Morality is objective — 180 Proof

Look at the poll results. :point: Wisdom Of The Crowd.

Wisdom Of The Crowd from our previous discussion in the The Twilight Of Reason thread.

duplicate post

Taking "human flourishing" as one's main goal is so ripe for exploitation. — BitconnectCarlos

I agree. But for me all humans can do is set goals. The fact that goals can be hijacked is always a risk.

The way that I approach it the purpose of morality is first and foremost to inform concrete, practical action; not to set a perfect, flawless starting point that can never be questioned or reasonably applied to concrete action.

I'm having trouble processing human flourishing. Would it mean that if I saw you with a cheeseburger I should slap it out of your hand to stop you from eating something unhealthy? Or should I just lecture you about it? Why not start there: You see a fat person eating something unhealthy.

I agree. But we have the science of medicine based on the equally vague idea of 'promoting health' a subject that obviously looks different for everyone. It seems to work as a science.

Would it mean that if I saw you with a cheeseburger I should slap it out of your hand to stop you from eating something unhealthy? — BitconnectCarlos

Like anything, we need to separate out the goal from the methods of that goal's promotion. Not sure anyone would advocate this kind of vigilante interference in other's lives. But here is a more telling question - should a surgeon have the right to say 'I am not operating on anyone who is a smoker because if they can't take care of their own wellbeing why should I provide care for them?'

I tend to choose my behaviour based more on a virtue ethics position these days - morality is performative. It's loose but I can't think of anything else.

I can't make the case (succinctly) any clearer than I did with my first post on p.1.

You lost me again.

You lost me again. — 180 Proof

Who wants to be a millionaire?

Lifelines:

1. 50:50 (Fifty-Fifty)
2. Ask a friend
3. Ask the audience OR Wisdom of the crowd OR POLL: Is morality - objective, subjective, or relative? :point: Look at the poll results and what you said,

Morality is objective — 180 Proof

They match - the % of people who believe morality is objective is highest (comparatively).

Gives me goosebumps but that's probably just me getting all excited for nothing!

... "for nothing" surely.

... "for nothing" surely. — 180 Proof

:sad: but hey, nothing is better than sex! :lol:

I'm having a Zen moment here. Just a second! Why do some people get excited/anxious about nothing? Any ideas? Is it because nothing is better/worse than sex/torture? Something worth pondering upon, yes/no?

Same reason, I suspect, falling into holes distresses folks.

Same reason, I suspect, falling into holes distresses folks. — 180 Proof

Matchless wit!

Excerpt from recent thesis on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion:

Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to
satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek
explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the
consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.

https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1282&context=philosophy_theses

Morality is objective because all suffering persons depend on one another to keep the implicit (eusocial) promise both to not harm each other and to help reduce each other's suffering whenever possible (Spinoza). — 180 Proof

But then the question here is why not antinatalism, or why don't we all embrace a suicide pact so as to end the suffering? If not either of those, then it sounds like the implicit assumption is that it's a moral good that humans continue to exist, even though that will guarantee a certain amount of suffering, even if we do our best to limit it.

In short, I don't see what the objective morality is here, other than most humans wish to continue to live. But that's just a biological imperative. We wish to continue living because evolution wired us that way, because otherwise our ancestors wouldn't have survived. Which is the problem when we tie morality to biology. What makes any evolutionary strategy moral?

1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity. — Kenosha Kid

Your points for morality being all three options make a lot of sense, but the question about the objective part is if it's not independent of humans, then what argument is there that we should accept our sense of moral necessity, other than most of us just do. Say if you're arguing with a sociopath who doesn't feel that necessity, being one of the edge cases, what argument is going to convince them that they should? A utilitarian one?

What argument is going to counter the antinatilist? That most want to have children and feel that it's morally right to do so? Because biology wired us that way? Or how about an extreme environmentalist who sees humanity as plague that needs to be eradicated? Or for that matter, the opposite view that we should do whatever we want to nature, as long as humans prosper? Or to take it beyond biology, the view that Mars should be kept pristine instead of colonized, because pristine Mars has some inherent value.

The concern here is that the objectivity of a biological underpinning for morality won't settle certain moral questions, because there's no moral evolutionary reason for human morality. It's just a survival strategy. But so is parasitism, which is something humans find morally repugnant, except of course for the edge cases.

I think you're getting at a weakness there with the anti-natalism, but not via the direct route to "why?" The issue is when. How do you scope your moral calculus of harm? Providing humanity with petroleum science in 1600 would help alleviate suffering on a massive scale, perhaps for centuries, but would also help spur on massive population growth and pollution. When the two intersect, as they are now, you now get harm on a gargantuan scale from the same actions that reduced harm.

The US had this very issue with grain donations after WWII. The US grows a massive food surplus. Donating food to nations with starving people helps reduce harm. However, it then undercuts the price of domestic agricultural products in those countries, which in turn causes poverty and retards economic growth, creating harm.

The harm principal may appear to be grounded in something objective, but any sort of attempt at utilitarian analysis to pick between mutually exclusive moral actions shows it to be grounded in a subjective perception of the estimated effects of our actions.

We don't say someone is immoral because they tried to reduce suffering and unknowingly increased it, nor do we call someone moral if they intentionally try to increase suffering, but their actions actually reduce suffering down the line. So objective suffering doesn't actually seem to have anything to do morality, only our subjective predictions on how our choices might effect future suffering. Objective suffering is another thing in itself we can never truly grasp, we can only grope around the edges, at our perceptions of probable outcomes.

Even if we leave grounding aside, you still have an issue of scope. There is no objective reason to prioritize the end of suffering today against the suffering of ten thousand years from now. However, if you take a long enough view, you could justify acts of extreme harm to others today on the premise that they would reduce harm tomorrow.

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Anyhow, I would take it in a different direction. Altruism at the species level is based on the logic of reciprocity. The rules of reciprocity can be shown using game theory. Morality can be objective in that one could define optimal strategies for reciprocity that result in maximum benefit.

It depends on the context and what exactly you mean by ‘morality’.

Generally speaking I’m inclined to answer ‘Yes’ to all three. A more specific question might help more, or maybe this is exactly the kind of response you wanted?

Say if you're arguing with a sociopath who doesn't feel that necessity, being one of the edge cases, what argument is going to convince them that they should? A utilitarian one? — Marchesk

A sociopath can completely agree with the description, agree even that to that extent they are faulty, and still choose to live antisocially (i.e. to not attempt to mimic social persons) since the _reason_ for behaving socially does not impact them personally. And why should it?

Once upon a time there would have been personal repercussions for antisocial behaviour: you were known to everyone who might be impacted by that behaviour. Now it's pretty much an advantage to be antisocial; in fact for many it's a virtue. So the answer is: an unsuccessful one :)

The nearest I have to a more optimistic answer is to look at current trends. Thanks to levelling processes like democracy and the internet, social behaviour is reasserting itself: we are mostly becoming more egalitarian, more altruistic, more socially conscious. The world is telling itself to do better and is sometimes listening, nudging itself closer to what makes us distinctly human. That doesn't help in individual problems like the one you describe, but individual problems can be dealt with by individual solutions.

What argument is going to counter the antinatilist? — Marchesk

I've never seen a rational antinatalist argument, but does there need to be a counter-argument? The origins of our moral thinking may be universal bar accidents, but it doesn't mean it's appropriate for the world we find ourselves in. In a thread I started last year, I argued that moral problems are an artefact of having moral biology evolved in one environment but being born into a completely different one. It was an oversimplification but it caught the right sense imo. If we share an understanding of what's right but have no means to realise it, we're in an existential situation. As long as the antinatalist isn't hypocritical, it's difficult to say they're wrong on moral grounds.

The concern here is that the objectivity of a biological underpinning for morality won't settle certain moral questions, because there's no moral evolutionary reason for human morality — Marchesk

It's more than a concern. It seems to me a fact. If it could, there'd be no reason to augment it with anything: it would be an objective thing only.

"The apple is likely to drop to the ground when unrestricted as it has always dropped to the ground when unrestricted before". You are justified in predicting based upon a pattern you have observed.

This is objectively true, and I don't believe you need further reasoning for the belief.

Whereas

The only ultimate explanation for why "suffering is bad" is that we feel it is. — Down The Rabbit Hole

And the only ultimate explanation for why "observation is reality" is because it looks like it is. In both cases we're appealing to our experiences: experiences of things seeming true or false, or experiences of things seeming good or bad. The only differences is that you accept sense-experience as a valid reason to believe something or not, but you don't accept appetitive experience as a valid reason to intend something or not. What reason do you have to accept one over the other? If someone just refuses to accept that observation has any bearing on reality, what then? NB that I think there is a sound response to that kind of skepticism, but then that response also defeats moral skepticism in the same blow. — Pfhorrest

I am sympathetic to the case you're making. As I said in the brain-in-a-vat thread, there is no reason to believe we are even in reality. Nonetheless I think it is best labelled as objective fact (even if only in an illusory world) that the apple is likely to fall to the ground when unrestricted - with the pattern in the sensory input the basis for the belief.

My views are already wacky enough, don't tempt me towards nihilism :lol:

But then the question here is why not antinatalism, ... — Marchesk

This reductio is absurd and moronic – the vast majority of us are not "wired" for suicide; almost all aspects of culture function as prophylactics against death and extinction (E. Becker). Besides, eliminating the problem does not solve the problem. Okay for individuals (I'm a conscientious antinatalist) but misses the forest for the trees as a policy. Yeah, no doubt, throughout history there have been groups who've sought to "save the village by destroying the village" but the species imperative, like that for all living things, is homeostatic: as much as possible, reduce suffering of the living without eliminating the living.

... or why don't we all embrace a suicide pact so as to end the suffering?

Same reason, I suppose, why we all don't "embrace" peace or nonviolence or altruism ...: not enough of us are "wired" for it.

My views are already wacky enough, don't tempt me towards nihilism :lol: — Down The Rabbit Hole

I'm definitely not trying to; if anything, the opposite. My point here is that you're already a moral nihilist if you think there's no objective morality, and that the same arguments against objective morality would be just as effective against objective reality... except that there is a defense against those arguments, that salvages objective reality, but in the process it also salvages objective morality, because it defends objectivity generally, not just in one particular domain.

Even your own "Nonetheless I think it is best labelled as objective fact" can work just as well for morality: you can just decide that reducing suffering for everyone just is what it means to be objectively good. That kind of defense has some obvious weaknesses in either case, but it works as well for one case as it does for the other.

I did want to push the respondents to give the best label for morality as a whole.

For example, some people say that although the goal (wellbeing etc) is subjective, morality is best labelled as objective on the basis that our means of achieving the goal are objective. Others believe as I do that if the foundations are subjective, they, and everything stemming from them are best labelled subjective.

Subjectively desiring chocolate cake is not itself a sufficient condition for actually – objectively – having or eating chocolate cake. :yum:

I don't see what the objective morality is here, other than most humans wish to continue to live. But that's just a biological imperative. We wish to continue living because evolution wired us that way, because otherwise our ancestors wouldn't have survived. Which is the problem when we tie morality to biology. What makes any evolutionary strategy moral? — Marchesk

:up: :clap:

Don't agree with anti-natalism, though. We don't choose to be born, we're born because of reasons well beyond any kind of conscious choice, and we can't decide to simply not be.

I think it would probably help to assess biology and related terms like ‘law’ and ‘ethics’.

The underlying principle is our biological make up. For that reason it seems an error to assume subjective begets subjective and objective begets objective. Your question is more epistemic than ethic as it deals with abstract ideals in the form of ‘objectivity’ & ‘subjectivity’.

I did predict that most respondents would vote morality is not objective, but I am surprised the majority of those voted it is relative.

EDIT: Subjective and Relative votes are equal now. I'm still surprised so many voted relative.

Exactly. :up:

If you ask what something is, then you are asking how it is actually instantiated in the world (ie. this is a question of empirical ethics). There is no doubt that there are people who treat it as objective, as subjective, and as relative. Now if you had asked, ought morality to be.....

Is there a moral system that doesn't start with a supposition - whether it be religious or secular? — Tom Storm

My moral system starts with two things: an empirical observation, and a thesis about the meaning of words. So yes, there is.

I'll explain my moral system to you if you like, but you won't agree with it. No-one ever does.

So your moral system starts with suppositions that empiricism is true and you can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system.

Can you do it in a few dot points? I'm interested.

All this talk about morality and, unless I have missed it, I rarely see an example of a system in practical use by anyone. Is killing a small child wrong? Discuss...