Well... it is anti-scientific for starters. It throws out observation and suggests we can account for the world by merely relying on the ideas we have used before. If we think in that manner, we lose capacity to notice states which confound our present theories.

It's also terrible with respect to interactions betweens humans. Since it is an essentialist position, it has us thinking we know the "nature" people without taking a moment to consider them and their relationship to our theories and actions. It leads to people being ostracised because they don't fit with the "essential" nature of (supposedly) all humans. An ignorance of the difference between our actions as a society (e.g. description, categorisation, etc., etc) and states of existence (e.g. someone's biological states) is created, such that we start equivocating our ideas and categories for someone with their existence.

Well... it is anti-scientific for starters — TheWillowOfDarkness

If it's anti-scientific, then why do scientists posit such things? If you don't think they do, then go ask a physicists if GR or QM applies to the entire universe. Go ask a biologist if evolution applies to all life. The topology of the universe itself is said to be determined by gravity, for Plato's sake.

It's also terrible with respect to interactions betweens humans. Since it is an essentialist position, it has us thinking we know the "nature" people without taking a moment to consider them and their relationship to our theories and actions. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, there must be something about humans which differentiates us from duckbill platypuses or peat moss. That people have gotten all worked up about what exactly that is and done terrible things doesn't change the fact that we're not dogs.

If it's anti-scientific, then why do scientists posit such things? If you don't think they do, then go ask a physicists if GR or QM applies to the entire universe. Go ask a biologist if evolution applies to all life. The topology of the universe itself is said to be determined by gravity, for Plato's sake. — Marchesk

What exactly does the "entire universe" mean here? If we are talking bout the observed universe or the measured universe which relates to the observed universe, then the answer is clear: we say GR or QM applies to the entirety of that realm because, for that realm (i.e. the observed and measured), the theory fits. The topology of the (observed) universe does express gravity. This doesn't mean the universe always express this. There may be instances of the universe which behave differently. (as we discovered in the shift from Newtonian mechanics to GR to QM).

Otherwise, if someone proclaims a theory must apply to the entire universe, in the sense of a "universal," in the sense everything thing which exist must necessarily be like that, it is merely that scientists can be just as vulnerable to thinking of the world infinite terms as any one with "belief."

Well, there must be something about humans which differentiates us from duckbill platypuses or peat moss. That people have gotten all worked up about what exactly that is and done terrible things doesn't change the fact that we're not dogs.

For sure... but it is not our statements or ideas (even about biology) which make that distinction. It is existing biological states. Whether or not we state the biological differences between humans, platypuses or peat moss, we are different. The difference is not defined by are acts of description or categorisation.

The contradiction comes from stating that we can't get outside our perspective to say what the world is like without us, and yet very important and successful scientific theories do exactly that.

'A theory' requires a set of connected axioms - what is it that makes the connections between those axioms? Theories are still entertained by minds, there is no way to get outside of that.

Furthermore, you're posing a false dichotomy between Kant and science - the Critique of Pure Reason is not creationism or religious dogma. Kant was an empirical realist, he wasn't trying to undermine science.

Furthermore, you're posing a false dichotomy between Kant and science - the Critique of Pure Reason is not creationism or religious dogma. Kant was an empirical realist, he wasn't trying to undermine science. — Wayfarer

I'm not saying he wasn't, but you stated that the view from nowhere is impossible for us, and yet science posits deep time in which there were no human minds. And what happened during this deep time is what led to human minds being able to connect axioms about that past. You also stated that the world outside of us is unknowable, but again science has quite a lot to say about this unknowableness. We weren't there in the Big Bang or when life first got going, but yet science says that's what's crucially important to us being here in the first place.

You have to bracket all that and add the caveat, as it appears to us. Or as it is correlated to us. Which is odd, because it appears to us that there was all this stuff happening without us, and most crucially, we wouldn't be around if not for all that. But if philosophically we can't say what the world is like without us, then those scientific theories are prima facie wrong without caveating them. It only appears to scientists that our existence depends on Evolution, etc.

I fully accept the facts of evolution, scientific analysis of the age of the cosmos, and the rest. But theories remain mind-dependent in the sense that any theory has to be entertained by a mind. 'What happened anyway', regardless of any observer, in the absence of all minds, is impossible or even meaningless to conceive of. 'The length of time that the Universe existed before us', is calculated in units which are meaningful to the human mind, in terms of intervals and distances which are measureable by that mind, such as 'the time taken for the earth to rotate the Sun' and 'the speed of light'. This doesn't mean that 'the universe exists in the mind' but t does mean that whatever we say or know about it is dependent on a mind that measures it and understands it; that is always part of the picture. It is an inextricable part of the whole. The conceit of scientific realism is to act as if that has been taken out, but it's always there; the whole issue with the 'measurement problem' in physics is that this has more or less reached out through the glass in the observatory and whacked scientists on the nose.

I understand that you accept that facts, and that theories have to be formulated by minds. Nevertheless, the theories that have been formulated state there is this deep time before us. I take that to mean evolution is true in that it really happened, as opposed to it just appears to happen to creatures like us with our particular senses and cognitive abilities.

But according to evolutionary theory, those same 'senses and cognitive abilities' are the sole consequence of the evolutionary processes - which are held to be blind, purposeless and un-directed. So it's a wonder that we have the ability to determine such things as 'the age of the Universe', if indeed we have done that. The things you pick up chasing wildebeest!

Anyway, this is a debate about scientific realism. What you're saying is that the world described by scientific theory is a real world, independently of what science says about it. I'm arguing that the world is inextricably bound up with the observing mind. That doesn't say that the world is 'in the mind', but it does deny the premise of scientific realism, that the observer is really separate from the world s/he observes. So I think we might agree to differ on that point, but I also think it has been a useful exchange for delineating what exactly is at issue.

It is useful, and I was wondering how universals might play a role in the debate over scientific realism. It sounds like Kantianism is a strong version of conceptualism. I wonder if scientific realism requires universals or tropes to be part of the world. Does the issue ultimately go back to how we are able to make sense of the flux of experience?

I wonder if scientific realism requires universals or tropes to be part of the world. Does the issue ultimately go back to how we are able to make sense of the flux of experience? — Marchesk

I think the idea universals have to be part of the world is correlationism working its way through a back door. What are we saying if we suggest that states of the world need "universals" to be? Well, we are saying that for a given state to exist, there must be this "universal" idea which its presence is dependent on. Instead of addressing particulars (states of existence) on their own terms, we are back trying to construct them out of ideas and experience (the "universal" we propose to be their origin).

The dependency of the world (states of existence) on the "mind" has snuck back into our philosophy. We are, once again, considering states of the world to be defined by the "universal" ideas we have in our minds, rather than considering them are there own unique moments of existence.

I think the idea universals have to be part of the world is correlationism working its way through a back door. What are we saying if we suggest that states of the world need "universals" to be? Well, we are saying that for a given state to exist, there must be this "universal" idea which its presence is dependent on. Instead of addressing particulars (states of existence) on their own terms, we are back trying to construct them out of ideas and experience (the "universal" we propose to be their origin).

The dependency of the world (states of existence) on the "mind" has snuck back into our philosophy. We are, once again, considering states of the world to be defined by the "universal" ideas we have in our minds, rather than considering them are there own unique moments of existence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

For me the idea that universals could exist apart from the world is unintelligible, so there wouldn't seem to be any alternative to saying they are "part of the world" (in the sense that they are inherent in any idea of "the world").

The idea "states of the world" is itself a universal. I think you are conflating nature, the existence which is "had" in experience, with the states that are subsequently "known" by experience (the quotation marks are to acknowledge that these are not my terms, but the terms of John Dewey's distinction between types of experience).

Particulars can only be "addressed" in terms of universals. The term 'particular' is itself a universal. A particular can only be understood in terms of its universal properties; the properties that make it a token of a particular type. So, for example the appearance and behavior of a particular lion is understood in terms of the appearance and behavior of lions in general. If no two supposed lions looked or behaved like lions then they would not be lions at all.

We do not "construct" particulars out of universals as origins, it is quite the reverse; we "construct" universals out of recognition of the manifest commonalities of particulars. Once an understanding of the general properties of a type of particular is established it may be used to recognize future manifestations of that type; but certainly not to construct future manifestations.

States of existence (what is known) in experience are of course dependent on the mind, but not wholly so; they are also dependent on the primordial existence which is "had" in experience prior to any knowledge (consciousness). The mind itself is of course dependent on this existence which is primordially "had" in experience but there are no objects or states of existence prior to consciousness, how could there be? To say there are such is to illegitimately transpose the eventuated understanding of objects and states, which is dependent on consciousness, or better codependent on consciousness, or better still, which is consciousness, back to the mere existence which is antecedent to any such understanding.

I don't think there is much of a problem with universals if we accept a version of 'conceptualism':

Conceptualism (also called psychologism and mentalism, depending on the sorts of objects under discussion): This is the view that there do exist numbers — or properties, or propositions, or whatever — but that they do not exist independently of us; instead, they are mental objects; in particular, the claim is usually that they are something like ideas in our heads. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Platonism in Metaphysics)

If everything is a thought I'm not sure you run into the same problems. There is no platonic realm needed to explain where redness etc. is, it is just a mental realm.

If everything is a thought I'm not sure you run into the same problems. There is no platonic realm needed to explain where redness etc. is, it is just a mental realm. — invizzy

Well, you still need to account for why we have such concepts, and how they map onto particulars. I assume we use concepts such as redness because it makes sense of something about particulars (that some of them are shaded red).

I am a little confused as to the difference between nominalism and conceptualism. Is it that nominalism just sees universals as naming schemes and arbitrary groupings, while conceptualism is more a matter of our cognitive makeup that we see the world in universal terms?

Why do we need to account for the concepts? Can't we dismiss them as false if we reject platonism? We can have false concepts right?

Why do we need to account for the concepts? Can't we dismiss them as false if we reject platonism? We can have false concepts right? — invizzy

Sure, but I guess the question is what do we mean we talk about the world using universals? If the universals are false, then what are we talking about?

Right but I'm saying universals don't exist. We just have a THOUGHT of redness.

Right but I'm saying universals don't exist. We just have a THOUGHT of redness. — invizzy

We have a thought of redness, true. But then there are red things. Which is presumably why we think of red.

Oh I see. Well an Idealist would say EVERYTHING is thought (or at least all that is known is thought) which would solve that problem, wouldn't it?

I don't think there is much of a problem with universals if we accept a version of 'conceptualism': — invizzy

From the IEP:

"As tidy as this seems, it too suffers from problems. To see this, we need to realize that concepts can be misapplied in some cases, such as when we say of a cat that it is a dog. And misapplied concepts explain nothing deep about generality. Conceptualism's appeal to concept application must concern only correct concept application. As such, it is fair to ask, “What makes it the case that the concept red is rightly applied to both a and b, but not of some third individual, c?” To treat this fact as brute and inexplicable is to revert to problematic Predicate Nominalism. So it seems the Conceptualist must say that the concept red applies to a and b, but not c, because a and b share a common feature, a feature c lacks. Otherwise, the application of red is unconstrained by the individuals to which it applies. But simply noting that a and b resemble each other isn't going to help, because that just is the fact we originally sought to explain, put differently. The Conceptualist might now say that a and b share a property. But if this isn't to amount to a restatement of the original datum, it must now be interpreted as the claim that some entity is in both a and b. That, of course, turns our supposed Conceptualist strategy back into Realism.

Critics say Conceptualism solves no problems on its own. In trying to ground our right to predicate the concept red of a and b, we are driven back to facts about a and b themselves and that leaves Conceptualism as an unstable position. It teeters back and forth between Realism, on the one hand, and Nominalism, on the other."

I am a little confused as to the difference between nominalism and conceptualism. — Marchesk

So, Marchesk, conceptualism is an unstable position between nominalism and realism, although it claims to be nominalism.

“What makes it the case that the concept red is rightly applied to both a and b, but not of some third individual, c?”

I don't see a problem here, surely red is applied if something is thought of as red.

a and b are similar but different to c. What makes this so? The redness of a and b, they are similar to each other.

That's not to say that the realist interpretation of similarity (universals) is necessarily correct. You could be a nominalist trope theorist and think that the Taj Mahal has a unique color, unique meaning numerically independent from any other trope, even an identical-looking trope. It seems to me that we can avoid the question of what makes these tropes similar by appealing to evolution and realizing that attributes exist in a spectrum, just as colors exist in a rainbow, and that it would be significantly beneficial to the survival of the species for an organism to be able to see similarities between objects.

Yeah but I'm saying a and b are called red because they are THOUGHT of as red. That's how conceptualism works. And if c is not thought of as red it won't be described as such. It is not about redness from a third person's view at all, that is totally irrelevant - from their point of view it could be green!

But why are a and b thought of as red while c is not?

Good question, could be a demon putting the thought in our head, we simply don't know. There is no access to the real world, you see. But presumably there is a cause; perhaps light reflecting, cones firing, the lack of tinted spectacles or water in the way, just the fact that there is anything there in the first place. Most likely a combination of these.

But it could be a demon. And that is an important point.

here is no access to the real world, you see. — invizzy

Not really.

But presumably there is a cause; perhaps light reflecting, cones firing, the lack of tinted spectacles or water in the way, — invizzy

Which would be the real access. You can't appeal to the real world to undermine real access. If everything is a mental construct, then that includes the brain, photons, etc. As such, scientific explanation can't undermine realism if they're already ideal.

Yeah I would agree that brains and photons are thoughts too. Everything is -from your own point of view. You can't think of anything that is not a thought.
We must be talking past each other a bit.
Do you agree that everything you can think of is mediated by a thought? That is not 'real' access, surely?

Do you agree that everything you can think of is mediated by a thought? That is not 'real' access, surely? — invizzy

Sure, and I agree that everything I see is mediated by seeing. As for real access, thoughts are real. People have them, presumably because they have brains, brains that are part of bodies moving about in the world. I consider being a body in the world to be real access.

Yeah but access to that body and outside things are going to be through thoughts. For us they're the only tthings that exist. And that's important, for US. I'm not saying bodies don't exist, they do but for us they only exist though mental activity.

1. Everything you can think is necessarily from your point of view.
2. It follows that everything (from your point of view) is what you are thinking at this point in time.
3. What you are thinking at this point in time is a thought.
4. It follows that everything is thought.