haha, pathetic. Like I say, you haven't got an argument. The law of non-contradiction is true. It is contingently true. That doesn't mean 'false'. It means 'true'. It is metaphysically possible for it to be false. That doesn't generate a contradiction in the actual world. And this explosion you are talking about is both disputable and will occur - if it occurs - in the possible world in which the law of non-contradiction is false, not in those in which it is true. Obviously.

Anyway, perhaps dimly recognizing that you have nothing to say once deprived of your symbols, you just resort to your favourite thing: talking about me, and not my arguments.

Here's the thing: continuing on in this belligerent irrational way will only render your posts here irrelevant. Folk will increasingly ignore you. As it stands, very few of the top posters bother to reply to you. Your posts are taken up by new members, who entertain you only until they realise your foibles. It's not a winning strategy. — Banno

Aw, has the nasty reasoning man exposed you as an empty kettle again? Aw, diddums.

But what is that truth? The moment you say what it is, you are wrong. — Banno

Then that's wrong because you just said it, right?, and that was wrong, right?...

Truth as we can best say is the best I can say. The noumenal is not knowable.

Descartes wasn't concerned with undermining arithmetic truth. He was, in fact, a pioneering mathematician who extended the nature and scope of such truth.

But he did try to ascertain if there was a kind of truth, unlike arithmetic truth, that could survive the test of hyperbolic (unreasonable) doubt. The kind of truth that would be valid in all possible worlds.

He claimed to have found this kind of truth in his own and in each person's Cogito Sum performance.
In other words, if, when, and while I am thinking in the first person present tense mode, in all possible worlds I must be existing.

In all possible worlds, my Cogito Sum performance will be existentially consistent and, therefore, existentially self-verifying.

Then that's wrong because you just said it, right?, and that was wrong, right?... — Hanover

Yep. That's what this shows.

Yep. That's what this shows. — Banno

Not now that you said it. Can you please ignore truth instead of agreeing and thereby falsifying it?

It's a reverse reductio. I'm taking it is true God is necessary and then examining what it entails.

Since a necessary God is given regardless of what exists, in any case, the necessary God cannot be dependent on being made true by existence. There is no counterfactual or other possiblity to the necessary God.

Therefore, the necessary God cannot exist. For the the necessary God to exist would deny God's very necessary, as it would mean God's presence would have to be made true by existing (as opposed to not).

How do we explain ourselves now? — frank

I think Freddy was referring to gods of ancient peoples as "metaphors". For we compost-moderns, gods are anxieties, not entities (agents). We "explain" ourselves today through commodity fetishes (placebos) and Prozac, etc.

Ok, see if I can work through this.

God is a necessary being; hence god exists in every possible world (definition of necessary being).

A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists.

...the necessary God cannot be dependent on being made true by existence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Not sure how to parse this. Seems to be the same as "A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists".

. There is no counterfactual or other possiblity to the necessary God. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So there are no possible worlds in which god does not exist. True by definition of necessary being.

For the the necessary God to exist would deny God's very necessary, as it would mean God's presence would have to be made true by existing (as opposed to not). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Seems something like that if god existed his being would be dependent on the existence of other things. I gather this would be in contradiction of what was said above, that "A necessary being exists regardless of whatever else exists".

and the conclusion is that god does not exist.

Something like that? Seems to have bits missing.

You have a good point. Necessity starts with us instead of realizing some necessary outside ourselves. That's what came to mind when I read your post. If I have the idea "1+1=2" then the necessary truth of it is in my mind and is my mind, because the mind is an organic unity. When I perceive the world I know I must exist because I exist in the moment. The necessity of life is felt when there is no anxiety. God would have to be our own consciousness if the idea of it is necessary

Like I say, you haven't got an argument. — Bartricks

I have demonstrated that the view that for some proposition A, A is both true and false, is a consequence of your view that the law of noncontradiction does not apply in some possible worlds. Reject noncontradiction in any possible world, and you reject it for every possible world. — Banno

I would add that Bartricks believes in absolute relativism because his God is so powerful it can do a contradiction. He wants to make a nuance that God created the world with laws but there is the point still that his God can change that and *anything* else while we are having this discussion

God is so powerful it can do a contradiction. — Gregory

That strikes me as a misunderstanding of the "power" of logic. Logic is just grammar. So, yes, god can say what ever he likes, but if he is going to make sense he is going to have to avoid contradicting himself, as must we all.

It's on a par with saying god is so powerful he can move the bishop onto any square of the chess board.

Well, yes. So can I. But that's not chess.

Logic is just grammar how exactly? You don’t think logic describes anything about the way you things work?

No. Once again, if something is 'contingently' true then there is a possible world in which it is false. It does not follow that it is false in all possible worlds. You saying it does is not an argument, it's just you being confused about the difference between contingent and necessary.

You don't have an argument. If you do, present it without asserting the crucial claim or squiggling and squoggling. So, a deductively valid argument with no question begging assumptions. Remember, you are trying to show that MY position entails a contradiction, not that my position contradicts yours. And so you are not allowed to assume that the law of non contradiction is a necessary truth. You must assume it is contingently true - TRUE not FALSE- and derive a contradiction from that.

You won't be able to. So I suggest sticking to fibbing and saying you have and criticizing me as a person and dispensing condescending advice on how to be more like you.

You don’t think logic describes anything about the way you things work? — DingoJones

Well, good thinking, perhaps.

Edit: oh, noticed the typo - the way you think works or the way that things work?)

Once again, if something is 'contingently' true then there us a possible world in which it is false. — Bartricks

And so for you there are possible worlds in which contradictions occur. That contradiction implies that anything can be true, not just in that possible world but in any possible world. The Principle of Explosion is not restricted to just that one possible world.

Hence if contradictions can occur in any possible world, they can occur in every possible world.

Pretending to be you for a bit, to help you out, you would have to come up with an argument that showed how contradictions in some possible world must be restricted just to that world. But (p .~p)⊃q does not do that. q can be any proposition.

Putting it formally, (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. Indeed, it is the very definition of what it is to be an impossible world.

And you will now bitch again about squiggles, but the fact is if you are going to talk about this stuff, you need to learn to use the squiggles.

That contradiction implies that anything can be true, not just in that possible world but in any possible world. The Principle of Explosion is not restricted to just that one possible world.

Hence if contradictions can occur in any possible world, they can occur in every possible world. — Banno

I don't see how this follows. Allowing for the sake of argument that the law of non-contradiction is only, contingently, not necessarily, true in this world, the fact that it is possible that contradictions might be true in other worlds does not entail that they must be capable of being be true in this world. You haven't provided an argument, as far as I can tell, to support that conclusion.

Ya I meant “things”, like in the sense that logic is describing something about the way the world works, an observation about physics for example. It seems like things have a logic to them and our grammar is an attempt to describe it. So I would say yes logic is grammar in one sense but it is also a reference to something as well, something observed and not created by humans.
Im not sure what is being described by logic if logic is just grammar alone, so I inquired about what exactly you meant.

Putting it more formally, (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. Indeed, it is the very definition of what it is to be an impossible world. — Banno

Allowing for the sake of argument that the law of non-contradiction is only, contingently, not necessarily, true in this world, the fact that it is possible that contradictions might be true in other worlds does not entail that they must be capable of being be true in this world. — Janus

Hmm. Ok, worth having a think about it again.

Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition q will be true, including propositions the actual world.

But that might be, Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be true in that world.

IS that something like what you haver in mind?

Putting it more formally, (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. Indeed, it is the very definition of what it is to be an impossible world. — Banno

But that argument assumes what it seeks to prove; the universality and necessity of the law of non-contradiction.

Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be true in any possible world.

But that might be, Suppose (p & ~p) is true in some word . Then any proposition will be truein that world. — Banno

Yes, that seems to follow. Any proposition will be true in a world in which the law of non-contradiction does not obtain, but this would have no bearing on worlds where the law of non-contradiction does obtain, as far as I can tell.

no, you don't need the squiggles, as I am demonstrating. If you can't say in words what the squiggles stand for, it's because you don't know what you are on about. The minute you do without them it becomes clear to virtually everyone that you are arguing in a circle. You are assuming what needs to be shown.

You are profoundly confused about contingency and necessity. If there is a possible world where the law of non contradiction is false, then some contradictions - at least one - will obtain in that world. Not all worlds. That world. To insist it is 'all' worlds is just to assume the law is necessarily false or necessarily true. That's obviously question begging. I think it is contingently true and you need to show how that view generates a contradiction. You haven't. You have just assumed -the law of non contradiction is necessarily true or necessarily false and then reasoned that as I think it is false in some possible worlds I am committed to affirming its falsity in all possible worlds. Why? Why the hell would that follow?

But that argument assumes what it seeks to prove; the universality and necessity of the law of non-contradiction. — Janus

Well, yes - the point being that removing the las of noncontradiction leads immediately to absurdity. But OK, I take your point.

but this would have no bearing on worlds where the law of non-contradiction does obtain, as far as I can tell. — Janus

Well, I can't see why it wouldn't, since there seems to be noting that limits the q in (p & ~p)⊃q to any particular word; But I will take you word for it.

Even if the argument form explosion did not work, it remains that (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world.

Even if the argument form explosion did not work, it remains that (p .~p) is not a thesis in any possible world. — Banno

I agree that the idea of a contradiction being true is impossible to parse. So, yes, a contradiction could not be a coherent (and much less a self-consistent) thesis, which I guess means it could not be a thesis at all, and could be nothing more than nonsense.

think Freddy was referring to gods of ancient peoples as "metaphors". — 180 Proof

Monotheistic gods too. His abiding point is about what the Christian metaphor means.

We "explain" ourselves today through commodity fetishes (placebos) and Prozac, etc. — 180 Proof

But it's amazingly easy to de-adapt from that stuff when the impetus comes.

A priest is the fool on the hill, the psychologist, the philosopher? Ironically, Nietzsche was a priest. Maybe Jordan Peterson. Not sure.

Just wanted to point out that Bartricks couldn't figure out your symbols when they are actually really easy to read even for me who has never studied symbolic logic. He has an inflated idea of his abilities, and probably borderline or some thing

I agree that the idea of a contradiction being true is impossible to parse. So, yes, a contradiction could not be a coherent (and much less a self-consistent) thesis, which I guess means it could not be a thesis at all, and could be nothing more than nonsense. — Janus

I came to same the conclusion. To maintain possibility there is a minimum requirement of defining a subject. Without contradiction to hold the line; then contradiction itself becomes both true and false which isn't a coherent state. Is a world of nonsense possible, maybe, but there isn't going to be a rational argument that can confirm it. Except for maybe randomness? A random world could defy or 'side-step' contradiction because no two things could be reliant. A world of total superposition where all things are in all possible states. Which doesn't imply coherence anymore than the above.

You won't be able to. — Bartricks

You are demanding an argument that doesn't presuppose logical contradiction. Which is clever as an impossible demand for evidence, but also incoherent, because there isn't criteria left to determine what is or isn't an argument. Ergo, an assertion is just as valid or not.

No, I am demanding an argument that doesn't presuppose the reality of necessity.
I think the law of non contradiction is actually true. True, not false. So I am sensitive to actual contradictions. I don't think any are true. So, if my belief that the law of non contradiction is contingently true can be shown to generate an actual contradiction, then I will take that to be evidence my view is false.
But what @Banno is doing is presupposing necessity and presupposing - not showing - that the law of non-contradiction is either necessarily true or necessarily false. That's precisely what I deny. He insists my denial of that is contradictory - he needs to show that, but he can't.

So again: I am not denying the law of non contradiction. I think it is true. I think it is 'contingently true'. I think all truths are. I don't believe in necessity. But what many here - including banno - don't seem properly to grasp, is that 'contingently true' means 'true' not 'false'

I am late to the party, but have read through the thread and would like to offer a few comments on the OP.

God is supposed to be a necessary being. — Banno

As some have already hinted, classical theism maintains that God is necessary being, not that God is a necessary being. In other words, God is not conceived as an individual being who "exists" in the sense of reacting with other individual things.

Something is necessary if it is true in every possible world.
There is a possible world in which god does not exist.
Hence, god is not a necessary being. — Banno

We can reformulate this as a conditional proposition that should be utterly uncontroversial: If there is a possible world in which there is no God, then God is not necessary being. On the other hand, we can also formulate another conditional proposition that should likewise be utterly uncontroversial: If God is necessary being, then there is no possible world in which there is no God. Taken together, what we have here is just a definition of "necessary being" in terms of possible world semantics: God is a necessary being if and only if there is no possible world in which there is no God.

The debate, then, is whether there is any possible world in which there is no God; theists say no, atheists say yes. Deductive logic, classical or modal, cannot settle this question. Charles Sanders Peirce instead turns to retroductive (also called abductive) logic in his 1908 article, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." He suggests that the reality (not existence) of God as necessary being (Ens necessarium) is a plausible (not certain or even probable) hypothesis to explain the origin and order of the universe. I wrote a paper about this if anyone is interested in further details.