If God is a necessary being, his existence is entailed by the rules of logic. Such is the meaning of "necessary." The statement "God is a necessary being" therefore defines God as subservient to logic and caused by logic. Such entails logic preexisting God. Under such a definitional framework, God's inability to violate logic is entailed. The OP sets the stage for this logic puzzle, by defining God from the outset as logically entailed.

For that reason, we read:

Hey, my OP, my god. — Banno

With that demand, the puzzle remains in the knot intended.

The theist would hold that God is dependent upon only himself as the uncaused cause, with the term "cause" including not just physical causes but logical causes. He is not a necessary being. He is contingent upon himself, not logic.

A math puzzle more than a God puzzle.

Is this another way of rendering what you are saying, or claiming?

God can be defined as a necessary personal being.

A personal being can be defined as necessary only if it can be demonstrated to be true that it exists in every possible world.

But if it can be demonstrated that there is a possible world in which god does not exist, then God cannot be defined as a necessary personal being.

My further comments will depend upon your response.

Not quite.

No need for "personal being" - the argument would apply to a necessary rock, were that posited by someone.

And truth ranges over statements, not things, so get rid of that, too.

And no need for "demonstrated to be true"; just being true would suffice. SO a better version would be:

...a thing is necessary only if it exists in every possible world.

But if there is a possible world in which that things does not exist, then it is not necessary. — charles ferraro

If God is a necessary being, his existence is entailed by the rules of logic. — Hanover

I'm not so sure. Kripke broke the link between necessity and the a priori; do you want to put it back? Do we have grounds to do so?

Why would anyone trust ancient religious texts when they are just human writings and contradict each other? — Gregory

Whom exactly are you asking this and for what purpose?

SO if someone is certain about god, it is not as a consequence of deliberation. — Banno

As I've been saying all along.

...and as a consequence it is irrational; it stands outside of rational considerations. It is perhaps there are a part of what Wittgenstein called "hinge propositions".

Yes. A hinge commitment.

The issue then becomes the extent to which such beliefs should be taken into consideration when deciding what to do.

Taken into consideration by whom?
Deciding by whom?

Why would anyone trust ancient religious texts when they are just human writings and contradict each other?

Indeed. And yet these are used in deciding issues such as abortion, euthanasia, women's rights and so on.

What exactly is being used: those texts, or some people's certainty about them?

When arguing against someone, one isn't arguing against their arguments, but against the other person's certainty of those arguments, ie. one is arguing against the strength of the other person's hinge commitments. (That's why logic and evidence so often have so little bearing on persuading people, because logic and evidence don't address what the argument is actually about.)

Here's the rub; the assumed link between god and what is we ought do. This is what must be broken. — Banno

Why must it be broken? Justify.

It's pretty clear that Bart is using a confused notion of the relation between necessity and contingency. — Banno

Really?? Pure wishful thinking on your part. You seem to think that if I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false, then I think it is false. 'If' is not an assertion.

I think the law of non-contradiction is true. I don't think it has to be. I just think it is.

It's you who doesn't seem to understand that in saying something is possible, one is not asserting its actuality.

So, again: unicorns don't exist. They're not impossible. They just don't exist. Presumably you don't think that's a contradictory thing to say?

Now: the law of non-contradiction is true. It doesn't have to be. It just is. Why - without recourse to silly symbols - do you think that's a contradictory thing to say?

It may be an implausible thing to say - most consider the law of non-contradiction to be a necessary truth - but it is not a contradictory thing to say.

You think it is. You've got no argument, however. Just squiggles that you can't translate into English.

And how on earth is my view of God incoherent? Someone who thinks God exists of necessity has an incoherent view - demonstrably so. They are affirming a contradiction. Someone who thinks God exists of necessity is an idiot, for they think God can do anything and can't do something (namely, not exist).

God exists contingently. God is omnipotent - so, can do anything - and thus God exists contingently. Why? Because he can do anything. Which means he can destroy himself. Thus he exists contingently.

How is that incoherent? Coherent. That's what that is.

And i note you just toss in that I am confused as well about God's ability to make mistakes....oh, am I? Really? Why?

If God is a necessary being, his existence is entailed by the rules of logic. Such is the meaning of "necessary." The statement "God is a necessary being" therefore defines God as subservient to logic and caused by logic. Such entails logic preexisting God. — Hanover

It's not clear that this is what all actual monotheists mean by God being necessary (apart from those in particular who argue like the above). Rather, the necessity of God's existence in monotheism is to be understood in contradistinction with the optionality or relativity of human existence, as in: God is necessary, but man is not; man is only optional.

Such would at least be the Christian reasoning, but not, say, Hindu. In some forms of Hinduism, man isn't merely optional; man is necessary and contingent on God, while God is not contingent on anyone or anything.

If we want to talk about the necessity of God's existence, we need to be clear which particular monotheism we're (indirectly) referring to, and justify our choice.
Why the Christian notion of necessity of God's existence, why not the Hindu one?

Along these lines, I'd point out that the most important truths we learn are through fiction. What then of this fiction that speaks the truth? — Hanover

If fiction is the path to truth, you've lost at least one basis to abandon religion. You don't have to believe the sea parted, just that there is a truth being told there.
— Hanover

But what is that truth? The moment you say what it is, you are wrong. — Banno

Not to be glib, but you're supposed to feel that truth in your heart.

Bettelheim's The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales is probably one of the most well-known (even if not original) studies of the importance of fairy tales.
For the more serious reader, there's Heuscher's A Psychiatric Study of Myths and Fairy Tales; Their Origin, Meaning, and Usefulness.


Why do we watch Star Wars or the Hobbit films and such? To feel good, to feel like we can handle life's problems, to feel like life has meaning. A feeling that can otherwise be extremely hard to come by; it's so elusive, yet so important for one's wellbeing and proactiveness.

If God is a necessary being, his existence is entailed by the rules of logic.
— Hanover
I'm not so sure. Kripke broke the link between necessity and the a priori; do you want to put it back? Do we have grounds to do so? — Banno

In order for the Kripke objection to be applicable, you would have to show that your OP didn't make an analytic a priori claim but that it was synthetic a priori. That is, was your claim more akin to "all bachelors are unmarried men" or was it more akin to "the morning star is the evening star." The former being analytic a priori and the latter, according to Kripke, synthetic a priori in that it requires some empirical knowledge to know it's truth. I am aware of the Quine objections to synonymity, but one issue at a time.

Your OP stated "God is supposed to be a necessary being." I would consider that analytic a priori because I don't know how one should be expected to know God is necessary a posteriori. That attribute of God as you've presented it appears purely definitional. Thus my analysis holds.

It's not clear that this is what all actual monotheists mean by God being necessary (apart from those in particular who argue like the above). Rather, the necessity of God's existence in monotheism is to be understood in contradistinction with the optionality or relativity of human existence, as in: God is necessary, but man is not; man is only optional. — baker

Outside of philosophical contexts, I've never heard God being described as necessary, certainly not in a deductive sense, as if God is the product of a syllogism. I was raised Jewish. Perhaps the concept of necessity appears somewhere, but I've not run across it. God is generally described as eternal, so the idea that he was caused really doesn't make logical sense.

I'd also point out that in a hyper-monotheistic religion like Judaism, the oneness of God can't be challenged. See, Maimonides 13 articles of faith, #2: http://web.oru.edu/current_students/class_pages/grtheo/mmankins/drbyhmpg_files/GBIB766RabbLit/Chapter9Maimonides13Princ/index.html
This oneness prohibits assigning attributes (or properties) to God. God is not considered to be a strange substance with various properties, but he is one and only one and indivisible in any way. Whether that makes sense or not I leave to the rabbis to better explain, but I did want to point out that these arguments that point to an attribute of God and then they try to explain how that attribute might be inconsistent with the concept of God is violative of the concept of his oneness.

The point being that these attacks of "God" take God as a very basic concept without contextualizing him into the definitional schemes of established theological systems. A believer of a particular faith would shrug off these objections as being inapplicable to what they believed God to be in the first place.

God is generally described as eternal, so the idea that he was caused really doesn't make logical sense. — Hanover

One source for the necessity thing is Aristotle. That form was transmitted to Christianity through Aquinas. The general theme is the need for some first cause to avoid an infinite backward regress of causes.

Those proofs weren't supposed to be persuading atheists of anything. They just executed atheists. They didn't argue with them.

Why must it be broken? Justify. — baker

Because people shouldn't replace morals with Leviticus 20:13 (for example)?


Incidentally, inquiring into possible readings of Leviticus 20:13 was run elsewhere (facebook) not long ago.
Some responded that the edict only applied to those tribes back then, others raised translation problems, others still suggested that it's not for humans to take action but leave it to post-mortem judgment, yet others held the US Declaration of Independence over the Bible, ... So, some of those responses were seemingly due to employing morals not defined by the Bible.
As anticipated, enough people in the groups were hesitant or silent or outright refused to give straight answers, one might hope due to moral quandaries, rather than fear of being boo'd out of town or something.
Anyway, it became clear enough that the passage can be read in detrimental ways by someone, and leaning in such a direction is just one step away, ... And that's sufficient to deny the Bible as a moral authority.
In Islam, there's a common sentiment that one must submit wholly to the Quranic Allah, and apply the Quran (and Hadith) to all aspects of life, which exposes a similar problem.
_{(nope, I'm not homosexual myself, not that it matters, I'm just a regular heterosexual, in case you're thinking of motives/self-preservation)}

You seem to think that if I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false, then I think it is false. — Bartricks

No, I don't.

You have claimed that LNC is contingent. I've explained in several different ways how this leads to inconsistency. A couple of other folk have made the same point.

I suppose if I am going to be charitable I might just say that you are working with an eccentric notion of contingency and leave it there.

I do not understand your question. I don't even think the word 'contingent' does any real work, if that helps. — Bartricks

You haven't explained it once - not once. This - Bartricks claims the law of non-contradiction is contingently true....#$^^** Kazam!! He's contradicted himself!! - is not an argument.

Possible doesn't mean actual. The law of non-contradiction is actually true. That's all you need to know. And my saying that does not - not - involve me in any actual contradiction.

Can't God make you wrong is this discussion without informing you? So you don't know you're right

Yes, of course he could do that. He can do anything. For instance, he could make it the case that you make good points. That isn't good evidence he's done it. I have excellent evidence your points are appalling. But he could make them good.

You haven't explained it once - not once. — Bartricks

Yeah, I did. Several times.

Try this one:

All theorems of propositional calculus are necessary theorems of modal logic.

The Law of Noncontradiction is a theorem of propositional calculus.

Therefore the Law of noncontradiction is a necessary theorem of modal logic.

If the Law of Noncontradiction is a necessary theorem, then it is not contingent.

The law of noncontradiction is not contingent.

QED

Question begging. You have to show me to be committed to a contradiction WITHOUT assuming necessity.

You are a bad and conventional thinker. That's your problem you are impressed with mediocrity and have no originality. Stop helping yourself to necessity. Show me to have committed a contradiction without appealing to any necessary truths. Or concede that you cannot.

So you want contingency without necessity.

I'd say that was an impossibility, but for you, that's not a problem.

If it's necessary than it is due to being self referentially the case. The true things can not be false without dissolving the meaning of true.

If it's contingent, then it is contingent on the future corroboration of cases where the LNC is maintained. There may be some unknown or unthought of statement in which the LNC doesn't apply; such as superposition or other funny physics we haven't discovered.

I think the question of whether it's rational to be skeptical in this case and if so when is not rational to be skeptical is the issue.

The true things can not be false without dissolving the meaning of true. — Cheshire

Yes, that's the point.

If we came across an apparent example of something's both being and not being the case, we would first assume that we had missed something, that somehow our description of what was going on was incorrect. We do this surprisingly often. It's the logic behind a reductio ad absurdum.

If we could not find an error in our observation, we would need to change the logical system we were using quite radically. That's the path to paraconsistent logic. Have a skim of the SEP article.

Note that Bart is not following this path. Paraconsistent logics claim that LNC is not true. He claimed that LNC is true, but not necessary. As I pointed out above, LNC is a theorem of propositional logic, and all such theorems are necessarily true.

Superposition is not an example of a real-life contradiction. If it were, we would be able to conclude absolutely anything. Rather, superposition is described within a mathematics that takes LNC to be true.

Finding a contradiction would be like claiming that 1+1=2 now, but we might find a case in which 1+1=3. Well, not, you can't find such a case, and if you think you have, then you are doing it wrong. But if you persist that 1+1=3, you need to present a new arithmetic in which this might happen, and then to how that it is better than the arithmetic we have now.

It's pretty clear that Bart does not have much of a grasp of logic, despite his protests.

Note that Bart is not following this path. Paraconsistent logics claim that LNC is not true. He claimed that LNC is true, but not necessary. As I pointed out above, LNC is a theorem of propositional logic, and all such theorems are necessarily true. — Banno

The LNC is a model of our expectations about the world. The model is undeniably consistent, but the assumption it will always correspond to the facts for the rest of time out into infinite starts to seem just as bold as questioning the LNC when you take the scale into account. Would finding an exception have implications; I imagine, but some exotic singular case could flicker through reality for a moment. But, it does feel like irrational speculation.

The model is undeniably consistent, but the assumption it will always correspond to the facts for the rest of time out into infinite starts to seem just as bold as questioning the LNC when you take the scale into account. — Cheshire

I don't think time plays a role here. I think logic tells us what we can reasonably say, and helps us recognise when we've said stuff wrong. Our response to any apparent contradiction must be to rephrase the issue.

I don't think time plays a role here. I think logic tells us what we can reasonably say, and helps us recognise when we've said stuff wrong. Our response to any apparent contradiction must be to rephrase the issue. — Banno

I don't think the empty chance of the model failing warrants further consideration of anything tangential. But, the universe is very big and time implies it's in constant flux; so in a nearly trivial point of ceremony I'd have to reserve an or not, but ignore it without any trouble. If something can be dismissed perhaps it ought be doubt concerning the LNC. I don't disagree and see the counter-point as the definition of arguing at extremes.

If something can be dismissed perhaps it ought be doubt concerning the LNC. — Cheshire

I'll agree with that.

That's fair.

Superposition is not an example of a real-life contradiction. If it were, we would be able to conclude absolutely anything. Rather, superposition is described within a mathematics that takes LNC to be true. — Banno

I thought the issue was the lack of even a metaphysical coherence? Qualifying it as "not real-life", implies some other type of existence. If the assumptions of the LNC being true are consistent with a metaphysical contradiction then the LNC proves it's coherent. Or not.