Making images of something means making images of the objects represented, not making the objects themselves. — Apollodorus

So, you believe that the Olympian gods actually exist?

Religious people do not think that when making images of deities they make the deities represented by the images. — Apollodorus

That may very well be what religious people believe.

A statue of Zeus was an artistic representation of the God residing on Mount Olympus, not Zeus himself. — Apollodorus

So, you do believe that Olympian gods exist!

Once again, follow your own statement. If a speech about the Gods has a true form, then it has a true form. — Apollodorus

Perhaps the true form of speech about the gods is that they do not exist. That is why such speech is reserved for the few who are suited to hear it.

No, the onus is on you to show that I don’t read the dialogue. — Apollodorus

You are doing a good job of that yourself. We have a record of it across three threads.

Once again, the issue is not the reality but Socrates’ belief in it. — Apollodorus

You have completely reversed your position, from claiming that the Forms a metaphysical reality and not hypothesis to saying the issue is not the reality but Socrates' belief.

Exactly, investigate the truth of beings, i.e., realities, not imaginary things. — Apollodorus

Investigate the truth of beings through speech. A speech about beings is not the reality of beings. The beings are hypothetical. They are investigated the same way that the mathematicians investigate, through images.

“Putting something down as being true” means believing it to be true. He is talking about realities. — Apollodorus

What is believed to be true is not true because it is believed. Yes, he is talking about reality, but it is still just talk. It does not transcend beliefs. The Forms are not realities, they are hypotheses about reality.

An opinion can be right opinion. — Apollodorus

And it could be a wrong opinion. Without knowledge we cannot determine whether it is right or wrong.

Of course he doesn’t. He speaks through his characters. — Apollodorus

His makes his characters speak. He chose not to speak. We have no way of determining if and when he agreed with what his characters say. As I previously pointed out there is an extensive literature on this. I provided a few sources.

In that case, the claim that Socrates or Plato do not believe in God/s is an assumption without support. — Apollodorus

The dialogues raise questions about the gods that are never resolved. The gods are absent from the discussion of what you call metaphysical reality in the Republic. The existence of gods are called into question not affirmed. Draw your own conclusions.

Anyway, as I said, the Sun is a God and the Good is (1) said to be the creator of the Sun and (2) is likened to the Sun. — Apollodorus

Where in the dialogue does it say that the sun is a god? It may have been a common belief but that does not mean that this belief is affirmed in the dialogue.

L. Strauss, On Plato’s Republic — Apollodorus

Once again, context is important. The context of the passage under discussion can be found at 379a:

It's appropriate for founders to know the models according to which the poets must tell their tales.

Socrates and Adeimantus are not agreeing to what the gods actually are or even if they are but rather to what the stories of the gods, that is, what the theology should be if the city is to be just. The theology begins with false speeches (376e-377a), for such speeches are in accord with the model.

That may very well be what religious people believe. — Fooloso4

Exactly. Religious people do not think that when making images of deities they make the deities whom the images represent.

Otherwise said, Socrates makes literary or metaphorical images of metaphysical realities he believes in, in the same way an artisan in 4th-century BC Athens would make images of Gods he believed in.

Perhaps the true form of speech about the gods is that they do not exist. — Fooloso4

Perhaps. But you have no evidence that this is the case.

Investigate the truth of beings through speech. A speech about beings is not the reality of beings. — Fooloso4

It is a speech about realities. You said that yourself:

Yes, he is talking about reality — Fooloso4

A talk about a reality is a talk about a reality, i.e. a talk about something that is a reality.

And it could be a wrong opinion. Without knowledge we cannot determine whether it is right or wrong. — Fooloso4

If without knowledge we cannot determine whether an opinion is right or wrong then we cannot claim that it is wrong without evidence to show this to be the case.

His makes his characters speak. — Fooloso4

Yes, that's what I'm saying. He speaks through his characters!

The dialogues raise questions about the gods that are never resolved. The gods are absent from the discussion of what you call metaphysical reality in the Republic. — Fooloso4

If the questions about the Gods are never resolved then you cannot insists that they are.

The Gods are mentioned without being discussed in detail because the Republic is about the ideal city and because the theology culminates in the Good. Plato's theology is a hierarchy of metaphysical or spiritual realities, as pointed out by Sedley, Gerson and other scholars of Plato:

D. Sedley, Plato’s Theology
D. Sedley, Plato’s Timaeus and Hesiod’s Theogony
L. Gerson, From Plato’s Good to Platonic God
P. Panagiotis, Plato’s Theology in the Timaeus
F. Solmsen, Plato’s Theology

Where in the dialogue does it say that the sun is a god? — Fooloso4

I have told you this many times.

“Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean for your question evidently refers to the Sun.” “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?” (Rep 508a).
“This [the Sun], then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the Good which the Good begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the Good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this [the Sun] in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.” (Rep 508b - c ).

The Sun is "one of the divinities (i.e. Gods) in heaven". Can't you read???

Socrates and Adeimantus are not agreeing to what the gods actually are or even if they are but rather to what the stories of the gods, that is, what the theology should be if the city is to be just. — Fooloso4

Exactly. Socrates and Adeimantus do not deny the existence of the Gods. And if they agree what the theology of the city should be, then there is a theology that is agreed on.

So, you do agree after all! :grin:

Nothing changes when you repeat your opinions about what you believe the poets believed yet again.

Perhaps. But you have no evidence that this is the case. — Apollodorus

One must follow the argument in order to determine whether there is any evidence. You are unwilling or unable to do that. What more is there to say?

A talk about a reality is a talk about a reality, i.e. a talk about something that is a reality. — Apollodorus

It is not talk about something that is a reality, it is talk about a hypothetical. You seem either unable or unwilling to see the difference. What more is there to say?

If without knowledge we cannot determine whether an opinion is right or wrong then we cannot claim that it is wrong without evidence to show this to be the case. — Apollodorus

We can, however, make a distinction between an opinion about reality and reality. You have denied, that the Forms are hypothetical, and have asserted that they are metaphysical realities. But you now confirm that the Forms are hypothetical. What more is there to say?

If the questions about the Gods are never resolved then you cannot insists that they are. — Apollodorus

That is your issue not mine. Your first post on the Phaedo thread:

According to some, Plato taught "animism" and "atheism". Is that true?

With fanatical frequency you have returned to that question. What more is there to say?

I have told you this many times. — Apollodorus

Right, we have discussed this. What more is there to say?

And if they agree what the theology of the city should be, then there is a theology that is agreed on. — Apollodorus

A theology of false speeches (376e-377a). We have been over this already. What more is there to say?

All of these things have been discussed. You have your opinions, I have mine, and different scholars have theirs as well. Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.

Nothing changes when you repeat your opinions about what you believe the poets believed yet again. — Fooloso4

Sorry but you seem to have some comprehension problems there. I am not talking about "poets". I am talking about Socrates making literary images of deities (metaphysical or spiritual entities) he believed in, in the same way Greek artisans made images of Gods they and their community believed in.

This is what Socrates says when he relates that he is taken to court "for making other new deities" and this is confirmed in the Symposium where it is said that he is full of speeches that are like images of deities.

It is not talk about something that is a reality, it is talk about a hypothetical. — Fooloso4

Wrong again. Here are your own words:

Yes, he is talking about reality. — Fooloso4

The text itself says "realities".

But you now confirm that the Forms are hypothetical. — Fooloso4

Of course not. "Hypothetical" is what you said:

The beings are hypothetical. — Fooloso4

Are you retracting your statement?

With fanatical frequency you have returned to that question. — Fooloso4

I have returned to that question simply because with fanatical frequency you have raised that question. You are defending the fringe position of Strauss and Bernardete, and I am defending the mainstream position of Gerson and Sedley. That is what discussion and dialectic is about, isn't it?

Right, we have discussed this. — Fooloso4

Of course we have. And yet you keep asking me where it says that the Sun is a God!!!

A theology of false speeches — Fooloso4

It is not a "theology of false speeches" at all. The Platonic corpus contains a theology that includes (1) Gods like the Sun, (2) Forms, and (3) a Supreme Deity represented by the Good.

I have given you a list of leading scholars of Plato to familiarize yourself with Plato's theology:

D. Sedley, Plato’s Theology
D. Sedley, Plato’s Timaeus and Hesiod’s Theogony
L. Gerson, From Plato’s Good to Platonic God
P. Panagiotis, Plato’s Theology in the Timaeus
F. Solmsen, Plato’s Theology

And yet you refuse to read even one of them and keep insisting that Straussianist esotericism and sophistry is the only correct way to read Plato.

As I said many times, there is nothing wrong with holding a fringe opinion. But at least you should (1) acknowledge that it is a fringe opinion and (2) be able to provide some evidence in support of your claims and not make statements that either are not true or are contradicting your own claims, like your claim about Ibn Sina, your repeated suggestion that the dialogue (Rep 508a) doesn't say that the Sun is a God even when this is contrary to the evidence, etc., etc.

More generally, you seem to refuse to acknowledge the fact that the dialogues are the product of 4th-century BC Greece and that it is not right to impose 21st-century ideas either on the dialogues or on their author.

Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.

There is no need for my "opinions" to convince anyone. They are the mainstream view already and have been for a very long time!

It is your opinions that are fringe and you have had the chance to produce evidence in support of them but you have failed to do so, as I said from the start you would.

Unfortunately, you refuse to acknowledge this and keep starting over and over again. :grin:

If you think that what you imagine to be the "mainstream view" is so secure then why are you so insecure as to continually post the same opinions? Your intolerance of other views is incompatible with free and open philosophical discussion. After over two thousand years of Plato scholarship a great deal of disagreement remains. Most scholars regard this as the condition within in which they work. They do not share your need for orthodoxy and do not spend their days endlessly arguing with heretics and trying to have the last word.

After over two thousand years of Plato scholarship a great deal of disagreement remains. — Fooloso4

No one disputes that there is some disagreement on certain points of textual interpretation.

However, when you say things like "the dialogue doesn't say that the Sun is a God" when the text of the dialogue clearly says so, and you repeatedly ask people to show where it says so after being shown already, then this is not a matter of opinion, it is a matter of denying unquestionable fact, which raises the question as to why you are doing it.

Why is it so unsettling to you that my opinions differ from yours and that there are highly regarded scholars whose opinions differ from those you favor?

You have made your views known, so now what is it you hope to accomplish by going over the same arguments yet again?

Anyone who is interested can make up their own minds. Or, perhaps that is what worries you, that they may not find your opinions as convincing as you do.

I'm not talking about your opinions. I was pointing out that you repeatedly asked me to show where the dialogue says that the Sun is a God when I had already done so, and when you can see for yourself that this is the case:

"Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?” “Why, the one that you too and other people mean for your question evidently refers to the Sun” (508a)

Which part of the passage above do you find difficult to understand?

Perhap you can take up basket weaving. I heard it can be therapeutic.

I would like to see a moratorium where both Fooloso4 and Apollodorus do not respond to each other for a good while. They have both explained their points of view well enough in regards to the other. There are other discussions of the texts that are being crowded out by the repetition.

Yes, you do sound like the kind of person that would have heard of a number of therapies, not just that one.

As for myself, I'm too busy discussing Plato's dialogues and I'm beginning to enjoy learning from the Straussian methodology. I'm sure Plato himself would have been delighted.

Anyway, have a nice day. And enjoy your drink.

I think that is a good suggestion and a diplomatic way of putting it. I share your concern that other discussions of the texts that are being crowded out by the repetition, especially given that they are discussions that I initiated and have an interest in maintaining.

Good.
How about you, @Apollodorus?

How about you, @Apollodorus? — Valentinus

Well, I don't want to have the last word, so I am currently unable to say anything.

Besides, I am busy studying Straussianism .... :wink:

Does that mean you agree to the deal?

I'm not entirely sure what the deal is in practice, but I don't want to be a spoilsport. So, yes.

I am asking that you don't respond directly to Fooloso4,
at least for some time.

Sure. I have no problem with that at all.

I posted this before, but given the low signal to noise that has plagued this discussion I am going to post it again so that it not get crowded out:

Socrates Argument For Why the Good Cannot Be Known

The argument is not easily seen because it stretches over three books of the Republic, as if Plato wanted only those who are sufficiently attentive to see it.

I begin by collecting the releverent statements. Bloom translation. Bold added.

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)

"Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
"Yes."
"While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

"You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

He makes a threefold distinction -

Being or what is
Something other than that which is
What is not


And corresponding to them

Knowledge
Opinion
Ignorance



The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not.

What is entirely is entirely knowable. The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. The good is then not entirely knowable. As if to confirm this Socrates says that he is giving his opinions about the good, but that what is knowable and unknowable is a matter of fact. As to the soul’s journey to the intelligible and the sight of the idea of the good, he says that a god knows if it happens to be true, but this is how it looks to him. He plays on the meaning of the cognate terms idea and look, which can be translated as Form. A god knows if it “happens to be true” but we are not gods, and what may happen to be true might also happen to be false.

The quote at 517 continues:

… but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence —and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it. (517c)

But it is not seen, for it is not something that is and thus not something knowable, and so no conclusion must follow. In order to act prudently, he says, one must see the good itself. Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers.

*

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a) — Fooloso4

I read recently that a fundamental theme in Plato is 'to be, is to be intelligible'. Bearing in mind the passages in Phaedo about the fact that the ideas have no opposite - then in some fundamental respect, they truly are - as I think the quotations indicate.

There is an expression in Plato's dialogues which I read of recently, but I can't recall what it is or bring it to mind. It's an expression about the status of sensable things - that they neither truly are, nor are not, but are a kind of mixture of being and becoming. Do you happen to recall that term?

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena.

A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers. — Fooloso4

Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework.

Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework. — Wayfarer

St Gregory Palamas writes:

God’s essence is entirely unnameable since it is also completely incomprehensible. Therefore we name it on the basis of all its energies, although with respect to the essence itself none of those names means anything different from any other. For by each name and in all names together nothing other is named except that which is hidden and whose real identity is unknown to all

– St Gregory Palamas, Topics of Natural and Theological Science and on the Moral and Ascetic Life: One Hundred And Fifty Texts

But this not the same as what is being implied here about the Good.

The claim that is being made is that:

1. According to Socrates, "in order to act prudently, one must see the Good. But the Good is not seen, not knowable, and is not. Therefore, whether one is acting prudently, remains an open question that cannot be answered."

2. "The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher."

But, obviously, we cannot live an “examined life” when neither the Gods, nor the Forms, nor even the Good or any other standards of reference exist, or are otherwise "not knowable and not seen", and when "the question of whether one is acting prudently cannot be answered."

In contrast, though Platonists and Christians refer to God or the One as "unnameable" and "incomprehensible" or "unknowable," they do know whether they do or do not act prudently.

The saints neither know the whole of God’s purpose with regard to every object or scriptural text, nor on the other hand do they write down once and for all everything that they do know. This is because in the first place God is beyond comprehension, and His wisdom is not limited in such a way that an angel or man can grasp it in its entirety. As St John Chrysostom says with regard to a certain point of scriptural exegesis, we say about it as much as should be said at the moment, but God, in addition to what we say, knows other unfathomable meanings as well. And, in the second place, because of men’s incapacity and weakness it is not good for even the saints themselves to say all that they know, for they might speak at too great a length, thus making themselves offensive or unintelligible because of the confusion in their reader’s mind.

- St Peter of Damaskos, Book II, Twenty-Four Discourses, XXIII, Holy Scripture

Again, no Christian would infer from the unknowability of God's purpose with regard to every object that God's purpose (or God himself) doesn't exist and that the question whether we are acting prudently cannot be answered.

Bearing in mind the passages in Phaedo about the fact that the ideas have no opposite — Wayfarer

It is not that they have no opposite but that they cannot "accept" or "allow" or combine with their opposite.

then in some fundamental respect, they truly are - as I think the quotations indicate. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is true of all the Forms except the Good. It is beyond being (509b)

Do you happen to recall that term? — Wayfarer

They are said to be images of the things that are, the Forms, but I don't know if that is what you have in mind.

I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena. — Wayfarer

But he does not say that all the Forms are beyond being, only the Good. The Forms are the beings. The Good is beyond being.

Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework. — Wayfarer

When making comparisons it is useful to see not only similarities but differences. Socratic philosophy proceeds by rational inquiry, by the critical examination of opinion, that is, dialectic.

I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena. — Wayfarer

The Republic says:

… but their very existence (to einai) and essence (ousia) is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence (ousia) in dignity and surpassing power (509b)

The text has ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας epekeina tes ousias “beyond essence”. The later Platonist term is ὑπερούσιος hyperousios “above being”.

I don't think that the Good is not essence/being in the literal sense. It may be that the Good is the only true essence because all essences are just specific determinations of the Good, in the same way particulars are specific manifestations of the Forms to which the properties or attributes of the particulars properly belong.

The main idea is that the Good transcends all other essences. The later Platonist term ὑπερούσιος hyperousios “above being”, is used in precisely this sense, not “not being” in the sense of “non-existent”. What is meant to be expressed by the term is the transcendence of the Good or God: the Good or God is "above and beyond" everything else.

There is an expression in Plato's dialogues which I read of recently, but I can't recall what it is or bring it to mind. It's an expression about the status of sensable things - that they neither truly are, nor are not, but are a kind of mixture of being and becoming. Do you happen to recall that term? — Wayfarer

Do you mean "expression" or "term"? The Republic has τὰ διπλάσια ta diplasia, “the double or ambiguous things” from διπλάσιος diplasios, “twofold” (Rep 479b - d).

The fact that the sensibles partake of opposite properties including being and not-being makes them imperfect appearances as opposed to the perfect Forms.

. Socratic philosophy proceeds by rational inquiry, by the critical examination of opinion, that is, dialectic. — Fooloso4

Much of Thomas Aquinas' writing is dialectical in form. The emphasis on 'salvation by faith alone' came with Protestant fideism.

But I do acknowledge I need to spend a lot more time on reading the text, and intend to do that.

Do you mean "expression" or "term"? The Republic has τὰ διπλάσια ta diplasia, “the double or ambiguous things” from διπλάσιος diplasios, “twofold” (Rep 479b - d).

The fact that the sensibles partake of opposite properties including being and not-being makes them imperfect appearances as opposed to the perfect Forms. — Apollodorus

That’s pretty close to what I mean, but there’s another term. If I encounter it again I’ll post it.

Incidentally, discovered a very interesting author this morning http://carlosfraenkel.com/books/

Much of Thomas Aquinas' writing is dialectical in form. The emphasis on 'salvation by faith alone' came with Protestant fideism. — Wayfarer

Correct. I think Aquinas is a very good example of how Christianity faithfully preserved Plato’s core teachings for many centuries. Although some seek to argue that Christianity represents a distortion of Plato (as well as of Judaism), this is contradicted by the objective examination of historical facts.

As Lloyd Gerson has pointed out, if you were to ask any moderately well-educated person in antiquity what the goal of life is according to the teachings of Plato, they would answer “to become godlike as far as possible”.

Becoming a godlike immortal had long been a feature of Greek mythology which abounded in the offspring of Gods and mortals. Among these we find Hercules, himself the son of Zeus, who had joined the Gods in Olympus after death.

Among philosophers like Pythagoras, this became the goal or telos of philosophical life. Plato and Socrates were merely prominent propagators of this tradition.

Thus Socrates says:

Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise (Theaetetus 176a – b).

That this was an actual Platonic teaching is suggested among other things by the fact that the desire to become godlike is found in King Phillip II of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great who had been instructed in philosophy by Plato’s pupil Aristotle. Phillip had already announced his wish to be treated as godlike or isotheos. Alexander himself followed in his father’s steps and declared himself a God: following his conquest of Egypt, he adopted the pharaonic title of “Son of God Re” and became “Son of Zeus” to the Greeks.

Aristotle’s political theory that regarded the ideal king as a paternal ruler likened to Father Zeus, blended with the metaphysical theory of the philosophers and became part of Greek and later Roman culture.

By the time of Jesus, the political concept of the ruler as a deity as well as the philosophical goal of the deification of man was well-established. Unsurprisingly, the latter appears as a central teaching of the Christian Gospels:

“But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God” (John 1:12).
“He called them gods, unto whom the word of God came” (John 10:35).
“The people who are right with God will shine like the sun in their Father's kingdom” (Matthew 13: 43).
“So try to be like God, because you are his own dear children” (Ephesians 5:1).

Christianity, especially in the east, preserved the political and administrative system of the Roman Empire and the emperor, though not a deity, remained a sacred representative of divine authority on earth. But Christianity also preserved Graeco-Roman culture with particular emphasis on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which represented the highest intellectual achievement of the classical era. Plato’s Academy at Athens continued to function till 529 CE and philosophy was taught at the Catechetical School of Alexandria and at the University of Constantinople (from 425 CE to 1453 CE).

The Platonic concept of deification or theosis remained central to the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Church as can be seen from the writings of lead theologians and scholars like Maximos the Confessor (580 – 662 CE):

The soul’s salvation is the consummation of faith (cf. 1 Pet. 1:9). This consummation is the revelation of what has been believed. Revelation is the inexpressible interpenetration of the believer with the object of belief and takes place according to each believer’s degree of faith (cf. Rom. 12:6). Through that interpenetration the believer finally returns to his origin. This return is the fulfilment of desire. Fulfilment of desire is ever-active repose in the object of desire. Such repose is eternal uninterrupted enjoyment of this object. Enjoyment of this kind entails participation in supra-natural divine realities. This participation consists in the participant becoming like that in which he participates. Such likeness involves, so far as this is possible, an identity with respect to energy between the participant and that in which he participates by virtue of the likeness. This identity with respect to energy constitutes the deification of the saints. Deification, briefly, is the encompassing and fulfilment of all times and ages, and of all that exists in either. This encompassing and fulfilment is the union, in the person granted salvation, of his real authentic origin with his real authentic consummation. This union presupposes a transcending of all that by nature is essentially limited by an origin and a consummation. Such transcendence is effected by the almighty and more than powerful energy of god, acting in a direct and infinite manner in the person found worthy of this transcendence. The action of this divine energy bestows a more than ineffable pleasure and joy on him in whom the unutterable and unfathomable union with the divine is accomplished. This, in the nature of things, cannot be perceived, conceived or expressed.

– St Maximos the Confessor, Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice

What emerges from this is a process of faithful preservation of Platonic teachings rather than “distortion,” and Aquinas as a philosopher and theologian who accords great importance to the concept of deification, is a prime example and representative of this process.

If anything, the “distortion” is the work of Protestantism which has inspired and fuelled the anti-Platonist movement that emerged in the 1800’s and 1900’s.

By the way, Fraenkel sounds like an interesting author. “Philosophical Religion From Plato To Spinoza” would definitely be my kind of book. I think people tend to forget the close historical and intellectual links between religion and philosophy and regard them as mutually incompatible fields, which in my view is a mistake.

In Parmenides and Sophist Plato makes distinctions between several meanings of 'not being'. With regard to this discussion there is:

What in no way is. The opposite of what “is entirely”
Becoming. What is between being and not being.
The Good which is beyond being.

Becoming is below being. The Good is above being.

What is entirely is entirely knowable. What in no way is is entirely unknowable.
Becoming, since it is not entirely, is not entirely knowable. About becoming we have only opinions.
The Good, since it is beyond being, is not something that is entirely. It is beyond what can be seen with the mind, beyond what can be known. About the Good we have only opinions.