If evolution is the case, then it's really hard to see how there can be objective morality, in the realist sense. We're moral creatures because that's the best strategy for us to pass our genes on, but the exact morality can vary depending on what works in any given time or culture.

However, if one isn't a realist about the world, then one could ignore evolutionary reasons for why we behave the way we do in favor of grounding morality in something else, like God or the platonic realm, I suppose. But then one needs to account for the various disagreements over ethics. Why is it that we can fundamentally disagree about how to behave if there is an objective moral code we're all supposedly aware of?

Moral realism IMO is the default position. Moral claims can be made using natural language, and they're just as truth-evaluable as any other sort of claim.

So it's incumbent on the anti-realist to tell us why this truth-evaluability is either somehow mistaken, or we're all massively incompetent with the sentences proffering such claims, or the 'truth' they express derives from things other than what they seem to derive from, etc. I'm not saying these things aren't possible, but as a starting point anti-realism is the one that has work to do.

It would be different if moral claims were in some obvious way different form non-moral ones, but they're not.

why would there be ways in which we should act - in the realist sense. — shmik

But look, this is a ridiculous question. Surely you do think there are ways you should act?

It would be different if moral claims were in some obvious way different form non-moral ones, but they're not. — The Great Whatever

But moral realism isn't simply about the semantics of normative propositions, otherwise there wouldn't be any difference between error theory and non-cognitivism. There's legitimately something that makes them true or false; the presence or absence of moral properties in the world.

In my opinion, moral realism is not compatible with a naturalistic worldview. It's either too spooky or not "morally" sufficient.

There's legitimately something that makes them true or false; the presence or absence of moral properties in the world. — darthbarracuda

1) "It's wrong to torture children." This is a moral claim, and it's also true. So there are true moral claims.

2) "It's wrong to torture children" is true because it's wrong to torture children. What makes it true is the fact that it's wrong to torture children. Since this is expressed by a moral claim, it's presumably a moral fact.

3) So, there is a moral fact. QED.

There was a US court case some years ago in which the issue was whether making child pornography with simulated children was wrong. I think, from memory, the court's decision was that it was not wrong, because no actual children were involved.

Whereas, I would think it is wrong to want to have sex with children, whether or not one does so, or whether or not it involves viewing, and being stimulated by, an animation or simulation. Fortunately, I have never felt sexually attracted to children, but I imagine that, for those who do, it could a source of considerable conflict and a very difficult thing to deal with. I have had conflicting desires, i.e. done things which my conscience says I ought not to do, but that is not one of them (fortunately).

However, if one isn't a realist about the world, then one could ignore evolutionary reasons for why we behave the way we do in favor of grounding morality in something else, like God or the platonic realm, I suppose. But then one needs to account for the various disagreements over ethics. Why is it that we can fundamentally disagree about how to behave if there is an objective moral code we're all supposedly aware of? — Marchesk

Excellent question, and one of the stumbling blocks for moral realism.

To be honest, I think there's a kind of collective memory burned into the European mentality, arising from the 30 Years War and the worst episodes of the Inquisition, and many other sorry episodes of religiously-inspired violence from the past. Often, religious claims were involved in these conflicts, and they were conducted by people who generally felt they were on the side of the Right and the Good. And it's natural, reviewing all that, to want to wash your hands of the whole thing. But unfortunately, the fact that well-meaning people can often be wrong, doesn't absolve us of the responsibility to pursue what is right.

Why is it that we can fundamentally disagree about how to behave if there is an objective moral code we're all supposedly aware of? — Marchesk

So is the idea "if there is an objective X, we can't disagree about X?"

But that's nonsense, right?

1) "It's wrong to torture children." This is a moral claim, and it's also true. So there are true moral claims. — The Great Whatever

I deny the ultimate truth aptness of this claim. It's not that torturing children is actually okay or righteous, but that there is no actual real moral truth to the matter. Moral truths, in my opinion, are based on agreement and rationalizing within a system of relative coherence and not correspondence.

So it is truth apt, but not ultimately truth apt?

What is the difference between being truth apt and ultimately truth apt?

I ask because the default position seems to be that there is no difference, since there is only one truth predicate with which we tend to be competent – 'true.'

--

It's not that torturing children is actually okay or righteous, but that there is no actual real moral truth to the matter. — darthbarracuda

But what can this mean other than to say that it's not actually or really wrong to torture children? But that's wrong, so your position must be wrong. And what would it mean to say that it's wrong to torture children, but not really or actually wrong to torture them? That just sounds like a contradiction.

But what can this mean other than to say that it's not actually or really wrong to torture children? — The Great Whatever

It means that I have the preference, or attitude, that looks down on torturing children (non-cognitivism), or it means that I legitimately believe that torturing children is wrong but understand that this is a belief that exists outside the philosophy room (error theory).

There's nothing incoherent about believing morality to be a fiction, but nevertheless see it as a useful or preferable fiction. Especially since it's not really practical to be a nihilist about everything.

So you don't think torturing children is wrong, but it's convenient to act like it's wrong?

Or, you do 'legitimately believe it,' but only when you're not doing philosophy? Do your beliefs change when you start doing philosophy?

So you don't think torturing children is wrong, but it's convenient to act like it's wrong? — The Great Whatever

I don't think there is any legitimate ground for the proposition that torturing children is wrong that isn't dependent on the mind, particularly the unconscious.

But it is useful to continue acting as it morality does exist, not only so others don't see me as a psychopath but also because I nevertheless have moral compulsions that motivate me to act in a certain way. I feel the universe should "be" a certain way, even if I know there isn't ultimately any mind-independent reason for the must-be.

I'd be curious to know what you think makes moral propositions true. Without God (or even with him...), there's nothing, from what I can tell, preventing us from asking "so what?"

I don't think there is any legitimate ground for the proposition that torturing children is wrong that isn't dependent on the mind, particularly the unconscious. — darthbarracuda

What does it matter whether it's 'dependent on the mind' or not?

But it is useful to continue acting as it morality does exist, not only so others don't see me as a psychopath — darthbarracuda

If you don't think torturing kids is wrong, but you pretend to think that so others don't suspect you of thinking torturing kids isn't wrong, aren't you a psychopath?

but also because I nevertheless have moral compulsions that motivate me to act in a certain way. I feel the universe should "be" a certain way, even if I know there isn't ultimately any mind-independent reason for the must-be. — darthbarracuda

You mean, you think moral claims are true?

I'd be curious to know what you think makes moral propositions true. Without God (or even with him...), there's nothing, from what I can tell, preventing us from asking "so what?" — darthbarracuda

What makes anything true? Before asking that question, we need to agree on the simple fact that they are true. But a deflationary account seems promising.

What does it matter whether it's 'dependent on the mind' or not? — The Great Whatever

Because that's the whole issue at stake here, whether or not moral propositions are in some way dependent on the mind or not for their truth. People typically think and act as though moral propositions are indicative of real properties and not just mental states.

If you don't think torturing kids is wrong, but you pretend to think that so others don't suspect you of thinking torturing kids isn't wrong, aren't you a psychopath? — The Great Whatever

Erm, no, because I'm still abiding by and studying morality. I just don't see it as being actually grounded in anything. Just like I can believe the legal system is wholly dependent on minds but nevertheless not be a criminal.

You mean, you think moral claims are true? — The Great Whatever

No, I think moral claims aim at truth but always fail to attain it, because there is no truth to moral claims, because there are no objective, real moral truthmakers.

What makes anything true? Before asking that question, we need to agree on the simple fact that they are true. But a deflationary account seems promising. — The Great Whatever

I fail to see why. In order to agree that something is true, we need to know what truth is, which you said apparently comes after determining what is and is not true. This isn't coherent.

Because that's the whole issue at stake here, whether or not moral propositions are in some way dependent on the mind or not for their truth. People typically think and act as though moral propositions are indicative of real properties and not just mental states. — darthbarracuda

Is that the issue? I thought the issue was whether there are 'moral facts' or not? Nothing about the mind was mentioned.

Are mental states not 'real properties?' What relevance does any of this have?

Just like I can believe the legal system is wholly dependent on minds but nevertheless not be a criminal. — darthbarracuda

But surely you think certain things are actually illegal? And that there are legal facts?

No, I think moral claims aim at truth but always fail to attain it, because there is no truth to moral claims, because there are no objective, real moral truthmakers. — darthbarracuda

So, if there is no truth to moral claims, it must be that there's no truth to 'torturing children is wrong.' And so you must be committed to thinking it isn't true that torturing children is wrong. Or what am I missing?

I fail to see why. In order to agree that something is true, we need to know what truth is, which you said apparently comes after determining what is and is not true. This isn't coherent. — darthbarracuda

Is torturing children wrong? By your own lights, it seems you can't ascertain the answer to this question until you have a philosophical theory of truth. But this would make you either an idiot or a psychopath.

Is that the issue? I thought the issue was whether there are 'moral facts' or not? Nothing about the mind was mentioned.

Are mental states not 'real properties?' What relevance does any of this have? — The Great Whatever

The relevance is that morality by and large is phenomenologically experienced as a sort of command structure from elsewhere, a series of hypothetical imperatives and obligations that don't derive their existence from the unconscious mind.

So yeah, if we're gonna say mental states are facts, then sure morality has a factual basis. But there's really no reason to go this route, because it's clear that's not what we're talking about here. We're talking about objective, mind-independent truthmakers of normative claims and to say otherwise is a red herring.

Now of course if you're an idealist, morality is not going to be mind-independent because nothing is mind-independent. But this doesn't necessarily make you a realist either, since you can still see morality as ultimately subjective.

But surely you think certain things are actually illegal? And that there are legal facts? — The Great Whatever

From a purely descriptive sense, yes, just as I can say certain things are commonly seen by humans as moral or immoral without attaching any prescription to the description.

So, if there is no truth to moral claims, it must be that there's no truth to 'torturing children is wrong.' And so you must be committed to thinking it isn't true that torturing children is wrong. Or what am I missing? — The Great Whatever

I'm saying the belief that torturing children is wrong has no mind-independent factual basis. That is all. Just because something is a hallucination doesn't mean it's worthless.

Is torturing children wrong? By your own lights, it seems you can't ascertain the answer to this question until you have a philosophical theory of truth. But this would make you either an idiot or a psychopath. — The Great Whatever

Again, this doesn't have much to do with anything, since I already said that moral fictionalism is not only a rational position to hold but also a comfortable position to hold. Like how you can play a game while understanding it's not actually reality. We exist, and we live and interact with other people, and figuring out how we should live that satisfies us in various respects, not altogether self-interested, is important.

1) "It's wrong to torture children." This is a moral claim, and it's also true. So there are true moral claims.

Yeh if someone was torturing a child I would try to stop it. I would condemn someone who tortured children. But the question isn't asking about that. There is something more to saying 'it is wrong to torture children', something that I likely don't agree with.

I'm leaving it vague because it's vague in the question. I don't agree that somehow, there are just somethings that us as humans should for some reason not do.

From what your saying, it is is just self evident that certain actions are morally wrong. I struggle to see the self evidence of whatever is outside actions to prevent it and human condemnation of it.

People usually ain't as ambivalent about moral right and wrongness when it's about them and people they care about. Someone who's faculties are fully functional cannot witness pain and distress and not feel pain and distress themselves.

Of course it's wrong... wake up. To witness such a thing, or be subject to it, you'd not only realize it to be wrong, but trauma inducing, haunting -- effecting you the rest of your life.

Morality is inherently about subjects that can be harmed, so that it is dependent in some way on subjects that can be harmed is no problem, or drawback. The scope need not be wider, and it need not account for anything beyond this. Living things are a certain ways, and share certain interests which make some things objectively better and worse for them.

The only problem is why one ought to care at all in the first place, not whether moral statements can be justified or not. This is a nonsense question though, because we always already do. The only real problem is on the finer details where moral disputes lie, where it isn't obvious what's right and wrong. That's where the adults play. This is baby games.

The only problem is why one ought to care at all in the first place, not whether moral statements can be justified or not. — Wosret

Ideally, meta-ethics shouldn't interfere with the practice of normative ethics. We're moral beings, even if morality is ultimately groundless. We'll continue to be moral regardless.

What kind of ground are you looking for? What kind of thing could make you, or compel you to be good? These seem to be the major claims of absence, but what would these things be like, if they were to exist?

There's nothing incoherent about believing morality to be a fiction, but nevertheless see it as a useful or preferable fiction. — darthbarracuda

It's not incoherent, but it's also not binding. If you believe it's a fiction, then you're acting, it's easy enough just to turn around and say, OK I don't actually believe it.

Morality doesn't make sense outside of a social setup. ''Moral'' and ''immoral'' are meaningless to a hermit in a cave. Morality is a property of interactions between two or more individuals, at least one of which is a human. Animals need not be considered as they lack the cognitive ability to process such concepts and are therefore exempt from moral considerations.

If you agree then the terms ''objective'' and ''subjective'' must apply or have meaning in the social domain.

Society is a form of meta-existence with the social group taking on a ''life'' of its own with its own sub-categories of organization and rules that govern interactions between them. One set of rules is morality.

As I said before morality is restricted in scope to a society. Therfore we may confine our questions on it in that domain. Is morality ''objective'' or ''subjective'' in a social context?

Clearly, there are acts that run counter to the health of a society. Torture, rape, murder, stealing, lying, all are evidently ''anti-social''. These are ''objectively'' bad.

Altruism, charity, equality, self-lessness, etc. are unequivocally beneficial to society. These are ''objectively'' good.

"It's wrong to torture children." This is a moral claim, and it's also true. — The Great Whatever

Is it wrong for tigers to torture children? Is it wrong for other children to torture children, even if we would normally not hold such a child responsible for their actions? Is it wrong in times of desperation to abandon new-born infants with a near-zero chance of survival?

1) "It's wrong to torture children." This is a moral claim, and it's also true. So there are true moral claims.

2) "It's wrong to torture children" is true because it's wrong to torture children. What makes it true is the fact that it's wrong to torture children. Since this is expressed by a moral claim, it's presumably a moral fact.

3) So, there is a moral fact. QED. — The Great Whatever

This doesn't support moral realism. It just denies error theory and non-cognitivism.

Compare with:

"It is illegal to sell alcohol to those under 18 years of age" is a legal claim and it's true, and what makes it true is the fact that it's illegal to sell alcohol to those under 18 years of age.

Nothing about this is inconsistent with the claim that its truth is – or could be, if it incidentally isn't – relative to each country (or other legislative area), or with the claim that it's made true by the decisions of people, rather than by some objective feature of the world (as is the case of claims regarding the chemical composition of water, for example).

People usually ain't as ambivalent about moral right and wrongness when it's about them and people they care about. Someone who's faculties are fully functional cannot witness pain and distress and not feel pain and distress themselves.

Of course it's wrong... wake up. To witness such a thing, or be subject to it, you'd not only realize it to be wrong, but trauma inducing, haunting -- effecting you the rest of your life.

Morality is inherently about subjects that can be harmed, so that it is dependent in some way on subjects that can be harmed is no problem, or drawback. The scope need not be wider, and it need not account for anything beyond this. Living things are a certain ways, and share certain interests which make some things objectively better and worse for them.

The only problem is why one ought to care at all in the first place, not whether moral statements can be justified or not. This is a nonsense question though, because we always already do. The only real problem is on the finer details where moral disputes lie, where it isn't obvious what's right and wrong. That's where the adults play. This is baby games. — Wosret

What exactly is your argument here. Looks like mixing a whole bunch of stuff together.

On the one hand your speaking about the justification of moral statements one the other how we always already care. But there clearly is a disconnect between the two being that according to the realist they are different things.
1. To the realist the caring is not an essential element of the moral statement. Some statements are true whether or not a specific person cares about them.

2. From the phenomenological perspective the whole of morality is in that caring. Morality is some description of our moral experience - of the real experiences and how we car during them.

The fact that the question of moral motivation comes up (and that you brought it up) is indicative of this disconnect. No one wanders whether them being hungry means they should eat. Just like people don't question 'why do X just because X is good' when X is something they already feel strongly compelled to do.

We're moral beings, even if morality is ultimately groundless. We'll continue to be moral regardless. — darthbarracuda

This is contradictory. What makes us moral if not that which grounds morality?

This seems to be confused; it supposes that features of people are not 'objective features of the world.' Again, the question of which objective features of the world make a thing moral is irrelevant to the more basic question.

We're talking about objective, mind-independent truthmakers of normative claims and to say otherwise is a red herring. — darthbarracuda

But this just makes no sense. Following this line of thought, we have to be anti-realists about all claims of human psychology, since those are 'mind-dependent' (after all, no human mind, no subject of human psychology).

Clearly some features of the world include humans, and are so because of humans. This doesn't make them not real in any interesting sense. And of course these things may still be grounded in things that are not 'human minds' or whatever it might be.

From a purely descriptive sense, yes, just as I can say certain things are commonly seen by humans as moral or immoral without attaching any prescription to the description. — darthbarracuda

But I'm not asking you whether certain things are 'commonly seen' as moral or immoral. I'm asking you whether they are moral or immoral.

Again, this doesn't have much to do with anything, since I already said that moral fictionalism is not only a rational position to hold but also a comfortable position to hold. — darthbarracuda

Okay, but I just want to understand your position. Is your position that it's not wrong to torture children, but that you pretend that it's wrong to torture them for convenience?

But the question isn't asking about that. There is something more to saying 'it is wrong to torture children', something that I likely don't agree with. — shmik

???

So you don't think it's wrong to torture children? You disagree with that claim?

I'm leaving it vague because it's vague in the question. I don't agree that somehow, there are just somethings that us as humans should for some reason not do. — shmik

Wouldn't this make you some kind of psychopath though? Surely you think you shouldn't torture children? :s

I struggle to see the self evidence of whatever is outside actions to prevent it and human condemnation of it. — shmik

So let me see if I understand. You don't think anything is wrong (or right). Is that your position?

My prediction for this thread: equivocations, equivocations and more equivocations...

Especially these two words: "moral" and "objective."

edit:

Yup, in the first reply already:

If evolution is the case, then it's really hard to see how there can be objective morality, in the realist sense. We're moral creatures because that's the best strategy for us to pass our genes on, but the exact morality can vary depending on what works in any given time or culture. — Marchesk