Words don't have an essence; — Cheshire

How so? My explanation is able to account, albeit only in a simple way, for the linguistic entity Wittgenstein calls family resemblance. — TheMadFool

I'm thinking about the context of poetry which couldn't exist without the open ability to manipulate words meanings subject to the other words that are surrounding them. — Cheshire

Ergo, the lack of essence allowed us the ability to assign words to things. Did we sit around guessing the animals name until we were presented with the essence sounding word for a goat? It isn't obvious if it is true. It is obvious if it is a goat; which is goatist falsification.

my explanation is the best one among others if such exist. — TheMadFool

If I ever say this; then I guarantee what ever follows will be wrong.

The reply has been set out before you, by @StreetlightX, by @Cuthbert and by myself. But you have not been able to see it.

Don't think, look.

This is how language works; without the need for explicit definitions.

@Banno

Words don't have an essence;
— Cheshire
How so? My explanation is able to account, albeit only in a simple way, for the linguistic entity Wittgenstein calls family resemblance.
— TheMadFool
I'm thinking about the context of poetry which couldn't exist without the open ability to manipulate words meanings subject to the other words that are surrounding them.
— Cheshire

Ergo, the lack of essence allowed us the ability to assign words to things. Did we sit around guessing the animals name until we were presented with the essence sounding word for a goat? It isn't obvious if it is true. It is obvious if it is a goat; which is goatist falsification.

my explanation is the best one among others if such exist.
— TheMadFool
If I ever say this; then I guarantee what ever follows will be wrong. — Cheshire

I'll try and explain this again as I've gained some more insights into the issue (Wittgenstein's language game theory).

We must make a distinction between how language is (ordinary language) and how language should be (ideal language).

Wittgenstein's language game/family resemblance is a feature of ordinary language but were we to ask him about his views on an ideal language, I bet he would've said the family resemblance shouldn't figure in it i.e. it's preferrable that language isn't a game in which a given word's meaning alters with context (form of life).

In other words, Wittgenstein probably would've been happier but less famous if it were the case that words had/have an essence to them.

What does this mean?

Simply that ordinary language is imperfect/flawed and it needs a lot of work (to become an ideal language). A number of possibilities as to why family resemblance is an aspect of ordinary language:

1. There's something inherent in language that prevents attempts to give words an essence. Analyzing this is above my paygrade.

2. People are careless with language. As described in the OP, substituting AND with OR is an instance of this.

3. Limitations of the brain. If words had an essence, even the slightest of differences will necessitate a new word. For example if I'm very strict about what flying means, say I define it as flapping of two wings, a dragonfly (has four wings) would need another word to describe its locomotion and so would a plane/glider (not flapping its wings). You get the idea. This would be a huge burden on our memory - there would be just too many words to remember. Thus, we assign different meanings to the same word (pun/polysemy) and if there's some overlap in meaning i.e. there's a family resemblance, the word rises to prominence in Wittgenstein's theory of language games.

Perhaps the absence of an essence to words is due to one or more or all of the above posited reasons.

Another thing is a word's essence can be viewed in two distinct ways:

1. An essence within a language game: For example when I use the word "god" in a christian context, it has a specific meaning, i.e. it has an essence viz. an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good being. This kind of essence (to words) exists. So if I encounter beings X, Y, and Z (sancte trinitatis) and all of them are the christian god then I know all of them are all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good (essences of "god")

2. An essence between language games: The word "god" means different things if you consider all religions and beliefs. The deistic god is not the same as the pantheistic god which has very little in common with the christian god. This kind of essence (to words) doesn't exist.

I bet he would've said the family resemblance shouldn't figure in it i.e. it's preferrable that language isn't a game in which a given word's meaning alters with context (form of life). — TheMadFool

He literally says that this is exactly what we shouldn't do. But sure, continue making shit up.

We must make a distinction between how language is (ordinary language) and how language should be (ideal language). — TheMadFool

Let me stop you right there. I'm going to read the rest but this is a full stop in itself. Ideal qualifying language outside of a Russian lease agreement is frankly an upsetting term. Alright, I'll give the rest due diligence and respond tomorrow.

That was a great response.

....were we to ask him about his views on an ideal language... — TheMadFool

Tell me, what do yo think the tractatus was?

Small steps. At least read a tertiary text about him before you say anything else.

We must make a distinction between how language is (ordinary language) and how language should be (ideal language). — TheMadFool

To put differently what has already been said by others: the part of Wittgenstein's philosophy that you're looking at is built on a rejection of the search for an ideal language, so what you're doing is arguing against his whole approach. In principle that's fine, of course, but it's good to be clear about it.

By the way, the idea of a "misuse" in his later work is to show, not that people need to work on improving language--which it seems to me is your own takeaway--but that philosophers have to pay attention to how language actually works.

I bet he would've said the family resemblance shouldn't figure in it i.e. it's preferrable that language isn't a game in which a given word's meaning alters with context (form of life).
— TheMadFool

He literally says that this is exactly what we shouldn't do. But sure, continue making shit up — StreetlightX

You must understand what it must be like as a philosopher which Wittgenstein was to come to the realization, discover, that people have been misusing, some would even go so far as to say abusing, language in ways that makes philosophy hard and even sometimes impossible (no essence, no philosophy :grin: ).

Attempting a bit of psychology since it seems to be a hot topic on the forum lately, Wittgenstein was actually complaining about the misuse/abuse of language rather than anything fundamentally important about the connection between language and philosophy. He wasn't aware of it of course. A pity.

My interepretation of Wittgenstein is that yes, he was onto something - that 1. words lack an essence and 2.
many issues that philosophers are racking their brains over are pseudo-problems.

1 is undeniably true but not necessarily because something's wrong with either the tool (language) or with the material (philosophy). Our beloved Wittgenstein seems to have completely missed another likelier culprit, us, the end user of language (human error) - misuse/abuse of lingo/tongue/language.

2 is also true because language has been so poorly wielded that people have f**ked up and f**ked up bad.

So, ultimately, in the finaly analysis, Wittgenstein detected the problem (words seem to lack an essence) alright but he then goes on to claim that (some) philosophical problems aren't real which, to my reckoning, is a grave error because it presupposes people aren't misusing/abusing language which they are.

Think of it, every time Wittgenstein dismisses a philosophical problem as a pseudo-problem, we can respond by saying that people have used the relevant words in the wrong way and since Wittgenstein's entire theory of language games is predicated on that being false we have successfully demonstrated that there are real philosophical problems not pseudo-problems.

Let me stop you right there. I'm going to read the rest but this is a full stop in itself. Ideal qualifying language outside of a Russian lease agreement is frankly an upsetting term. Alright, I'll give the rest due diligence and respond tomorrow. — Cheshire

Read my reply to StreetlightX.

Tell me, what do yo think the tractatus was?

Small steps. At least read a tertiary text about him before you say anything else. — Banno

Wittgenstein himself didn't read any books I'm told. Also, please go through my reply to StreetlightX.

To put differently what has already been said by others: the part of Wittgenstein's philosophy that you're looking at is built on a rejection of the search for an ideal language, so what you're doing is arguing against his whole approach. In principle that's fine, of course, but it's good to be clear about it.

By the way, the idea of a "misuse" in his later work is to show, not people need to work on improving language--which it seems to me is your own takeaway--but that philosophers have to pay attention to how language actually works. — jamalrob

In my humble opinion, Wittgenstein's "meaning is use" doesn't quite do the job it was designed/formulated to do/for. He intends to deflect our attention from the usual way we understand meaning as essence.

I remember drawing an analogy between a book and a word. A book can be used to prop up a cellphone, a book can be used to hold paper down on a windy day, a book can be used to keep a cup of hot tea on, you get the idea. Thus the meaning of the book depends on how one uses it. Words too are like that, so Wittgenstein thinks - there's no essence to a book (word), what it is (what it means) is entirely a matter of how we use it.

So far so good.

However, if "meaning is use", there can be no such thing as misuse/abuse of language. In the book analogy above a book can be anything at all i.e. we can use it for anything and everything and no one would/could say I've misused/abused the book. In terms of words, I'm free to say the word "water" is, intriguingly, fire and that "god" means devil. You couldn't object to this because the notion of word misuse/abuse is N/A. This is taking Wittgenstein's theory taken to its logical conclusion, if you plant Wittgenstein in your garden and tend to it with care and love a particulalry exotic flower will bloom. What is this flower? Total chaos, utter confusion of course.

Retracing the evolution of the Wittgenstein flower of chaos and confusion back to its seed - language games/family resemblance - we can conclude with a certainty unbecoming of a philosopher that Wittgenstein's theory of language games and family resemblance boils down to, is ultimately about, chaos & confusion in language and by extension philosophy.

What is chaos and confusion in re language? Even a child knows that both happen in the absence of rules or if there are rules, not observing them (misuse)! This thread is about the latter - misuse of language!

It's a common misunderstanding that Witty is an advocate for 'vagueness' or somesuch — StreetlightX

Yes, I agree. I stated the criticism about vagueness but finished 'I tend to think not' as my post was long enough already. 'Vague' can be a pejorative term but it can also mean just 'adaptable to circumstances'. If we take the same time to walk round the block that is a different kind of 'same time' as the same time it takes two Olympians to run 100m.

In every case it must be asked: does that word fulfil its purpose? And if so, it's exact as it can be. — StreetlightX

I think there are practical examples in medicine and law, for example. What is diabetes? Diagnostic criteria are very specific and a yes/no diagnosis is possible by following them. So the Socratic method works. But not quite. There are patients marginally outside the criteria who would benefit more from treatment than other who are marginally inside. So fix the criteria. But we know that this will never be perfect. So make the criteria somewhat adaptable, analogously to case law: you make 'anti-social behaviour' criminal and then decide on each case and by precedent. The 'purpose' of the concept 'diabetes' in this context is to get people to treatment who need it and not inflict invasive treatment on people who don't. Fixity and adaptability (which may be 'vagueness' with the pejorative tone taken out) are both needed.

Wittgenstein himself didn't read any books I'm told. Also, please go through my reply to StreetlightX. — TheMadFool

He was an aeronautical engineer and his position was validated by Russell at least initially. If you want to keep running backwards in this corn field then by all means.

You must understand what it must be like as a philosopher which Wittgenstein was to come to the realization, discover, that people have been misusing, some would even go so far as to say abusing, language in ways that makes philosophy hard and even sometimes impossible (no essence, no philosophy :grin: ).

Attempting a bit of psychology since it seems to be a hot topic on the forum lately, Wittgenstein was actually complaining about the misuse/abuse of language rather than anything fundamentally important about the connection between language and philosophy. He wasn't aware of it of course. A pity.

My interepretation of Wittgenstein is that yes, he was onto something - that 1. words lack an essence and 2. many issues that philosophers are racking their brains over are pseudo-problems.

1 is undeniably true but not necessarily because something's wrong with either the tool (language) or with the material (philosophy). Our beloved Wittgenstein seems to have completely missed another likelier culprit, us, the end user of language (human error) - misuse/abuse of lingo/tongue/language.

2 is also true because language has been so poorly wielded that people have f**ked up and f**ked up bad.

So, ultimately, in the finaly analysis, Wittgenstein detected the problem (words seem to lack an essence) alright but he then goes on to claim that (some) philosophical problems aren't real which, to my reckoning, is a grave error because it presupposes people aren't misusing/abusing language which they are.

Think of it, every time Wittgenstein dismisses a philosophical problem as a pseudo-problem, we can respond by saying that people have used the relevant words in the wrong way and since Wittgenstein's entire theory of language games is predicated on that being false we have successfully demonstrated that there are real philosophical problems not pseudo-problems. — TheMadFool

None of this has anything to do with your made up assertions about family resemblance or ideal languages.

He was an aeronautical engineer and his position was validated by Russell at least initially. If you want to keep running backwards in this corn field then by all means. — Cheshire

Indeed, Wittgenstein was an aeronautical engineer. I completely forgot about his background in engineering and his relationship with Bertrand Russell. Thanks for refreshing my memory - I remember just skimming through the Wikipedia entries on him.

Coming to the point I was making, what are your thoughts about it?

If "meaning is use", the concept of misuse is N/A and anything goes but if anything goes, I could use the word "water" for fire and also for water itself. If that's the case water (water) is cold and water (fire) is not cold (hot). There's a great risk of confusion because a person who doesn't know that "water" = water = fire, the statements water is cold and water is not cold (hot) is what in logic is known as a contradiction.

It appears that there's a trade-off between memory and clarity in language. We can't have too many words because that would overburden our memory, thus we have polysemy/family resemblance but polysemy/family resemblance taken to the extreme causes confusion as demonstrated above and there would be a constant need to disambiguate words.

The memory aspect of language leads to Wittgenstein's meaning is use.

The clarity aspect of language leads to meaning as essence.

We need to strike a balance between the two.

None of this has anything to do with your made up assertions about family resemblance or ideal languages. — StreetlightX

Kindly read my post just above. Thanks.

Kindly read my post just above. Thanks. — TheMadFool

Sure - it involves the same misreading you've been peddling everytime you talk about Wittgenstein, and every time someone corrects you, you ignore it and peddle it again. To wit:

If "meaning is use", the concept of misuse is N/A and anything goes — TheMadFool

That 'anything goes' does not follow. The full expression of 'meaning is use' is 'meaning is use in a language-game'. "Misuse" is what follows when meaning is not used in a language-game. This is Wittgenstein 101.

Thanks for the link.

I find this idea of ‘family resemblance’ to be similar to Darwin’s ‘population thinking’, as termed by Ernst Mayr. As a very brief summary: “any description of a species is at best a statistical summary that applies to no individual”.

Before I continued to wade through the thread or step into the argument - and given that I haven’t read Wittgenstein on this - am I even on the right track with this understanding?

That 'anything goes' does not follow. The full expression of 'meaning is use' is 'meaning is use in a language-game'. "Misuse" is what follows when meaning is not used in a language-game. This is Wittgenstein 101. — StreetlightX

You seem to have forgotten, an honest mistake, what language games are. They are, FYI, precisely what I refer to when I say anything goes.

They are, FYI, precisely what I refer to when I say anything goes. — TheMadFool

Then you have no idea what you are talking about.

However, if "meaning is use", there can be no such thing as misuse/abuse of language. In the book analogy above a book can be anything at all i.e. we can use it for anything and everything and no one would/could say I've misused/abused the book. In terms of words, I'm free to say the word "water" is, intriguingly, fire and that "god" means devil. You couldn't object to this because the notion of word misuse/abuse is N/A. This is taking Wittgenstein's theory taken to its logical conclusion, if you plant Wittgenstein in your garden and tend to it with care and love a particulalry exotic flower will bloom. What is this flower? Total chaos, utter confusion of course. — TheMadFool

I believe ideas similar to this are what lead Plato to "the good", as the goal, the purpose, or "the end" in Aristotle's words, that for the sake of which. Likewise, in Wittgenstein's PI you'll find a reference to the requirement that a signpost (analogous with a word), serves the purpose. In this conceptualization an inability to serve the purpose might be called misuse. Chaos and confusion have been avoided because people are inclined toward the good. that is to say that they act with intention.

The issue of abuse is very complex and difficult, well represented by a common form of abuse in language use, commonly called deception. When reading Wittgenstein I suggest you be very wary of the many instances where he demonstrates the reality of deception. This is why there are many distinct interpretations of his work. If a man's goal with his use of words (signposts) is to deceive (mislead), then the possibility of a correct interpretation is negated.

They are, FYI, precisely what I refer to when I say anything goes.
— TheMadFool

Then you have no idea what you are talking about. — StreetlightX

Huh? If there were such a thing as misuse of language, the word "game" (Wittgenstein's favorite) couldn't be applies to chess, battle simulations (war games) and sports - there's nothing that unites these three thematically to permit the use of the same word for all. This is Wittgenstein's family resemblance and they're only possible if you violate the rules of good definitions i.e. if you use words inappropriately or, put simply, you misuse words. If, on the other hand, you're willing to ignore misuse of words (language is use), like we all do at some point, we're asking for trouble - confusion & chaos will ensue and ample evidence is available on this forum, some of that being my own.

the word "game" (Wittgenstein's favorite) couldn't be applies to chess, battle simulations (war games) and sports - there's nothing that unites these three thematically to permit the use of the same word for all. — TheMadFool

Are they not the activities that people do for fun and leisure mostly (well some do for money - but the fun factor still there) using their mind and body? There are clearly something common resemblance in there. The good definition in the core don't have to be misused to use the word.

If there were such a thing as misuse of language, the word "game" (Wittgenstein's favorite) couldn't be applies to chess, battle simulations (war games) and sports — TheMadFool

Misuse happens precisely when one treats the word 'game' as univocal across all these cases. 'Misuse' is what happens when you transplant words from one language-game into another without paying attention to the specificity of each. Use and misuse are comparative notions. Of course Wittgenstein did not speak of 'misuse', but simply, a lack of use tout court. The idling engine of language.

This simply means, to my reckoning, that words definitely do possess an essence but due to the fact, as herein described, that they're being (mis)used with complete disregard of definitional criteria (OR instead of AND) it creates an illusion of an absence of essence which Wittgenstein falsely believes is real (Language games/family resemblance). — TheMadFool

I don't believe words have essence. Words have meanings which are contingent, traditional and empirical, and people use them by the rules and learning the meanings. Is there any word which are a priori? Some say words like ma ma mom are, because without being taught, the new borns utter it. But it would be like saying dog barking is their a priori language, because all dogs bark without getting taught.

Misuse happens precisely when one treats the word 'game' as univocal across all these cases. 'Misuse' is what happens when you transplant words from one language-game into another without paying attention to the specificity of each. Of course Wittgenstein did not speak of 'misuse', but simply, a lack of use tout court. The idling engine of language. — StreetlightX

It seems there are two ways of looking at misuse of language:

1. In the context of a language game (Wittgenstein): So, a word X means different things in different forms of life or different language games (contexts). Misusing a word would occur when one is oblivious to this fact and we assume that X has the same meaning across all contexts (language games or forms of life). This is your position. Too, words don't have an essence.

2. Failure to meet definitional criteria (My position): A word X is being applied to entities A, B, and C but there's nothing in common to all A, B, and C that could justify such a practice. One explanation: The logical AND operator that appears in definitions is being swapped for the logical OR operator. Words have an essence.

Would you define a dog as a wolf OR tame or as a wolf AND tame? The answer to that question should give you an idea as to why words are being misused the way I described it (AND substituted by OR).

Wittgenstein's theory of language games makes sense only if 2 (above) doesn't count as misuse (of language) i.e. there's nothing amiss with applying the word X to A, B and C simultaneously. Were this not the case, the notion of family resemblance wouldn't make sense; after all, family resemblance relies completely on the logical error being committed (OR replaces AND).

:chin:

2 (above) is a mistake, a logical one pertaining to the nature of definitions. Ergo, Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblance and language games is entirely based on misuse of language, the upshot being if language isn't misused, there would be no family resemblance; if there are no family resemblances, there would be no language games; if there are no language games, there would be no Wittgenstein! :chin:

I've given the matter of language acquisition and animal communicatiom some thought but, luckily or not, I lack the wherewithal to conduct a proper investigation into it.

I'll say this though, children acquire language in ways that seem rather mysterious. The sound "ma" and "mama" seem to be hardwired into our brains. At other times, we need to teach children words. :chin:

Wittgenstein's theory of language games makes sense only if 2 (above) doesn't count as misuse — TheMadFool

You're so obsessed with this notion of 'misuse' that you completely overlook the fact of no use: language which has no language-game at all, or an employment of language which, although mistaken for a use, does not have one. Your convoluted rambling misses the mark.

You're so obsessed with this notion of 'misuse' that you completely overlook the fact of no use: language which has no language-game at all, or an employment of language which, although mistaken for a use, does not have one. Your convoluted rambling misses the mark. — StreetlightX

No point discussing words that are no use, right? I don't get why you open up a new bottle of wine when you haven't finished the already open one, figuratively speaking.

No point discussing words that are no use, right? — TheMadFool

Your thread is one such instance and apparently it's gone on for two pages, so you tell me. Figuratively speaking.

Your thread is one such instance and apparently it's gone on for two pages, so you tell me. Figuratively speaking. — StreetlightX

You remind me of this :point:



Not a bad trick sir/madam as the case may be, not a bad trick at all!

@StreetlightX and I'm like :point: