It seems to me even that "more" is, in the Socratic sense at least, not completely certain. Knowing ourselves includes knowing we can be – most of our lives we are (which is how we're able to develop) – mistaken even about knowing ourselves.

Of course the possibility is always there, at least theoretically. But presumably, increased self-knowledge is accompanied by greater certainty. Otherwise, "Know Thyself" remains an unattainable goal.

... an unattainable goal. — Apollodorus

Or infinite task (i.e. the journey is the destination). A philosophos (seeker) is not a sophos (sage).

Or infinite task (i.e. the journey is the destination). A philosophos (seeker) is not a sophos (sage). — 180 Proof

Well, according to Socrates, the only true sophos is God. But if the philosopher's goal is to become a sophos, then there must be greater self-knowledge and certainty along the way (at least in respect to some things). Otherwise, there is no progress.

On what specifically? — 180 Proof

The difference between an exemplar and an avatar..

Oh okay. In the context in which I used the terms, exemplar is a representative example of e.g. "Know Thyself" and avatar is a divine proxy for some ideal / perfection such a "sage" or "prophet". To belabor the obvious it seems to me, Socrates is an exemplar to be imitated / emulated in this sense and not an avatar to be worshipped / fetishized.

Thanks.

It's interesting because it's contrary to a JTB approach to knowledge. — Cheshire

The way I see it JTB is more like a Stoic idea and is not the best approach to understand Socrates and Plato.

We must not forget that for Plato true knowledge is not about some propositions, but about Ideas or Forms.

The way I see it JTB is more like a Stoic idea and is not the best approach to understand Socrates and Plato. — Apollodorus

Does anyone still think that JTB is a useful way of thinking about knowledge?

I would offer that the culprit is the desire for the outcome (certainty) that science provides, that the same outcome can be reached by anyone, so not only does it have nothing to do with our interests and commitments, but the process does nothing to make us a better person. — Antony Nickles

Spot on! (I should mention this book, The Blind Spot, by William Byers. It is exactly about this point. I went and ferreted it out from an obscure branch of my University library some years ago, unfortunately I found it very hard to understand, but the abstract and summaries speak volumes.)

I agree. I don't think skepticism implies foundationalism, but JTB does. Now, this is an area that's never been very clear to me

We must not forget that for Plato true knowledge is not about some propositions, but about Ideas or Forms. — Apollodorus

. Is that to say true knowledge is internalizing propositional truth into some refined state or knowledge is about a system/method/mode of thought?

Does anyone still think that JTB is a useful way of thinking about knowledge? — T Clark

Probably not too many. Certainly not Platonists.

Is that to say true knowledge is internalizing propositional truth into some refined state or knowledge is about a system/method/mode of thought? — Cheshire

Well, Socrates/Plato distinguishes between (1) discursive, propositional knowledge relating to thought (dianoia) and (2) nondiscursive, nonpropositional knowledge relating to intellect (nous).

(1) can be conveyed directly, through textual constructions that are addressed to and processed by discursive thought (dianoia).

In contrast, (2) nondiscursive, nonpropositional knowledge, is pre-predicative, i.e., logically prior to propositions and can only be conveyed indirectly, by means that address, and are processed by, our intuitive or contemplative faculty, viz., the nous.

Platonic knowledge proper (noesis or gnosis) has the Forms as its objects, therefore it is nonpropositional and is above JTB which is roughly at the level of Plato's right opinion (orthe doxa).

See also the end part of the OP.

Does anyone still think that JTB is a useful way of thinking about knowledge? — T Clark

There's a discussion of that in Theaetetus, under the heading of ''Knowledge is True Judgement with an Account" - you can find a summary here.

There are endless debates on this forum about justified true belief, sometimes it's hard to judge what makes it such an elusive topic. I think something to bear in mind is that Socrates is very much concerned with 'the human condition', or maybe even you could say 'the human predicament' - with very fundamental questions about truth, beauty, justice, courage, and so on, which by their very nature are much harder to pin down than detailed knowledge of some area of expertise.

There are endless debates on this forum about justified true belief, sometimes it's hard to judge what makes it such an elusive topic. — Wayfarer

I whine and complain about the needless tangle of words with which western philosophy ties up important philosophical issues. None is sillier or more misleading than justified true belief. I have been accused of being a pragmatist, someone who believes that philosophy has to reflect how people live their lives and make decisions. I also believe that epistemology has to be constrained by human nature. JTB ignores both of these principles completely.

Ok, ok. Sorry. I promised myself I wouldn't let my comments lead into a discussion of this issue, which isn't really relevant to the subject in the OP.

I whine and complain about the needless tangle of words with which western philosophy ties up important philosophical issues. None is sillier or more misleading than justified true belief. — T Clark

:clap: :100:

I'm fed up with your questions!
— KDT

Who is KDT? — Prishon

Just someone I overheard.

As once I said, ideas enslave as much as they emancipate.
— TheMadFool

In a sense, that is the message of Taoism. — T Clark

Catuṣkoṭi

Śūnyatā (emptiness) is the ninth 'view' (Sanskrit: dṛṣṭi), the viewless view, a superposition of the eight possible arrays of proposition P [and its 'inseparable contradistinction' (Sanskrit: apoha)]. — Wikipedia

The idea is not to get trapped in system (of beliefs). Supposedly, this is the so-called madhyamaka (the middle path) in Buddhism. @Wayfarer might be able to clarify the matter further.

Speaking for myself, nec caput nec pedes! It's all Greek to me!

I whine and complain about the needless tangle of words with which western philosophy ties up important philosophical issues. None is sillier or more misleading than justified true belief.
— T Clark
:clap: :100: — 180 Proof

Why is what T Clark said worthy of :clap: :100: ?

:chin:

IMO what T Clark says about the anachronistic "JTB" word salad is demonstrable true. Knowledge is falsifiable (i.e. fallibilistic), therefore not a matter of "justification" (re: the problem of induction, infinite regress of 'foundationalism', self-inconsistency of positivistic "verificationism", etc). Read Peirce-Dewey. Read Wittgenstein (re: PI, OC). Read Popper, D. Deutsch, N.N. Taleb. Read Sextus Empiricus (re: Pyrrhonians).

IMO what T Clark says about the anachronistic "JTB" word salad is demonstrable true. Knowledge is falsifiable (i.e. fallibilistic), therefore not a matter of "justification" (re: the problem of induction, infinite regress of 'foundationalism', self-inconsistency of positivistic "verificationism", etc). Read Peirce-Dewey. Read Wittgenstein (re: PI, OC). Read Popper, D. Deutsch, N.N. Taleb. Read Sextus Empiricus (re: Pyrrhonians). — 180 Proof

If you ask me, the JTB definition of knowledge is perfectly acceptable in the domain of abstract philosophy wherein you axiomatize. However, in the empirical domain, falsifiability is the right way to do one's business. What say you?

Read Popper — 180 Proof

No thanks. After having read one book of him and his falsificationism I have grown up. All his books, I can say without actually having read them, will be a waste of my time. Now Im a big fan of wasting my time (I saw it written somewhere here that this is better than let time waste you). Or my time being wasted. But his three worlds combined with falsificationism I will not let again do that. The book tries to catch science in a pseudo scientific way. It offers a picture of how science should be and Popper's method of doing science rings true only in an artificial world. This world contains obedient slaves of Popper only and these slaves think and act in accordance with the great leader to construct and maintaining exactly the world he describes in his book. Science would die slowly. So the advice to read Popper is a bad one. Unless you are interested in his wicked ways and need an antropological subject matter...

Im not sure what merit(s) made him a "Sir" in the UK. I can think of something but that's quite inappropiate to mention on a philosophy site.

. It offers a picture of how science should be and Popper's method of doing science rings true only in an artificial world — Prishon

. :up:

Physicists on Popper:

The idea is not to get trapped in system (of beliefs). Supposedly, this is the so-called madhyamaka (the middle path) in Buddhism. Wayfarer might be able to clarify the matter further. — TheMadFool

There's a lot of literature on the possible influences between Madhyamaka and Pyrrho of Elis. There's quite a good wikipedia entry on it here.

The Pyrrhonists promote suspending judgment (epoché) about dogma (beliefs about non-evident matters) as the way to reach ataraxia (tranquility, although that's rather a weak synonym in my view). This is similar to the Buddha's refusal to answer certain metaphysical questions which he saw as non-conducive to the path of Buddhist practice and Nagarjuna's "relinquishing of all views (drsti)".

The radical nature of this 'suspension of judgement' needs to be noticed, however. In later life, it was said of Pyrrho:

Diogenes (9.62) reports Antigonus as saying that Pyrrho’s lack of trust in his senses led him to ignore precipices, oncoming wagons and dangerous dogs, and that his friends had to follow him around to protect him from these various everyday hazards. But he then reports the dissenting verdict of Aenesidemus, according to which Pyrrho was perfectly capable of conducting himself in a sensible manner. ....Pyrrho is depicted as maintaining his calm and untroubled attitude no matter what happens to him. This extends even to extreme physical pain—he is reported not to have flinched when subjected to the horrific techniques of ancient surgery—but it also encompasses dangers such as being on a ship in a storm. (This is not to say that he did not avoid such troubles if he could, as suggested by the apocryphal stories mentioned in the previous paragraph; it is just to say that he did not lose his composure in the face of life’s inevitable hardships.) There is another aspect to this untroubled attitude as well. In numerous anecdotes Pyrrho is shown as unconcerned with adhering to the normal conventions of society; he wanders off for days on end by himself, and he performs tasks that would normally be left to social inferiors, such as housework and even washing a pig. Here, too, the suggestion is that he does not care about things that ordinary people do care about — in this case, the disapproval of others. — SEP, Pyrrho

Knowledge is falsifiable — 180 Proof

Hypotheses are falsifiable. Plato was concerned with what is truly knowable. His hesitancy about what ought to be regarded as knowledge, was due to hs conviction that the sensory domain lacked intrinsic reality. The Forms were the objects of perfect knowledge, because only they are perfectly intelligible. In fact, that sentiment is preserved in Galileo's 'book of nature being written in mathematics' - here he is basically referring back to the Platonic conviction of the superiority of dianoia (mathematical knowledge). However as a natural scientist, he also has to contend with the principles governing phenomena, which was not of as great a concern in Plato.

Popper's principle of falsifiability is only to distinguish theories which are theoretically empirical from those which are not, it's not in itself a statement about metaphysics. (Significant that even this principle is being questioned by some of those involved in the 'physics wars' over interpretation of string theory; see String theory vs The Popperazi, Massimo Piggliuci.)

I have grown up — Prishon

:up:

Physicists on Popper: — frank

Great video! I have watched some parts and will certainly watch the whole! I didn't know how Tegmark looked. I have always been against him. That is to say his level 1 multiverse. I am not against him anymore, but against his multiverse (at least the type 1 and 2) I am still. Popper is celebrated and off course they say nice things. But not really confirming. Its all about testability. If I were there the situation would have been different. I would offer them a possible TOE and speak against Popper... And put them to the test. For sure they must be testable. Like Popper himself.

I think they all agreed that testability is good, but that frequently comes late. It's certainly science prior to discovery of ways to test.

Yes. It takes some time to test a theory indeed. GR is still being tested. The first test was made by Edington I think. Maybe Mercury can be viewed as a test too. But thats more an observation. Testability plays a role. A huge role in fact. Who does not want his theories to be tested? I know I would! This can off course be contested. Again, great video. Im curious what that first guy has to say about the beginning (of the universe). Thanks again.

Diogenes (9.62) reports Antigonus as saying that Pyrrho’s lack of trust in his senses led him to ignore precipices, oncoming wagons and dangerous dogs, and that his friends had to follow him around to protect him from these various everyday hazards. But he then reports the dissenting verdict of Aenesidemus, according to which Pyrrho was perfectly capable of conducting himself in a sensible manner. ....Pyrrho is depicted as maintaining his calm and untroubled attitude no matter what happens to him. This extends even to extreme physical pain [...] — SEP, Pyrrho

This is both funny and somber. Funny because no one in faer right mind would ignore danger like Pyrrho is said to have done and somber because here was a man who practiced what he preached.

Jokes aside, what do you make of a philosophy (Pyrrhonism) that can induce such a transformation in someone who takes the idea (that) seriously?


It appears that despite the similarities between Buddhism and Pyrrhonism, Buddhism is less radical than Pyrrhonism in its general attitude towards life and reality.

:up:

conducting himself in a sensible manner. .... — SEP, Pyrrho

I can see where "making sense" has its origin now. "Sensible" just means to rely on your senses. Thw two remind me of Plato and Aristotle (also P&A).