, anyone, does Craig's response mean that God's goodness is coincidental/accidental? (Seems a bit like kicking the can down the road.)
On another note, what does Craig's identity (God himself = the paradigm of goodness) mean for people doing the right thing (irrespective of their beliefs)? Coincidental/accidental? Say, do they somehow become part of God or something (un/wittingly)? Surely Aboriginal Australians did some good things before being polluted with ideas of Craig's God, err before the European invasions.

We can't escape the fact that we are following a higher principle that is above us. — Apollodorus

What means "higher" and "above"? How can I follow anything unless I have some idea of what it is I am following and why I am following it? And that idea as general certainly need not originate in me, but for me to use it it must be mine and particular in some sense. And if not originating in me, then where? We may suppose in reason, or at least in minds, and maybe even in one mind first. But by the time it gets to me, shaped by the influence of many minds.

The source of reason is mind. Is it reason that is "higher" and "above"?

No discussion of anything gets very far until and unless it is settled upon what that something is, even if just provisionally. Conditional/hypothetical predication, as ground for any discussion, must remain that until and unless the conditional/hypothetical is resolved.

Plato, through Socrates, puts language to the question. And finds, usually, that language itself can't answer. That's the substantive message. If we are to read the dialogues for other than delight or historical or literate interest, then we have to be of sterner stuff and insist on some knowledge of the subjects of the dialogue. If the dialogues don't tell us and we read that knowledge into it, then it is not the dialogues we're reading anymore.

First task, then, is to keep in mind that the dialogues were written at a time and place for specific readers and in a certain language, all conditioned by then current understandings, meanings, and intentions. That leaves open all questions of the form, what did they mean by gods, good, piety, the gods' love, justice, and so forth. Not knowing the answers to these means not knowing what the dialogues are about.

But we can read into the dialogues, and arguably must where and when we can not read out from them. Setting aside the notion of "violence" to the dialogues, if we're going to read into them, and be justified in any way in doing that, then we ought to be able to make clear what we're reading in. The same questions, then, but not what did they mean, but what do we mean - a decent respect for the dialogues calling on us to keep track of the differences.

A disregard for this part of the process means in effect that we've all come to play a game, but some have brought soccer balls, others hockey pucks, others footballs, baseballs, basketballs shuttlecocks, tennis balls, epees, lacrosse sticks, dice, cards, and so forth.

we've all come to play a game, but some have brought soccer balls, others hockey pucks, others footballs, baseballs, basketballs shuttlecocks, tennis balls, epees, lacrosse sticks, dice, cards, and so forth. — tim wood

And some may have no interest in playing when they perceive the agenda behind the game.

At any rate, if we take "justice" to mean treating people as they deserve, then we need to know what is right and what is wrong and we learn this from society or some other source that is higher than us and has more authority than the individual. That's why Justice has been conceived of as a higher power or principle that we all must obey and has usually been associated with a supernatural entity to highlight this fact.

don't know what the question is but I'm sure Karl Marx has all the answers. Or so they say .... — Apollodorus

:clap: :rofl:

The "Euthyphro problem" for theism is commonly misrepresented; as its central question being "Is something pious because it is beloved by God or is it beloved by God because it is pious?" The actual question in the text is "Is something pious because it is beloved of the gods, or is it beloved of the gods because it is pious?". — Janus

Sorry for butting in but the dilemma dissolves once we realize the fact that, beloved of God = pious. So, the question, "is something pious because it is beloved by God or is it beloved of God because it is pious?" becomes " is something pious because it is pious or is it pious because it is pious?" This boils down to, "is it pious because it is pious?" which is the circular argument, "it is pious because it is pious" in question form.

Socrates is right to criticize Euthyphro iff what is beloved of God can be impious but that would be a contradictio in terminis; after all, beloved of God = pious.

the dilemma dissolves once we realize the fact that, beloved of God = pious. So, the question, "is something pious because it is beloved by God or is it beloved of God because it is pious?" becomes " is something pious because it is pious or is it pious because it is pious?" This boils down to, "is it pious because it is pious?" which is the circular argument, "it is pious because it is pious" in question form. — TheMadFool

Unfortunately, the materialists will claim that the Gods love the pious man because he is pious which in their view demonstrates that you can be pious without following a divine command.

But good point, anyway.

Unfortunately, the materialists will claim that the Gods love the pious man because he is pious which in their view demonstrates that you can be pious without following a divine command.

But good point, anyway. — Apollodorus

I was merely pointing to the fact that "beloved of God" is just another way of saying pious. Socrates' argument only works if that isn't the case. That's how it seems to me. I could be wrong though.

I'm not saying you're wrong, only that the materialists will come up with new questions, arguments and "contradictions", given that this is their purpose of the discussion:

To answer the question that engendered this post, belief in god is not necessary for being good. — Fooloso4

They've already decided on the answer.

Socrates' education of Euthyphro begins when he points beyond Euthyphro's circular claim. He replaces the idea that what is loved by the gods is what is pious with the idea that the pious is what is just. (11e)

Socrates is right to criticize Euthyphro iff what is beloved of God can be impious but that would be a contradictio in terminis; after all, beloved of God = pious. — TheMadFool

Socrates argument is as follows: The pious is part of the just. If it were the other way around and the just is part of the pious then as the odd is part of number and the other part of number is its opposite, the even, the other part of the pious would be the unjust. If instead the pious is part of the just then the other part would be the impious. Socrates was accused of impiety, by questioning the justice of the gods he is impious.

If instead of gods we consider God then the question is whether something is beloved of God because it is just or just because it is beloved? In terms of piety the question would be: is it pious because it just or just because it is pious? If God loves the just and hates the unjust then what is pious, as what is loved by God, would be what is just. If someone like Euthyphro claims he is pious because he is doing what is beloved of God and what he does is unjust then either the unjust is beloved by God or he is not pious. In other words, the equation beloved of God = pious is insufficient without the possession of knowledge of God.

does Craig's response mean that God's goodness is coincidental/accidental? (Seems a bit like kicking the can down the road.)
On another note, what does Craig's identity (God himself = the paradigm of goodness) mean for people doing the right thing (irrespective of their beliefs)? Coincidental/accidental? Say, do they somehow become part of God or something (un/wittingly)? Surely Aboriginal Australians did some good things before being polluted with ideas of Craig's God, err before the European invasions. — jorndoe

I believe Craig would argue that people know what is right and good because it is built into their being by God. Hence the good things done by people who are ignorant of the Abrahamic God.

:up:

In all this talk about God and the powers that we have attributed to him, the problem of the Euthyphro has been lost. Whether it is one God, many gods, or no gods we remain human beings. What is at issue is what we do and why. Appeals to God or gods are problematic. — Fooloso4

What this misses is that some do what they do and are able to find their justification in that without any appeal to God or gods, and others are able to find their justification only by appealing to God or gods. It's called 'human diversity'; everyone does not have to agree with everyone else as to the justification of their ethical principles in order to have an acceptably healthy society, a sufficient number just have to agree (to a sufficient degree) as to what those principles are.

It is not so simple. It is not a matter of ethical principles but of whether particular acts are just or unjust. In a healthy society it is not enough that a sufficient number, (what number?),do something in order for it to be permissible. If we agree that murder is wrong, are we then wrong or is it both right and wrong if some group shouts "death to the infidels" and starts killing people? They consider themselves to be pious followers doing the will of their god, for which they will be rewarded.

I mulled over the Euthyphro dilemma and here are the results:

I find it odd that Socrates should think up Euthyphro's dilemma and also, at the same time, lay the foundations of virtue ethics. The latter, if I'm not mistaken, isn't based on some theoretical framework of morality the likes of utilitarianism; au contraire, it, for moral guidance, simply asks the question, "what would a virtuous person do if such and such were the case?" In a MS word document of Socrates's virtue ethics, do the following: Find & Replace "virtuous person" with "God." That Socrates, in a sense, provides the solution to his own dilemma should jump out at you. Something is good precisely because, the paragon of a virtuous person - God - commands it.

Euthyphro claims that what he is doing is a necessary purification (4b). The Greek term for purification is related to the Greek term for 'pious'

Purity was and in some cases is still a major religious concern.

From Deuteronomy:

But suppose the man’s accusations are true, and he can show that she was not a virgin. 21 The woman must be taken to the door of her father’s home, and there the men of the town must stone her to death, for she has committed a disgraceful crime in Israel by being promiscuous while living in her parents’ home. In this way, you will purge this evil from among you.

“If a man is discovered committing adultery, both he and the woman must die. In this way, you will purge Israel of such evil.

“Suppose a man meets a young woman, a virgin who is engaged to be married, and he has sexual intercourse with her. If this happens within a town, you must take both of them to the gates of that town and stone them to death. The woman is guilty because she did not scream for help. The man must die because he violated another man’s wife. In this way, you will purge this evil from among you. (22:20-25)

As a matter of piety one should do what the Law of God commands, majority of the pious today would not kill someone under such circumstances. It is not piety that leads us to see that this as wrong.

Would a virtuous person do what Euthyphro was going to do?

But Euthyphro seems to have forgotten all that and now agrees that the pious is part of the just.
Socrates asks what part of justice the pious is. If we follow the example of number and odd, just as the other part of number is the even, the other part of justice would be impiety. — Fooloso4

It is not piety that makes one just but rather one must be just in order to be pious. — Fooloso4

Fooloso4, you always hate it when I shoot down Socrates, but yet once more I shalt.

I assume that Socrates' stand is that one must be just in order to be pious. So one part of piety is being just. The other part? unjust. Just like in the parallel example Socrates gave the parallel between odd and even numbers.

GMBA to Socrates: "Neener, neener! I caught you on the horn of your own dilemma!!"

Fooloso4, I wish to read more of these famous stories exemplifying Socrates' powers of reasoning and logic, and we could see how many stand the test of GMBA.

I am sorry, but I am awash with the sweet feelings of victory. I will probably regret being this cocky, but hey, if you can't live for the moment, then you can't live at all.

t is not so simple. It is not a matter of ethical principles but of whether particular acts are just or unjust. In a healthy society it is not enough that a sufficient number, (what number?),do something in order for it to be permissible. If we agree that murder is wrong, are we then wrong or is it both right and wrong if some group shouts "death to the infidels" and starts killing people? They consider themselves to be pious followers doing the will of their god, for which they will be rewarded. — Fooloso4

Yep - the problem with religious ethics is they have no foundation. It is entirely down to people using personal preferences to determine what the correct interpretation of God's will might be. 'Thou shalt not kill' may be a commandment, but killing is clearly the Biblical way for so many situations and interpreted by followers in any number of additional ways.

Please remember, if your daughter isn't a virgin on her wedding night, she is to be stonned to death on her father's porch. I've always considered this especially pious advice.

Most of you seem pretty damned confused, I have to say.

There was a quote from William Lane Craig above that identifies the main supposed problem that 'Euthyphro' is used to refer to (no-one cares what the original text says). And that is, that if morality is made of God's commands, then morality will be arbitrary.

I believe morality is indeed made of God's commands and I think the Euthyphro fails to raise a reasonable doubt about it. However, I must take issue with Craig's solution (though it is not his specifically, as it is as old as the hills). If you say - as Craig is doing - that for a character trait to be a virtue is just for it to be being instantiated by God - then you have not answered the objection. For any character trait that God instantiates will qualify as a virtue. It's that way around. It isn't that the character traits are virtues and thus God has them. It is that God has them and thus they're virtues. But that does nothing to fix them in place or to prevent the metaphysical possibility of, say, sadism being a virtue in the future.

But anyway, what it is to be virtuous is not to 'resemble' God. After all, if that was the case, then really God isn't needed for morality. For one can 'resemble' a virtuous person even if no such person exists. And thus on Craig's strange view, it turns out that God is not actually necessary for morality.

SImilarly, if you insist that I am wrong to say that Craig's view is that a virtue is a virtue by virtue of God instantiating it and maintain that they are virtues independently of God, then once more divine command theory has been abandoned in favour of some kind of metaethical naturalism.

So, although I have the utmost respect for Craig as a philosopher, his solution is no solution at all.

Here's my solution. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason. So Reason is God (by which I mean that Reason is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). Does that mean that it is arbitrary what's right and wrong? No, for 'arbitrary' means 'for no reason'. To think that what Reason commands is arbitrary then, is simply to have failed to understand this is Reason we are talking about - the one against which arbitrariness is measured. It is, then, conceptually confused to think that Reason's imperatives could be arbitrary, for by their very nature they are the opposite.

Would a virtuous person do what Euthyphro was going to do? — Fooloso4

Hard for me to say because virtue ethics is about character/identity of a person as stipulated, it seems, by culture i.e. as some have pointed out, virtue ethics, is relative and that's as big as hints get if you're trying to solve the Euthyphro dilemma - goodness is, to some degree, arbitrary.

If I may be allowed to speculate, Socrates was no fool or, more accurately, he's not the type who would say anything without having thought about it deeply. He must've, at some point, realized that no single moral theory is going to suffice - there'll always be exceptions/special cases that would render them useless on more occasions than can be reasonably tolerated. That's why, my best guess is, Socrates counts reason/wisdom among the virtues for you need them to ensure the best outcome absent a consistent (contradiction-free) and complete (covers all bases). In short, you need to be rational/wise to be able to handle all cases - ordinary/exceptional. Implicit in this emphasis on reason/wisdom is the acceptance of an unsavory truth - there's something whimsical/arbitrary about morality/ethics.

Down roughly a millennia and half later, Kant comes along and refines Socrates' insight that morality is simply a facet of reason/wisdom by formulating the cateogrical imperative (CI). The CI is, to me, old wine in a new bottle i.e. it's simply Socrates's virtue ethics given a new look so to speak. After all, Kant makes it absolutely clear that the bad/immoral entails a logical contradiction, inconceivable as it were. Doesn't this mean the same thing as Socrates's claim that goodness is reason/wisdom in action?

Virtue ethics is a normative theory, not a metaethical theory. Divine command theory - at which the Euthyphro is directed - is a metaethical theory. So whether virtue ethics is true of false is orthogonal to the issue at hand.

Virtue ethics is a normative theory, not a metaethical theory. Divine command theory - at which the Euthyphro is directed - is a metaethical theory. So whether virtue ethics is true of false is orthogonal to the issue at hand. — Bartricks

Which ethics is non-normative, may I ask? There would be no point in one, right? Divine command theory, as I understand it, is to quite literally put our faith in, trust completely, God's moral decisions. That's the metaethics of virtue ethics; if that floats your boat, amen!

That out of the way, virtue ethics is predicated on a person's character and one horn of Euthyphro's dilemma is what is purportedly an undesirable state of affairs - good being whatever God command. However, if virtue ethics is what it claims it is - about character - then God's character as the most virtuous person implies, as of necessity, that his commands are good, right?

Which ethics is non-normative, may I ask? — TheMadFool

Metaethics! Metaethical theories are theories about what morality is composed of (so they'd be theories of what 'normativity' is). Normative theories are theories about the content of morality - that is, they're theories about what we ought to do (not theories about what the oughtness itself is) and what has moral value (not what moral value itself is).

Virtue ethics is a normative theory - it is the theory that the right act is the act the virtuous person would do, or something like that.

It's not a theory about what the goodness of a virtue 'is'. That's what divine command theory is. Divine command theory would be the view that the goodness of those character traits that are virtues (where this means no more than a character trait that has moral goodness) consists of them being valued by God, or recommended by God, or some such.

Anyway, you can't deal with the Euthyphro criticism by appealing to the supposed truth of a normative theory, for the whole point would be that the theory in question would be true contingently, not of necessity. And thus even if virtue ethics is indeed true, its being true is arbitrary (that would be the criticism - the misguided criticism - anyway).

Anyone, does Craig's response mean that God's goodness is coincidental/accidental? (Seems a bit like kicking the can down the road.) — jorndoe

...the question is: does God will something because it is good, or is something good because God wills it? If the theist says that God wills something because it is good then the good is independent of God and, in fact then, moral values are not based in God. They are independent of him. On the other hand, if you say something is good because God wills it then that would seem to make what is good and evil arbitrary. God could have willed that hatred is good; then we would be morally obligated to hate one another, which seems crazy. Some moral values seem to be necessary, and therefore there would be no possible world in which hatred is good. So the claim is that this shows that morality cannot be based in God.

I think it is clearly a false dilemma because the alternatives are not of the form “A or not-A” which would be an inescapable dilemma. The alternatives are like “A or B.” In that case you can always add a third one, C, and escape the horns of the dilemma. I think in this case there is a third alternative which is to say that God wills something because he is good. That is to say, God himself is the paradigm of goodness, and his will reflects his character. God is by nature loving, kind, fair, impartial, generous, and so forth. Therefore, he could not have willed that, for example, hatred be good. That would be to contradict his very own nature.

So God's commands to us are not arbitrary, but neither are they based upon something independent of God. Rather, God himself is the paradigm of goodness. — WLC

So, not accidental or coincidental but intrinsic.

what does Craig's identity (God himself = the paradigm of goodness) mean for people doing the right thing (irrespective of their beliefs)? — jorndoe

Karl Rahner floated the idea of the 'anonymous Christian':

"Anonymous Christian" means that a person lives in the grace of God and attains salvation outside of explicitly constituted Christianity. A Protestant Christian is, of course, "no anonymous Christian"; that is perfectly clear. But, let us say, a Buddhist monk (or anyone else I might suppose) who, because he follows his conscience, attains salvation and lives in the grace of God; of him I must say that he is an anonymous Christian; if not, I would have to presuppose that there is a genuine path to salvation that really attains that goal, but that simply has nothing to do with Jesus Christ. But I cannot do that. And so if I hold if everyone depends upon Jesus Christ for salvation, and if at the same time I hold that many live in the world who have not expressly recognized Jesus Christ, then there remains in my opinion nothing else but to take up this postulate of an anonymous Christianity. — Rahner, quoted in Wikipedia

Perhaps they're members of the 'invisible Church':

The invisible church or church invisible is a theological concept of an "invisible" Christian Church of the elect who are known only to God, in contrast to the "visible church"—that is, the institutional body on earth which preaches the gospel and administers the sacraments. Every member of the invisible church is saved, while the visible church contains some individuals who are saved and others who are unsaved. According to this view, Bible passages such as Matthew 7:21–27, Matthew 13:24–30, and Matthew 24:29–51 speak about this distinction. — Wikipedia

what would an alternative to virtue-ethics look like? Can you give an example of a viably universal non-normative ethical system? I am seriously curious about this. It is a very interesting topic imo.

Metaethics! Metaethical theories are theories about what morality is composed of (so they'd be theories of what 'normativity' is). Normative theories are theories about the content of morality - that is, they're theories about what we ought to do (not theories about what the oughtness itself is) and what has moral value (not what moral value itself is). — Bartricks

Precisely, Euthyphro's dilemma is about what constitutes good and bad. Is it Divine command or is it not?

Virtue ethics is a normative theory — Bartricks

In my book, we can't have reached a normative ethics which virtue ethics is without having passed the metaethics waypoint.

Now, what is the metaethics of virtue ethics? Is it not Divine command theory; after all virtue ethics is about the character of virtuous people and God's commands would no doubt be a reflection of God's character, no?


Perhaps when I spell it out like that, you might be able to make the connection between the Euthyphro dilemma (metaethics) and virtue ethics (normative ethics).

That's how I feel anyway. I could be wrong of course.

Socrates asks what part of justice the pious is. If we follow the example of number and odd, just as the other part of number is the even, the other part of justice would be impiety. Socrates’ pursuit of justice is in part impious, he questions what should be piously accepted as true. — Fooloso4

Thus pointing at situations where piety may be detrimental to being good. E.g. human sacrifices.

Socrates asks what part of justice the pious is. If we follow the example of number and odd, just as the other part of number is the even, the other part of justice would be impiety. Socrates’ pursuit of justice is in part impious, he questions what should be piously accepted as true. — Fooloso4

Thus pointing at situations where piety may be detrimental to being good. E.g. human sacrifices.

God's character as the most virtuous person implies, as of necessity, that his commands are good, right? — TheMadFool

As you correctly pointed out and as @Fooloso4 was forced to admit, "pious" = "loved by the Gods".

So, let's have another look at the so-called problem:

"Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον to hosion) loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?"

The first problem with this question or puzzle is that it seems to imply that only two answers are possible which is not the case.

The second problem is that it depends on our perspective of the concepts involved.

ὅσιος hósios means both pious in the sense of sanctioned by the Gods and pious in the sense of devout or observant of what is commanded by the Gods.

Thus the pious (to hosion) is in any case something that is sanctioned (loved) by the Gods.

Now, we could ask, if we had nothing better to do, why do the Gods love the pious?

Some may answer that the Gods love the pious because it is good and just in itself. This may lead to the erroneous conclusion that there are moral standards that are independent of the Gods - which is what the materialists, the anti-theists and the neo-Marxists are trying to demonstrate, without much success however.

In reality, if, for example, justice is a manifestation of the divine principle of Justice (the Goddess Dike or Justitia), then the Gods love the pious because it is divine, i.e., a manifestation of their own innate goodness and justice.

Similarly, when humans assess what is right and what is wrong, they do so according to the divine sense of justice present in their souls.

As clearly stated by Plato, justice is not something external, it is an innate virtue of the soul which is essentially divine.

The world (cosmos) itself was created by God and arranged in such a way as to produce a vast array of good effects (Timaeus 28a).

So, when humans perform good and just actions they do nothing else than obeying the divine principle of justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne).

In mythological terms, Justice (Dike) was created/fathered by God (Zeus) and placed on earth to uphold justice (Theogony I. 901) which is another way of saying that justice is a divine principle.

I assume that Socrates' stand is that one must be just in order to be pious. So one part of piety is being just. The other part? unjust. Just like in the parallel example Socrates gave the parallel between odd and even numbers. — god must be atheist

Euthyphro first makes the mistake of saying that number is part of odd. By his actions he makes the same mistake, making the just part of piety. In that case the other side of piety would be, as you say, unjust.

One part of being just is piety, the other is impiety. One part of number is odd, the other is even. The observe is not true.