides to forgive them, the device activates forcing Sam into a fit of rage and killing them. Sam bumps into someone on the street and gets so angry he kills them without the device activating. Is Sam deserving of punishment? I’d say yes. Even though he couldn’t have done otherwise. Because he intended to do harm and did what he intended to do. That seems to be what really matters for ethics. — khaled

Yeah, one of the Frankfurt cases. So not this sense either. But clearly some sort of freedom - ability to do otherwise - is usually thought of as necessary. (At least in our present Western culture; attitudes towards moral responsibility have varied.)

You haven't read G.E.Moore, have you?

No, but what is the point?

Can you give an example of how to derive an ought state from a state of being?

He coined the term 'naturalistic fallacy'. It doesn't refer to the supposed fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. Just saying. (I have read him).

If xing is wrong, you ought not x, yes?
Xing is wrong.
Therefore you ought not x.

If xing is wrong, you ought not x, yes? — Bartricks

How do you know that X is wrong? That's just asking the question shifted.

Example: Is it right or wrong for a resource-poor country to invade a resource-rich neighboring country?

Please infer based on the facts alone.

How do you know that X is wrong? — SolarWind

By my reason.

Anyway, you've missed the point. I derived an ought from an is. Here, again:

1. If Xing is wrong, then we ought not to do X
2. Xing is wrong
3. Therefore, we ought not to do X

I don't think the test would work, because we don't know how effective free will is to counter recidivism. We could know that if we could observe some test subjects with free will and some without it. But in the actual world, either everyone has free will or no one has it. Alternatively, we could compare the frequency of recidivism between humans and dogs, but the two might be too different to compare haha.

the existence of free will would add another "internal force" that can change our behavior. — Samuel Lacrampe

I take back what I said. Free will is not another force that we add to sum up among the other inclinations. Rather, free will can always choose against all the inclinations, no matter their intensity. That's what makes it free.

↪SolarWind

How do you know that X is wrong? — SolarWind


By my reason.

Anyway, you've missed the point. I derived an ought from an is. Here, again:

1. If Xing is wrong, then we ought not to do X
2. Xing is wrong
3. Therefore, we ought not to do X — Bartricks

Sorry, I don't understand a word, not even the first sentence:

"1. If Xing is wrong, then we ought not to do X".

Who or what is "Xing"?

'X' stands for some obviously wrong act.

Rape is wrong, yes? Don't be dumb and say "how do you know?" That's a different issue - that's an issue in epistemology and that's why I said 'X'. Focus your mind on the topic at hand. Can you get an ought from an is? Yes. Here:

1. If rape is wrong, then you ought not to rape
2. Rape is wrong
3. Therefore, you ought not to rape

Done. Ought derived from an is.

Maybe you think nothing is right or wrong in reality. Then you're silly and confused. Silly because there's no reasonable way to arrive at that conclusion. And confused because it would make no real difference to my argument, for if it is 'possible' for an act to be wrong that's sufficient to do the trick, as you'd then have to accept that it is 'possible' to derive an ought from an is.

If you think that it is impossible for any act to be right or wrong, then you're even more silly and confused. Even more silly because it is harder to show that it is impossible for anything to be right or wrong than to show that nothing is actually right or wrong. And even more confused because now you'd have to believe that it is impossible for there to be oughts, and so saying 'you can't get an ought from an is' would be akin to saying 'you can't get a square circle from a married bachelor'.

"...some say that killing is wrong because you shouldn't kill other people."

Petitio principii.

If there is no such thing as free will, can there be any such thing as altruism?

1. If rape is wrong, then you ought not to rape
2. Rape is wrong
3. Therefore, you ought not to rape — Bartricks

Points 1 and 3 seem logical to me, but point 2 does not. Why is gang rape wrong, for example? Some have fun and there is only one victim. In the sense of utilitarianism this could be commanded.

Free will is not another force that we add to sum up among the other inclinations. Rather, free will can always choose against all the inclinations, no matter their intensity. That's what makes it free. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is an "inclination"? For example, if someone feels sleepy does he have an inclination to fall asleep?

Maybe you think nothing is right or wrong in reality. Then you're silly and confused. Silly because there's no reasonable way to arrive at that conclusion. — Bartricks

Just wondering, in what way did you arrive at the opposite conclusion?

I don't think the test would work, because we don't know how effective free will is to counter recidivism. We could know that if we could observe some test subjects with free will and some without it. But in the actual world, either everyone has free will or no one has it. Alternatively, we could compare the frequency of recidivism between humans and dogs, but the two might be too different to compare haha.

the existence of free will would add another "internal force" that can change our behavior.
— Samuel Lacrampe
I take back what I said. Free will is not another force that we add to sum up among the other inclinations. Rather, free will can always choose against all the inclinations, no matter their intensity. That's what makes it free. — Samuel Lacrampe

In my humble opinion, high recidivism rates would mean we have no control over our preferences (here desire to commit crimes) and that we can't, most importantly, resist/overcome them no matter what the consequences. Hence, I believe, the phenomenon. No?

A low frequency of recidivism, on the other hand, would mean we can override our "programming."

You make a good point though - we can't design an experiment with test and control subjects among humans. Nonetheless, we can compare humans with artificial entities, I'm referring to robots, that can't defy their nature (what they're instructed to do).

Substitute x for something that is wrong by a utilitarian's crazy lights. It'll still go through.
Incidentally, this argument refutes utilitarianism:

1. If utilitarianism is the correct normative ethical theory, then gang rape is right (if the gang is sufficiently big)
2. Gang rape is wrong (irrespective of the size of the gang)
3. Therefore utilitarianism is not the correct normative ethical theory.

I mean, do you seriously think any premise in an argument that has the conclusion 'therefore utilitarianism is correct' is going to be more plausible than 'gang rape is wrong'?!?

It's about as self evident to reason that rape is wrong as that 2 + 2 = 4. Thus some acts are wrong.

So, if you try and argue for nihilism your argument needs to have premises all of which are more plausible than 'rape is wrong'. Good luck!

Furthermore, any argument for moral nihilism will, with small adjustment, entail normative nihilism. And that's absurd - indeed, self refuting.

Incidentally, this argument refutes utilitarianism:

1. If utilitarianism is the correct normative ethical theory, then gang rape is right (if the gang is sufficiently big)
2. Gang rape is wrong (irrespective of the size of the gang)
3. Therefore utilitarianism is not the correct normative ethical theory. — Bartricks

Good point. But almost every action has disadvantages for someone (animals included). How do you want to offset these disadvantages?

Or in other words, what is the correct normative ethical theory?