That is not what the word possible means and not the claim that's being made. "...then it by chance is false" is the issue. There is nothing to justify the assumption of a chance; as a result the assumption possibility fails; implying but not proving by your standard a necessity. — Cheshire

Yes, I know - he, not I, is 'arguing' that I am contradicting myself. So, he - not I - is 'arguing' that as I think the law of non-contradiction is contingent, then I am committed to thinking it is actually false. So it is he, not I, who does not understand the notion of metaphysical possibility.

Yes, I know - he, not I, is 'arguing' that I am contradicting myself. So, he - not I - is 'arguing' that as I think the law of non-contradiction is contingent, then I am committed to thinking it is actually false. So it is he, not I, who does not understand the notion of metaphysical possibility. — Bartricks

It seems like your misrepresenting his argument.

Impossible to be otherwise is pretty close to necessary. — Cheshire

Yes, I know. It's the same. But it doesn't get us anywhere. It's like giving me the Dutch for necessary. I want to know what the truth-maker is of the claim that something is necessarily true (or, if you prefer, impossible-to-be-otherwise).

Yes, I know. It's the same. But it doesn't get us anywhere. It's like giving me the Dutch for necessary. I want to know what the truth-maker is of the claim that something is necessarily true (or, if you prefer, impossible-to-be-otherwise). — Bartricks

Fair enough.

I haven't changed the terminology. You are changing the topic from metaphysics to epistemology. Now, you tell me how you know the law of non-contradiction is true - i mean, you think it is true, right? - and that'll almost certainly be how I know it is true as well.

Then you tell me how you know that it is 'necessarily' true, and I will show you that it is contingently so. — Bartricks

No, I haven't. You made a metaphysical claim; that the law of non-contradiction is certain but contingent. I asked you how you know that it is certain (or for that matter how you know it is contingent).

I know the law of non-contradiction is necessary....for rational discussion. I make no claims beyond that. Any claim beyond that would probably be a category mistake anyway. You cannot say the law of non-contradiction is contingent by saying something self-contradictory; to make sense, anything you say must itself be a non-contradiction: which rather proves the point.

It seems like your misrepresenting his argument. — Cheshire

I'm not. He can come in at any point and clarify, but he'll just squiggle and squoggle and hope that others will accept that he's doing what he isn't.

I am saying that something - the law of non-contradiction - is possible false. Metaphysically possibly false, not epistemically.

He is insisting - 'arguing' is much too kind - that my view involves a contradiction. An actual one, not a possible one. Now, how can that be? How can one get from 'possibly' false to 'actually false' without helping oneself to the notion of necessity - the very notion I am claiming has nothing answering to it in this case or any other?

It is not a misrepresentation. He has no argument. He has this: Bartricks thinks the law of non-contradiction is possibly false....squiggle squoggle, Kazam!....Bartricks has contradicted himself. That's what he's got. And it's rubbish.
And then what he does is insist that Bartricks thinks the law of non-contradiction is false. And then he insists that this means that it is not worth arguing with me. Even though he'd jump at the chance, he says, to argue with Graham Priest, a contemporary philosopher who thinks the law of non-contradiction is actually false!
So, you know, we're not dealing with a very clear thinker, are we?

I know the law of non-contradiction is necessary....for rational discussion. I make no claims beyond that. You cannot say the law of non-contradiction is contingent by saying something self-contradictory; to make sense what you say must itself be a non-contradiction: which rather proves the point. — Janus

How? How do you know it? Look, I am not going to get into a tedious 'how do we know anything' debate. If you think the law of non-contradiction is true, tell me how you know it. Then I'll tell you that I know it to be true the same way. See? Then you'll be satisfied, won't you? So, tell me how you know it. Or do you not? You just assume it, and that's that?

Then tell me how you know it to be necessarily true.

I am saying that something - the law of non-contradiction - is possible false. Metaphysically possibly false, not epistemically. — Bartricks

So, you are saying it is metaphysically possible false because it can hold a truth value. Not, because of known possibility.

So, your saying it is metaphysically false because it can hold a truth value. — Cheshire

I don't know what you mean. I don't think the law of non-contradiction is false. I think it is true. This is getting a bit mind bending. I think it is 'true' not 'false'. It doesn't 'have' to be. Nothing 'has' to be true. 'Hasness' 'mustness' - these are not real features of reality.

Are you asking me what makes it true?

I left out a few words initially.

How do you establish possibility without deducing an alternative state of affairs? The only reason I can imagine is because it has a truth value. I'm not saying it is a good reason.

How do you establish possibility without deducing an alternative state of affairs? The only reason I can imagine is because it has a truth value. I'm not saying it is a good reason. — Cheshire

I don't know what you mean. I think propositions are true or false. I don't think adding 'possibly' adds anything, apart from when it is being used to express the utterer's lack of confidence in the proposition's truth.

So, my claim is that the law of non-contradiction is true. Not necessarily true - I don't know what that means. Just true.

Is it possible for it to be false? Well, I don't know what that means either. I only say that it is 'possibly' false as a way of conveying to others that I do not think it is necessarily true. But if you press me on what 'possibly' means (beyond functioning to express a speaker's lack of confidence), then I do not know and don't need to know, as it is the opposite of something nonsensical, namely necessity.

So, I say "the law of non-contradiction is true". I deny that it is 'necessarily' true. There are different ways of saying that. One can say that it is 'possibly false'. Or that it is 'contingently true'. But when I say those things, I just mean by them "not necessarily true". ANd I mean that by them because I haven't a faintest idea what 'necessity' is.

Take flugemont. Is the law of non-contradiction flugemont true? No, I don't know what 'flugemont' means.

Ah, someone might say, if you don't think it is flugemont true, then you think it is flidgemey true.

Okay, I say, I think it is fligemey true.

What makes it fligemey true?

Well, I don't know - i've no more idea what fligemey true means than flugemont true - isn't it enough that I just think it true? I don't think it is flugemont true, and I say it is fligemey true simply as a way of denying that it is flugemont true, but really I just think it is true and don't add anything to it.

Dispense with necessity talk - it is easy if you try. And contrary to what many here seem to think, doing so will not mean one cannot reason. Far from it. One will reason better.

So, I think this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

That is, I think that if 1 and 2 are true, 3 is too.

A believer in necessity who isn't completely stupid will agree that the argument is valid. But they will insist that if 1 and 2 are true, 3 'must' be too.

Well, I think that 'must' has nothing corresponding to it in reality. And I think the person who sticks the must in doesn't have a clue what they're talking about.

But we both think 3 is true if 1 and 2 are. So we can still reason with each other, it's just that they - the believers in necessity - keep sticking this word 'necessary' in all over the place.

I might say that something 'must' be the case as well sometimes. But when I use the word 'must' it functions expressively (as it does when everyone else uses it, with the exception of philosophers). That is, I am conveying to my listener that I really want them to, or that it is really important to, or some such. That usage comes with no metaphysical baggage.

How would you know if the law of contradiction changes suddenly? Can it change for you and not us? Why or why not?

Some propositions would appear to be true and false at the same time.

Why are you arguing with people who might have a different epistemology then?

I don't know what you mean. If there appeared to be propositions that are true and false at the same time, that'd be prima facie evidence that the law of non-contradiction is false.

There are some propositions like that - such as "this proposition is false". The jury is out on whether they are really true and false at the same time. But it may turn out that the best explanation of why those propositions appear to be true and false at the same time is that they are; and in that case the law of non-contradiction would be false. Some propositions are true and not false, but some are true and false.

No. From your ontology on God's nature you have to posit that each person might have their own soliptistic epistemology and truths. So why are you on this forum?

What the hell are you on about? You never make any sense. Stop attributing bonkers views to me! Stop just asserting things without showing any working whatsoever. It's tedious.

Bartricks: "the law of non-contradiction is true, but not necessarily true"

Groggy: "So you own a cat?"

Bartricks: "What?

Groggy: "Epistemologimagically you said you own a cat and no one else owns a cat".

Bartricks: "Er, no I didn't. I said what I said, which isn't at all what you just said"

Groggy: "So, solipsticimagically, you said that you are the only cat in existence and everything else is a figment of your imagination. Correct?"

Bartricks: you're mad.

Wrong again. How do you know your God of relativism hasn't given everyone their own truth. Your "guy at the top" has no logical rules to follow, so there is no reason for you to argue with people who (perhaps) have a different truth value to follow. You are the one painted yourself into a corner. To be logical you can only stop arguing with people

Stop derailing this with your incoherent ramblings. Nothing - nothing - you say about the views of others is accurate. Nothing.

You're stuck, stumbling, and stalling

For the third or fourth time, how do you God didn't make contradictions true for everyone except Bartricks? Why arguing with people whom your Lord of Contradictions may have given true wisdom? You don't try to figure other people's posts, admit you are wrong, or try to learn from others. That makes you not a good person to have a conversation with

↪Gregory Some propositions would appear to be true and false at the same time. — Bartricks

Actually, a pretty good answer. Credit where it's due.

For the third or fourth time, how do you God didn't make contradictions true for everyone except Bartricks? — Gregory

Because he does not seem to have done so. It appears to everyone that if a proposition is true, it is not also false.

Be assured, I test it every day. I go into my local and I say "I would like a pint". The bar lady says "that'll be $7. I say "I have paid you". She says "No you haven't". I say "I know I haven't. But I have". She then says "That makes no sense. You can't have paid me and not paid me. You either paid me or you didn't. And you didn't". I then ask everyone else in the bar if they agree. They invariably do and so I conclude that the law of non-contradiction remains in force for me and everyone else in my vicinity.

Yet you say you are Cartesian. Descartes thought God couldn't lie to him about what he say around him and how people were. Yet your God of Contradictions can do this. How can you be sure of your own thoughts if you are contingent? And if God can make contradictions everywhere around in between any second on any day, God can fool you in any way possible. You become a Quietest. I've never come across a relativism so complete as yours and I think about the theory every day

So, we've dissolved contingently and possibly. What about tentatively? There might be a razor's edge in between absurd doubt and tentative laws of contradiction where a position might be maintained.

Yet your God of Contradictions can do this. — Gregory

She's not 'my' God, she's God. And she's not a god of contradictions, for it is due to her that there are not any.

How can you be sure of your own thoughts if you are contingent? — Gregory

I don't understand the question. You must be confusing 'necessarily' with 'certainly'. I exist with certainty. I don't exist with necessity.

Yet you say you are Cartesian. — Gregory

I agree with a lot of what Descartes said, but I am not a follower. I follow me. If Descartes was alive, I think he'd be a Bartricksian too.

for it is due to her that there are not any. — Bartricks

So every second that follows in the future has a 50/50 chance of staying consistent? And what about the past? If God can do contradictions "she" can make the past such as that you were never born, nursed, or grew up.

So every second that follows in the future has a 50/50 chance of staying consistent? — Gregory

Why would it be 50/50? I have a coffee every morning. I don't have to. I just do. But the chance that I will have one tomorrow is not 50/50, but about 90/10.

And what about the past? If God can do contradictions "she" can make the past such as that you were never born, nursed, or grew up. — Gregory

Yes. Powerful, eh?

Yes, to say that something is 'possibly true' is normally to express tentativeness. And that's fine. That's how I generally use it. Similarly, if someone says "that 'must' be true" they mean to express certainty.

It is philosophers who mistakenly think that these terms do not just function expressively, but can sometimes function descriptively - to describe curious features of the world called 'necessity' and 'contingency'. There are no such features, just the fallacy of reification.

Our reason tells us that some things 'must' be so, and others are merely 'possibly' so. Philosophers (with the occassional exception, such as me) then think that there is, in addition to truth, 'mustness' and 'possibility'. There is not. There's just God being adamant and God being tentative.

Why would it be 50/50? I have a coffee every morning. I don't have to. I just do. But the chance that I will have one tomorrow is not 50/50, but about 90/10. — Bartricks

We were talking about God acting not you

Yes. Powerful, eh? — Bartricks

So you reject all history because "God" can make the past different from what he was. Descartes just as likely started WWII in your worldview as Hitler, and Buddha was the big bang!

Your position on relativism leads straight to solipsism. I've had threads on relativism but not any as extreme as yours