:grin:

The best reason there is.

:100:

If you believe, you’ve already justified. Of course it’s authoritarian; you’re it. — Mww

When are you not justified then?

.

The best reason there is. — Banno

:chin:

Well, can you give an example of a better reason?

Better reason for what?

Eating chicken.

Anything you want.

Eating chicken.

Anything you want. — Banno

:chin:

Why limit yourself with reason. Transcend reason. Be a force of nature
— Wittgenstein
I don't want to. — Wheatley

The best reason there is. — Banno

You OK?

I'm just trying to understand.

When are you not justified then? — Wheatley

You being justified or not, is very different than a belief being justified or not. The thread concerns beliefs, not the holder of them.

.

When is a belief not justified? — Wheatley

When it contradicts experience.

Suppose that I am John:

You being justified: — Mww

John is justified in believing that the cat is on the mat.

Belief being justified — Mww

John's belief that the cat is on the mat, is justified.

^^^ What's the difference?

.

When it contradicts experience. — Mww

I believe that I am sane. :joke:

The internet. I don't use it myself. But I am sure that if you look up either normative reasons or justifying reasons you'll find that they're the same.

Anyway, a normative reason is typically characterized as a favouring relation. So, to have a reason to believe something is to the object of a favouring relation. It is to be 'favoured' believing it. Thus normative reasons are not things, per se. They are relations between things.

There are different kinds of normative reason - instrumental, moral, epistemic (more than this, but these are the main kind). But they're all justifying reasons. Sometimes we are justified in believing something on instrumental grounds - that is, there is overall instrumental reason to believe it; sometimes moral grounds - there is overall moral reason to believe it; sometimes epistemic grounds - there is overall epistemic reason to believe it. But evidence is made of epistemic reasons (having good instrumental or moral reason for believing X does not amount to there being evidence that X is true - Buddhists, for instance, will typically only offer instrumental reasons for believing in the truth of their stupid worldview, but even if such instrumental reasons do exist, they will never constitute evidence that the view is true....which is why serious philosophers don't tend to take Buddhism seriously).

So, all normative reasons justify and 'justifications' - all of them - are made of normative reasons. "I am justified in believing X, but there is no normative reason to believe it" is a contradictory statement. But philosophers - true philosophers - are only interested in uncovering what epistemic reasons there are, for those are what evidence is made of. (To have 'evidence' that X is true is one and the same as there being epistemic reason to believe X).

Anyway, to be justified in a belief is for there to be overall normative reason for you to believe it. That's a conceptual truth.

To 'justify' a belief, however, is different. That's to do something - that's to attempt to show that there are normative reasons for the belief in question.

So, the former is a status, the latter is an activity.

For an analogy, take being hated. That's a relation. Hate is not a thing, but a relation between things. And to be hated does not require that one do anything or know that one is hated. You are hated just if someone hates you. Maybe you know that they hate you, have some idea that they hate you, or have no idea at all.

Likewise, for a belief of yours to be justified is for your possession of that belief to be something you are favoured believing. Perhaps you know that you are favoured believing it; perhaps you have some idea you are; or perhaps you have no clue. Those are all compatible with you being favoured believing it (just as having no clue you are hated is entirely compatible with you being hated).

Justifying a belief is different, as already mentioned. Justifying a belief is an activity in which one attempts to show that one has normative reason for believing what one does.

That's not to deny that sometimes an attempt to justify a belief can result in that belief coming to be one that one is in fact justified in believing. That is, sometimes we may be justified in a belief precisely because we attempted to justify it and would not have been justified in it otherwise. (Just as, by analogy, one might come to be hated because one believes everyone hates one). The point remains, however, that to be justified in a belief is not of a piece with justifying it. And thus one can be justified in a belief even if one is unable to justify it.

This we can see both from an analysis of normative reasons themselves, and independently. For we can know that not all beliefs need justifying else we would not be justified in any of our beliefs (being so requiring that we have previously accomplished the impossible task of providing an infinity of justifications).

, you're free to believe whatever (ir/rational alike).
If you want others to believe the same, or take you seriously, then they may ask you for justification.
They'd be equally free to not take your word for it.

_{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy » The Analysis of Knowledge » 1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief}

That's dreadfully confused.

A normative reason is given as the reason for an action, not for a belief.

No, they're for actions and beliefs. And it is not confused, its incredibly clear. You an expert on this stuff are you? Who've you read recently on normative reasons?

Well, yes. It's part of Davidson's account, which I have read moderately closely. So, see, for example,

Reasons for action are traditionally divided into “motivating reasons,” which explain why someone did something, and “normative reasons,” which concern why she should (or should not) have done it.

https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199657889-e-8


Or,

Most contemporary philosophers start by distinguishing two types of reason for action: “normative” reasons—that is, reasons which, very roughly, favour or justify an action, as judged by a well-informed, impartial observer; and “motivating” reasons—which, again roughly, are reasons the “agent” (that is, the person acting) takes to favour and justify her action and that guides her in acting.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/

Or,

Such normative reasons are reasons there are for a particular agent to believe, feel, or act a certain way.

https://iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/

Need I go on?

Er, those confirm what I said. Normative reasons apply to actions and beliefs. You said they apply to actions alone and that I was confused. I am not. They apply to actions and beliefs.

Some, however, only apply to beliefs. Epistemic reasons - which are a kind of normative reason - apply to beliefs alone.

Normative reasons apply to actions and beliefs. — Bartricks

Yep. I should have known better than to enter into a discussion with you.

No, Bart, you did't say that. At no place, in anything you have said here, Did you used the word "action", until I pointed out your error.

I said it above, liar. They apply to actions and beliefs. There's what you should do, and there's what you should believe. These are normative questions.
If I was previously talking about beliefs that does not imply I think normative reasons apply to beliefs exclusively. Only someone quite dumb would think that.

Now, you said they apply to actions and not beliefs. What about epistemic reasons? They are normative reasons. And they apply exclusively to beliefs. (And all of the other kinds can apply to actions and beliefs).

What 'error' Banno? Identify the error in what I wrote.

You made one. A howler. You said they apply to actions, not beliefs. No. They apply to both. Apart from epistemic reasons. They apply to beliefs exclusively. As you know, of course.