I've read it. So what? As I said there are many examples of clinical bad practice and I am not fan of the medical model - but you can make similar claims about about lawyers and mechanics too. Read The Noonday Demon about depression by Andrew Solomon, a much more nuanced book.

My point is uncomplicated. Many people are resurrected by treatment and become fully human for the first time (in years or ever) when the relentless persecution, voices, self-harm, paranoia, along with sleeping rough, using substances and eating out of rubbish bins ends. I personally have observed this hundreds of times over three decades.

But yes, hospital work can be cursory and bad and some shrinks are patronising and medication without psychosocial support is not great and the hospitals and medical services can treat people like numbers. Sure, I have also seen suicides and murders... None of that is acceptable but this is part of a much more complex story and one that also has numerous triumphs. Life is about perspective.

I very much doubt that. Think through the implications of 'correspondence' and you will see that it must have profound problems: in what sense does an idea or a proposition correspond to a state of affairs? To even ask that question immediately opens up the whole subject of semiotics and theory of meaning - what 'correspondence' entails, and how it relates to facts. The expression that such-and-such a proposition 'corresponds to the facts' is really just a vernacular expression. It is common-sense realism as an epistemological stance. — Wayfarer

Some people seem to think that the correspondence theory of truth is unlike other theories of truth in that the correspondence theory of truth makes claims in accordance with facts, while other theories are about making claims in accordance with other criteria (such as consensus etc.) and less or more denying the relevance of facts or ignoring them (while fully knowing that facts exist and what they are).

A common-sense realist proabably cannot even understand what the concept of "theory of truth" is about.

But if morality is about how we treat other beings, and if most people are common-sense realists, then this is something that a theory of morality must take into consideration.

I disagree with what Wittgenstein says there. — Banno

While you're a proponent of virtue ethics?

Can you sketch out your brand of virtue ethics?
What is your virtue ethics based on?
In your virtue ethics, what are other people?

But yes, hospital work can be cursory and bad and some shrinks are patronising and medication without psychosocial support is not great and the hospitals and medical services can treat people like numbers. — Tom Storm

I'm not talking about that, I'm talking about the nature of psychological/psychiatric intervention and treatment as such.

And to tie this to the thread topic:

Psychological/psychiatric intervention and treatment are inherently of a moral dimension. Psychologists/psychiatrists intervene because they believe there is something wrong with the person, that the person is acting wrongly and shouldn't act that way.

How do psychologists/psychiatrists define morality, what do they base it on?
Do they believe in moral facts?


(As for Styron's essay not being particularly nuanced: I gathered that this is so by design. The first thing that struck me about it was how superficial it is; but then I concluded it must be deliberately so.
And as for people who are successfully helped by psychological/psychiatric intervention and treatment: sure, the types you describe are so far gone that only an authoritarian approach can help them. But that doesn't mean everyone who gets charged with a psychiatric diagnosis is in the same category).

Dang. Looks like I've ended up in the wrong century. :cry: — Wayfarer

You're not the only one.
Dinosaurs are bound to become extinct. You can't stop progress!

Can you sketch out your brand of virtue ethics?
What is your virtue ethics based on?
In your virtue ethics, what are other people? — baker

None of that is relevant to the thread. But my present view runs parallel with that of Martha Nussbaum.

And again, I happily admit I have no answer to the question in the OP - just a few thoughts that need ordering. Hence my interest.

I'm not talking about that, I'm talking about the nature of psychological/psychiatric intervention and treatment as such. — baker

So was I. It can work and treatment has probably (for all the mistakes) provided more happiness to people than philosophy or pondering moral facts ever did.

Psychological/psychiatric intervention and treatment are inherently of a moral dimension. Psychologists/psychiatrists intervene because they believe there is something wrong with the person, that the person is acting wrongly and shouldn't act that way.

There are strict laws on this and generally mental health services get involved if there is demonstrable risk to self and others. behaving wrongly is out of scope.
— baker

How do psychologists/psychiatrists define morality, what do they base it on?
Do they believe in moral facts? — baker

Like any group they are not monolithic and hold diverse beliefs. But I am not all that interested in the moral beliefs people hold. People's actions are more significant. Banno is right on this. Met too many hypocrites. You can tell a good psychiatrist, not by what they say at conferences or by the papers they write, but how they treat people. I think this applies to all folk.

Dinosaurs are bound to become extinct. — baker

Hey I’m not out by aeons. Only a few centuries.

I have read and thought about metaethics for several months now and I have constructed a bit of a theoretical framework to try and understand morality. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I've been reading it on and off for more than forty years, and have changed my framework several times. If you will excuse the condescension, you've more nous then most on the forum who deign an opinion.

SO let's consider this:

So, perhaps it is similar to the case when we state, “Onions taste awful,” that the syntax is configured in such a way to be making a general statement, when in actuality, we are making a particular subjective statement. It could be the case that we are egotistical enough to hold the notion—at least subconsciously—that our perspective of right and wrong should not only matter to everyone else, but that it is applicable to them as well. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Let's contrast taste with morality. That you do not eat onions is perhaps a preference you would not insist applies to everyone. That folk should not lie is presumably a preference that you and I would insist applies to everyone. That is, one of the characteristics of moral statements is that they are not only about how the speaker should act, but how everyone, in comparable circumstances, should act.

Does that mesh with your view?

And this:

Beliefs are subjective and can potentially require cognition — Cartesian trigger-puppets

What are the implications of saying beliefs are subjective?

They can be stated. They can be shared. You and I might have the same belief.

I've a certain scepticism towards the use of the term "subjective"; I'd avoid it, if possible, and with it, considerable philosophical baggage.

We might usefully analyse a belief as a relation between an individual and a statement, such that the individual takes the statement to be true. What is gained by describing it as subjective?

I do not believe that moral facts (values, duties, behavioral standards, etc,) exist in the objective sense. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Similarly, what is "objective" doing here? How does "I do not believe that moral facts (values, duties, behavioral standards, etc,) exist in the objective sense" differ from "I do not believe that moral facts (values, duties, behavioral standards, etc,) exist"? Do you just mean that we don't stumble across them, the way we stumble across rocks and tables?

Did I miss your further explanation on this?

This would mean that moral facts are simply declarative sentences expressing a descriptive statement conveying information about the subjective states of the individual who is making an evaluative observation. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

SO moral statements are no more than extended expletives?

If that's the case, then they do not have a truth value. Are you content to say that it is not true that one ought not lie? That it is false that it is OK to harm children?

Again, I don't claim to have the answers - these are questions I put to myself as well as to you.

......myself as well as to you. — Banno

Ever one but not the other? Ever one before the other? What if “we” do not analyze, but it is only each “I” that does? Therein, perhaps, lay the transcendental subject, which in turn facilitates the subjective condition itself.

What is gained by describing it as subjective? — Banno

Describing is tacit acknowledgement of limitation to specific time and membership. Whether a gain or not, depends on discourse.

So was I. It can work and treatment has probably (for all the mistakes) provided more happiness to people than philosophy or pondering moral facts ever did. — Tom Storm

Oh? You'd tell Plato to go seek the help of a psychiatrist?
I'm sure some people benefit more from psychology/psychiatry than they do from philosophy. And then there are those who benefit more from philosophy than they do from psychology/psychiatry. Yet only psychologists/psychiatrists have the legal right to interfere with the lives of others. There's a clear power imbalance.

Like any group they are not monolithic and hold diverse beliefs. But I am not all that interested in the moral beliefs people hold. People's actions are more significant.

I'm not asking about the moral beliefs they profess to have, I'm asking about those they actually have (which they may or may not speak of openly).
If you look at the DSM, for example, you can infer that it espouses the morality and worldview of the atheist, secular (upper) middle class, even though officially, psychology/psychiatry is supposed to be morally and religiously neutral.

But I am not all that interested in the moral beliefs people hold. People's actions are more significant.

Sounds like a good slogan. But it's quite useless, given that one gets to see only a small fraction of another's actions, and that those one does see are still up to interpretation.

We might usefully analyse a belief as a relation between an individual and a statement, such that the individual takes the statement to be true. What is gained by describing it as subjective? — Banno

Perspective, contextual placement, relativization, optionality, ownership, responsibility.

Let's contrast taste with morality. That you do not eat onions is perhaps a preference you would not insist applies to everyone. That folk should not lie is presumably a preference that you and I would insist applies to everyone. That is, one of the characteristics of moral statements is that they are not only about how the speaker should act, but how everyone, in comparable circumstances, should act. — Banno

The problem is, what makes for "comparable circumstances"?

Comparable age, socio-economic status, sex, race, relative position in the socio-economic hierarchy between the parties involved (e.g. whether one is the boss or the employee, the parent or the child, etc.), relative position in the situation at hand (e.g. a court hearing about a traffic accident with a fatal outcome; parent asking the child about whether she's using drugs)?

Is there empirical evidence that we ought not lie? Can we derive from first principles that we ought not kill? Do we even understand what it means for a moral proposition to be true if we can't even conceive of what would verify or falsify it?

Oh? You'd tell Plato to go seek the help of a psychiatrist? — baker

Of course, if he was experiencing psychosis and/or suicidal ideation, or other significant distress from mental ill health.

Seems to me that you have made up your mind about mental health treatment and psychiatry. You are perfectly entitled to be a pessimist.

Sounds like a good slogan. But it's quite useless, given that one gets to see only a small fraction of another's actions, and that those one does see are still up to interpretation. — baker

It's highly useful. The issue is how do we identify moral behaviour in doctors (or anyone)? We only have one way: their actions. The fact that you may not see them at work is irrelevant to the point. The point is ethical behaviour is demonstrated you can't discover it by what someone says publicly or writes about it. In the case of doctors and mental health professionals - given that they work openly with patients every day - it is actually very easy to see what kind of person they are.

Yet only psychologists/psychiatrists have the legal right to interfere with the lives of others. There's a clear power imbalance. — baker

This is factually wrong. Lot's of professions have a right to interfere - police, the military, lawyers, politicians, immigration officials, customs ... etc. I would agree with you if you said this is a responsibility that needs to be used wisely. You think it is not, based on what you have stated and I think it often is (but not always). We should probably get off this so the thread can continue.

To be honest, I am not familiar with TAK. Is it a theory in epistemology? What it is that I'm trying to say is not so much that moral declarations are facts of the world but rather that moral declarations are representations of our moral beliefs and it is a fact that we hold such beliefs. For example, let's say I have a friend named Lindsay who believes that Earth is flat. I'm not saying that her believing that the earth is flat makes her statements that the earth is flat true or factual, but that it is (at least it seems to be) a fact that she holds a belief that the Earth is flat. Does that not get me anywhere? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes. TAK is generally accepted in epistemology, but has some definite issues. So rejecting it completely isn’t unheard of, that’s why I asked.

I understand what you’re saying. I’m asking how can Lindsay justify the claim that she believes the Earth is flat? There’s no verifiable way of determining what exactly it is she believes. People lie all the time, so just taking her word for it doesn’t do much in the way of justifying her claim.

I think of facts such as mathematical facts, logical facts, aesthetic facts, etc, and I think that some facts must represent abstract entities as well as entities that exist in physical reality. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I agree, but the difference with these facts and beliefs are that there are verifiable ways to determine them. There’s established rules of math and logic that can can be consulted. Beliefs aren’t like that. There’s no brain scan that can inform me of your thoughts.

I guess it really depends on which theory of truth we are considering, too. A correspondence theory would impose the sort of existence conditions to truth that you are extending to facts as well. I have read much less about facts than I have about truth, which has not been enough to really grasp what it is and what it can be applied to. I'd like to hear your thoughts on both. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I haven’t read much about this either, it’s all basically just my own thoughts. But, I think facts necessarily have to be true, so they are a subset of truth. But I don’t think all truths are facts. The difference seems to be that facts are objective. There’s definitive solutions to math problems and things of that nature. I don’t really know if facts have to correspond to reality, because it depends on what you consider reality to be, but the have to correspond to something, right? A question about how a chess piece can move is answered by consulting a chess rule book. So whatever the solution is must correspond to whatever is in the rule book. But are some contrived rules written in a book part of reality? I’m don’t really know.

FWIW, I consider myself a moral nihilist, but it doesn’t have much to do with error theory. The inability to bridge the is-ought gap is enough for me to conclude that moral statements, judgements, commands, whatever term you prefer, cannot be logically justified. Additionally, I don’t even think logic or reason have any place in ethics. They’re rooted firmly in our feelings, and therefore irrational. I think our emotional reaction to certain acts is what convinces us that those acts are good/bad. And honestly, I think that’s all there is to it. There’s nothing more to understand. But anyway, your posts indicate a much deeper knowledge than I have, so I figured I’d ask about the things I didn’t understand/agree with and see if I end up learning something.

Do we even understand what it means for a moral proposition to be true if we can't even conceive of what would verify or falsify it? — Michael

Presumably you understand the difference between a lie and a truth...?

Is there empirical evidence that we ought not lie? Can we derive from first principles that we ought not kill? — Michael

There can be empirical evidence that you have lied or that you have killed. But that you ought not to do so is a matter of principle. And such principles are validated against ethical systems, not against predictive empirical hypotheses.

[Psychiatry] can work and treatment has probably (for all the mistakes) provided more happiness to people than philosophy or pondering moral facts ever did. — Tom Storm

I have the idea that normality is bell curve. Those on the left - the mentally ill - are dis-integrated from society and inhibited in normal functioning. It is for them that psychiatry is a cure. The majority of people are in the middle - as with bell curves generally. But the enlightened (in Platonic terms) or the ‘self-realised’ are on the right of the bell-curve; their capacities are on the far side of normality. That is the subject of philosophy proper and the various forms of noetic or gnostic discipline that have existed throughout history. Although modern culture privileges normality so it makes it rather hard to appreciate that.

That is one of the more enticing paragraphs I have read here.

Philosophy as elitism.

Philosophy as elitism. — Banno

Do say more.

Platonism, philosopher kings, ubermensch, and so on.

Philosophy is self-serving nonsense - as Witti showed. It is easy to mythologise the philosopher king, to suppose that the philosopher has something worthwhile to add to the discussion. Mostly this is a mistake.

Platonism, philosopher kings, ubermensch, and so on. — Banno

Yes, the use of the word 'higher' attached to so many things is curious too. I used to kick around with a lot of folk into yoga, Buddhism, spirituality, New Age, Theosophy and such in the 1980's and it often struck me how many of them were vulgar and acquisitive materialists at heart, who had sublimated their 'products' and elitisms into higher consciousness and public shows of deep understanding 'you couldn't possible follow'. But they can't all be like that...

Philosophy as elitism. — Banno

yells the mob.

Yeah, well, I prefer the company of the bungled and botched to that of the gods.