Do we know how it works? If we don't know how it works, do we really know what it is? — mew

Peter Hacker has rather convincingly argued that the most fruitful line of inquiry regarding your second question is to pay attention, in Wittgensteinian spirit, to the manner in which we learn to use the word "consciousness" (and related words such as "attention" and "awareness") and the intersubjective criteria that guide our applications of them. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 in Bennett and Hacker Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience are devoted to such an examination.

I'm sure it would have been correct to say that even before any scientific enquiry we knew what water and trees were. An understanding of particle physics doesn't seem necessary. So in this sense it could be correct to say that we know what consciousness is – even if we don't know anything more.

So in this sense it could be correct to say that we know what consciousness is – even if we don't know anything more. — Michael

What would you say it is in this sense?

'm sure it would have been correct to say that even before any scientific enquiry we knew what water and trees were. An understanding of particle physics doesn't seem necessary. — Michael

Does this work for all kinds of things? Either we are talking about doors or about the concept of numbers what you said applies? Aren't there things that we need to know how they work in order to say that we know what they're really are?

For example, if we don't know how water is constituted, we might think that it is the substance out of which everything is constituted and then say that this is what it really is, not just something for us to drink.

Do you mean that what it is depends simply on the context of our discussions? Can't we just use the word wrongly?

Does this work for all kinds of things? Either we are talking about doors or about the concept of numbers what you said applies? — mew

I don't know what you mean here.

Aren't there things that we need to know how they work in order to say that we know what they're really are?

For example, if we don't know how water is constituted, we might think that it is the substance out of which everything is constituted and then say that this is what it really is, not just something for us to drink.

The point is that even before any scientific enquiry we were able to distinguish water from other things like trees and fire, and knew what to do with it. We might not have known anything about hydrogen and oxygen atoms, and so we didn't comprehensively know what water is, but I don't think we need to comprehensively know what something is to know what it is.

I know who my parents and my friends are even though I don't know everything about them.

Yes, we knew that water wasn't a tree but we couldn't know that the tree wasn't somehow made of water. We can distinguish between water and trees when someone talks to us about trees, but if we don't know what water really is, can we distinguish between water and the ultimate substance of the universe when someone talks to us about the ultimate stuff of reality? Now that we know what it is made of, we know it is not the basic stuff of the universe, before that we couldn't tell (this is maybe what Pierre-Normand is talking about?).

Sorry if I don't express myself clearly, I'm still learning english and I find these thoughts really confusing :P

Do you mean that what it is depends simply on the context of our discussions? Can't we just use the word wrongly? — mew

Yes, we can use the world wrongly. But when we are simply ignorant of hidden features of the objects or phenomena that we are talking about, this need not signal that we are misusing the words and don't really know what we are talking about. Maybe science can enlighten us on underlying mechanisms, or the way known phenomena are realized, or disclose hidden properties that they have. But this would not necessarily show that we have initially misidentified the objects or phenomena talked about, as Michael's examples illustrate.

Also, there is another way to misuse a word which is to use the name a phenomenon talked about in ordinary life (i.e. in non-scientific discourse), theorize about its referent, and then confuse the phenomenon of ordinary life with the theoretical entity postulated for purpose of scientific theorizing. Hence "consciousness", for instance, which was not originally conceived to be designating an object of awareness when we understood what it means for someone to be conscious, or unconscious (intransitive use) or to be conscious of something (transitive use) comes to seem to designate an object of private acquaintance. This is because the semi-technical uses fostered by the philosophy of mind, or by cognitive science, led us to misuse the original term, and we lost track of the familiar phenomenon that we originally were intending to explain.

If in daily someone asked me, I would say that to be conscious is to recognize that I'm having an experience. But this implies that I'm also aware of myself, so then how is self-consciousness different from consciousness? And how science or philosophy use these words differently?

If in daily someone asked me, I would say that to be conscious is to recognize that I'm having an experience. But this implies that I'm also aware of myself, so then how is self-consciousness different from consciousness? And how science or philosophy use these words differently? — mew

Well, self-consiousness is the topic of the next chapter in Bennett and Hacker's book. This may not be a phrase that has had an ordinary use before philosophical and cogsci theses began to seep into popular culture. I may surmise that nobody has a view on what "self-consiousness" refers to which roams free of some loaded theoretical standpoint or other.

Sebastian Rödl wrote a very nice book titled Self-Consciousness. His approach is resolutely Kantian, and he has no concern for qualia or for passive introspection onto the quality of ones own private mental life. "Self-consciousness", in his book, rather refers to the tacit a priori knowledge that rational agents have of formal features of their own perceptual and agential abilities.

Do we know how it works? If we don't know how it works, do we really know what it is? — mew

Consciousness is awareness of the outside world and that is immanent in all living things.

We have some idea as to how it works e.g. there's a great deal of progress in the analysis of logic, psychology, etc. The complete picture is missing though. Maybe there's something wondrous hidden in the darkness of human ignorance.

Thank you, even though I don't understand at all what you mean in your second paragraph :-#

Everytime I come here I think I'm leaving more perplexed than before :P Most people use too advanced language for someone like me who hasn't read philosophy and when I try to search for the things they say, usually to understand the explanations, I have to search for other explanations because again it's given in a language I don't understand. Are these books you mentioned easy to understand? Or do you know any other books or sites where I can read about philosophical ideas in easier language?

Consciousness is awareness of the outside world and that is immanent in all living things. — TheMadFool

Do you mean that plants are conscious the same way humans are?

Do you mean that plants are conscious the same way humans are? — mew

Plants are aware of their surroundings: the branches grow towards the sunlight.

Humans are also aware of their surroundings but one extra bit humans have is self-consciousness

How can I understand that the sun is there and move towards the sun but not understand that I'm moving toward the sun?

Also, why don't you think that the way plants grow is just programmed and automatic?

How can I understand that the sun is there and move towards the sun but not understand that I'm moving toward the sun? — mew

The answer to the above question is below:

lso, why don't you think that the way plants grow is just programmed and automatic? — mew

What do you mean? >:O

If plants are conscious but their reactions are just automatic, then a robot which is programmed to react to certain things is conscious. But that is clearly false, robots are not aware, they are programmed. I thought that what we mean by "aware" is "not-automatic" :P

Are these books you mentioned easy to understand? Or do you know any other books or sites where I can read about philosophical ideas in easier language? — mew

The book by Sebastian Rödl is quite technical and requires some philosophical background. The book by Bennett and Hacker, though, is written in very plain language and is intended for a broad audience of non-specialists. It is a very fine introduction to the philosophy of mind and of cognitive sciences.

Thank you :D (L)

Thank you, even though I don't understand at all what you mean in your second paragraph — mew

I meant to explain that there is a sense of "self-consciousness" that doesn't refer to the mere outcome of turning one's own gaze inside, as it were, and contemplate what it is one is feeling, experiencing, etc., but rather is a form of critical reflection on what it is that is required to make sense of one's ability to know the world on the basis of experience, or to know what it is one ought to do (and that one is actually doing or intending to do -- i.e. practical self-knowledge) on the basis of practical deliberation, and that reveals explicitly features of our rational abilities that are necessarily operative in every mature human being, including those who don't critically reflect on them. Immanuel Kant is one fellow who pioneered this sort of reflection and Sebastian Rödl is traveling a parallel path.

If plants are conscious but their reactions are just automatic, — mew

The recent movie Sausage Party makes the case that some edible plants (and other food items) may achieve self-consciousness at the moment when they arrive to the supermarket.

:D

I meant to explain that there is a sense of "self-consciousness" that doesn't refer to the mere outcome of turning one's own gaze inside, as it were, and contemplate what it is one is feeling, experiencing, etc., but rather is a form of critical reflection on what it is that is required to make sense of one's ability to know the world on the basis of experience, or to know what it is one ought to do (and that one is actually doing or intending to do -- i.e. practical self-knowledge) on the basis of practical deliberation, and that reveals explicitly features of our rational abilities that are necessarily operative in every mature human being, including those who don't critically reflect on them. Immanuel Kant is one fellow who pioneered this sort of reflection and Sebastian Rödl is traveling a parallel path. — Pierre-Normand

I'm still not sure I understand this :P
What I meant wasn't that self-consciousness is to think about what I'm feeling or experiencing but just to notice that I'm here, I'm someone, to be aware of myself. And then I think that it is difficult to be conscious of something else and not to be conscious of myself or to be conscious of myself and not be conscious of other things. I think that one implies the other. You mean that these philosophers say that self-consciousness is not about that?

What do you mean? — mew

I mean consciousness is simply being aware of the enivornment we're in. A plant growing towards the sun is ''aware'' of the direction of sunlight.

Robots in a maze are aware of their environment.

Awareness of the environment is a basic feature of consciousness.

Awareness of the environment is a basic feature of consciousness. — TheMadFool

What is then the difference between awareness and consciousness under this view?

And then I think that it is difficult to be conscious of something else and not to be conscious of myself or to be conscious of myself and not be conscious of other things. I think that one implies the other. You mean that these philosophers say that self-consciousness is not about that? — mew

No, I think you're right about that. Your being aware (i.e. having the perceptual knowledge) that there are objects in the world that exist independently of your perception of them requires awareness that you can potentially experience them -- i.e. that they be potential objects of experience. You arrived at this conclusion without Kant's help. Congratulations!

What is then the difference between awareness and consciousness under this view? — mew

Awareness, as indicated by behavior, is sign of consciousness

According to neuroscientist and quasi-philosopher, Antonio Damasio, consciousness is self-awareness + awareness of one's environment (i.e. immediate surroundings).

According to neuroscientist and quasi-philosopher, Antonio Damasio, consciousness is self-awareness + awareness of one's environment (i.e. immediate surroundings). — Maw

That sounds right. I wanted a distinction between ''awareness of environment'' and ''awareness of self''. I guess the two cannot be meaningfully separated. Consciousness does need both.

First, we do not know how consciousness works. However, not understanding the perfect interworkings of something does not prevent up

As to the general point, "what is consciousness", I do not know. It seems to be some sort of awareness, but we run into some problems. For example, I would say machines have awareness of things, but machines are not conscious.

The "awareness of self" condition also runs into problems when we try to attribute consciousness to things because what exactly does awareness entail in this case? Distinction from other things?

Because plants turn toward the sun doesn't make them anymore "aware" than a leaf that is blown in the wind or an apple that falls to the ground. Physical reaction is not equivalent to awareness.